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The argument of this thesis is that the legal liability of 
the administration in France and England, at first sight very different, 
is actually very similar. In France, the existence of a separate 
system of administrative courts with jurisdiction in delictual actions 
against the administration haG led to a division between public and 
private law. In practice, however, the distinction is less clear than 
might be supposed because the substantive rules of public and private 
law are very similar, while in some cases the State is answerable to 
the civil courts. 
Although French law is drafted in terms of general principle 
in contrast to the English common law, the existing rules of liability 
are not in practice dissimilar. Two theoretical bases of liability 
are, however, relatively novel: the risk principle (which applied to 
the administration can be used to impose liability for all unlawful or 
invalid administrative acts) and the principle of Equality before 
Public charges (which can be used as a theoretical basis for a system 
of administrative compensation). On examination, the adoption of these 
principles into English law is seen to necessitate a change in our 
traditional constitutional balance of power. Nor, in any event, are 
they actually the basis of the French system. 
Neither French nor English law is, at the end of the day, coherent 
and all—embracing. Both need to be buttressed by statutory and extra—
statutory administrative compensation schemes. These should be seen as 
an acceptable and efficient substitute for civil liability and their 
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INTRODUCTION 
My intention in undertaking this study of administrative liability 
was to evaluate the Ehglish system, of which there has been from time 
to time much criticism and perhaps to suggest how it could be improved. 
I did not intend a straightforward comparison of two opposed systems of 
administrative liability, Indeed, to read the study in this way might 
be misleaaing. The comparison with France is only a means to an end. 
It did, of course, at the outset seem a logical point of departure. 
Surely if one were to sit down and plan an ideal system of government 
liability7 the English and French systems represented the obvious alter-
natives? At the theoretical level, they seemed to reflect divergent 
political traditions: on the one hand, a paradigm of the checks and 
balances theory of government in which the State is subjected to control 
by the ordinary courts of the land and liability imposed according to 
the normal rules; on the other, a classic example of Separation of Powers 
in which the Executive is immunised from wha4assment" by the judiciary 
and can be sued only in special administrative courts staffed by adminis-
trative officials, the best known and most prestigious of which is the 
Conseil d'Etat, Modern writers had suggested that this French model had 
led to a synthesis between the two great administrative law actions 
(le recours pour exces de nouvoir and le recours de pleine juxidiction), 
which had fused into a coherent system of administrative law with great 
potential for control of executive abuse of power. 
At a technical legal level, too, the systems seemed to afford a 
sharp contrast. England emphasised the personal liability of individual 
public servants, while France stressed the corporate liability of the 
State, which finds expression in the idea of maladministration or 
'faute de service' (fault in the administrative system). Previous 
writers had suggested that this concept was better tailored to the needs 
of government liability and afforded the subject a better chance of 
compensation. A second difference was the greater willingness of French 
administrative courts to impose strict liability which, it was suggested, 
had in some areas virtually superseded fault as a basis of liability, 
again affording a better chance of success. It seemed logical to 
suppose, therefore, that the two systems would prove, in practice and 
in theory, very different; that a clear preference would emerge; and 
that a straight choice could be made between the two systems. At a time 
when English administrative law was noticeably introspective and 	searching 
feverishly for new solutions, merely to establish the facts seemed 
useful. The first three chapters contain the results of my comparative 
study, including an account of the historical development of the French 
system without which any comparison is unintelligible. 
The results of my study, however, were not quite what I expected. 
At both the organisational and doctrinal level, the differences turned 
out to have been exaggerated. The autonomy of the French system is not 
very complete nor do individual public servants possess greater immunity 
than their English counterparts. They may today be found liable for 
personal faults in civil courts. They may also be prosecuted for criminal 
offences in criminal courts. If the victim is joined as civil complainant 
(partie civile) civil compensation may be awarded by the criminal courts. 
In both these cases, a recursory action is available against the State. 
On the other hand, where the victim proceeds in the first instance 
,a 
against the State, the latter may recoup its losses by/ recursory action 
against the wrongdoer personally. Again, many public bodies which we 
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would normally think of as "administrative", (including state-owned 
commercial services and those police engaged in the work ofcriminal 
investigation (police judici4e)) are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
civil courts. Their liability is then governed by the principles of 
the Civil Code and the normal civil rules of vicarious liability apply. 
At the doctrinal level, too, the systems are more similar than 
dissimilar. Both are in fact predominately fault based. Where 
differences emerge - as for example, in the important case of risk 
liability - these differences turn out not to be features peculiar to 
French public law which in fact closely resembles French private law. 
The differences are not, therefore, necessarily attributable to any 
inherent difference in the nature of 'public' and 'private' liability; 
they may equally spring from differenCes between the French civilian 
system and the English common law system of civil liability. 1 
As this became increasingly clear to me, I began to doubt the 
'separate' nature of government liability. The French insistence on 
autonomy seemed explicable in terms of political theory. Theories of 
government liability traditionally have more to do with government than 
with liability. They tend to embody liberal dogmas concerning the relation-
ship of State and individual and of the Sovereign with the Rule of Law. 
In this sense, all are variations on a single theme which is more con-
cerned with curbing authority and establishing human rights than with 
accident compensation. Sometimes this political perspective is explicit. 
Dicey's insistence on the personal responsibility of all public officials, 
"from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes" 
and their subjection to the ordinary courts is the lynch pin of his theory 
1. See chapter 4. 
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of the Rule of Law. His preference for rule by the law courts and 
his exaggerated antipathy to the droit administratif - an attitude 
which he later modified - is no more than a statement of his political 
cree4. Dicey does not even pretend to provide a complete picture of 
the existing English law. He passes over without comment many obvious 
deficiencies, including the doctrine of Crown immunity, at that time 
1 a serious lacuna in the Rule of Law. 
Other writers make their political preferences less explicit, 
on the surface addressing their criticisms to the mechanics of the 
system. Their implicit assumptions do nonetheless colour their theories. 
When, for example, Professor Mitchell tells us 2 that maladministration is 
not political in character, he is advocating a preference for legal 
liability over parliamentary control or the Ombudsman technique. 
Similarly when Professor Wade implies 3  that Parliament, if its attention 
had been drawn to the problem, would, in the nineteenth century, have 
favoured compensation of landowners for intangible losses such as loss 
of amenity or depreciation in value of the land,and blames the courts 
for their failure to fill this apparent "gap7 he is making a contro-
versial political 	, judgment. Such value judgments are unavoidable. 
Government compensation is a Pandora's box filled to the brim with 
difficult evaluations of this kind. The danger is that we may fail to 
acknowledge that the argument for an autonomous system of administrative 
liability is really a political argument of the same kind. 
1. See chapter 1. 
2. See chapter 6. 
3. See chapter 6. 
Commonsense suggests that a dual hierarchy of courts would 
inevitably exact a high price in the shape ar jurisdictional disputes. 1 
Only if a separate jurisdiction could make a unique and distinctive 
contribution to the law of liability could such an innovation justify 
itself. Of course, if a theoretical basis more suitable for adminis-
trative liability than the fault liability of civil law really did exist, 
a separate system of courts and separate rules of liability, with all 
the complexity that this implies, might become worthwhile. Turning to 
the French system once more to see whether a radical new start could be 
based on an idea from their distinctively public law system, two 
approaches seemed to present possibilities. The first was to equate 
liability with illegality by constructing a new system of administrative 
liability based on the ultra vires concept and linked with judicial review. 
The philosophical support for this solution would lie in the idea that 
the risk of loss caused by illegal or invalid administrative action falls 
rightly on the administration. This proposition is discussed in Chapter 5. 
A second approach was to extend the existing jurisdiction of our 
courts by allowing them jurisdiction also to award compensation in cases 
where loss had been caused to individuals by administrative action but where 
the existing rules of civil liability seemed inadequate to the case. 
This approach is broadly comparable to the principle of French adminis-
trative law that abnormal losses or charges borne in the public interest 
should not be allowed to rest on individuals (le Principe d'Egalite 
devant les charges publiques). This idea is discussed in Chapter 6. 
Attractive as each idea seemed at first, neither proved on examination 
to be any more logically satisfying than our present fault—based system. 
1. See Chapter 4. 
Ironically, the link with the ultra vires concept might actually restrict 
administrative liability if introduced into the English system while 
the effect of such a link on judicial review seemed unpredictable. The 
second idea involved a transfer of power from politically controlled 
institutions into the hands of the judiciary which seemed to me incom-
patible with our traditional political structures. 
I concluded therefore, that the idea of administrative liability as 
'special' in character is an untenable one. We ought to admit that adminis-
trative liability is in fact nothing more than the civil liability of 
public servants and administrative bodies. If we attempt to distinguish 
cases of 'public' from 'private' liability all we shall be doing is to 
complicate what is already too complex by sub-dividing a coherent legal 
category. 
For the French and English systems are in all essential respects-
identical. Each is a system of legal liability and possesses the 
essential characteristics of such a system. In each system, recovery is 
exceptional: it is never intended that every victim should recover. For 
this reason, the pattern of liability is, in both countries, deliberately 
complex. When this is realised thewhole idea of an all-embracing and 
coherent system of administrative liability becomes suspect. If compen-
sation is really to be assured to all or even a majority of those injured 
by administrative action, then legal liability inevitably needs to be 
buttressed by ex gratia payments and statutory or extra-statutory compen- 
sation schemes. The truth of this deduction is confirmed by the formidable 
array of statutory compensation schemes which do in fact exist in France 
as well as in England to shore up the already complex system of civil 
(and administrative) liability: 
1. See Chapter 7. 
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In England, with its long established tradition of ex gratia compen-
sation, it is perhaps surprising that this has not long been obvious. 
The explanation lies partly, perhaps, in the absence of information 
prior to the creation in 1967 of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration, who has, in his reports, made a great deal of material 
available. Partly, however, the explanation once more lies in the 
peculiar angle from which public lawyers approach the topic of govern-
ment liability, in their image of battle incongruously staged in courts 
of law against serried ranks of government mercenaries. This vision 
encourages them in the belief that the practice of administrative com-
pensation consolidates discretion in the hands of public servants. All 
ex gratia payments seem to savour of the discriminatory while legal 
liability is correspondingly overrated because of its supposed deterrent 
and punitive value. 
This is a false perspective. Ex gratia payments are found on 
examination to consist less in informal, exceptional payments than of 
highly formalised schemes which are ex gratia only in the sense of being 
extra statutory. Tort lawyers, who today evaluate the law of torts 
primarily in terms of its capacity to provide an efficient system for 
compensating the victims of accidents and allocating economic losses, 
have long been alive to the superiority of administrative schemes as a 
cheap and effective tool for allocating compensation. Public lawyers, 
somewhat surprisingly, since many would analyse the march of modern tort 
law in terms of a shift from 'private' to 'public' law, have failed to 
keep in step. This gives their theories an old fashioned look. Private 
lawyers, on the other hand, may have underestimated the deterrent element 
and the constitutional role of the superior courts. These two threads need 
to be tied in. I attempt to do this in my conclusions. 
11 
CHAPTER 1  
The Historical Inheritance 
The societies of France and England are sometimes depicted as being 
in sharp and unfriendly rivalry. This is far from the truth. Although 
from time to time we have experienced divergence and even hostility, we 
share in the main a common historical heritage and our social and political 
institutions would seem to an ethnographer more similar than dissimilar. 
Nor has the Channel proved a barrier to the flow of ideas in both directions. 
Our political theory really forms a common stook, restated from time to 
time with a difference of accent and emphasis. To a limited extent we 
also share a common legal inheritance. It is likely that we shall find 
these common attributes reflected in our separate experiences of govern-
ment liability. 
At the beginning of the modern period, which for convenience I have 
placed with the end of the Ancien Regime in the last years of the 
eighteenth century, the difficulty in suing the Sovereign or State is 
found at three different levels. At the procedural level, the special 
position of the Monarch as fountain of justice prevented the King from 
being impleaded in his own courts. In Ehgland, the exceptional 'petition 
of right' procedure had been evolved in response to this difficulty. 1 
In France the theory of 'justice retenue' had always allowed the King to 
override the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts by summoning cases to 
the King's Council or attributing them to specialised, exceptional 
jurisdictions 	This practice is seen as the precursor of 
1. Ehrlichi Proceedings against The Crown in Oxford Studies in Social & 
Legal History, ed.Vinagradoff 1921, vol.VI I pp. 83-89, 185-8. I Bl. 
Comm.246; Hogg, The Liability of the Crown, 1971, p.3; Holdsworth, A 
History of English Law, Vol. ix, pp. 8-22. 
2. For a brief account, see Auby et Drago, Traits de Contentieux Aaminis-
tratif, 2nd edn. 1975, pares 322, 323. 
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the specialised administrative jurisdiction which today forms the 
characteristic feature of the French legal system. 1 
At the technical level, the substantive meaning acquired by the 
maxim "The King can do no wrong" seemed to constitute an absolute bar 
to tortious liability. The very terminology of 'tort' 'trespass' and 
'delict' implies wrongdoing and, during the formative years of the 
nineteenth century, when the prevailing theory of tortious liability was 
everywhere the fault principle, the maxim seemed at first an impassable 
obstacle. 2 This difficulty was later compounded when corporatist theories 
of the State became fashionable and it was argued that the State, being 
a legal and not a natural personality, was incapable of committing faults. 3 
At the political level, the idea of the Nation-State, whose funda-
mental political attribute is Sovereignty, formed a serious obstacle to 
the imposition of legal liability on the State. Sovereignty was con- 
ceived in terms of monarchy and majesty; it entailed power (puissance) 
4 
and authority. To borrow the early and influential definition of Bodin: 
"Sovereignty is the absolute and 
perpetual power ... of commanding 
in a state ... given to the prince 
without any charges or conditions 
attached ..." 
The imposition of legal liability is, however, "a charge or condition". 
Logically, therefore, the statement of the great nineteenth century jurist 
Laferriere to the effect that "the attribute of Sovereignty is to impose 
yea1•0•■•••11.011140■1061.• 	
1. de Toqueville, L'Ancien R;gime et la Revolution, Fontana, transl. 
Gilbert 1966, pp. 80-84. 
2. Moreau, L'influence de la situation et du comportement de la victime 
sur la responsabilite administrative, 1956, p.4. 
3. Below p.42.. 
4. Six Books Concerning the State, 1.8. 
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itself on everyone without compensation" 1  is entirely in accordance 
with the traditional political view of Sovereignty. 
It would be possible to describe the history of governmental liability 
in both England and France as a series of imperfect attempts to master 
this central problem. 
At this point, however, a significant divergence in the English and 
continental legal traditions must be noted. For continental lawyers, 
all constitutional and administrative law must be considered to take 
place within the framework of a theory of the State. Some writers trace 
this concept of the State initially to Roman law. 2 It may, on the other 
hand, derive from the thinking of the philosophers of the Revolutionary 
era, which transferred Sovereignty from the Monarch to the Nation. 
Even before the Revolution, Rousseau had argued that Sovereignty 
was an attribute of the people or the Nation rather than of the Monarch 
personally. It was this idea which was later enshrined in the resounding 
,periods of Article 3 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man. 
"The source of all sovereignty rests 
in the nation. No body and no individual 
can exercise authority which does not 
derive from it." 
Whatever the truth of this, in continental legal theory, the State is a 
legal entity, which is subject to the rule of law, i.e. it is a 
'Rechstaat' or 'Etat legal. , ' . 3 The State has obligations, particularly 
11 Trait6 de la juridiction administrative et des recours contentieux, 
1st edn., 1887. 
2. Merryman, "The public law — private law distinction in European and 
U.S. law", (1968) 17 Journal of Public Law 3, 5. 
3. Nevil Johnson "Law as the Articulation of the State: a German Tradition 
seen through British Eyes" (unpublished paper). For possible origins of 
this doctrine, see Dowdall "The Word 'State" (1923) 39 L.Q.R.98; 
Borchard, "Governmental Responsibility in Tort" (1924-5) 34 Yale L.J.1, 
129, 229; 36 Yale L.J. 1, 757, 1039; G.D.H. Cole's Introduction to 
Rousseau's Social Contract, Dent's edition 1973 pp.xxiv-v. 
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the duty to maintain public order and carry on the work of administration. 
In return, the State possesses the means to carry out these obligations. 
For France, this means that the Executive possesses an inherent right 
to legislate and to take "those measures necessary for the good 
functioning of the administration placed under its authority" and this 
right is exclusive of statutory powers or of powers to legislate dele-
gated by the Legislature. 1 The State also possesses inherent powers to 
act in the public interest and for the public safety known as "the police 
powers". These powers are not limited to the maintenance of public order 
but comprise also public health powers, rights to supervise public morals 
(e.g. by censorship or by the regulation of prostitution) and might even 
extend to economic measures. Indeed, the term is sufficiently vague 
to be capable of comprising all the powers of the State 
to regulate by law and executive 
measures all aspects of the life of the 
Nation which, in the public interest, 
cannot be left to the uncontrolled whims 
and will of the citizen." 2 
In extreme cases the Executive may proceed to the execution of 
its decisions "ex officio" and without the necessity of obtaining a 
prior ruling from a court. 3 
These far—ranging powers must always be borne in mind when French 
administrative law and its theories of governmental liability are under 
consideration. They differ strikingly from the powers accorded to the 
1. Jamart C.E. 7 Feb. 1936 Rec.172 noted Long, Weil et Braibant, Les 
Grands Arrets Administratifs (G.A.) 5th edn. 1969 p.229; Sieghart, 
Government by Decree, 1950 
2. M. Simon "Police Powers in France" (1974) IV Kingston Law Review 3,10. 
3. Ste immobilire de Saint—Just C.E. 2 Dec. 1902, Rec.713 concl. Romieu, 
G.A. P.47. 
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executive by the common law in England. Indeed, it could be said that 
the Civil War was fought to prevent the establishment of powers such 
as these and that the 'police power' perished with Baconian theory. 
The celebrated 'General Warrant' cases of the eighteenth century 1 prevented 
its re—establishment, curtailing executive power by confining the govern-
ment to those powers of arrest, search and seizure permitted by the common 
law to individuals. The tide of the common law has always flowed strongly 
in this direction. It is this tradition which Dicey praised and to the 
support of which he lent his powerful voice. 2 
The repudiation of the concept of 'police power' is paralleled 
by the refusal of English legal theory to develop a coherent doctrine 
of, or even to admit the existence of, "the State". Maitland believed 
this omission to be due to a confusion between "the King" and "the Crown", 
a confusion initially derived from medieval law. The State was "a late-
comer ... slow to find a home in English lawbooks", concealed behind 
the concept of the Crown. Maitland concluded that English law was 
inadequate: 
"We cannot get on without the State, 
or the Nation, or the Commonwealth, 
or the Public, or some similar entity, 
and yet this is what we are professing 
to do."3 
1. Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 19 St.Tr. 1153; Leach v. Money (1765) 19 St.Tr. 
1002; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St.Tr. 1030. 
2. The recent decision in Malone v. Commissioner of Police for the Metro-
1211a [1979] 2 W.L.R. 700 where the plaintiff sought to challenge the 
legality of telephone tapping, carried out by the Post Office at the 
request of the police, runs against the stream. It legalises govern-
ment action unless specifically precluded by statutory provisions or 
the common law. This allows the government something in the nature of 
a police power. 
3. "The Crown as Corporation" (1901) 18 L.Q.R. 131. See also Levy, La 
Responsabilite de la Puissance Publique et de ses Agents en Angleterre, 
1957 p.84. 
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I shall return to this point. 
A second important difference between the two countries lies in 
the nature of their legal systems. It may not be strictly true to 
assert that the English Revolution was not directed at lawyers; neverthe-
less, lawyers seemed at all times to emerge miraculously on the winning 
side. The Common law too survived unscathed. 1 Reform of the common law 
came to be associated With two unpopular political platforms. At the 
start of the seventeenth century, Bacon proposed a restatement of both 
case law and statute which would l as he thought, prune the law of prolixity 
and of obsolete rules. This proposa1J, which won the support of James I 
and was bitterly opposed by Coke, came to be associated with the doctrine 
of absolute monarchy. The second attack was launched during the Common-
wealth by Levellers, but their reforms did not survive the Revolution 
and Harding suggests that this failure of the Cromwellian Parliament to 
achieve legal reform "condemned English law to years of incompleteness 
and improvisation, until the job of comprehensive reform was taken up 
again in the nineteenth century."3 The result in the area of government 
liability was considerable becausethe law of torts was left, in the 
absence of codification or even restatement, almost entirely for the 
judges to develop, with only occasional, sporadic legislative inter-
vention. Furthermore, the unreformed common law system was a poor 
instrument for development, based as it was on a medieval system of causes 
of action.4 Throughout the crucial period of the nineteenth century, 
1. D. Veall„ The Popular Movement for Law Reform 1640-1660, 1970. 
2. °Nolte, pp.65-74. 
3. A. Harding, A Social History of English Law, 1966 p.267; contra Veall„ 
op.cit., p.228. 
4. C. Harlow and M. Distel, "Legality, illegalite et responsabilitg de 
la puissance publique en Angleterre", (1977-78) 29 E.D.C.E. 335. 
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England was dominated by 'pigeon—hole' theories of tortious liability 
which led some authors to deny the very existence of a 'law of torts". 
In 1886, for example, Pollock felt able to comment in these words: 
"... a complete theory of torts 
is yet to seek, for the subject 
is altogether modern ... The really 
scientific treatment of the principles 
begins only with the decisions of the 
last 50 years". 1 
As late as 1927, Salmond dogmatically assured us that: 
"Just as the criminal law consists 
of a body of rules establishing 
specific offences, so the law of 
torts consists of a body of rules 
establishing specific injuries. 
Neither in the one case nor in the 
other is there any general principle 
of liability". 2 
It is not surprising 	that with 	the doctrine of strict pre- 
cedent 	a hindrance rather than a help, the judges showed hesitancy in 
coping with some of the difficult and novel points which arose. 3 I do not 
wish to suggest that the cases would have been differently decided if, 
for example, the nature of vicarious liability had been more perfectly 
understood, for that the reasoning of the common lawyers was always 
inadequate — the reasoning of the Mersey Docks case4 is sufficient to show 
the contrary. The instrument at the disposal of French judges and writers 
of doctrine was, however, a very different instrument. Without pushing 
1. Pollock, Torts, 1886, p.vii. 
2. Salmond, Law of Torts, 7th edn. 1928, p.7; but see for a contrary view 
Winfield, The Province of the Law of Tort 1931, p.33. 
3. In Viscount Canterbury v. A-GL (below), for example, Lord Lyndhurst 
expressed relief that writ of error was available to quash his decision if 
he had gone wrong in dealing with so many new and difficult points of 
law. 
4. Below, p.43. 
18 
the point too far, one could say that the reasoning of the Government 
Commissioner in the Blanco decision belongs to the modern world: that of 
Lord Lyndhurst or Chief Justice Erle in the 'petition of right' cases belongs 
to a long-dead medieval world, begotten in the Year Books. 
The unpopularity of the pre-Revolutionary parlements had helped 
to ensure that the French legal system did not survive the Revolution 
unscathed. These uerlements possessed a curious combination of legis-
lative and judicial powers not entirely dissimilar in character to those 
once possessed by our own High Court of Parliament. These powers were 
used not only to frustrate all attempts at administrative and financial 
reforms, however moderate or desirable, but also to render impossible 
all reform of the antiquated legal system and to administer a harsh, 
criminal justice in an unenlightened and even barbaric fashion. 1  Like 
its Cromwellian counterpart, the Revolutionary Constituent Assembly 
devoted much time to reform of the legal system, starting with the abolition 
of the execrated yarlements. The task of codification was, however, never 
completed and was finally finished in characteristically impetuous style 
by Napoleon who allowed his committee of distinguished lawyers 5 months 
to draw up the Civil Code. 
The delictual liability of the Civil Code was unambiguously based 
on fault. Article 1382 provided simply that: 
"Any act of a man, which causes damage 
to another, obliges the person through 
whose fault it occurs to repair it". 
and by Article 1383: 
"Everyone is responsible for the damage 
he causes, not only by his act, but also 
by his negligence or his imprudence." 
1. Cobban„ "The Parlements of France in the Eighteenth Century" in Aspects 
of the French Revolution, 1968; Lefebvre, The French Revolution from 
its Origins to 1793 (transl. Evamson 1962) pp. 98-101. 
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Article 1384 provided for vicarious liability in the following terms: 
(1) A person is liable not only for the 
damage which he caused by his on acts, 
but also for that caused by the acts of 
persons for whom he is answerable. 
and 
(2) Masters and principals [are liable] for 
damage caused by their servants and agents 
in the execution of the functions for 
which they have been employed. 
There was at first a divergence of opinion, revealed in the trams vaux 
prenaratoires 1 as to the basis of Article 1384. Some preferred a 'master's 
tortlexplanation of vicarious liability, believing that a master ought 
to "reproach himself with having trusted in men who are unsatisfactory, 
unskilful or incompetent". Others, more modern in their outlook, believed 
vicarious liability to be in the nature of a guarantee. At a later date 
this view prevailed and the French judiciary wore able to construct on 
this fragile base complex rules of strict liability both for servants 
and for dangerous chattels (including motor vehicles). 2 
In this work of lawmaking tk.jrough interpreting the text of the 
Code the judges were helped — somewhat ironically — by the declaratory 
theory of the judicial function which found favour with the Revolutionaries, 
inspired by the doctrine of Separation of Powers and mindful of the pre— 
vious experience of judges (parlements) as lawmakers. 3  By constituting 
the text of the Code as the groundrule of liability, the shackles of 
precedent were broken. To illustrate this by a simple comparison, the 
judge—made doctrine of common employment, although it had long outlived 
1. Chapus, Responsabilite publique et Responsabilit; 
PP•43-50, 6 
2. Lawson, Negligence in the Civil Law, 1950/contains 
see also International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
rivee, 1954, p.260. 
—73 
a good account; 
Law, vol.XI (Torts), Chaps. 
tat 
3. On the syllogistic theory of justice in the Revolutionary period see 
Troper, op.cit. below, pp.50-51. 
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any usefulness it might have possessed, lingered on unreformed by the 
English judges and was ultimately repealed by the legislature. 1 In 
France, on the other hand, when the Civil Courts repented of their choice 
of fault as the basis of employers' liability, they were able to reverse 
Ito 
(revirer) their previous decisions and/change the direction of the law. 2 
In this context, it is now appropriate to examine the characteris-
tic feature of French law, namely the existence of separate administrative 
courts with jurisdiction in contract and tort. 
So potent is the mythology of Separation of Powers that the French 
as well as the English have been led into believing that the establish-
ment of administrative courts was, in France, a deliberate choice. It 
seems more correct to call it an accident of history or perhaps a series 
of accidents. The pre—Revolutionary tradition of 'justice retenue' 
may have been one factor. The law courts (parlements) of the Ancien 
R‘gime were, as we have seen, discredited both by their adherence to the 
aristocratic cause and by their consistent opposition to administrative 
reform. It was natural that the Revolutionaries should seek to ensure 
that nothing similar should ever recur. The parlements were abolished; 
and amongst other similar texts the Constituent Assembly enacted Article 13 
of the Law of 16th-20th August 1790, which provides: 
"Judicial functions are distinct and 
will always remain separate from adminis- 
trative functions. The judges may not, 
on pain of forfeiture, interfere in any 
way with the operation of the administration, 
nor summon administrators before them in 
respect of their official duties." 
	.. N.01111•••••••■•■•■•MOLON■ 	 Amp 
1. Priestley v. Fowler (1837) 3 M & %a-repealed by the Law Reform (Personal 
Injuries) Act, 1948. On the way round by way of breach of statutory 
duty;see Fleming, Law of Torts, 5Ih edn., 1977., p.484. 
2. Discussed below, p.83. 
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All complaints against administrators were to be made through adminis-
trative channels and directed to the King. The prohibition was repeated 
by the Constitutions of 1791 and 1795, and a decree of 16 fructidor of 
that year stated: 
"The prohibition is repeated against 
the courts taking cognisance of acts 
of administration of any kind whatsoever". 
The underlying motivation for this legislation is a matter for 
dispute ammtst French constitutional theorists. 1 The writers of the 19th 
century tended to see an embodiment of the classic "specialist" or 
"tripartite" theory of Separation of Powers in which each organ of 
Government is totally separate from and free from harassment by the other 
organs, a position summarised in the celebrated dictum "Juger liadminis- 
. trationc!est aussi administrer". It seems probable, however, that, in 
line with Montesquieus the constituents preferred the "dualist" theory 
of the "balanced Constitution" in which the judiciary is permitted to 
control the administration. The question of an administrative jurisdiction 
was postponed by the Constituent Assembly to a later stage in the dis-
cussion and, although various proposals for a series of special adminis-
trative tribunals were at one point discussed, the matter was never 
thoroughly settled. That not all the participants in the debates favoured 
an administrative jurisdiction is clear from the debates and projets de loi. 
One speaker, indeed, remarked that the establishment of separate courts 
would "cover France in judges, overburden the people with costs and also 
them 
torment/with jurisdictional questions." 2 
1. For an excellent account, see M. Troper, La *aration des pouvoirs et 
lthistoire constitutionnelle fran9aise, 1973. See also Gaudemet "La 
*aration des Pouvoirs: Mythe et Realite" D.1961 Chr. XXIII. 
2. Cited Troper, op.cit., p.56; and see for a teneral account pp. 44-57; 
Auby et Drago, op.cit., pp. 293-326. 
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The French Revolution, dedicated to Liberty and Equality, had 
partly by accident, confirmed the immunities enjoyed by the executive 
under the Ancien Regime. The Napoleonic settlements extended them. 
Article 75 of the Consular Constitution of 1800 provided that 
"Government agents other than Ministers, 
can only be pursued for acts relating to 
their official duties with the permission 
of the Conseil d'Etat; in that case the 
action takes place before the ordinary 
courts." 
The Penal Code provided severe penalties for judges who breached the 
provision. Thus the French executive came to enjoy an immunity from 
civil liability far wider than that possessed by the Crown in England, 
Where personal liability was always the rule. It was fortunate for 
France, therefore, that in the Conseil d'Etat Napoleon bequeathed to 
France an institution accustomed to make policy decisions and enthusiastic 
for reform, sufficiently prestigious to survive almost every change of 
political regime anicapable of supplying these lacunae in the constitutional 
arrangement s. 1 
The creation of the Conseil d'Etat and, at departmental level, the 
Conseils de Prefecture, 2 allowed the administrative jurisdiction to be 
formalised. From an early date, the Napoleonic Conseil received many 
complaints; these gradually acquired "a judicial character which they 
had not previously possessed". 3 But there were limits. The Conseil d'Etat 
was not a court but an advisory body. Only in 1872 was its 'Section du  
Contentieux' or judicial section permitted to hand down binding judgments. 
Furthermore, its tentative jurisdiction, derived from the fragmentary 
1. For a historical sketch seetetourneur, Bauchet, M4ric,Le Conseil d'Etat 
et les Tribunaux Administratifs 1970, pp.9-46. For a more complete 
study see Le Conseil d'Etat, -son histoire a travers les documents di4Poque 
(1799-1974) Paris 1974. 
2. Later to evolve into today's departmentally organised tribunaux adminis-
tratifs. 
3.. Auby et Drago, op.cit. Vol.2 p.469; for a general historical outline 
see pp.468-476. 
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texts, was always regarded as "exceptional" - that is as an exception 
to the "normal" jurisdiction of the civil courts. This attitude dis- 
appeared only after the establishment in 1848 of the Tribunal des Conflits 
to settle jurisdictional disputes. The new court, consisting in an 
equal number of judges from each jurisdiction tended to view the two 
hierarchies as 'separate but equal' and the result was a generous inter-
pretation of the term "acts of administration", the evolution of sophis-
ticated jurisdictional criteria and an expansion of the jurisdiction of 
the administrative courts. 
During this early period, too, there was hostility to the imposition 
on the administration of a duty to compensate. Annulment was one thing; 
it promoted administrative efficiency. Compensation was quite another 
matter. It was construed as an "interference with the work of the 
administration" which savoured of the Ancien Regime. It was seen as 
an impingement upon the necessary 
freedom of the service(s), a source of 
stagnation and a cause of embarrassment 
which, at the end of the day, would result 
in harm to society as a whole". 
Moreau states that, until the second half of the nineteenth century, 
state liability was exceptional. 2  Nor was the Conseil d'Etat generous 
in granting permission to proceed in the civil courts. It has been 
suggested that the primary consideration here was the "loyalty" of the 
public servant and his attitude to his superiors. Very early the habit 
developed of using the immunity to stifle administrative scandals. 
Throughout the period, therefore, there was a background of dissatisfaction 
and discontent. Many attempts to introduce legislation abrogating the 
1. Delbez, "De l'Exces de pouvoir comme source de Responsabilite 1932, 
R.D.P. p.441, 456. 
2. Op.cit., p.3. 
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the personal immunity were made. 1 
This being the case, it is less of a surprise to learn that the 
provisional Government of 1870 which followed the collapse of the Second 
Empire found time, even with the enemy at the gates of Paris, to rescind 
the provisions of Article 75 of the 1800 Constitution, "together with all 
other dispositions of law, general or special, having for their object 
the prevention of proceedings against all kinds of public officials." 
(Decree of 19 September 1870). At a later date, an interesting explanation 
was given for this action by the distinguished Government Commissioner, 
later Prime Minister, M. Leon Blum. 2 Even if his words are no more than 
a mythologisation, an unconscious attempt to read back into the world of 
the Second Empire the Anglophile and liberal sentiments of a later age, 
they are of interest. It is after all intriguing to find a Diceyan 
apologist in the temple of the Conseil d'Etat. 
M. Blum opened his opinion by comparing the prevailing French system 
2 
of State liability with countries in which, in his words, 
the constitutional regime has not 
been smothered by a too invasive 
administrative regime. The roles are 
reversed. Personal liability of the 
official becomes the rule, and the 
liability of the administration, where 
it exists, is exceptional." 
The aim of the legislators of 1870 was, in the opinion of M. Blum, to 
reverse these roles. He explained: 
"Today, when these polemics and 
controversies have a purely historical 
flavour, we can say that the intention 
of the authors of this decree — an 
1. Maestre, La Responsabilite Pecuniaire des Agents Publics en Droit 
Francais, 1962 pp.33-34. 
2. Lemonnietl C0E0 26 July 1918, S.1918-19. 111.41 Concl. Blum n. Hauriou. 
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intention clarified by the debates 
surrounding Art.75 under the imperial 
regime — was to confer normal juris-
diction on the civil courts in all civil 
actions for liability founded on a fault 
of the public service. This normal civil 
law jurisdiction seemed to afford the best 
guarantee of individual liberty. It was 
hoped that, as in England, in the case of 
arbitrary arrest, illegal seizure, or any 
kind of wrongful abuse of power, the 
official who had given or executed the order 
would suffer a personal sanction. Fear of 
personal sanction is, for a public servant, 
assuredly a much more powerful brake than 
the ultimate liability of the service by -
which he is employed." 
In fact, as M. Blum went on to point out, the legislative intention 
was frustrated. 1 The Napoleonic tradition was too strong and the 
mythology of Separation of Powers possessed too great a magic. The 
Tribunal des Conflits intervened to stultify the operation of the 1871 
decree. 
In the famous Blanco case, 2 a small child was run over and injured• 
by a wagon belonging to a state tobacco factory. The parents sued the 
workers personally and the State as vicariously liable in the civil courts. 
The Prefect demurred to the jurisdiction, 3 and the Tribunal des Conflits 
therefore had to decide, in the light of previous conflicting decisions 
of the civil and administrative courts, which courts were competent. 
Previous decisions had suggested that the State, when acting in a private 
capacity or entering into relationships normally regulated by private law, 
1. Bertrand points out ("Edouard Laferrfere", (1956)/E.D.C.E.145, 154-5) /10 
that citizens were quick to avail themselves of the relaxation and 
attributes the re—establishment of the authority of the administrative 
courts to Laferrik-e. 
8 
2. T.C./Feb. 1873, D 1873.3.71 concl. David. G.A. No. 1. 
3. Ordinance of 1 June 1828 (as amended) allows the Prefect, whenever he 
believes that a civil court has been seised of a question solely within 
the jurisdiction of an administrative authority (court), "to raise a 
conflict of jurisdiction." Since 1849, such questions have been referred 
to -the Tribunal des Conflits. A conflict of jurisdiction may not be 
raised before a criminal courts Brown & Garner, French Administrative 
Law, 2nd edn.1973 pp.77-8. This procedure is throughout referred to as 
a "demurrer". 
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was amenable to the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The operation 
of a tobacco factory, a normal commercial undertaking, should have come 
within this definition. But, on the advice of the Government CommiSsioner, 
M. David, the Tribunal des Conflits changed:course, holding that the 
administrative courts were in principle competent in any case which 
concerned the operation of a public service; any other provisions con-
stituted a derogation from the general principle of Separation of Powers 
and were to be narrowly construed. 
The reasoning is redolent of administrative privilege. The judg-
ment stated that the relationship between the State and its employees 
differed from private law relationships, their terms of employment being 
governed by special rules which "did not always leave any freedom of 
choice to the administration." The liability of the State could there-
fore be "neither general nor absolute" and special rules were applicable. 
To allow the civil courts to develop these rules would entail application 
of the general principles of delictual liability contained in the Civil 
Code, besides permitting the civil courts to "interfere with the operation 
of administration or "take cognisance of acts of administration." 
Finally, the essential task of the administrative courts for which they, 
and they alone, were qualified, was the development of such rules, the 
consideration of the needs of the administrative services and the recnn-
ciliation of public needs with private interests. On these grounds the 
previous jurisdictional division between act of authority (acts e de 
puissance 	 lie) and operational acts (acadela.ItL12rize) was 
replaced by a new test, the criterion of "public service". 
2 
The second key decision, Pelletier, 1  involved an action for 
damages and restitution in respect of illegal seizure of copies of a 
newspaper by the Prefect and Commissioner of police. The action was 
brought in the civil courts, but was referred to the Tribunal des Conflits, 
which was forced to consider the ambit of the 1870 decree. This was 
construed as narrowly as possible, and it was held that it merely abrogated 
the need for permission from the Conseil d'Etat before proceedings could 
be brought against public officials personally in the civil courts. No 
change had been effected in the basic division of jurisdiction; the 
citizen was not free to choose whether to sue the agent in the civil 
courts or the State in the administrative courts. Government officials 
could be pursued in the civil courts 2202. where their actions did not 
involve any consideration of an "act of administration", i.e. in the case 
where the agent was not acting in the course of duty and had committed 
a "personal fault". In the present case it was the official conduct of 
the defendants which was the subject of complaint and no specifically 
personal acts had been pleaded. It followed that the administrative 
courts were alone competent. Thus the new jurisdictional demarcation line 
was between "personal acts" for which the agent would be liable in the 
civil courts, and "fautes de service" for which the State, and not the 
author of the acts, was liable in the administrative courts. 
These two decisions created the foundation for a system of "public 
service" liability administered by the administrative courts, although 
the final stone was only placed when, in 1908, 2. the Tribunal des Conflits 
extended the jurisdiction of the administrative courts to local authorities, 
1. T.C. 30 July 1873, S 1873.3.5. concl. David, G.A. No. 2. 
2. Feutry T.C. 29 Feb 1908 S 1908.3.97. concl. Teissier n. Hauriou, 
No.20; de Fonscolombe T.C. 11 Apr. 1908 Rec 448; Jouilli6 T.C. 23 May 
1908 Rec. 509. 
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giving as a reason that "the State is a unity, and the nature of its 
acts and operations does not change according to the geographical size of 
the administrative authority in point." This self-evident truth had not 
revealed itself at an earlier date, explained the Government Commissioner 
in the Feutry case (the great French jurist Teissier),because the res-
trictive attitude of the Conseil d'Etat towards governmental liability 
had rendered it desirable to leave local authorities to the mercy of the 
civil courts. This admission is a revealing one. 
But the celebrated arrat Blanco introduced into French law a 
logical contradiction. Laferrigre admitted1 that liability, whenever it 
derives from the Civil Code, is naturally the concern of the civil courts. 
The Blanco decision is open to the objection that it distinguishes in 
random fashion between public and private enterprise and fails to confine 
the "special" rules of administrative liability to those situations to 
which, because they involve the use of sovereign power, the special rules 
are more appropriate. However essential the decision for the development 
of French public law - and many public lawyers believe that its signifi-
cance has been restrospectively overrated and inflated - it was not 
entirely rational. This was tacitly admitted by the Conseil d'Etat at a 
later date wheni amidst a storm of doctrinal dissent, they returned 
jurisdiction in cases concerning the liability of publicly owned commercial 
enterprises to the civil courts. By this time, however, the harm had 
been done; the Blanco decision had persuaded generations of French public 
lawyers of the need for "special"rules of administrative liability. 
Ignoring the fundamental similarities of the two systems, they were driven 
to seek an all-embracing theory of administrative liability, wholly original 
and different in kind to the rules of civil liability. 
1. vol. I, p.674. 
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During this period, (1789-1870) categorised by many of the authors 
as "the age of irresponsibility; jurisdiction,and not the substantive 
rules of liability, was the main preoccupation of the Conseil d'Etat. 
Indeed Moreau remarks that judgments dealt "mainly with questions of 
jurisdiction and Cwere) mainly inexplicit as to the basis of liability 
or the system of compensation." 1 
Even if liability was 'exceptional', it covered a surprisingly 
wide area of public life; 2 ranging from War Damage compensation, (a 
principle which dates from the Napoleonic wars), to compensation for loss 
caused by public works,as e.g.,,by road, canal or railway construction, 
and covering also liability for loss caused for public services such as 
the postal service, the ports authority and the tobacco monopoly. The 
reason why liability was said to be 'exceptional' was that it was derived 
from statute and not based on the general principle of liability contained 
in the Civil Code. The statutory provisions dated to the Revolution and 
had their roots in hostility caused by the failure during the Ancien 
Regime to repair damage to individual property. The schemes, in the main, 
stipulated a right to compensation irrespective of any fault. These no—
fault schemes thus provided the germ of the later theories of liability 
regarded as characteristic of public law. They were also helpful in 
familiarising people with the idea of State liability. 
Koechlin argues, 3 however, that none of the schemes was "capable 
of providing a general principle of liability" and that "only the fault 
concept was able to fulfil this task." As a description of what actually 
1. Op.cit. p.4. 
2. Koechlin, La Responsabilite de l'Etat en dehors des Contrats de Ilan 
VIII g1873, 1957. 
3. Op.cit. p.106. 
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happened this statement is correct. As an explanation of why it occurred, 
it is defective. Risk or Equality before Public Charges were rational 
choices as a basis for State liability. Other factors must have led to 
the choice of fault. No doubt, in France as in England, the prevailing 
moral and political climate favoured fault; but the decisive factor was 
in all probability the gravitational pull of the fault based liability 
of the Civil Code. 
Moreau describes the second half of the century as "the golden age 
of liberalism". It was also a period in which state interventionism 
increased sharply. At the same time, the stabilisation of the French 
Revolution had created a bourgeois society heavily weighted in favour of 
a minority of property owners 1 — from which class the members of the 
Conseil dtEtat were naturally recruited. All this created a favourable 
climate for systematisation of government liability, and the Conseil dtEtat 
was well placed to cater for the demand. 2 It is worth repeating that 
its members formed a self—confident elite well disposed to reform. They 
also numbered some of the most eminent lawyers of the day among their ranks. 
The Conseil dtEtat now advanced on two fronts: from a jurisdictional 
viewpoint, rapid strides were made in undercutting the sacrosanct area 
of governmental action previously sheltered by the theory of Sovereignty; 
from the doctrinal point of view, general principles of administrative 
liability were evolved and developed. 3 
1. See Kamenka and Erh—Soon—Tay "Beyond the French Revolution: Communist 
Socialism and the Concept of Law", (1971) 21 Univ.of Toronto L.J. 109, 
114; Bertrandl "Edouard Laferrie're", op.cit., 
2. Loschak, Le r'le politique du juge administratif francais, 1972 esp.p.16; 
Waline, "Ltaction du Conseil dtEtat dens la vie fran9aise", Livre 
Jubilaire du Conseil dtEtat, Paris 1950 p.131. 
3. See further Ch. 2, below. 
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At the turn of the century, the main problem which faced the 
Conseil was the imposition of liability for misuse of thetpolice power'. 
In Tomaso,—Grecco 1 the Conseil for the first time admitted that there 
might, in certain circumstances be liability for the use of the police 
powers. The government commissioner pointed out that to permit immunity 
for Jacts of authority'' or for use of 'police powers' was to shelter a 
dangerously indefinite area of governmental activity; the second term 
might even legitimately be interpreted as encompassing the whole field of 
administrative law. But the Conseil did not feel able to concede that 
liability could be general or absolute, and, although the civil law 
concept of fault was chosen as the basis for liability, the standard 
imposed was that of gross fault (faute lourde). In Olivier and Zimmerman 2 
the State was ` again held liable for '=acts of authority and abuse of 
governmental powers this time by a Prefect. Unlawful quarrying activities 
had been carried out on the plaintiffs' land, and in an attempt to dis-
guise this fact the Prefect purported to legalise the trespass retros-
pectively by a declaration that th4tland had always been public property 
(domaine publique). So to use his discretion was a clear abuse of power. 
The Conseil felt the parallel with the civil law principle of abuse of 
right and the State was held liable. The way was now open for a more 
general conquest of Sovereignty. 
It is convenient to leave the developing caselaw of the Conseil 
dtEtat at this stage to notice one important consequence flowing from 
the jurisdictional arrangements. The two great administrative law actions, 
the petition for annulment of illegal administrative action (le recours  
pour exces ap pouvoir) and the action for indemnity (le recours de pleine  
1. C.E. 10 Feb 1905, D 1906.3.81 concl. Romieu. This was an action for 
negligence by a policeman who had fired a shot when a bull ran amok 
amongst a frightened crowd. 	 /- 
2. C.E. 27 Feb 1903, S 1905.3.17 n. Hauriou. Discussedbelow Ch.6 
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juridiction) were developed in tandem and came to be seen as pendants. 
This link had several consequences. From an early date the action for 
indemnity was seen in the light of a sanction. To quote Moreau again, 1 
 in the early period 
"... The limited liability of the 
policeman — State is more like a 
punishment imposed on a guilty 
party than compensation awarded to 
a victim." 
Once the Conseil d'Etat abandoned its early practice of issuing 
instructions or orders to administrative authorities 2  the idea of sanction 
became more important. The action for indemnity could also be used as 
a means of collateral review to bypass the extremely short time limit 
of 2 months in cases of annulment. This practice,again for punitive reasons, 
was encouraged by the Conseil dTEtat and received an accolade of approval 
when joinder of the two actions was first allowed in 1911. In a note 3 
approving the Conseil diEtatts change of heart, Hauriou emphasised the 
punitive nature of the action for indemnity, pointing out that annul- 
ment on its own was, in the absence of mandatory remedies, powers to 
order reinstatement. or to redraft regulations, meaningless. An order 
for indemnity gave meaning to annulment and joinder of the two petitiOns 
allowed this to be easily achieved. 
There is no doubt that this attitude towards the indemnity as a 
sanction rather than a means of compensation endures today, and forms 
the principal rationale for awards of damages against the administration. 
111•0•■■1 
1. Op.cit. p.7. 
2. A. Mestre, Le Conseil dtEtat Protecteur des prerogatives de ItAdminis-
tration, 1974 pp. 59-61 tells us this practice endured throughout the 
19th century. 
3. Blanc C.E. 31 March 1911, S 1912-111-129 n. Hauriou. The case repre-
sented a "revirement". 
Nothing has been of such influence in shaping French theories of 
government liability as the existence of a separate jurisdiction. 
One can 	see in every major theory of administrative liability in 
France, at least prior to Eisenmann, an apology for the administrative 
jurisdiction. One might also observe that, thanks to Dicey, the existence 
in France of a separate administrative jurisdiction has not been without 
influence in shaping the governmental liability of England. 
It is fair to single out of a distinguished school of French 
theorists, the masterly and influential writings of Leon Duguit. The 
first point to notice is that Duguitys theory, like that of Dicey, is 
embedded in a theory of the Constitution: Unlike Dicey, however, Duguit 
expounded his theory in detail and at considerable length. 2 
Duguit's theory takes shape within and forms part of his "General 
Theory of the State" (Vol.2 of his work). Duguit calls his theory 
"objectivist" and believes he can discern at the time of formulation of 
his theory, a disappearance or transformation of the doctrine of sovereign 
power (puissance publique). His work is therefore an attack not on 
authority itself, but on the traditional conception of authority. This 
transformation has been worked for Duguit by a new and undoubtedly socialistic 
concept of "public service". Particularly characteristic of the trans-
formation are "the organisation of the public services, the relationships 
of the government with its agents entrusted with the implementation of 
	■•••••■••1•10•0*000 
1. Traite de Droit Constitutionnel, 1st edn. 1911 (5 vols.). My references 
are to the 3rd edn. 1928. 




public services and above all else, the ever increasing responsibility 
of the State, recognised in settled caselaw on the subject of the 
execution of all the public services." 1 In this way, sovereignty comes 
to be limited by the notion of "public service" since the State is no 
more than a collectivity established for the implementation of public 
services. 2 
From this initial premise, Duguit draws two deductions: first, he 
argues that, since the Revolution, the paramount principle is protection 
of private property. It is therefore proper for the property attributed 
to the State for the operation of the public services to be used for the 
purpose of compensating individuals injured by their operation. 3 Both 
fault 	liability and liability without fault derive from this principle. 
Secondly, Duguit argues that the basis of State liability is never 
fault — the State, being a corporate entityl is incapable of fault.4 The 
basis of State liability is always the Revolutionary principle of equal 
treatment or Equality before Public Charges. In this way Duguit is able 
to explain the development by the Conseil dtEtat of liability without 
fault which is derived from the statutory procedure for compensation in 
case of expropriation of property and loss caused by the execution of 
public works. He says: 
"These two lines of caselaw are in no 
way based on the idea of the general 
liability of the State, but on the 
inviolability of private property. 
Despite this, these precedents have 
certainly opened the way to the present 
1. Traite, Vol.2 p.40. It is difficult to render Duguitts style in English. 
Sometimes I have chosen excessively liberal renderings. 
2. See further C. Pisier—Kouchner, Le Service public dans la theOrie de 
ltEtat du Leon Duguit, 1972. 
3. Traite l pp.68-69. 
4. Ibid., Vol.IV p.468, Transformations, p.230. 
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caselaw, which tends to recognize 
the liability of the State on every 
occasion when State intervention, although 
legal and without fault, imposes on an 
individual or group of individuals a 
charge heavier than that which rests on 
others. 1 
Duguit has now argued himself into a position where the jurisdiction 
of the administrative courts has been justified by his theory of the 
unique nature of State liability. He is able to say with conviction that 
the administrative jurisdiction is properly "the court competent to 
decide if ... [a given set of facts] reveals a defect in the operation 
of the public service sufficient for the public funds to repair the 
damages which results from it." 2 It remains only to isolate the cases 
to which the special theory applies: in other words, to devise juris-
dictional criteria. 
Duguit favours an expansionist theory of the administrative juris-
diction. He criticises at length 3 the original demarcation line drawn 
between 'acts of authority' and 'operational acts' (acte de puissance  or 
acte dlautorife and acte de gestion) in which he professes to see no sense. 
Indeed, Duguit could hardly allow such a distinction without conceding his 
original point that the State is no more than an arrangement for the 
organisation of public services. Instead, Duguit, completing his circle, 
necessarily concludes in favour of the 'public service' criterion of 
jurisdiction inaugurated in the Blanco decision, though he notes sadly 
in passing that the Conseil has, of late, erred and strayed from the way 
01.11■111■1 
1. Ibid. p.228. The Equality principle is analysed below, Ch.C. Duguit's 
ideas are more fully developed in Traite'Vol. TV -- p.460. 
2. Ibid. p.498. 
3. Traits, Vol.2 pp.78-81. 
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of truth, veering once more towards the earlier, operational criteria 
of autorit6 and gestion. 1 
It would be symmetrical to oppose to Duguit his great contemporary 
Hauriou. 2  It is more convenient, however, to mention the critique of 
Charles Eisenmann who at a much later date, in agriking and influential 
article, 3 exposes the fiction 	of the theory of administrative 
liability as unique and therefore, autonomous. Eisenmann argues that 
administrative liability can be shown to be 'unique' or special in character 
only if the great majority of its rules are wholly different from those 
of private law. Similarly, it can only be 'autonomous' if all public 
authorities are subject to the jurisdiction of the specialised courts. 4 
Eisenmann goes on to demonstrate how, in the system as it has developed, 
both propositions are false. He concludes that the theory of the 'unique' 
nature of administrative liability is a myth. 
It is an abstract idea, a position 
of principle which treats 'the autonomy' 
of the regime of public liability as the 
natural and logical solution, The theory 
starts from the very general idea, that, 
normally, the life and all the activities 
of the State machinery, and in particular 
of the Administration, are and ought to be, 
regulated by rules which are 'special' 
'autonomous' and 'outside the ordinary law', 5 
1. He cites (p.81) the conclusions of M. Cahen-Salvador in Mestral C.E. 
3 July 1925, D1926.111.18 and of M. Rivet in Ste' des Affsrma7Reunis 
C.E. 24 May 1924 D 1924.111.26. 
2. Hauriou's notes are collected and published as La Jurisprudence adminis-
trative de 1892 a 1929 (3 vols) 1929. 
3. "Sur le degrg d'originalit‘du regime de la responsabilitd'extra-
contractuelle des personnes (collectivites) publiques", J.C.P. 1949.1. 
nos 742 and 751. 
4. Below, Ch.4; 
5. Exorbitant de droit commun. - The French expression 'droit communl refers 
to 'normal' as opposed to 'special' rules. It is thus sometimes used 
(as in this passage) to contrast the civil law with administrative law. 
Equally the caselaw of the Conseil d'Etat is often referred to as the 
'droit commun.' of administrative law and contrasted e.g. to statutory 
exceptions. 
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by which we mean private law. The 
classic thesis of the separate nature 
of public liability is simply one of the 
corollaries, or one specific application 
of,the general theory of the autonomous 
nature of public law — by which I mean 
here the law which regulates the machinery 
of the State — and, more particularly of 
administrative law. It is an indissoluble 
part of this thesis." 1  
This passage does expose the doctrine of the "specialness" of 
government liability. Like most myths, it is founded on fact: i.e. the 
theory simply explains and justifies the existing institution of the 
administrative jurisdiction. But the myth has a secondary purpose: like 
theories of fundamental rights, it seeks to secure civil liberties. If 
the State is not to be governed by the rules of private law, there is 
a danger that it will escape altogether from legal controls. The myth 
that the State is subject to 'special' rules is designed to ensure that 
this shall not happen. Thus Eisenmann points to a feature obscured by 
the structure of English law but evident from the parallel nature of the 
two grand recours in France: that the rules of government liability may 
be visualised tas part of the apparatus' of administrative law. 
If the keynote of the French system of administrative liability 
is the emphasis on the State, then nineteenth century England presents a 
very different picture. I have already referred to Maitland's suggestion 
that the absence of any legal theory of the State may have contributed to 
a 
the absence of corporate system of governmental liability. I have tenter. 
tively suggested, too, that the absence of a formal 'police power' may 
have been a contributory factor; if powers are framed in individual terms 
it seems logical that individuals should be personally responsible for 
them. 2 A third factor of significance was — fairly obviously — the 
1. No. 742 Para 10. 
2. For confirmation, see Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution, 9th edn. by Epp Wade, 1939 p.265. References throughout 
are to the 9th edn. 
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possibility of personal liability. 
It has been suggested that the fact of real, personal liability 
may have actually impeded the growth of tortious liability in England, 
1 
at least in the case of public officials. During the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, in contrast to France, many public offices were 
filled by unremunerated volunteers. To submit their private incomes to 
the threat of awards of damages was harsh and might necessitate reform 
of this system - a change stubbornly resisted. Several cases make reference 
to this risk. In an early American case, for example, it was suggested 
that 
"No man would accept the office of 
judge, if his estate were to answer 
for every error in judgment, or if 
his time and property were to be 
wasted in litigation t with every man, 
whom his decisions might offend." 2 
Too much should not be made of this, because the judges were not 
noticeably more generous with public funds. Fiscal frugality was a 
Victorian characteristic. "Victorian budgetary policy had the single 
aim of balancing the annual account at the lowest possible figure." 3 And 
there is a long established tradition of judicial parltimony with the 
rate funds. Again, it is generally accepted that the judiciary during 
the period of industrial expansion was inclined to protect burgeoning 
industry by allowing the cost of accidents to fall on individual victims. 4 
1. E.g. Jennings, "The Tort Liability of Administrative Officers", (1936) 
21 Minn.L.R. 263; Borchard t op.cit. above. 
2. Phelps v. Sill (1804) l' Dayls Cases in Error (Conn) 315, 329 cited loc. 
cit. above p.271. For English examples see R. v. Commissioner of Sewers  
for Tower Hamlets, (1830) 1 B.and Ad.232, 109 E.R.773 . Everett V. Griffith: 
-1-4 - 1 1 1 A.C. 631. 
3. Taylor, Laissez-faire and State Interventionism in 19th Century Britain, 
1972, p.60. See also Dicey, Law and Opinion in England, 2nd edn. 1914, 
Introduction p.lxxxvi. 
4. For example, Green, "The Individualls Protection under Negligence Law: 
Risk-Sharing", (1953) N.W.Univ. L.R. 751; but the point is generally 
accepted today. 
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These themes come together and can be traced through many of the cases. 
Duncan v. Findlater 1 is but one example. 
This was an action against turnpike trustees for the negligence 
of their workmen in leaving piles of earth in the road and causing an 
accident. The empowering legislation provided that the trust funds were 
to be applied to certain specified purposes and no other purposes what-
soever. The reasoning of the House of Lords is confusing and the judgment 
of the Lord Chancellor contains a complex equation of "legality' with 
'liability', designed apparently to justify the prejudgement against 
compensation implicit in the first line of the following passage: 2 
"It is impossible to suppose that 
the framers of this statute contemplated 
that any part of this fund would be 
appropriated for the purpose of affording 
compensation for any act of the persons 
who might be employed under the authority 
of the Trustees. If the thing done is 
within the statute, it is clear that no 
compensation can be afforded for any damage 
sustained thereby, except so far as the 
statute itself has provided it; and this is 
clear on the legal presumption that the act 
creating the damage being within the statute 
/a 	must be/lawful act. On the other hand, if the thing done isnot within the statute, either 
from the party doing it having exceeded the 
powers conferred on him by the statute, or 
from the manner in which he has thought fit 
to perform the work, why should the public 
fund be liable to make good his private error 
or misconduct?" 
The case is interesting, too, because the judgment of Lord Brougham 
contains a classic exposition of the doctrine of vicarious liability as 
it was understood at the period. Lord Brougham said: 3 
1./6 Cl. and F894, 7 E.R. 934. 	 /(1839) 
2. At p.939. 
3. At p.940. Glanville Williams, "Vicarious Liability: Tort of the Master 
or of the Servant?",(1956) 72 L.Q.R. 522. 
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"The rule of liability, and its reason, 
I take to be this: I am liable for what 
is done for me and under my orders by 
the man I employ, for I may turn him off 
from that employ when I please: and the 
reason that I am liable is this, that by 
employing him I set the whole thing in 
motion; and what he does, being done for 
my benefit and under my direction, I am 
responsible for the consequences of doing 
it." 
This conception of vicarious liability as based on the personal 
negligence of the master,which can be contrasted with the 'servants tort' 
or 'guarantee' theory, (already under consideration by the framers of 
the French Civil Code), was to cause much trouble in the context of 
Crown Proceedings. It is worth noting, though, that Lord Brougham, 
had he followed his own reasoning, ought to have imposed liability on the 
trustees who had both employed the negligent workers and instructed 
them to mend the road. But even if the reasoning in the case leaves 
something to be desired, it is unwise to attribute this either to sympathy 
fofthe individuals found personally liable or to imperfect understanding 
of the doctrine of vicarious liability. The most that can be said is 
that these may have been contributory factors in producing a decision 
which was satisfactory to the House-probably because it accorded with 
previous English precedents. 
The central piece in the puzzle of governmental liability was, 
however, the doctrine of Crown immunity. Had this issue been formulated 
in abstract terms and inside a theory of the State, as in France, the issue 
would have been sufficiently difficult. As it was, the courts were left 
to fumble from case to case with the authority of precedent and the Year 
Books to help them. 
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The idea that vicarious liability involved "fault" at once brought 
the courts squarely up against the ancient maxim that "the King can do 
no wrong". In Viscount Canterbury v. Attorney-General 1 the Speaker of 
the Commons brought a petition of right against the GroWn to recover 
compensation for the loss of his goods in a fire caused by negligent 
workmen which consumed the Speaker's house (and incidentally the House 
of Commons). The court held that petition of right did not lie in the 
case of a pure tort, partly on the ground that no previous precedent could 
be traced. But Lord Lyndhurst L.C. found difficulty with the law of 
. master and servant 	2 , saying: 
"It is admitted that, for the 
personal negligence of the Sovereign, 
neither this nor any other proceedings 
can be maintained. Upon what ground, 
then, can it be supported for the acts 
of the agent or servant? If the master 
or employer is answerable upon the 
principle that qui facit per alienuml 
facit per se, this would not apply to 
the Sovereign, who cannot be required 
to answer for his own personal acts. 
If it be said that the master is answerable 
for the negligence of his servant, because 
it may be considered to have arisen from 
his own misconduct or negligence in selecting 
or retaining a careless servant, that principle 
cannot apply to the Sovereign, to whom negli-
gence or misconduct cannot be imputed, and for 
which, if they occur in fact, the law affords 
no remedy." 
This reasoning was amplified in the subsequent case of Tobin v.  
The Queen, 3 an action for damages in respect of a ship seized by a naval 
officer on suspicion of slaving and burnt. In this case Erle C.J. dis- 
tinguished the ordinary case of master and servant on the ground that the 
relationship was not analogous to the relation of the Sovereign with a 
1. (1843) 1 Ph 306, 41 E.R. 648. 
2. At p.654. 
3. (1864) 16 C.B.N.S. 310, 143 E.R. 1148. 
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naval officer. The Queen does not appoint the officer personally; nor 
does the Sovereign "control the conduct of the captain in his movements, 
but a sense of professional duty"; nor was the particular act of seizure 
1 ordered or authorised by the Queen. The reasoning here parallels in an 
interesting way the remarks of the Government Commissioner in the Blanco 
case concerning the special nature of the relationship between the State 
and its public servants; but, at the same time, it fully bears out the 
3 strictures of Maitland as to the ill effects of 'personalising the Sovereign'. 
And the judge went on to create a watertight doctrine of Crown :nmunity, 
arguing, on the authority of Hale (L.C.43) and Coke (2 Inst.86) that: 4 
 "The maxim that the King can do no wrong 
is true in the sense that he is not liable 
to be sued civilly or criminally for a 
supposed wrong. That which the sovereign 
does personally, the law presumes will not 
be wrong: that which the Sovereign does by 
command to his servants, cannot be a wrong 
in the sovereign, because, if the command 
is unlawful, it is in law no command, and 
the servant is responsible for the unlaw-
ful act, 	the same as if there had been 
no command." 
This reading of vicarious liability would have been more tolerable 
if those who did employ and control the officials, i.e. Ministers or the 
Board of Admiralty, could have been held liable for the wrongful acts of 
their subordinates in the service. This solution, was unfortunately pre-
cluded by an established line of cases. 5 Thus the plaintiff was left with 
1. At p.1164. 
2. Above p.25 
3. Opecit. abovefIS. 
4. At p.1165, 
5. Lane v. Cotton 1 Ld.Raym. 646 cited and confirmed Whitfield v. Lord le  
Des enser (1778) 2 Cowp. 753;,(Duncan v. Findlater (above); Raleigh v.  
Goschen 1898] 1 Ch.73; Tobin v. R. (above). 
/98 E.R. 1344 
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his remedy against the individual tortjeasor. And the third case in 
the trilogy expresses complete satisfaction with this arrangement. 1 
however 
"Let it not/be supposed", explains Chief 
Justice Cockburn, 
ft... that a subject sustaining a legal wrong 
at the hands of a minister of the Crown is 
without a remedy. As the Sovereign cannot 
authorize wrong to be done, the authority of 
the Crown would afford no defence to an action 
brought for an illegal act committed by an 
officer of the Crown ... a position which appears 
to us to rest on principles which are too well 
settled to admit of question and which are alike 
essential to uphold the dignity of the Crown on 
the one hand, and the rights and liberties of 
the subject on the other." 
All that was left was for the courts to curtail as far as possible 
the effects of Crown immunity. In Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v.  
Gibbs, 2 the House of Lords made a bold step forward by depriving of the 
shield of Crown immunity a large number of public corporations which 
offered to the public ordinary commercial services. The case concerned 
the negligence of a harbour authority, incorporated by Act of Parliament 
as a Committee of trustees, in maintaining their dock in such a way that 
the plaintiffs' ship hit a mud bank and his cargo of guano was damaged. 
The judges were consulted, and Blackburn J. replied on their behalf. 
The existence of a fund from which compensation could properly be 
paid was an influential factor in this decision. Blackburn J. cited with 
approval an earlier dictum that, where Act of Parliament authorised 
payment from the public funds, it was "inconsistent with actual justice 
and not warranted by any principle of law" that the loss should fall on 
individuals. 3 Blackburn J. also felt able to explain away earlier precedents 
1. Feather v. The Queen (1865) 6B and S 257, 122 E.R. 1191, at pp.1205-6. 
See for criticism, Holdsworth, H.E.L. Vol. IX, p.44. 
2. (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 93. 	
(1858) 
3. Bramwell B. in Ruck v. Williams 3 H & N 308, 157 E.R.488 1 493, cited by Blackburn J. at p.1 
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'concerning the liability of hierarchical superiors for their subordinates, 
saying: 1 
"All that is decided by this class of 
case is that the liability of a servant 
of the public is no greater than the 
servant of any other principal, though 
the recourse against the principal, the 
public, cannot be by an action." 
But the case is most remarkable for its robust and modern dis-
cussion of public policy. In the words of Lord Cranworth: 2 
"It would be a strange distinction to 
persons coming with their ships to different 
ports of this country, that in some ports, 
if they sustain damage by the negligence of 
those who have the management of the docks, 
they will be entitled to compensation and 
in others they will not; such a distinction 
arising, not from any visible difference in 
the docks themselves, but from some municipal 
difference in the constitution of the bodies 
by whom the docks are managed." 
It is always deceptive to read history backwards. Some might be 
tempted, however, in the light of the nearly contemporaneous Blanco 
decision, to see the Mersey Docks case as a missed opportunity to create 
for England a theory of 'the public service'. In fact the case contains 
a curious anticipation of the later reasoning of French administrative 
courts when, in the 1920s and 1930s, they retreated from the exposed 
Blanco position and returned jurisdiction in case of tortious loss caused 
through the activity of the 'commercial' or 'industrial' public services 
to the civil courts, on the grounds that such services operated in cir-
cumstances similar to private commerce and industry. 3 History seemingly 
repeats itself. 
awil•InImMal..61.0111a.....■•••■•■111m••••••■■■■■•■•■••■••■•■•••■■■•011.0. 11111■11•■• Im.11 	 ..■•••■•waintwoorgamo•••••■•■•■••■■••■■••■••••••■•■•••••■■•■•■■■••••■■•■■•••••••■••••■■■••■•• 
1. See noteSr,42 above. At p.111. 
2. At pp.122-3; see also per Blackburn J. at p.107. 
3. L'Ouest Africain (Bac d'Eloka) T.C. 22 Jan.1921, D.1921.III.1 concl. 
Matter; Verbanck et Mabille C.E. 9 Feb.1934, D 1934.111.9 n. Waline; 
Melinette T.C. 11 July 1933, D 1933.111.65 concl. RouchonMazerat 
n. Blaevoet. 
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A tentative synthesis of this English caselaw with the later 
writing might go as follows. Maitland was correct in his belief that the 
personalisation of the Monarch had led to an extension of the doctrine 
of Crown immunity. Borchardt too t was correct in thinking that the 
continental theorising over the real nature of corporate liability hdd 
been helpful in persuading lawyers that the State "could and should be 
I liable for its torts like any animate 'persont". Laski was correct again 
when he tersely argued that in England "The State cannot be sued because 
there is no State to sue." 2 
On the other hand, the very absence of a precise legal definition 
of the State left the courts with some room for manoeuvre because they 
could, and sometimes would, deprive some public authority of the benefit 
of immunity by denying its link with the Crown. The reasoning in the 
Mersey Docks case is significant here. It could have crystallised into 
a French—style distinction between lautorite" and tgestiont but, perhaps 
because common lawyers are hostile to abstractions and this is an 
abstract idea, this distinction never materialised. 
It was Dicey, who sanctified the idea of personal liability at the 
theoretical level. It is tempting though in view of his wide reading and 
his later recantation, 3 unfair, to visualise the great writer, pen in 
hand, at the window of his Martello tower, testily watching for the 
impending Napoleonic invasion. For Dicey's theory, like Duguit's is 
political. Unlike Duguit's it is short and inexplicit. 
1. Op.cit. above, p.775. 
2. "The Responsibility of the State in England", (1919) 32 Harv. LoR. 447. 
3. Wade, Appendix to 9th edn. of Dicey's Introduction, p.476; Lawson, 
"Dicey Revisited" (1959) 7 Pol.Studies109,/Dicey, "Droit Administratif 
in Modern French Law" (1901) 17 L.Q.R. 302. 
/207; 
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Centred round the idea of legal equality the theory "pushes to 
its utmost limits", the ideal of the "universal subjection of all classes 
to one law administered by the ordinary courts". The essence of the 
theory is that : 1 
every official from the Prime 
Minister down to a constable or a 
collector of taxes, is under the 
same responsibility for every act done 
without legal justifications as any 
other citizen ... all men are in England 
subject to the law of the realm; for 
though a soldier or a clergyman incurs 
from his position legal liabilities from 
which other men are exempt, he does not 
(speaking generally) escape thereby from 
the duties of an ordinary citizen." 
The absence in Dicey's theory of all reference to the malign topic 
of Crown immunity has given rise to much criticism. 2  It is however, 
understandable. Dicey was not primarily interested in tortious liability 
as a vehicle for compensation. His was a theory of civil liberties in 
which tort law was viewed in the light of a deterrent directed 
at people rather than institutions. For, just as the impersonal State 
cannot personally commit a fault, so it cannot be deterred. But later 
writers did not miss this point. Like Maitland, they viewed with concern 
the accretion to the government of powers for which, because the Crown 
could not be sued in tort, "the Government" was not legally liable. These 
developments were the more pernicious for being unarticulated and unrecognised. 
Authors like Borchard and Laski, familiar with continental political 
theory, found much that was admirable in continental law. Personal 
liability Anglo-American style increasingly seemed not enough. The 
1. Dicey, op.cit., pp.193-4; see also p.287. 
2. See, typically, Wade, Introduction p.lxxviii; Appendix p.527 et seq. 
Contemporary judgments express no dissatisfaction or anxiety. It may 
be, therefore, that the practice of agratiapayment was already 
established. 
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interest in continental solutions stoked the developing fire of the 
reform movement. 
More telling is the criticism 1  that Dicey chose to ignore the 
growth of statutory governmental powers. These were vested haphazardly 
in public authorities; in individual officials for whose acts there was 
no vicarious responsibility; or sometimes in the Crown, which could not 
be sued. Their growth turned the law of liability into a tangled under-
growth of special exceptions and incomprehensible rules of statutory 
interpretation apparently devoid of general principle. 2 The search for 
systematisation and rationalisation was to lead in time to a second move-
ment for reform, whose sponsors also demanded a re—evaluation of the 
public law solutions of civilian systems. Discussion of this movement is 
postponed until the next chapter. 
The movementfbr reform of the law of Crown Proceedings, although 
powerful and waged on both academic and political terrain, 3 was not 
crowned with success until 1947, allegedly because of systematic opposition 
from the civil service and from the law officers of the Crown. 4 Reform 
when it came followed the traditional, English pattern. 5 The legislation 
1. Wade, ibid. Discussed fully in Chap. 5 below. 
2. E.G. Robinson, Public Authorities and Legal Liability, 1925. 
3. Borchard, op.cit; Laski, op.cit.; Morgan in the Introduction to Robinson, 
op.cit. Report of the Committee on the Crown Proceedings Bill, Cmnd. 
2842 (1927); Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers, Cmnd. 4060 
(1932); Wade, Introduction. 
4. Wade, Appendix to Dicey pp.534-6. 
5. Hogg, op.cit., p.63 points out that earlier Commonwealth legislation 
would have provided a better precedent. 
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did not attempt a codification nor did it abolish the rules of common 
law entirely; it simply set out to rectify the most obvious defects in 
piecemeal fashion. 
I do not propose a textual analysis of the Crown Proceedings Act, 
1947, largely because this has already been done more proficiently than 
I could hope to do it. 1 I propose at this stage to make only a few 
general points which seem to me relevant to the synthesis I am attempting. 
First, the Act is at the theoretical level, weak. It makes no 
attempt to settle the difficulties of definition already discussed by 
incorporating a definitive definition of the Crown — surely an extra-
ordinary omission? Just as in France the term 'public service- 1 had to 
be filled by judicial definition, so in England with 'the Crown'. Not 
surprisingly the courts have shown themselves reluctant to attempt any 
authoritative definition l with the result that we are still, seventy 
years after Maitland wrote, without a legal concept of the State. It is 
-still possible to say that, in English law; 
/public 
H... The administration does not exist. 
Instead the law contemplates two things: 
'the Crown' which is very broadly the 
central government, and other/authorities 
— largely local authorities, with public 
corporations existing in an uncanny half—
world. "1 
Secondly, and quite deliberately, the Act simply reserves the pre-
rogative powers without attempting either to enumerate them or to classify 
them (Section II). This has the effect of preserving, even arguably 
extending, all existing immunities without consideration being given either 
IIMMIIM.I.11.11•011101••• 
1. Notably Glanville Williams, Crown Proceedings, 1947; Street, Govern-
mental Liability, 1953; Hogg, op.cit., Ch.4. 
2. Mitchell, "The causes and effects of an absence of a system of Public 
Law in the United Kingdom" [1965] P.L. 95, 113. But see, now, Town 
Investments v. Minister of Environment [1977] 2 W.L.R. 450; B. v. 
	 L1977j 2 W.L.R. 201; Harlow "The Crown: Wrong once Again?" 
(1977) 40 M.L.R. 728. 
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to their real uswfulness or to a possible French—style distinction between 
'governmental' and 'commercial' functions. 1 Several examples of this 
confused thinking were given during the debate. For example, the immunity 
of the Post Office was confirmed despite protests that the Post Office 
was an ordinary commercial service comparable to other public services 
such as the railways which did not possess such immunities. 2  Again, the 
Attorney—General told the House3 1hat 
"The private citizen does not have the 
same kind of responsibility for pro-
tecting the public, such as the Crown 
possesses; he does not have the care of 
the public safety; he does not have the 
defence of the realm to consider; he is not 
responsible for the organisation of such 
great services as the Post Office." 
The last remark was glaringly false — unless of course, one chooses 
to see the Post Office as a manifestation of the 'police power' providing 
opportunitie6 for the opening of mail, for telephone tapping and for 
censorship generally. 4 
Illogically, however, the Act does follow the traditional pattern 
by equating the Crown with a private person of full age and capacity. 
(Section 2(1)). For two reasons this is an unhappy formula: first, it 
fails to make general provision for primary duties which may rest on the 
Crown except those, such as Occupiers' and EMployers' Liability, which 
are specifically enumerated in the Act (Section 2(1)(b) and (c)); secondly, 
it fails to anticipate the move of the common law towards primary liability 
thus tying the courts to an outdated conception of personal and vicarious 
1. Moore, "Law and Government", (1905) 3 Comm.L.R. 205. See also H.C. Deb. 
Vol. 439 oo1.1723. 
2. H.C. Deb. Vol. 439 col. 2612 et seq.; co1.1744. 
3. Ibid., co1.1674 
4. Bunyan, The Political Police in Britain, 1976, pp.211-212. 
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liability for the torts of servants or agents (Section 2(1)(c)). In 
sharp contrast to France, this formulation hampers the growth of an 
abstract idea of 'fault in the administrative system'. 1 
The Act left many injustices unremedied. The exception for the 
armed forces, for example, created serious inequality between officers 
and members of the public; 2 and the failure to deal with malfunctioning 
of the judicial process (Section 2(5)) was attacked by Members. 3  Nor did the 
AA attempt to fill gaps in the existing law. It was easily accepted 
that it was not designed to extend liability for typical acts of what 
today would be called maladministration. It would not for example, create 
-Crown liability for a wrong certificate by the Land Registry or negligent 
failure to pay a pension.- 4 Thus the Act left a gap which finally 
necessitated the Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967. It did not bring 
to an end the long tradition of ex gratia payments. Nor, inevitably, 
could it satisfy those who wanted reform of the substantive rules. 
During the nineteenth century the courts of Ehgland and France 
had to deal with a major expansion of the law of tort or delict. If the 
liability of the government and administration was to keep in step the 
major obstacle of Sovereign immunity had to be surmounted. While England 
was free to develop personal liability, the law of 1790 drove French law 
into another channel. Both methods were really surprisingly successful 
1. Street, "Liability of the State for Illegal Conduct of its Organs", 
Max Planck Institut 1967 230, 237-8. 
2. H.C. Deb. vol. 439 cols.1713-4. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 001.1706 (Mr. Asterley Jones). 
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in dealing with the problem which confronted courts,although- never 
entirely successful. Both systems have had to acknowledge certain areas 
of residual monarchical privilege where there is, even today, no liability. 
These areas are always closely linked to the traditional conception of 
the police power or the prerogative power or the governmental power of 
the State. Tradition rather than logic justifies the immunity. As a 
President of the French Republic has said: 
"All our law stemmed from the conception 
of a strong state, stronger perhaps for 
limiting its intervention to the most 
characteristic functions of public power: 
justice, defence, order." 1 
Inside these areas of thigh policy', courts dare not trespass and 
a measure of immunity seems generally acceptable — more so in England 
than elsewhere in the world, perhaps. Thus, the Crown Proceedings Act 
preserves immunity from liability in respect of the judicial function 
(Section 2(5)) while the courts, too, jealously guard judicial immunity. 2 
In France, the judicial function also resisted the systematic imposition 
of liability and the legislature finally intervened. 3 
Similarly,the courts of both countries acknowledge a residual cate-
gory of cases in which the courts will not intervene because of the supposed 
need to leave the goverment free to conduct foreign affairs or the 
defence of the realm. The category is usually definable only in terms of 
the absence of jurisdiction. In France, where the category of Acte de 
.1•0011■11■  	 0•1114.•••■•■•■•• 
1. President Pompidou, addressing the Conseil dtEtat, cited Hayward, 
The One and Indivisible French Republic, 1971, p.116. (See also Borchard, 
op.cit., (1925) 34 Yale L.J. at p.240). 
2. Sirros v. Moore [1974] 3 NLR 459; Brazier, "Judicial Immunity and the 
Independence of the Judiciary" [1976] P.L. 397. 
3. Law of 5 July 1972 discussed Lombard, "La responsabilitg du fait de la 
fonction juridictionelle et la loi du 5 Juillet 1972", 1973 R.D.P. 
p.585; Auby, A.J.D.A. 1973 p.4. See further below p.303 
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Gailmrnement has been pared to the minimum there are still acts which, 
in the words of a leading author escape from control and cannot be reviewed, 
but which cannot be classified either. "Their only common characteristic 
is that one cannot question the legality of these acts or impose liability 
on the State in respect of them although the normal legal rules are 
powerless to explain this situation." 1 Atypical example is the case 
of Societe Ignazio Messina. 2 A ship was stopped outside territorial 
waters by the French navy and searched for arms on the suspicion that she 
was carrying weapons to the insurgents in the Algerian uprising. The 
owners claimed compensation in respect of the delay. The Government 
Commissioner found it hard to classify the act as a fmesure de police'; 
on the other hand, she thought the act could not be an Act of State as 
no foreign State was involved. But the Conseil d'Etat was not willing 
to impose liability. The court contented itself with the formula that: 
"the measures taken ought to be 
regarded as attaching, taken as a 
whole, to military operations which, 
by their nature, are not capable of 
entailing the liability of the State." 
If legal rules cannot explain the absence of jurisdiction, the 
answer is in fact quite simple.) 
The acts in question lie too near the centre of political power, 
concerning as they do, the defence powers or the relationships of govern-
ment with government or of government with Parliament. If the courts 
were to meddle they would risk retaliation. On the other hand, they are 
not anxious to admit their impotence by defining the 'no—go' area too 
precisely. Thus a judge noted normally for his verbal precision has 
	•••■■■••■■•••••■■•••••• 	 ■■••■••■•■•■•■■■.••••••••••••••■ 
1. Vedel, Droit administratif, 5th edn. 1973 p.307. 
2. C.E. 30 March 1966, 1966 R.D.P. p. 789 coml. Questiaux, 1967 p.143 
n. Waline. 
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defined an Act of State in the following hazy terms: 
"I think we must say either that all 
acts of the executive are acts of State, 
or that acts of the executive should only 
be called acts of State in cases where the 
court will not enquire into them or give 
relief in respect of them, but should not 
be called acts of State when the coures , 
 jurisdiction is not ousted.° 
It is not that Acts of State cannot be defined, it is that courts 
do not wish to define them. Even today there is tacit acceptance that 
some acts partake so strongly of the attributes of Sovereignty, as to 
be wholly "governmental" in character. Such acts by their very nature 
cannot attract the liability of the State. The only difficulty is that 
there is no agreement as to which functions merit immunity and which 
activities are governmental. It follows that they cannot be precisely 
defined. 
Even if we can see important parallels in the experience of the 
English Supreme Court and the French Conseil d'Etat in coming to grips 
with the difficult subject of sovereignty, their styles were, at least 
during the nineteenth century, very different. The Conseil d'Etat was 
an overtly political court, very confident in its role as arbiter and 
censor of the morality of "the administrative and governmental scene". 
A strong link was forged at an early date between illegality and liability 
and the latter was viewed primarily as a sanction for the former. In 
England, on the other hand, the courts were very distinctly private law 
courts, confident in their private law role of administering the common 
law of England, but eschewing the political whenever possible. The solution 
of personal liability which was adopted does in fact seem well adapted to 
the court'S own assessment of its role. 




A country which possesses no separate administrative jurisdiction 
must inevitably define administrative liability in terms of the general 
rules of legal liability. Administrative courts might do otherwise, 
and exaggerated claims have been made for the originality of French 
administrative law in this respect. In practice, however, the origins 
of the system during the nineteenth century, the struggle of the adminis-
trative courts to establish themselves as a "jurisdiction", and the legal 
training of many of the greatest of the early public lawyers tended to 
inaugurate the civil law as a starting point. For administrative lawyers, 
"the rules of liability translate into 
legal language the obligation which 
falls on every person to repair loss 
suffered by another person. This 
definition is , as 	valid in respect 
of civil liability as it is for the 
liability of public authorities." 1  
So strongly does "liability" suggest "legal liability" that it is doubtful 
whether the position could ever be otherwise. 
My plan in this chapter is to give detailed illustrations of the 
operation of the legal rules of liability in certain limited areas. 
have chosen areas in which English law has been criticised on the ground 
that it is inferior to that of France or in which French public law has 
civil 
been said to differ radically from French/law. This is a deliberate choice. 
To enumerate all the rules in sufficient detail to permit a genuine com-
parison with English tort law would need a volume; a comparison with French 
1. °dent, Cours de Contentieux administratif, 3rd edn,1971, p.1042. 
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civil law would be beyond my capacity. On the other hand, if such 
a 
sketches are too greatly compressed they become misleading because/false 
impression of coherence and simplicity is given which could not be sus-
tained if actual cases were examined. In other words, one is in danger 
of comparing the broad general provisions of a code with a case law system 
an account of 
and/the operation of the code is more revealing than a terse statement 
of its provisions. 
Before embarking on this course, however, it is convenient to give 
a brief summary of the rules of liability in French administrative law 
by which the reader may orientate himself. 1 
Before any liability can arise in French administrative law, two 
conditions must be fulfilled:(i) there must be quantifiable damage and 
(ii) there must be an act attributable (imputable) to an administrative 
body. For the act to be attributable it must be committed by a person 
or body for whom the public authority impleaded is responsible. Here 
the test is usually that of agency employed by the civil law. The act 
must also be one committed in the course of duty'. The distinction here 
is that drawn by the Pelletier case between a 'personal , act and an 'act 
of the services. On closer examination this distinction also resembles 
the civilian:idea of 'course of duty' and this is one of the areas which 
I have chosen for more detailed analysis. 
The general principle (droit common) of liability in French adminis-
trative law is that of fault and more particularly of faute de service (or 
fault in the administrative syste4 This will be more fully defined at a 
1. For an excellent short account see Fromont, "La responsabilit4' de 
ltEtat polar le comportement illegal de ses organes", Max Planck Institute, 
1967; or see Brown and Garner op.cit., pp.92-115. 
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later stage. The standard expected is always objective but is variable. 
In some areas of administrative activity (notably the case of the police, 
the fire services, mental hospitals and clinical negligence, and super-
visory. activities of the State in using its powers of ttutellet over 
local authorities and other public bodies) the standard. used . is gross 
fault (faute lourde). The general standard in cases of faute de service  
is, however, simple fault. 
Although French law does not use the duty concept, it does employ 
causal tests. There must always be a causal link between the fault and 
the damage. The victim's own fault or the fault of a third party are in 
theory sufficient to break the causal link and exempt the administration 
from liability,although, where the fault is that of a third party, it is 
more usual to hold that both wrongdoers are joint tort feasors whose 
acts have contributed concurrently to the damage. 
The second main head of liability in French administrative law 
concerns public works (travaux publics)) today defined as works or operations 
carried out on land either by a public authority in the general interest 
or carried out by a public authority in the course of an administrative 
function (mission de service public). 1 Liability is without fault and 
derives originally from a law of 28 pluviose of the year VIII (1799) 
whichis 7 in:faot the genesis of risk liability in French administrative law. 
1. Commune de Monsegur C.E.10 June 1921, S.1921.3.49 concl Corneille n. 
HaurioA.; Effimieff T.C. 28 March 1955 Rec.617. See Vedel, op.cit. 
pp.127-8, pp.400-405 for an excellent short account. The term 'travail 
public' is apt to cover not only the operation concerned e.g. the 
building of a road, but the edifice constructed e.g. the road itself, 
more properly termed touvrage public'. 
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The rules of liability in respect of public works are exceptionally 
complex and difficult to summarise. A first distinction is drawn between 
permanent damage caused to the owners of land (such as depreciation in 
value, loss of amenity and nuisances generally)which are compensated for 
on the basis of risk but only if the damage is considered 'abnormal and 
special'. Liability in the case of accidental loss — as fOr example 
loss which springs from a failure to maintain a road or a building — is 
governed by the status of the victim. A complex division exists between 
'third partiee(tiers), who claim on the basis of risk,and 'consumers' 
(us alters) who must show failure to maintain the public works in question. 
For example, an athlete injured in a sports stadium or a motor cyclist 
injured by a badly maintained highway would have to meet this standard of 
proof equivalent to fault. 1 This rule gives rise to much difficulty. 
The defences open to the administration in case of public works 
liability are limited to "Lossenaa,'eure" (roughly equivalent to our 
common law concept of inevitable accident) 2  and the victim's own default. 
Act of a third party is not a defence (except where the third party is 
also the victim). This rule, which differs from the rule operating in 
the area of fault liability, also causes difficulty and, on occasion, 
injustice. 
A sociological survey of the cases entered in the Versailles tribunal 
in 1967-83 illustrates the respective importance of fault liability and 
1. Vedel op.cit., pp.404-5• 
2. Dragol Etude relative aux dicisions rendues par le tribunal administratif 
de Versailles au cours de ltannee judiciaire 1967-8 1 (1968)21 EDGE p.163 
at 180. 
3. Odent op.cit., pp.177-178 deals succinctly with this head and icasfortiatt 
or accidents whose cause cannot be discovered. 
58 
liability for public works. There were in all 148 claims of which 87 
(58.7%) succeeded. In the 82 cases where the grounds could be deter-
mined the grounds of the claim were: 36.58% fault (7.32% gross faults); 
and public works 35.36%. The authors estimated that about 3  of the 
cases actually depended. on fault. By way of contrast only 14.64% depended 
on liability without fault,of which 11 were cases of Equality liability 
and one of unspecified liability without fault. 
Originally derived from this liability of the administration for 
injury caused to third parties by public works, a limited incidence of 
risk liability was created by the caselaw of the Conseil d'Etat. The 
main heads today are: liability caused to third parties by the use of 
firearms by the police; and injury caused to those living in the neigh— 
bourhood by a dangerous activity or operation. 1  The last head rather 
surprisingly covers also the case of damage caused by delinquents escaping 
from approved schools and is discussed in greater detail below. The 
administration is also liable without fault in the case of riot damage 
(although this originates in a statutory scheme) 2 and in the curious case 
of liability to a person who is collaborating temporarily and on a 
voluntary basis with the administration in carrying out the functions of 
the public service. This liability originates in the more general obligation 
of the administration imposed by the celebrated Games decision to compen-
sate employees injured in industrial accident without proof of fault, 
today superseded by industrial injuries compensation. It is, therefore, 
only a residual liability, justifiable largely by the fact that a general 
1. Fromont, loc.cit., p.154 limits this class to explosions. This seems 
to be incorrect. 
2. Waline, op.cit., pp.867-8. 
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statutory duty exists under Article 63 of the Penal Code to render 
assistance to all those in need of help. Moral duties exist also to 
respond to requests for assistance by the administration e.g. in arresting 
Criminals, fighting fires or, where necessary, shooting wolves and 
letting off fireworks. 1 
One final head of liability derives from the principle of Equality 
before Public Charges. Two classes of case are comprised: liability for 
loss caused by the unequal operation of a statute (responsabilit6 du fait  
des lois) and loss caused by the application of a legal governmental 
decision in a particular case. Both classes derive originally from one 
decision, and in both classes only special, abnormal damage can be 
claimed. The rules of liability are complex and the caselaw is seldom 
applied. This category of liability is not treated in this chapter but 
is considered at length in Chapter 6. 
It is convenient to finish by summarising the cases of immunity 
already mentioned briefly in the first chapter. A category of Act of 
Government exists although it is extremely limited. Relationships between 
Parliament and the Executive are immune,as are important governmental 
policy acts (as e.g. the exercise of the prerogative of mercy). There 
is a limited immunity for the defence power and for acts done in the 
course of relationships with a foreign State. War damages are dealt with 
by statute, as are industrial injuries to public servants. This statutory 
liability, as we shall see, exhausts the common law liability of the State. 
1. Commune de Saint-Priest-de-Plaine C.E. 22 Nov.1946, Rec.279. See 
G.A. No.69 for a useful explanatory note. The difficulties in which 
this rule involves the court are manifold and some of the cases are 
discussed in Chapter 4. For particularly awkward cases see Min. des  
Finances c.Lemaire C.E. 24 June 1966, AJDA 1966 p.637 conclaertrand 
and Dame Muesser„ Veuve Lecompti, C.E. 3 March 1978 Alf , 1978, pp.210 1 
 232. 
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As a normal rule, also, there is no liability for loss caused by a 
judicial act whether an administrative or civil court is concerned. 1 
1. 	Fault: 
Turning to more detailed consideration of certain areas, it is 
convenient to begin with the relationship of personal liability with 
that of the administration. 
Modelled in both countries on the civil law, liability is inevitably 
based on personal and individual liability. This has resulted in the 
dominance of the fault principle, favourite of nineteenth century legal 
where 
theory,/individual responsibility was an article of faith embodying, as 
it did )the notion of free will. Fault liability was considered to be 
just. As Holmes said, it allowed a man "a fair chance to avoid doing 
the harm before he is held responsible for it." 2 
In France, the start of the nineteenth century saw 	fault 
elevated to the general principle of civil liability by Articles 1382 
and 1383. This was coupled with the vicarious liability of Article 1384 
which, as we have seen already, was capable of alternative explanations 
in terms of fault or guarantee. 3 The Blanco  decision adopted this same 
pattern. The judgment referred to the liability "which devolves upon the 
State ... through the act of persons who are employed in the public 
service." But in contrast to early decisions, where state liability was 
said to depend on whether the act complained of was "committed in the 
	4.11••••••1111 
1. Fromont, op.cit., contains a convenient summary of the heads of 
immunity. 
2. Holmes, The Common Law, 3rd edn. 1923, p.112. 
3. See above p.11, 
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exercise of the functions which the employees of the administration had 
been appointed (preposes) to carry out", 1 the Blanco formula cast doubt 
on the relevance of the civil law relationship of agent/principal to 
public law. It was said that the relationships of public servants with 
the administration, not being derived from contract, were unlike those 
of master and servant in private law. This development drove apologists 
of the system increasingly to deny tha private law origins of adminis-
trative liability. A further step towards separateness was taken by the 
Pelletier decision, which substituted for the civil law notion that the 
master is quit of liability where the servant/agent is acting outside 
the "course of his duty" or the "exercise of his functions", a distinction 
between "personal acts" and "acts of the service". This had the effect 
of recasting administrative liability in an impersonal and corporate 
mould. Liability was still fault liability, but the fault was a fault 
of tha system, a fault resulting "from the bad organisation or bad 
operation of a public service, together with those anonymous faults which 
cannot be attached to the personal actions of any specific official or 
group of officials." 2 Even today the Standard definition of faute de  
service is "a malfunctioning of the public service." 3 Only at a later 
stage when the concept of faute de service was expansively interpreted to 
overlap with personal fault, did the actor once more assume importance 
inside French administrative law. 
1. Manoury T.C. 20 May 1850, S1850.11.618. 
2. ()dent, op.cit., p.1083. 
3. Vedel, Droit administratif 5th edn. 1973 p.366. 
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At an early stage, therefore, French administrative law became 
vulnerable to the positivist objection that fault liability, being 
wholly personal in character l was inapplicable in the case of the State 
which, being a corporation, possessed no personality. 1 This highly 
artificial argument ignores the existence of "vast government offices 
full of human, and, therefore, fallible men." 2 It is also open to the 
objection that it is not specific to the Statenors, for that matter, to 
systems of public law. In fact a very similar doctrinal argument recurs 
in English law as the basis of the ultra vires tort doctrine which pre-
cludes the criminal or tortious liability of corporations (public or 
private) for acts committed in the course of an ultra vires activity. 3 
Theoretically pure though this doctrine may be, it ignores both the 
underlying purpose and the nature of vicarious liability, for which reason l 
 no doubt, the English courts have shown little affection for it.4 The 
French administrative courts have shown themselves equally unwilling to 
abandon fault liability on purist theoretical grounds. 
The corporate character of French administrative law may present 
a contrast to the civilian concept of vicarious liability; but the two 
systems have in common their objective definition of fault. IFaultlis 
a departure from a standard of conduct, a failure to take that care which 
a reasonable man would take in the circumstances, or in administrative 
law, departure from the standard set by "an officer of average competence." 5 
1. Duguit, Transformations, p.231. Contrast Michoud, "La responsabilite 
de l'Etat a raison des fautes de ses agents", R.D.P. 1895 p.401. And 
see Waline, Droit Administratif, 9th edn., 1963, NO. 1530. 
2. Laski, "The Responsibility of the State in England", (1919) 32 Harv. 
L.R. 447, 451. 
3. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts, 1967, p.383; Street, 
"The Liability of the State for Illegal Conduct of its Organs (Great 
Britain)", op.cit. above,pp.235-6. 
4. See Campbell v. Paddington Borough Council [1911] 1 K.B. 869. 
5. Benoit, Droit administratif, 1968, p.710. 
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The subjective 'duty of caret, on the other hand, is specific to English 
law. It- may or may not be a weakness, but if it is, it is a weakness 
in the English system rather than one attributable to the absence in 
England of a system of public law. 1 
On the other hand, specific to French administrative law is the 
creation of variant standards of liability. There axe certain activities, 
such as medical care, where courts will always demand negligence to be 
clearly shown, and occasionally epithets such as 'grave' or 'gross' fault 
and 'flagrant' or 'culpable' error appear: but in general neither French 
nor English civil law admit variations in the degree of fault or negligence. 2 
At the turn of the century,the Conseil d'Etat felt impelled to 
introduce a scale of liability. This ranged from 'faults of exceptional 
gravity', required e.g. in the case of wrongful detention in a mental 
hospital; and 'grave faults', defined as "those which ought never to be 
committed by an officer of average competence"; to 'simple fault' which 
"exceeds small, tolerable imperfections". 3 Initially the motive was to 
soften the shock to government of the imposition of pecuniary liability 
for the exercise of functions 	traditionally regarded as discretionary 
or political in character and forming part of the police power which had 
previously been sheltered by the doctrine of Sovereign immunity. When 
take 
1. Buckland "The Duty to/Care", (1935) 51 L.Q.R. 637, 639; Milner, 
Negligence in Modern Law, 1967, pp.27-28. 
2. Mazeaud at Tunc, Trait6thelorique et pratique de la Responsabilite'civile, 
1965, vol. 1 p.504. Cornu, op.cit., pp.235-242, denies that the con- 
cept of taaltamallaaumne has reintroduced the distinction. See 
also Marshall, "Liability for pure economic loss negligently caused -
French and English Law compared", (1975) 24 I.C.L.Q. 748, 783. For 
English law see Herrington v. British Railways Board L1972] 2 WLR 537,568 
and 574 and Southern Portland Cement Ltd. v. Coo er [1974] 2 WLR 152. 
For comparison see Harlow, "Fault Liability in French and English Public 
Law", (1976) 39 MLR 516. 
3. Benoit, loc.cit. 
64 
liability was first introduced in 1905, gross fault was chosen as the 
standard of liability. 1 A secondary motive was to avoid the risk of 
paralysing the operation of certain services whose work, like that of the 
police or fire services, was difficult and onerous. 2 
However laudable the motive, the practical effect was the gradual 
construction of an immensely complex system of liability. The intro-
duction of risk liability has served only to increase the complexity. 
In England the law has been greatly complicated by the absence of 
any attempt at codification. As we have remarked already, English law, 
in sharp contrast to French, consisted at the end of the last century of 
a limited number of disparate torts rather than of general principles of 
liabilityeWscholars were actually unable to agree whether the common law 
should be termed a law of "tort" or of "torts". 
The courts, influenced no doubt by the views of scholars of the 
calibre of Austin, Hblmes and Salmond, favoured fault liability. Academic 
legal writing was,however, descriptive and classificatory rather than 
critical and creative, 3 and the continental practice of analysing impor-
tant decisions in critical notes (arrgtisme). had not yet arrived. A gap 
opened between the practitioners and the academics, and the latter must 
accept some blame for their failure to offer any constructive prospectus 
for the law of tort. Ultimately, negligence became the rallying point for 
a modern law of tort, but the rigorous doctrine of precedent made progress 
1. Tomaso-Crecco C.E. Feb.10, 1905 Rec. 139 concl. Romieu. 
2. Clef C.E. Mar 13, 1925 R.D®P. p.274 concl. Rivet. 
3. See Harari, The Place of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 1962 p.21 0 
 See also Winfield, The Province of the Law of Tortsda purely classi-
facatory work. 	 1931, 
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painfully slow and uneven. False starts and blunders could only with 
difficulty be removed from the law. Indeed, as late as 1970, when a 
leading member of the House of Lords referred to the rule in Donoghue v.  
Stevenson as a general principle of liability to be applied unless com-
pelling reasons to the contrary existed, one of his brethren contested 
the point on the ground that there could be no liability in the absence 
4 of a precedent bearing on the same or a readily comparable fact situation. 
A system which regarded precedent as merely illustrative of general 
principle could have circumnavigated such difficulties with greater 
assurance. 
The fragmentary nature of the law of torts and the grave lacunae 
which existed in the law of negligence naturally had its repercussions 
on the liability of public authorities. An attempt to classify the legal 
liability of public authorities as it existed in the early years of the 
century revealed that this was virtually an impossible task as the rules 
lacked both rhyme and reason. 2 Amongst the graver deficiencies which 
the 
went to make up/general disarray one might stress: the absence of any 
general liability for negligent mis—statements; 3  the unsatisfactory rule 
by which liability could not normally be founded on an omission to act 
(nonfeasance) or a failure to exercise a statutory power; 4 the general com-
plexity of the law in respect of breaches of statutory duty and the general 
1. Dorset Yacht v. Home Office [1970] 2 WLR 1140, 1146 (Lord Reid) con-
firmed Anns v. Merton L.B.C. [1977] 2 WLR 1024,1032 (Lord Wilberforce); 
See contra, Viscount Dilhorne loc.cit., at p.1160 e.s. For a general 
account of the evolution of negligence, see Milner, op.cit. above. 
2. Robinson, The Legal Liability of Public Authorities, op.cit. ; above. 
3. Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co. [1951] 2 K.B.164 was reversed by Hedley  
Byrne v. Heller L1964J A.C. 465. 
4. Moore ? "Misfeasance and. Nonfeasance in the Liability of Public Officers" 
/415; (191 4) 30 L.Q.R.276,/East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent [1941] A.C. 74 partially disapproved in Anns v. Merton L.B.C. L1977 .1 2 WLR 1024. 
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unwillingness of the courts to allow that a common law duty of care 
might be superimposed on statutory duty. 1  One must add that, until 
recently, purely economic interests were poorly protected by the law of 
torts. 2 
2. 	Vicarious Liability  
I have already stated that the first movement for the introduction 
of public law rules of liability to cure existing deficiencies in the law 
of tort was triggered off by Crown immunity and that the passage of the 
Crown Proceedings Act did not cure all these defects. I have also 
remarked 	that the equation of the Crown with a "private person" 
(s.2(1) ) is a fundamental misconception since the Crown is a corporate 
entity, and, by limiting liability to the case where a good cause of action 
exists against an identifiable individual, the Act distinguishes the 
Crown from other corporate bodies who can be, and are increasingly, held 
responsible for breaches of primary duties of care originating (for the 
most part) in statute. Liability for a defective "system" 3 might there-
fore be precluded in the case of the Crown4— although, by the 
device of fixing liability on an individual or group of individuals in 
the public service, (as was done, for example, in the Vehicle and General 
Affair)5 this difficulty could be circumvented, even if the solution seems 
somewhat inequitable. 
1. Street on Torts, 6th edn. 1976 Ch.14 gives a general account. 
2. S.C.M. (U.K.)Ltd.v. Whittall [1971] 1 Q ,B 337; Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd.  
v. Martin L1973_1 Q.B. 27; Craig, "Negligent Misstatements, Negligent Acts 
and Economic Loss", (1976) 92 L.Q.R.213; Fleming 	' James "Limitations 
in Liability for Economic Loss caused by Negligence", (1972) 12 J.S.P.T.L. 
(N.S.) 105. 
3. As in ReaLit_cssadonaRt [1938] 4 All ER 633; Ministry Lliousing and 
Local Government v. Sharp [1970] 2 WLR 802. 
4. Street, op.cit., 1967 pp.233-5, 238. But the position of the Crown with 
regard to Statute is itself very confused; zee Street, "The Effect of 
Statutes upon the Rights and Liabilities of the Crown" (1948) 7 Univ.of 
Toronto L.J. 357, Town Investments v. Min. of Ehvironment [1977] 2 WLR 450. 
Report of Inquiry into the Collapse of the Vehicle & General Insurance Co. 
H.C.133 (1971-72), discussed below p./39, 
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The relationship of master and servant is defined by s.2(6) in 
terms of payment from the Consolidated Fund combined with appointment 
by the Crown; this again is a test less generous than those applied to 
less exalted employers and one which is capable of causing difficulty. 
It can be criticised, because it leaves unresolved the relationship 
between the Crown and other, quasi—independent public corporations; 1 
although, since no such corporation has as yet proved incapable of meeting 
its financial liabilities, this problem may be academic rather than real. 
Indeed, all these are trivial points. 
But vicarious liability does pose one serious, theoretical problem 
in the case of public authorities. According to the so called "independent 
discretion" rule, there can be no vicarious liability for torts committed 
in the exercise of statutory or common law duties or powers vested 
specifically in the servant and not the master. This fundamentally mis-
taken proposition may originate in "master's tort" theories of vicarious 
liability which depend on the fiction of implied command and therefore 
base vicarious liability on the master's right to control the servant. 3 
Alternatively, the rule may be an illustration of a more general, though 
equally fallacious, line of reasoning which denies that there can ever be 
vicarious liability for a breach of statutory duty. 4 Whatever its origins, 
the rule has been responsible in its time for some extremely hard cases. 
1. Griffith, "Public Corporations as Crown Servants", (1952) 9 Univ. of 
Toronto L.J. 169: Tamlin v. Hannaford [1950] 1 K.B.18. 
2. Hogg, op.cit., p.102 e.s,;Atiyah, op.cit., p.76; Stanbury v. Exeter 
Corp. [1905] 2 K.B. 838. 
3. Glanville Williams, "Vicarious Liability: Tort of the Master or of the 
Servantr(l956) 72 L.Q.R.522; Turberville v. Stampe (1698)Ld. Raym.264; 
Tobin v.  R. (1864) 16 B.N.S. 310; Fowles v. Eastern and Australian 
Steamship Co. [1914] 17 C.L.R. 149. 
4. Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co.Ltd. .0 .. Long (1957) 97 CLR 
36; Harrison v. National Coal Board  L1951j A.C.339; National Coal Board 
v. England  11954] A.C. 403; 	v. Shatwell [1965j A.C.656; Hogg (op. 
cit. pp.102-4) believes the rule can no longer be removed from Australian 
law, but the case is not the same for England where the reasoning is 
contained in obiter dicta. 
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Prior to the Police Act 1964 (Section 48(2)(b)), for example, a police 
constable for the purposes of the law of tort was a "servant without a 
master": the Crown,to which his primary allegiance lay, did not pay or 
appoint him; the local authority had no right to "control" the indepen-
dent exercise of his discretionary powers; and the chief constable was 
merely a fellow servant, albeit a hierarchical superior, who could not 
be vicariously liable. 1 In cases of wrongful arrest or malicious pro-
secution, therefore, both plaintiff and defendant were placed in an 
untenable position; the former faced the possibility of an insolvent 
defendant, the latter the possibility of a very real financial respon-
bility which he could not shuffle off by a plea of superior orders. 2 
Only the arguably unlawful3 practice of the police authority in standing 
behind its servants mitigated this dilemma. 
That the difficulty might occasionally prove a very real one capable 
of causing genuine hardship is illustrated by a queer Canadian case. 4 
Here an action was brought against the municipality as employer of a 
certain 'Noxious Weeds Inspector', who, in the exercise of his functions, 
had somehow managed to start a fire which spread to the plaintiff's land. 
The munkipality was found not to be liable for the damage caused by the 
fire on the ground that the inspector was carrying out statutory functions 
1. Fisher v. Oldham Corp. [1930] 2 KB 364; A-G for New South Wales v.  
Perpetual Trustee Co. [1955] A.C.457; Enaver v. R. (1906) 3 C.L.R. 969; 
1 Ch.73. See generally Marshall, Police and Government, the status 
and accomtability of the English Constable, 1965, Ch.7. 
2. Glinski v. McIver [1962] A.C. 726. 
30 Pollard, "The Police Act, 1964" [1966] P.L. 35, 56. 
4. Mead v. Marquis Rural Municipality (1928) 2 D.L.R.524. See also 
Raleigh v. Goschen 1.1898j 1 Ch.73. 
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imposed by the legislature in the general public interest from which 
the municipality derived no special benefit. The duty rested on himself 
personally and it was immaterial that he was employed by the municipality. 
The plaintiff therefore failed in his action against the only solvent 
defendant, the employer. 
These are, of course, exceptional cases, the effect of which is 
likely to be minimised in practice by the good sense of public authorities 
and insurers alike. In a leading modern case, 1 for example, an action 
for negligence and breach of statutory duty was brought against the 
local Registrar of Land, together with one of his clerks and the local 
authority as employer. Lord Denning M.R. suggested that the local 
authority might not, on the facts, be vicariously liable. The clerk 
had been, for the purposes of maintaining the register, seconded to the 
staff of the Registrar. The Registrar himself was probably covered by 
the 'independent discretion' rule and the council was therefore not 
liable: 
"The local land registrar is their 
clerk, but he is not, in this respect, 
under their control. In keeping the 
register and issuing the certificates, 
he is not acting for the council. He 
is not carrying out their duties on 
their behalf. He is carrying out his 
own statutory duties on his own behalf. 
So he himself is responsible for breach 
of those duties and not the council: 
seenl2y tSta Ze-....tez....x Cororat 	[1905] 
2 K.B. 838." 
The council and its insurers, however, refused to take this point. 
Lord Denning M.R. congratulated them for their good sense and generosity, 
Which leaves one wondering why he himself chose to breathe new life into 
1. Minister of Housi and Local Government v. Shar. [1970] 2 W.L.R. 802, 
815 Lord Denning M.R. . 
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this unloved principle rather than to leave it buried in decent oblivion, 
as his fellow judges preferred to do. 
For a number of reasons, neither public authorities nor the Crown 
nor insurers are likely to stand on the letter of the law here. Legal 
rules seems to have once more lost touch with reality. In the case of 
the public service, staff regulations (S.C.paras 2701-2711) provide that 
officers against whom writs are issued must report the proceedings to 
the departmental solicitor to ascertain the Department's views. If the 
Department believes that the act complained of fell within "the scope of 
the officer's employment", the Department takes over the defence. But 
the Treasury Solicitor's department, which is usually consulted, does not 
take the line that the Crown should stand strictly on its legal rights and 
I am informed that it has often stood behind civil servants in cases which 
were not strictly covered by the legal rules of vicarious liability. 
Similar regulations govern local authorities. The standing regulations 
of the Greater London Council, for example, provide that actions "brought 
against a member of staff arising out I the discharge of his official duties" 
are to be reported. The employees of local authorities are insured by 
their employers who form a powerful consumer group and any attempt by 
insurers to stand on a technical point such as the 'independent discretion' 
rule would no doubt be considered a departure from the "gentlemen's 
agreement"which governs recuxsory actions against employees. 1 In any 
event, the interested unions have told me that they have "no experience 
of such cases, a statement which is confirmed by the actions of insurer 
and employer in the Sharp case. 
	•••■•••■■■•••••• 	
1. Discussed below, Ch. 3. 
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Commentators, however, judge the efficacy of a legal system by 
the formal rules rather than the informal practices which lie behind it 
and thetindependent discretion' rule is open to criticism. It leaves 
the employee in an exposed position while at the same time allowing too 
much discretionary latitude to public authorities. This is particularly 
dangerous where the court is not properly informed about, and cannot 
take notice of, insurance practice. It has been suggested that public 
authorities may shelter behind their officers and that the officer's 
lonely position may attract judicial sympathy dausing loss to be allo-
cated to the victim instead of the public authority. Thus the rule, 
which is theoretically unsound because of the hardship which could be 
caused,has fuelled a protest movement - stronger in the United States 
and the Commonwealth than in the United Kingdom - against exceptional 
4 cases of personal liability such as we have been discussing. The problem 
with Anglo-American law is said to be that we have an unhappy compromise 
between personal and corporate liability. The real alternatives are 
(i) true personal ligbility, where liability rests on the employee who 
must, like any car owner, insure against it; or (ii) a system of institutional 
or corporate liability in which the employer pays and is responsible for 
insuring his employees. 2 For those who prefer the second solution - which 
is in many ways less logical - the French principle of faute de service  
seems attractive. ' Certainly it is true that the reasoning of the 'independent 
discretion rule' would not appeal to a French public lawyer as the following 
passage indicates: 
I. Pannam, "Torts under Unconstitutional Statute", (1966) 5 Melb.Univ.L.R. 
113. The problem has been much greater in the United States; see 
Jennings, "The Tort Liability of Administrative Officers" (1936) 21 Minn. 
L.R. 263; Davis, Administrative Law Treatise Ch. 26. 
2. Pannam, op.cit. above. 
3. Schwarz, French Administrative Law and the Common Law World, 1954, 
pp.287-8. 
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"The measure of independence enjoyed 
by an official in the exercise of his 
functions does not prevent the authority 
on whose behalf he exercises his functions 
from being liable for his acts. The State 
is responsible for a modest subaltern in 
the same way as for an academic or a research 
scientist who are virtually independent in 
the organisation of their teaching or research 
The State is after all liable for the acts 
even of Ministers of State. But Ministers 
are not subject to control by superiors, 
it is they who exercise it."' 
But this is hardly the end of the argument even on this limited 
point of 'independent discretion', because, as I have suggested above, 
the 'independent discretion' rule is not a foregone conclusion even in 
English law. It springs really from a misguided use of the 'control' test 
of vicarious liability according to which the master is not liable where 
he cannot exercise control over the way in which the servant performs 
his duties. This in turn derives from the 'master's tort' theory of 
vicarious liability. 
A series of cases on hospitals show that the common law can cir-
cumvent this particular difficulty in two ways: first, by allowing the 
'control' test to be superseded by more modern tests, such as the 'integration 
test' (explained below) or the distinction between a 'contract of service' 
and a 'contract for services'. This is in fact the trend of modern 
English law. 2 The second way round is to impose liability for a defective 
system. This, of course, is the solution seemingly adopted in the concept 
of faute de service. What the hospital cases show us is that English law 
can reach this second solution as easily as French administrative law. 
They show us also that the French distinction between personal faults and 
1. Chilloux et Isaad—Slimane T.C. March 25, 1957, S 1957.196 concl. 
Chardeau. 
2. Street on Torts, pp.418-9. 
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'fautes de service' does not automatically solve the problems posed 
by the 'control' test. Indeed, the historical development of the 
hospital cases in France and England shows striking parallels. 
The 'control' test of vicarious liability proved, from the outset, 
unsuitable for the area of medical liability because of the exalted view 
of their own clinical independence taken by medical practitioners. At 
first, however, this was not appreciated by the courts. In France 4 it 
may be largely an accident of history that acts of clinical judgment came 
to be defined as personal acts; 1  in England, the original motive of the 
courts appears to have been to spare the funds of charitable organisations 
(an idea which takes us back in time to the turnpike trustees). 
In Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital 2 an action was brought 
against the trustees of a charity hospital in respect of the negligence 
of a visiting surgeon. The action failed on the ground that the surgeon 
was neither employed by the hospital nor subject to the control of the 
trustees. But such a solution effectively confined the liability of 
hospital authorities for medical staff to cases of peripheral accidents 
such as the carelessness of a nurse in spilling a cup of tea. It was 
rejected, therefore, as absurd and unjust. 3 A. new test of 'integration 
1. The caselaw is collected in Chilloux et Isaad-Slimane (above). Much 
of the original caselaw antedates the growth of State hospitals. 
Furthermore, the cases were being used for two purposes. One line of 
cases dealt with the boundary between the civil and administrative 
jurisdiction. The caselaw of each jurisdiction tends to be at variance, 
as each hierarchy stretched the law in order to alleviate the position 
of the plaintiff, who might otherwise be nnnsuited and have to start 
again in the other jurisdiction. The second line of cases in the civil 
courts deals with the vicarious liability of the hospital authority. 
The two lines of caselaw therefore diverge. This is a recurrent problem 
in this area: see generally, Douc-Rasy, Les Frontie4 de la faute per-
sonnelle et de la faute de service en droit administratif francais, 1963. 
2. [1909] 2 K.B. 820. 
3. Credit is usually given to an extremely influential article by Professor 
Goodhart"Hospitals and Trained Nurses" (1938) 54 L.Q.R. 553. 
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into the service! was substituted. Where the patient finds "a depart-
ment equipped with suitable apparatus and a whole-time employee engaged 
to give the treatment", independent clinical judgment is irrelevant and 
there will be vicarious liability. 1  Today it is probable that only in 
the case that the patient selects or employs the consultant will the 
hospital escape liability. 2 
An exactly similar progression has been seen in France. Clinical 
negligence was at first seen as a personal fault for which the practitioner 
was alone answerable. But the caselaw was not entirely consistent. In 
1957, the Tribunal des Conflits made a thorough examination of the 
question to resolve the jurisdictional issue. The Government Commissioner, 
M. Chardeau, discussed the nature of clinical judgment at some length. 3 
He concluded that the 'independent discretion' of a doctor was not 
different in kind from that of a Minister or any other senior adminis-
trative official. An error of clinical judgment was not a personal fault, 
Indeed, if it were to be considered as such, then 
"... the liability of the hospital 
service would operate only in case 
of the administrative formalities of 
admission of patients; diet; maintenance 
of buildings and equipment; and the acts 
of the auxiliary staff to the exclusion 
of all medical staff. That is to say, 
only the ancillary, inessential aspects 
of the hospital service would be covered. 
Yet the essential purpose, indeed, the 
1. Gold v. Essex County Council [1942] 2 K.B.293, 303 (Lord Greene M.R.). 
2. Cassidy v. Minister of Health [1951] 2 K.B.343, 362 (Denning L.J.). 
The consultant, who will obviously be insured, will here be contrac-
tually liable. See Street on Torts, p.419. 
3. Chilloux et Isaad-Slimane T.C. 22 Mar, 1958, S 1957.196 concl. Chardeau, 
quoted above. 1):12,. 
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very object of the hospital service 
is the treatment of patients: ..." 
The error of clinical judgment was held to be a fault for which the 
hospital service was liable and the jurisdiction of the administrative 
courts confirmed. 
This is not the end of the line of cases, because in France, too, 
the private practitioner may avail himself of the facilities of state 
owned hospitals and the liability of the hospital authorities must and 
somewhere. At the present moment, the line seems to be drawn in the same 
place as by English law, i.e., where the private patient selects and 
employs his own consultant. This is discussed in a very interesting case 
in which the 'Government Commissioner wished to go farther than the Con—
seil dtEtat would allow. 1 
The plaintiff had suffered injury during treatment in the tclinique  
ouvertet of a public hospital, in which patientslitwe free to choose and 
pay their own practitioner, who utilised the hospital facilities. The 
Government Commissioner favoured imposing liability on the State. He 
argued that the clinic was an "indissoluble part" of the public service; 
the telinigue ouverte® system was merely the most effective way of 
organising the public hospital service. The court rejected this argument, 
confining the liability of the State to cases in which either the premises 
or equipment were shown to be defective, or where a member of the per-
manent hospital staff was shown to be negligent. In such a case "a mal-
functioning of the public service" would be shown. In the instant case, 
however, the consultant had been both selected and employed by the patient 
and could not be shown, in the English terminology, to be "integrated into 
the work of the hospital." 
1. H6pital de Pont—I4lousson C.E. 4 June 1965, D.1965.746 n. Piquemal; 
AJDA 1965.11.410 coml. Galmot. 
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To turn to the second way around the difficulties of the control 
test, this should pose no theoretical difficulties for French law where 
pule de service is defined as 'a malfunctioning of the public service". 
The idea of a 'fault in the system' has two advantages in the area of 
medical liability. First, it exonerates the doctor from a finding of 
gross fault which will damage his professional reputation. Secondly, 
it helps the plaintiff who will not have to work through the medical 
hierarchy to identify (i) the wrongdoer and (ii) the person able to 
control the wrongdoer's acts, 	1 at law the person vicariously 
liable. In the Isaad Slimane case, the Government Commissioner said of 
this difficulty: 
"From a practical standpoint, with the 
complexity of modern medicine, parti-
cularly surgery, the liability of the 
medical 'team' forms a whole. Often 
it will be impossible to find the author 
of the fault. If a patient dies in the 
course of an operation, is the fault to 
be imputed to the intern who operates, 
the consultant who is present or the 'boss". 
who has given permission for the operation 
in the first place?... If a duty surgeon 
in refusing to operate is guilty of a 
clinical fault (i.e. a personal fault) is 
he to take on his back the error of the 
medical student who agreed to operate in 
his place? Because that is virtually the 
position here; the widower has impleaded 
the chief medical officer, the surgeon and 
the midwife; if the civil court had proceeded 
to a decision on the merits,how would they 
have divided liability between these three ...?" 
By basing liability on a faute de service, a primary duty to pro-
vide an efficient system was laid on the hospital authorities. It was 
not necessary to work out exactly how the patient, a young woman who had 
died in childbirth, had come to die nor to identify the medical officer 
primarily responsible. 
7 7 
In Jones v. Manchester Corporation)  an English court faced with 
a similar problem reached an identical conclusion. A. young and very 
inexperienced anaesthetist caused an accident during an operation and 
the hospital claimed an indemnity from her. The Court of Appeal held 
that the hospital which had permitted such an inexperienced doctor to 
operate was a jioint tortfeasor and could claim only if the court thought 
it equitable. 	In the instant case the court thought the 
hospital wholly to blame for its defective service. The indemnity action 
was therefore disallowed. In *tayntCocilCollinsv.Her - 	C uncil, 2 
Hilbery J. spoke of a hospital's "own responsibility for its own negligent 
system" and based liability on the fact that it had permitted " a system 
to be in operation which was dangerous and negligent." This is in 
effect to substitute for vicarious liability a non-delegable duty of care, 
a development by no means confined to this area of medical liability, 
but gaining ground throughout the law of tort. 
I have not intended in citing these medical cases to state the 
most recent law on the liability of doctors and hospitals but simply to 
illustrate the proposition that vicarious liability and plate de service,, 
however different they may seem at the theoretical level, in practice 
yield rather similar results. There is a simple reason for this which 
becomes clearer if we examine a passage from the conclusions of M. Blum 
in the Lemonnier case 7 3  the classic decision on the concurrence of a 
1. [1952] 2 All E.R. 125. 
2. [1947] K.B. 598. See now Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensi on Hos ital. 
Management Committee [1969 1 Q.B. 428. And see the report of an inquiry 
into the death in hospital of a child through an overdose of drugs 
settled by the hospital and the Medical Defence Union for E500. The 
report stated that the blame for the mistakes could not be attributed to 
any one individual but that the paediatric team as a whole must bear the 
responsibility. The Times, June 9, 1975. 
3. C.E. 26 July 1918, S 1918-19.111.41 coml. Blum n. Hauriou. 
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personal fault with a faute de service. The Government Commissioner said: 
"Public bodies are not vicariously 
liable. Vicarious liability is a 
secondary, guarantor's liability. which 
presupposes the primary liability of the 
agent, author of the damage. But this is 
precisely what the combined caselaw of, 
the Conseil d'Etat and the Tribunal des 
ConflitS excludes. The State is liable, 
not secondarily as employer, but in its 
primary capacity as director of the 
service." 
Why does this have to be so? After all, the civil law and the 
common law of England have no difficulty in casting the State in the role 
of employer. The reason is jurisdictional: 
"The jurisdiction of the civil courts can 
Ipranbe exercised in exceptional cases 
:',where the personal fault can be isolated 
or completely detached from the service; 
and the administrative fault, which can 
only be a faute de service, lies ordinarily 
in the jurisdiction of the administrative 
courts." 
Any admission that the liability of the State is vicarious in 
character might imperil this jurisdictional demarcation. The Government 
Commissioner therefore blandly assures us that the liability of the 
State "is in no way based on Article 1384 of the Civil Code." 
Here M. Blum is not being entirely honest because, as we have seen, 
administrative liability was initially derived from the Civil Code. More 
important, the corporate liability of the State resembles vicarious 
liability because it too is a legal fiction which masks a "guarantor's 
liability". "The hospital authorities", in Denning L.J.'s Phrase, "have 
no ears to listen through the stethoscope,and no hands to hold the surgeon's 
knife." 1 State hospitals are not manned by robots; they are manned like 
1. 	 idly v. 	[1951] 2 K.B. 343, 360. 
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Laskits government offices, by human and fallible agents. Vicarious 
liability has another and more fundamental purpose than that which Malum 
was considering. Vicarious liability exists to mark the limits of 
liability of the employer or the State for its agents. In other words 
it informs the State for whose actions it is liable and in what circum-
stances it is liable for those actions. Had M. Blum been addressing his 
mind to this aspect of the question, he would have seen that vicarious 
liability and faute de service were both fulfilling the identical function 
of guarantee. 
Implicit in the argument that vicarious liability is unsuited to 
public law and should be replaced by the concept of faute de service, 
is the suggestion that these two concepts differ substantially. Yet 
Waline feels it safe to conclude that, today, 
"Each public body (collectivite) is 
liable for those persons in respect 
of whom a relationship similar to 
that of principal and agent exists." 
This is the relationship required for vicarious liability in French civil 
law. 
In doubtful cases the "control" test of civil law constantly recurs. 
A lorry used for departmental business but driven by an (unlicensed) 
employee of central government causes an accident. The State can be 
liable only if the driver deliberately disobeys an instruction or is in 
flagrant breach of duty. 2 Otherwise, the department which issues instructions 
1. Droit administratif, 9th edn.1963, pp.828-9; for a more detailed account 
which reaches the same conclusioni see Chapus, op.cit., pp.256-7. 
2. Minisiere des travaux ublics c. Cie des Assurances"La Providenceet 
1'Allier'C.E.21 Dec 1966 Rec. 683 concl. Galabert. Compare Mersey Docks  
& Harbour Board v. Coggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd. L1947J A.C.1. 
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as to what work is to be done and how it is to be carried out is liable. 
Again ? a municipality cannot be held liable for the acts of a member of the 
public assisting in fighting a fire if he causes a car accident on his way 
to the scene before he has taken any effective part in the firefighting 
activities. At this stage he has not submitted himself to the 'direction' 
of the fire service. 1 
One series of cases did suggest that the Conseil d'Etat had veered 
away from the test of "exercise of functions" or "course of duty", 
substituting an allegedly wider test of "link with the service" or "act 
severable from the service". The probable motive was to circumvent the 
difficulty that crimes and deliberate wrongdoing had originally been 
classified as personal faults for which the State could not be liable. 2 
The new test was used successfully to establish that the State could be 
liable for the driver of a public service vehicle who was inebriated or 
unlicensed (both criminal offences); or who deliberately deviated from 
the route or used his vehicle for private purposes. 3 Obviously, however, 
there is nothing fundamentally novel in such a proposition. The common 
law, too has had gradually to adapt itself to the realisation that criminal 
acts may simply be wrongful ways of carrying out one's duties and to 
accept that there may be vicarious liability for deliberate wrongdoing. 4 
Once this point had been established by the administrative courts in France, 
the Conseil deliberately allowed the law to drift back to the civilian 
test 5 a trend accelerated no doubt by the transfer of large blocks of 
1. Cie d' Assurances "L'Urbaine et la Seine" C.E. 22 Mar 1957 Rec 200. 
2. Douc—Rasy, op.cit., above, pp.29-56. 
3. Mimeur Defaux et Besthelsemer C.E. 18 Nov 1949 Rec 492. 
4. Compare, for example, 	 yLlodv.Grace.Smith [1912] A.C.716, with .122.12.21. 
C.E. 21 April 1937 Rec 413. See also Century Insurance Co.Ltd.  
Northern Ireland Road Trans ort Board 1942J A.C. 509 and Williams v. 
Hem hill 1966 S.C. H.L. 31. For fuller discussion see Atiyah, op.cit. 
pp. 2- 5. 
See the useful note in G.A. pp.319-323. 
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jurisdiction to the civil courts and the obvious preference of the 
legislature for the civilian terminology. 1 Today it is even possible 
that the test of "link with the service" is wholly superseded. 2 
The Lemonnier conclusions raise another point. M. Blum calls 
vicarious liability "a guarantor's liability". We have seen, however, 
that vicarious liability originated in the idea of the'masterls.fault' 
and English law was slow to depart from this conception. At a period 
when this idea dominated the common law one would expect to find that 
Ifaute de service' was more extensive than the corresponding common law 
concept. But the guarantee theory has long ago carried the day. Today 
vicarious liability is more often than not seen as a vehicle for allocation 
of losses to those with !deep pockets' not to say a bridge between fault 
and risk. The administration with its apparently bottomless purse comes 
increasingly into the firing line. The frontiers of vicarious liability 
are pushed forward and it blends into corporate liability for breach of 
primary duties. This is precisely the trend which we are witnessing in 
England today. 
Fault and Risk 
Fault liability satisfied nineteenth century jurisprudential 
criteria and embodied the prevailing moral values of the community; the 
practical results of the system were,howaver,far from universally commend-
able. Strict liability, rejected as an anachronistic archaism, might at 
times produce results unduly harsh to defendants: fault liability, on 
1. A case which illustrates the difficulties caused by the interplay 
of these various factors is Societghospitaliere d'assurances mutuelles  
c. Heritiers Assemat C.E. 5 Feb 1975, AJDA 1976, p.100 n. Moderne. 
2. See Min. des Armges c Cie d'assurances "La Pro anceet Ste des labora-
toires Berthier-Merol C.E. 5 Nov 1976, AJDA 1977.365 Chr. Nauwelaers 
et Fabius. 
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the other hand, frequently resulted in the cost of accidents resting 
on individual victims, an equally inequitable result. 
Industrialisation,together with the development of railways and 
later: the petrol engine lrapidly transformed the law of tort into a 
vehicle for the compensation of accident victims. The growth of cor-
porate enterprise (and at a later date of liability insurance) emphasised 
the inequality inherent in allowing the individual victim to bear the 
full cost of accidents. The natural consequence was a doctrinal move-
ment which dellande4Strict liability, at least in the case of industrial 
accident. The risk of accident was a loss which should be offset against 
the profits afthe enterprise responsible for the accident; corporate 
enterprise should no longer be permitted to harvest the rich profits 
created in some cases by individual suffering. 1 
It is important to stress the international character of this 
movement. The Conseil d'Etat, relatively unencumbered by accretions of 
caselaw or by strict doctrines of precedent, was well placed to give 
expression to the "doctrinal movement created by the unceasing development 
of mechanisation"2 but it was by no means alone in wishing to do so. 
Indeed, at the time of the celebrated Games decision, Workmen's Compen-
sation legislation was already before the Senate, and the Conseil d'Etat 
merely anticipated the legislation. 
1. See Ballantine, "A compensation plan for railway accident claims", (1916) 
29 Ham.. L.R. 705; Laski, "The basis of vicarious liability", (1916) 
26 Yale L.J. 105; Lawson, Negligence in the Civil Law, p.44 es.; Douglas, 
"Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk", (1928) 38 Yale L.J. 
584. See also De Sitter c. L'Etat beige s189o.4.18 n. Labbe. 
2. Report of M. Le Marc 'hadour in Jand'heur 13 Feb 1930 D.P. 1930.1.57; 
Lawson, loc.cit., gives a full account. 
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In Games 1 a workman injured by an accident in a State arsenal 
claimed damages for personal injury. The civil courts had recently 
stipulated that, to succeed, the worker must prove fault. 2 In Games the 
cause of the accident was not clear, though by a presumption of fault, 
irrebuttable or rebuttable, the Conseil could have circumvented this 
obstacle. But the Conseil refused to equivocate, It declared boldly for 
liability without proof of fault and on the basis of risk. 
The case seemed the precursor of a general move in administrative 
law from fault to risk which, had it materialised, would have been truly 
innovatory. The precedents seemed to exist in the shape of legislation: 
a law of the Revolutionary period designed to provide compensation for 
losses caused to private property by the execution of public works; laws 
of 1831 and 1853 providing for military and civilian invalidity pensions 
and the new Workmen's Compensation legislation of 1897. Moreover, the 
climate, was favourable. In a note praising the Games decision, Hauriou 
made two points. First, the decision in Hauriou's view justified the 
existence of the separate administrative jurisdiction because the court 
had pushed the legislature down a path which it had hesitated to take. 
This point is interesting because several later cases in which the Conseil 
d'Etat has imposed strict liability have been quickly followed by govern-
ment intervention. This reminds us of the genesis of the Conseil d'Etat 
as a forcing house for administrative reform, a role in which our English 
courts would be anxious not to cast themselves, though individual judges 
from time to time have accepted the challenge. Hauriou's second point 
1. C.E. 21 June 1895, S1897.3.33 concl. Romieu n. Hauriou. 
2. 19 July 1870, D.R.1870,.1.361-. In 16 June 1896 D.P.1897.I.433 the civil 
courts created a presumption of fault subject to strictly limited defences; 
in Jand'heur (above) they moved to strict liability. 
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is theoretical. He calls the decision 
"an illustration of the general theory 
of administrative risk which seems to 
be the basis of State liability in every 
case of injury resulting from the operation 
of the public administration." 
That the Conseil d'Etat may also have been thinking along these 
lines was suggested by the case of Olivier et Zimmerman / (discussed in 
the previous Chapter) in which it was stated that the Prefect's decision 
to invoke the administrative privilege of executing a decision without 
awaiting the outcome of a judicial hearing (la decision prealable) was 
of such significance that it could be taken only "at the risk and peril 
of the administration." Although Hauriou approved this decision, calling 
the power "the great prerogative of the State", he seems to have analysed 
the abuse of power as a faute de service. When the Conseil d'Etat 
reverted to fault liability in the subsequent case of Tomaso Grecco, 2 
Hauriou approved this decision, too: 
"We are very struck ... by the fidelity 
of the Conseil d'Etat to the fault con,- 
cept and we are tempted to wonder whether, 
in fact, the caselaw is not in better case 
than the doctrine and whether the writers 
have not been a bit too much influenced by 
a wish to brush to one side a civil law 
theory [i.e. fault] which seemed to carry 
with it the implication that the civil 
courts were the competent jurisdiction." 
Thus, the swing from fault to risk projected by the theorists 
never took place and by the time the Conseil d'Etat in 1919 3 made a further 
foray into the field by introducing the principle of "abnormal risk falling 
1. C.E. 27 Feb 1903, S 1905.111.17 n. Hauriou (and above p.3 1 ). 
2. C.E. 10 & 17 Feb 1905, S 1905.111.1113 n. Hauriou. 
3. Regnault—Desroziers C.E. 28 Mar 1919, S 1918-19.111.25 n. Hauriou 
(discussed more fully below). 
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upon those who lived in the neighbourhood of a hazardous enterpriseP 
Hauriou castigated the decision as twenty years out of date. His 
reasoning is once more of interest. Hauriou believed that the decision 
was a cross between the nuisance liability of civil law, which — like 
strict liability in administrative law for travaux publics — catered for 
damage to property but not personal injuries; 1 and the industrial injuries 
cases. This hybrid could be justified only if the Conseil d'Etat would 
adopt risk liability generally. But Hauriou did not recommend this. Risk 
liability was a slippery slope and it was unfashionable. "We are bored 
with new schools of legal theory and realist schools and new philosphies 
and objective theories." In Hauriouls view, the imposition of risk 
liability was a legislative, not a judicial, prerogative; it was justified 
was 
only when the risk ./ exceptional; when the victims needed exceptional 
protection; or when the enterprise in question could afford to insure. 
Hauriou never again changed his view2  and I have cited his note at some 
length because there is so much good sense in it and because it seems so 
modern. 
Nor did the Conseil change its view, although the leading commen-
tators never ceased to urge (i) that it had done just this and that risk 
was now the general principle of liability, or (ii) that it ought to 
do so. 3 But to summarise very briefly, risk liability is still exceptional 
in French public law. To repeat the cases in which it exists today, 
these comprise certain cases of loss caused by public works; the wholly 
exceptional case of injury to a member of the public who is assisting on 
1. Compare the extension of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher to personal 
injuries discussed Street' p.255 where the conflicting authorities are 
listed. 
2. Sfez, Essai sur la contribution,du doyen Hauriou au_ droit administratif 
francais /  1966 pp.147-154. s  
3. E.g. Berlia, "Les fondements de la responsabilite eivile en droit public 
fran?ais", 1951 RDP, p.685; Eisenmann, op.cit. above. 
8 6 
a temporary and voluntary basis in the execution of a public service; 
the case of riot and civil disorder; and finally, strictly enumerated 
and limited cases of hazardous activity. In addition there may 
occasionally be liability without fault in the case of abnormal losses 
following from the lawful use of power, notably loss caused by new 
legislation or regulations or from the lawful exercise of discretionary 
power Liability without fault is quite exceptional and fault remains 
queen of the administrative law board. Before discussing this further, 
it is useful to turn to England.qin the struggle towards general 
principle the English courts had discounted the possibilities of strict 
liability. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 2 theoretically as capable of 
generalisation as the parallel rule in Donoghue v. Stevenson, 3 was 
treated by the courts as an archaism, wholly inappropriate to a modern 
industrial society, and its impact was deliberately blunted by a series 
of restrictive rulings. 4 To constitute property owners or manufacturers 
insurers was to a majority of the judiciary, "contrary to the rules of 
natural justice."5 The inequality involved in throwing on to individuals 
unable to insure against them the incalculable and unforeseeable risks 
involved in technological development escaped the attention of all but a 
minority of judges. 6 
1. Waline, op.cit., para 1530 et seq; ()dent, op.cit. pp.1136-1170, 
1122-1134 give extended accounts. 
2. (1866) L.R. I Ex 265, 279 (Blackburn J.). 
3. Markesinis,"The Not so Dissimilar Tort and Delict" (1977) 93 LQR 78. 
4. Rickards v. Lothian [1213] A.C.263; Read v. Lyons [1947] A.C.156 British 
Celanese v. Hunt L1969J 2 All E.R.1252. For discussion see Harari, op. 
cit., generally and Ch.12; Friedmann, "Modern Trends in the Law of Torts", 
(1937) 1 MLR 39; Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Tort, 1926, p.344; 
Newark, "Non—natural user and Rylands v. Fletcher", (1961) 24 MLR 557. 
5. Hammond v. Vestry of Sty Pancras (1874) L.R.9 C.P.316, 322 (Brett J.). 
6. But see Midwood v. Manchester Corp. (1905) 2 KB 197; Charing Cross Elec-tricity , Su..l Co. v. 	draulic Power Co. [1914 3 KB 772; Pearson 
87 
The different approaches can be neatly illustrated by a pair of 
very well known cases. In Read v. Lyons, 1 the plaintiff, an inspector 
in a munitions factory, was injured during an inspection of the premises 
through an explosion, the cause of which was, as in the Cames case, never 
properly established. The House of Lords was asked to rule on the pre-
liminary point whether in the absence of negligence there could be liability. 
Although the reasoning was not uniform, the House of Lords agreed that 
the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was not applicable and that there could 
be no liability without negligence. The court was prepared to admit the 
need for a very high degree of care; but all drew the line at liability 
without any proof of negligence. In reaching this conclusion the House 
was clearly concerned to secure a measure of uniformity in the rules of 
tortious liability; to secure the position of negligence as a general 
principle of liability; and to avoid the creation of separate categories 
of claimants, some with better chances of success in the forensic lottery 
than others. 
In Regnault—Desroziers, an action for damages was brought against 
the French State in the administrative courts by those people resident 
in the neighbourhood of the fort of Double—Couronne in Paris who, during 
the 1st World War, had suffered damage through a violent explosion inside 
the fort. The circumstances suggested fault;-indeed 7 the judgment makes 
reference to "sketchy organisational measures"-but the Conseil dlEtat pre-
ferred to base liability on abnormal risk. This was defined as that 
risk .t,ihich "exceeds the limit of risks normally resulting from proximity." 
The similarity of this principle to the Rvlands v. Fletcher principle is 
very marked. 
1. [1947] A.C. 156. 
2, nbovc,13 ,s4 
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It is somewhat profitless to speculate why the rule in Rylands  
v. Fletcher 	found no favour with the judges while,on the 
continent, strict liability was acceptable. One answer given is that 
the case was decided too late. 1 It came to be associated, therefore, 
with a landowning class of limited influence and with an obsolete, 
medieval law. Negligence, on the other hand, was the rule adapted to 
the century of industrial and commercial activity. This seems an 
incomplete answer and I repeat my tentative suggestion that the answer 
may have something to do with a desire to escape the law of separate 
actions and replace it by a general principle of liability. Strict 
liability is more conveniently represented in English lavby vicarious 
liability, by reliance on statutory duties, by presumption of fault. 2 
From the point of view of public law, the most unsatisfactory 
result has been to insulate from liability public enterprises such as 
gas, water and electricity authorities where, in case of serious accident, 
the plaintiff is often at an intolerable disadvantage in proving fault. 3  
In England) 	in the last resort, recourse must be had 
to public inquiries, ex gratia settlement ) or statute. The Law Commission 
has expressed concern at this and has suggested spreading the burden of 
risk "as widely as possible, whether over the general body of taxpayers 
or at least, through adjustment of the tariffs, among those members of 
the community who enjoy the service supplied." 4 The present position is 
1. Friedmann, op.cit., pp.51, 63. 
2. Milner, op.cit., 1967, p.89 et seq; Glanville Williams, "Vicarious 
the Liability andhlasterts Indemnity" (1957) 20 M.L.R. 220; Friedmann 
"Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability" (1949) 63 Harv. 
L.R. 241. 
3. Dunne v. N.W. Gas Board [1964] 2 Q.B.806; Pearson v. N.W. Gas Board [1968] 7=7:1476573e.. .=v. Won [1970] A.L.R0595• 
4. Law Com. No. 32 Civil Liability for Dangerous Things and Activities, 
1970,5 potr-c1 ,15. 
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certainly indefensible. 
There is one rather interesting theoretical argument here. One 
reason why the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is not applied to statutory 
undertakers- is a judicial sentiment that it applies only to activities 
undertaken for private profit. In Lord. Moulton's phrase,"It is not 
every use to which land is put that brings into play that principle. It 
must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others and 
must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is 
proper for the general benefit of the community." 1 Bohlen has argued 
that this is an illustration of a common law tradition that "one whose 
person or property has been injured for the public benefit must himself 
bear the loss." 2 Bohlen goes on, therefore, to stress the possibilities 
of the Rylandiv. Fletcher principle as an alternative to the civilian: . . 	. 
idea of "Equality before Public Charges". An exceptional or abnormal 
loss which falls on a single member of the community and which is suffered 
in the public interest is a charge which ought to be divided amongst the 
community. Loss caused by a hazardous activity is exceptional and 
abnormal and by applying the Rylands v. Fletcher rule to statutory under-
takers the charge is laid , 	oft the community. An alternative 
explanation is that of 'profit and loss'. The community which enjoys 
the benefit of the services must also support the charges. These are 
the two favourite explanations of the basis of risk liability in French 
administrative law.3 
1. Rickards v. Lothian [1911-13] All E.R. Reprint 71, 80. 
2. Op.cit., p.430. 
3. Blaevoet, "De lianormal devant les hautes juridictions civile et 
administrative" 1946 JCP 560; Eisenmann, op.cit., Chapter 4. 
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The courts have shown no interest in Bohlen's idea but have clung 
tenaciously to a limited notion of Rylands v. Fletcher which links it 
firmly to the law of nuisance. It is interesting to find the Conseil 
d'Etat also preferring a principle of liability based on (i) abnormal which is 
risk (ii) to neighbours (iii) created by hazardous activity/clearly 
1 based on the civilian principle of nuisance. It is interesting, too, 
to see that the principle is entirely residual and applicable only where 
fault cannot be proved. 2 The essentially conservative nature of the 
Conseil d'Etat is plain to see. 
Before leaving the subject of risk liability, it is well worth 
considering some of the difficulties which flow from a mixed system of 
liability. These, too,are most easily illustrated from a detailed com-
parison of a strictly limited area. In the well known case of Dorset 
Yacht v. Home Office3 the House of Lords ruled that it would be possible 
for the Home Office to owe a duty of care to those who suffer loss to 
person or property at the hands of escaping Borstal boys or prisoners 
where the escape is occasioned by obvious negligence and where there is 
an obvious risk that the escape will occasion the loss which occurs. This 
decision was received somewhat grudgingly by Professor Hamson who, in a 
note on the case (at the Court of Appeal level), 4 compared the Conseil 
d'Etat decision of Thouzellier, 5 in which the State was held liable for 
1. Corna, op.cit., pp.69-90. 
2. Picard et Goux C.E. 18 Nov 1970 Rec. 687; Entreprise Lefebvre C.E. 
9 June 1971 Rec. 424. 
3. [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1140. 
4. Hamson !"Escaping Borstal Boys and the Immunity of Office" [1969] Cam. 
L.J. 273; Semar [1969] P.L. 269. 
5. Min. de Justice c. Thouzellier C.E. 3 Feb 1956 Rec 49, D 1956.597 n. 
Auby. 
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damage caused by juveniles who escaped from an approved School with 
a liberal regime,on the basis that the very existence of the institution 
created "a special risk to third parties resident in the neighbourhood". 
Somewhat extravagantly, Professor Hamson concluded that, in France 
ft 	a remarkably developed and developing 
body of caselaw has been created by a 
court which knows how to, and does, adapt 
an appropriate liability to the constantly 
changin demands of society. Here [in 
England the court has not yet begun to give 
consideration to the extremely complex 
problems of how a true balance is to be 
struck between the necessary requirements 
of a public service and the just rights of 
the citizen." 
A more realistic assessment might be that these decisions are 
similar rather than dissimilar. Each manifests a cautious and res-
trictive attitude towards the imposition of liability in situations for 
which private law provides no obvious precedent. The English judgment 
achieves this end by confining liability to cases in which negligence 
is "clearly proved" and the risk of damage "manifest and obvious". But 
the French formulation is equally restrictive since it defines the 
'special risk' as that created by the existence of an institution operating 
"a liberal regime", i.e. an open prison or Borstal, and limits damage to 
the "immediate neighbourhood". So obviously restrictive was the latter 
requireMent that it was almost immediately replaced by the test of 
"direct causal link", 1 precisely the formula preferred by Lord Reid in 
the Dorset Yacht case. 2 
■■••••11.■•••■••••■•. 	 ...010.11101=••••■••••=1■110a 
1. See Waline in a note on Thouzellier RDP 1956 p.854 cited Hamson loc. 
cit., and Trouillet C.E. 9 Max 1966 Rec 201. 
2. At p.1116. 
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The former requirement has always been strictly adhered to, with 
incongruous results. 1 For example, the State is liable under the risk 
principle for juvenile delinquents; but it cannot be liable for loss 
caused by juveniles who are entrusted by the State under the equivalent 
of a care and control order to a private institution because here the 
only link with the State is in the choice of institution and this is not 
something which entails a 'special risk'. This distinction has been 
defended by French commentators in terms somewhat less glowing than 
Professor Hamson's. 2 They admit that it is somewhat arbitrary, when 
juveniles are committed under two forms of court order to the same 
institution where they mix freely, to hold the State liable for loss 
caused by an escaping delinquent but not by an escaping non—delinquent. 
On the other hand, to hold the State liable "would lead to an endless 
extension of non-fault liability at a time when all attempts to rehabilitate 
social inadequates rest theoretically on the rejection of all forms of 
isolation." The arbitrary line is therefore justified because it has 
the merits of clarity. 
It is true, of course, that the Dorset Yacht decision requires 
the proof of negligence by the plaintiff while the Thouzellier decision 
does not. At first this does seem restrictive, especially when the 
somewhat discouraging dicta in the Dorset Yacht case itself are considered. 
To the English lawyer risk liability comes to be seen as a means of 
easing the plaintiff's burden of proof. But this is only one of its 
functions and experience shows that it is the initial victory which is 
the hardest. Once the courts have admitted that a given activity can, 
in principle, give rise to liability, the claims pour in and are usually 
1. Garde des Sceaux (etc.) c. Ste de constructions et de fabrications  
pour le bltiment etc. and Garde des Sceaux (etc.) c. Mutuelle generale 
fran9aise Accident et Garage Caron et Dodon C.E. 14 June 1978, AJDA 1978 
pp. 590-592. 
2. Dutheillet de Lamothe et Robineau, ibid. p.557. 
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met by a compensation scheme. Should liability be denied and an action 
come to court, the proof of negligence may, in this particular area, be 
less difficult than imagined. Negligence can usually be read backwards 
from the damage which results. In a recent English case, for example, 
a local authority was found liable for fire damage amounting to £99,000 
caused by a 12 year—old boy who escaped from a council community home 
while in the case of the council. The judge found that closer observation 
and a "strict watch" would have prevented the escape. Since in practice 
such precautions are not only impossible but intolerable — as our French 
commentators noticed — what we are really looking at is a concealed form 
of risk liability. 1 To put this slightly differently, legal classifications 
are not always definitive. Behind the conceptual facades, there is much 
room for manoeuvre and judges frequently bend the rules to arrive at 
equitable decisions. 
Risk liability in French administrative law often serves the 
secondary purpose of enabling the Conseil d'Etat to raise the standard of 
care expected of an administrative authority by circumventing an established 
rule that liability is for gross fault alone. 2  (This was in fact the 
requirement in the case of escaping prisoners or mental patients prior to 
Thouaellier.) 
The introduction of risk liability is not a magic formula which 
will automatically resolve "the extremely complex problems" of public 
policy which arise. The concept of risk is open to manoeuvre in the same 
way as the fault concept. Because tortious liability has many pur- 
poses besides compensation, the court may be tempted to vary the formula 
1. Potter v. Essex County Council, 	*. The Guardian, April 3, 1979. 
And see below p.179. 
2. Stain C.E. 21 Jan Rec.29, Dept. de la Moselle C.E. 13 July 1967 D.1967. 
675 n. Modern; Ville de Paris c. Epoux Pion et Caisse de Coordination des Assistances bociaies de la RATP C.E. 1 Oct 1969 Rec 415. 
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for liability in any given case to achieve one or more of the sub- 
sidiary goals (e.g. sanction or deterrence). The law then becomes complex 
and uncertain. A series of recent Conseil d'Etat decisions on escapes 
from psychiatric institutions illustrate the difficulties which the 
court has to face as well as the multifarious solutions available. 
In the first of these cases, 1 psychiatrists decided, after care-
ful consideration, to release from hospital a dangerous psychotic with 
a long criminal record. The decision had to be confirmed by the depart-
mental prefect, who not unnaturally accepted the advice of the specialists 
concerned with the case. Unfortunately, the ex-patient shortly after-
wards committed a homicide. Both the hospital and the department were 
found/liable on the basis of gross fault. 
In a well reasoned note ., Moderne points to the illogicality and 
injustice of this decision. The specialists and the Prefect acted 
perfectly legitimately, taking into account all the known facts. The 
ruling stigmatised their decisions as gross faults merely because they 
had taken a calculated risk and turned out to be wrong. Why did the 
Conseil d'Etat not substitute risk liability? The answer is a general one. 
The courts are afraid to go too far in imposing risk liability on the 
medical services. They find it hard to balance the need 
"to assure to victims who have suffered 
loss in such circumstances the just 
reparation which is their due with the 
need not unnecessarily to overburden the 
public services". 2 
1. Htpital psychiatrique de St. Egreve C.E. 31 Dec 1976, D 1977.191 n. 
Moderne; 1JDA 1977.135 Chr. Nauwelaers et Fabius. 
2. Moderne, ibid. 
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As Denning L.J./said:  
we should be doing a disservice to 
the community at large if we were to 
impose liability on hospitals and doctors 
for everything that happens to go wrong. 
Doctors would be led to think more of their 
own safety than of the good of their 
patients. Initiative would be stifled 
and confidence shaken." 1 
A further factor is no doubt, that the imposition of enterprise 
liability would have the effect of extending protection beyond the 
innocent victim to the doctor's insurers. Doctors and medical staff are 
well-known to be insured and hospital authorities do come to private 
agreements with the insurers as to the respective shares of responsibility 
to be assumed. 2 The function of vicarious liability in allocating 
financial loss to a suitably deep pocket is secured. In this way it 
comes about that the transfer to risk liability seems superfluous and 
the courts of both countries still struggle to balance the competing 
interests in individual cases inside the fault principle. 
A second decision3 with almost identical facts lends point to 
Moderne's criticism of the Saint-Egreve case. A patient was the subject 
of a rehabilitative regime known as "night hospital" in which he was 
totally free to come and go during the daytime but slept in the hospital 
at night. While at liberty he one day committed a serious assault. 
The plaintiff sued the hospital authorities for damages in the administra-
tive courts. 
1. Roe v. Minister of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, 86 	(Denning 	lino( see 
now Whitehouse v. Tordiiv.),71re Timis, Dec..4 ict7c1 
2. See the note by Dutheillet de Lamothe and Robineau cited above; for 
the English practice see Hepple and Matthews Cases and Materials on 
the Law of Tort, 1974, p.666. 
3. H6'pital psychiatrictue gpartemental de Rennes c. Dame Clotault C.E. 
30 June 1978, AJDA 1978, pp.598 and 556 Chr. Dutheillet de Lamothe et 
Robineau. The Government Commissioner was M. Morisot. 
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The Government Commissioner argued for risk liability on the 
basis of the earlier caselaw. The Conseil d'Etat however refused to 
accept that "night hospital" was a method of treatment creating a special 
risk for third parties capable of creating liability without fault. 
Logically, the answer was . 	to demand a gross fault or refuse liability. 
The Conseil d'Etat avoided this answer by holding that this was not a 
"diagnostic fault", since "night hospital" was not "a method of treatment". 
The hospital's responsibility was really limited to the provision of 
shelter and certain facilities to someone not able to adapt to a normal 
social life. The Conseil d'Etat therefore based liability on simple 
fault. The public service had functioned inadequately because the hospital 
ought to have foreseen that in leaving a person with known aggressive 
tendencies free all day with no occupation or employment he might get 
into trouble. (Paraphrasing this finding, one might say that the hospital 
had diagnosed the case incorrectly). 
The cynic might read this casuistic reasoning as a bargain between 
those who, like the Government Commissioner favoured risk liability, and 
those who preferred to maintain the traditional ground. 1 The compromise 
position does, however, represent a distinct trend in French administrative 
law. The requirement of gross fault, designed to protect the State from 
excessive liability, may result in a serious slur being cast on the doctor's 
reputation. The courts have responded by substituting liability for the 
defective operation of the medical service. As one expert has said: 2 
1. This cannot be confirmed because judgments are collegiate in French 
courts and no dissenting judgments are recorded. The deliberation is 
private and the Government Commissioner, although present, is not a 
member of the court. 
2. M. Guinet, President of the administrative tribunal at Lyoni 22 Oct 
1971, quoted Revue hospitaliere de France Feb 1972 p.41; Sec. d'Etat 
1 la Sante Publigue c. De'ous C.E. S 1958.182. Compare Jones v. 
Manchester Corp_ 	2 Q.B. 852. 
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"It is certain that the judge, knowing 
the consequences ibr the practitioner of a 
decision based on medical fault, tends to 
appeal to the concept of poor organisation 
of the public service, which also makes it 
easier to justify compensation". 
Why then, did the specialists of Saint-Egreve not get the benefit 
of this principle? Was it, perhaps, because the Conseil d'Etat l in 
common with the public at large and the judiciary in many other countries, 
refuses to believe in the rehabilitation of dangerous criminals and 
deplores their release on any occasion? By holding the hospital liable in 
this casei the. Court was able to express its doubts about the, practice 
and even discourage it. 	But by classifying the release as a 'gross 
fault' and refusing to move on to the terrain of risk, the court was able 
to warn the psychiatric experts that release is to be narrowly scrutinised 
and allowed only in exceptional cases. In short, in the Saint—Egreve  
case ,a deterrent element was allowed to creep into the rules cfcivil 
liability which Will, no doubt, do nothing to inhibit the victim's 
recovery in sUbh cases. 1 
Although I have been critical of some of these decisions, I do not 
wish in any way to suggest that the Conseil d'Etat is not a court which 
considers the needs of public policy or that the solutions which it has 
adopted are in any way inadequate. Allegations that the courts have 
allowed themselves to become "the prisoners of their own formulae" lOr 
betray an "underlying uncertainty as to the purpose of the tort remedies 
in particular casesfl / contain a measure of truth, but fall short of the 
whole truth. To balance "the necessary requirements of a public service 
1. On this point see further op.cit. Harlow (1976) 39 M.L.R. 516, 520-521 
where the French authorities are cited. 
2. Modern D.1977.191 and Millner, loc.cit. below. 
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and the just rights of the citizens" in any given case is not only 
difficult but verges on the impossible. The Conseil d'Etat has made a 
very reasonable attempt at solutions and is not to be blamed if it fails 
to please every commentator on every occasion. But similarly the 
judges in the Dorset Yacht case were by no means blind to the issues and 
made a very good shot at resolving them, within the framework of the law 
1 of negligence and without recourse to the risk principle. I believe 
that they should receive credit for the following reason: 
The introduction of a system of gradation of fault combined with 
limited areas of risk liability has produced in France extremely complex 
rules in which any change is likely to produce serious anomalies. For 
example the risk principle applies to cases in which the police use 
"arms or engines creating exceptional risk to persons or property." 
This principle covers only the use of firearms and does not cover the use 
of teargas. 2 Again, a sudden maverick decision means that a schoolboy 
injured during rugby football champions is compensated on the basis of 
risk. To find out whether the rule applies to football or tennis or can 
be extendelto all legitimate sporting activities in defiance of the 
existing caselaw, there will have to be litigation. Increasingly, the 
rules of liability become dependent on the status of the victim and 
depend, on the relationship between the victim and the tortfeasor. In 
English law) factors such as the 'escape' rule in Rylands v. Fletcher or 
the duty of care in negligence are used to restrict liability. In France, 
1. Milner, "Growth and Obsolescence in Negligence" (1973) 26 CLP 260. 
2. See for criticism, Nicol C.E. Apr 27 1953, J.C.P.1953.I.113 n. Gazier. 
3. Gauthier T.A. Lyon 1 July 1976, AJDA 1978 p.53 n. Plouvin. 
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factors such as the victim's status as a 'user of the facilities 
of the public service' or an 'occasional collaborator of the public 
service" serve the same classificatory purpose. 1 
It is just as well that at this juncture, we should clearly grasp 
this point. Risk liability no longer has to be imported by public 
lawyers via the caselaw of the Conseil d'Etat. It is the ideas of 
private lawyers which have been influential in persuading the Pearson 
have 
Commission to consider no-fault liability and which / resulted in the 
curious compromise mixture of fault, risk and extra judicial statutory 
Pearson compensation which the/Commission recommended. 2 It is private law, this 
time imported from Europe via the EEC, which has recommended limited 
areas of strict liability interwoven with fault as the basis of a system 
of liability for defective products. 3 
However, just as the advocates of scientific allocation of losses 
to those enterprises and activities which cause the losses seem to have 
won the day for strict liability, 4 the pendulum seems to be swinging in 
the opposite direction. 5 The scientific basis of the new theories is 
1. See Lucchini D.1957 p.770 and Dame Muesser et Veuve Lecompte C.E. 3 Mar 
1978, AJDA 1978, 210 Chr. Nauwelaers et Dutheillet de Lamothe. 
2. See as particularly influential in influencing public opinion, Atiyah, 
Accidents Compensation and the Law, 1st edn. 1970. See also the 
Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for 
Personal Injury, 'Cmnd.. 7054, (1977-78). And see J.C. Fleming, "The 
Pearson Report: its "strategy"(1979) 42 M.L.R. 249; Ogus, Corfield and 
Harris "Pearson: Principled Reform or Political Compromise" 
Industrial Law Journal 143 (1978). 
3. Liability for Defective Products, Law Com. No.82, Cmnd.6381 (1976-77). 
4. See Coase, "The problem of Social Cost" 3 Journal of Law & Economics 
(1960), p.1; Posner, "A Theory of Negligence" 1 Jnl. of Legal Studies 
(1972 29; Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: a legal and Economic 
Analysis, 1970. 
See, for example, on the effects on the pharmaceutical industry, (1978) 
128 N.L.J. 274 and New Society, Mar 1st, 1979. The Medicines Commission has also expressed doubts on the Pearson Commission's proposals. 
10U  
itself in doubt. As Posner, himself an advocate of fault as the optimum 
criterion for loss allocation, has remarked: 
"The question whether a general sub-
stitution of strict for negligence 
liability would improve efficiency 
seems at this stage hopelessly con-
jectural; the question is at bottom 
empirical and the empirical work has 
not been done.D 1 
The experience of the risk principle in French administrative law 
does clearly demonstrate 	that risk liability is not, as its 
advocates often claim, a universal panacea. It does not result in all 
victims being compensated nor even in a significant lowering of the 
burden of proof. It may even complicate the law by producing variant 
standards of liability. Its relationship with accident prevention is 
unclear and unproven. The question of which risks are to be allocated 
to whom is a difficult one and, though models abound, none seems particularly 
convincing. 
In this ambivalent situation,the adherence of the English courts 
to the fault principle is not particularly blameworthy. There is much • 
to be said for Hauriouts argument that risk liability is the responsibility 
of the legislature. In France,indeed, it must never be forgotten that 
risk liability derives originally from legislative provisions and that the 
Conseil d'Etat in utilising the principle have merely embroidered a legis-
, 
lative(pattern.) If the legislature were to give the lead, the English 
courts would no doubt prove capable of embroidery. Until then discretion 
is undoubtedly the better part of valour. 
1. "Strict Liability: A Comment" 2 J.Leg.Studies (1973) 205, 211-2. See 
also "A theory of Negligence" (1972) 1 J.Leg. Studies 29; Economic 
Analysis of Law, 1972, p.78. 
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Conclusions:  
By limiting my comparison of the legal rules to two main areas 
of vicarious liability and risk liability and by presenting only a 
limited number of examples, I am aware that I open myself to a charge 
of distortion. It could be said that, if I had chosen different examples 
and widened my range, the answer might have been different. I am not 
pretending,however> that the two systems resemble each other point for 
point: obviously they do not. (There is, for example, no real equivalent 
in English law to the special liability in France for public works; and 
other examples, apart from the example of risk liability which was my 
own choice, could be given). But a detailed study already exists, 1 
ihe author of which l writing at a period before the law of negligence 
had flowered into the general principle of civil liability, was, like 
myself, struck by the fundamental similarity of the two systems. Diver-
gence at the theoretical level had led people to expect divergence in 
practice, but such was not the case. "The differences are only secondary. 
In practice the two systems are equivalent."2 Professor Levy was not 
surprised by this discovery. He felt that, where two countries with a 
similar administrative structure set out to solve the same probletu — 
in this case, the problem of how to compensate the victims of adminis-
trative activity — they were likely to come up with the same answers. 
Adopting this conclusion, I would add a rider. The solutions would not,  
in all probability be so similar if the legal principles of civil liability 
were not broadly alike. There are, of course, areas of difference, but 
the parallels are striking and the common lawyer coming fresh to the Frehoh 
1. Levy, La Responsabilit6 de la Puissance Publique et de ses Agents en 
Angleterre, 1957, PP.348-352• 
2. At p.350. 
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civilian system will quickly orientate himself and feel entirely 
at home. Even the legal vocabulary is relatively familiar. 
By confining oneself to outlining the broad general principles 
one actually risks maximising the differences between the systems, 
• because, as Professor Levy observes, the differences of approach 
lie mainly at the jurisprudential level. Common lawyers are used 
to deducing principles from decided cases, an attitude largely 
responsible for giving the common law its characteristic, disordered 
appearance. Civilian lawyers reason from principle to the facts. 
If, therefore, one stops without examining the way in which the prin-
ciple has actually been applied in the caselaw, the civil law may seem 
deceptively simple. What is surprising is not that the systems of 
administrative liability should di_ ffer in England and France, but 
that they should be in all essential respects so similar. It is 
this surprising correspondence which emerges so clearly from the 
cases. 
To what, then, should we attribute the continuing fascination of 
the French system? I have suggested that the initial attraction lay 
in he apparent success of the ConseirdtEtat in imposing legal 
liability on the State, a victory which naturally attracted common 
lawyers, infuriated by the unsatisfactory law of Crown 
Proceedings. This movement survived 
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the 1947 Apt, partly because the commentators and critics addressed 
their minds to the injustices which might result from the poor drafting, 
rather than to the actual operation of the Act. 1 The idea grew up 
that there must be an inherent distinction between 'public' and 'private' 
liability. It was believed that the absence of this distinction in 
England explained the weakness of English law in dealing with the State. 
the 
For obvious reasons l /French system with its wholly separate administrative 
jurisdiction, seemed an embodiment of the distinction between public and 
private law. 
This view was fostered by the French publicists themselves who 
felt a need to emphasise the 'originality' and the 'autonomy' of the 
principles of administrative liability. At an early stage and in the 
most creative period of French administrative law, Hauriou had consis-
tently denied the truth of this assertion. By the 1950s, detailed 
studies by distinguished French lawyers, representative of both systems, 
had conclusively demonstrated that the rules of civil liability used by 
the two jurisdictions were to all intents and purposes alike. 2  Variations 
in liability did not represent the dramatic theoretical distinctions which 
Duguit hoped he could see, but were minimal in character. Now one, now 
the other, jurisdiction made the running. The administrative jurisdiction 
was for example, more inclined to experiment with risk liability, while 
the civil jurisdiction was consistently more generous in awards of damages. 3 
1. See, for example, Lord MacDermott, Protection from Power under English 
Law, 1957, pp.107-9. 
2. Ghapus, Responsabilite"publique et Responsabilite'privee 1954; Oornu l 
Etude Compare de la responsabiliter Telictuelle en droit prive'et droit 
public 1951; Eisenmann, Sur le degre d'originalite du regime de la 
responsabilite- extra-contractuelle des_personnes (collectivite's) pub-
liques J.C.P. 1949 I. nos. 742 and 751. 
3. Harlow, "Remedies in French Administrative Law" [1977] P.L.227, 240. 
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Sometimes the differences were explicable by those temporary variations 
of attitude which one expects in any system of judge made law. As late 
as 1966, Prieur felt able to say 1 that, in the case of clinical medical 
negligence where injury had been caused through operative or post-
operative failures, the civil courts were making the running. In his 
view: 
".... faults of this type [i.e. medical 
faults] seem to be making an appearance 
more and more frequently both in the 
civil caselaw and the administrative case — 
law. It seems that the administrative 
courts are retreating when compared with 
the civil judges who have admitted the 
concept of "inexcusable" fault and who seem to 
be introducing into civil liability the sanction 
theory of liability." 
Indeed, the concern of the Conseil d'Etat to preserve its jurisdiction 
in medical cases may have been partly dictated by concern at this 
civilian expansion of liability. 
Had the English lawyers been more aware of this interplay, they 
might have noticed that many of the features which they found so enviable 
in French public law, particularly its basis of general principle, were 
actually present in French civil law. 2 Schwarz, 3 for example, made 
special reference to the deficiencies of the common law with regard to 
negligent misstatement and liability for omissions to act. It is true 
that French administrative law has never found difficulty in this area, • 
but then, neither has French civil law. 4 
1. The study was published only in 1973; Un exemple dfetude sociologique 
du contentieux administratif (Strasbourg 1966) 1973 R.D.P. p.1489 at 1531. 
2. Lawson, op.cit., makes this abundantly clear. 
3. Loc.cit., above. 
4. Di Malta, "Les Renseignements Administratifs" D.1964 Chr. XXXIII 23 2 ; 
Juris. Admin. 	" 	Faso. 720 and 721. But see Cornu, op.cit., 
P.193. 
105 
This is a useful choice of example, because it reminds us that 
many of the articles which are so critical of English law antedate the 
decade of unprecedented growth and creativity in the common law of 
tortious liability. The particular gaps to which I have just referred 
have 	long been filled 1 andl more generallyiRhbinstein 
felt confident by 1964 that English law was perfectly adequate to deal 
with liability for what he calls 'bureaucratic negligence"- and attri- 
buted the dearth of cases to lack of enterprise on the part of the legal 
profession. 2 The profession has since grown more enterprising and more 
attuned to "deep pocket" theories of tortious liability. These develop-
ments authorise a less pessimistic assessment of the potentialities of 
the common law. Were the same articles to be written today, their 
authors might wish to modify some of the views expressed. 
Some of those who have espoused 
the cause of French administrative law are deeply committed to the legal 
control of government power through an expansion of administrative law. 
They are, in short, attracted by the theoretical picture of 1121ELL2011 
or the State submitted to the rule of law courts. , ) 
. 	 - When such writers talk of a need for systematisation, they refer 
not so much to confusion in the caselaw or its heterogenous nature,but to 
the absence of a special, public law system of liability, which could 
	4•111110MI!1111111.1 ,10.1.110•0411 , 
1. Above ,notes,3 and14 , r .65 
2. "Liability in Tort of judicial officers", (1964) 15 Univ.of Tor. L.J. 
317, 328-9. 
3. Especially BilitChell "The State of Public Law in the United Kingdom" 
(1966) 15 1.C.L.Q.133; "The Causes and Effects of the Absence of a 
System of Public Law in the United Kingdom" [1965] P.L. 95; "Adminis- 
trative Law and Parliamentary Control" (1967) 38 Pol.Quarterly 360. 
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nicely round off administrative law. The fact that the administrative 
liability of France is also confused, complex and heterogenous — as any 
experienced tort lawyer can immediately see 1 — is not relevant to their 
argument. What attracts these writers is the synthesis between the two 
tjgrand5recourst. Government liability is envisaged as an extension of 
judicial review and its primary use is as a collateral means of challenge 
of administrative action. 
Those who do not visualise administrative law in this light must 
proceed with caution. It is not self—evident that a legal system must, 
as Professor Garner believes, possess a special law of administrative 
liability. 2 This may be an expensive and inefficient solution. Moreover, 
in considering a new structure for a system of administrative liability, 
we should be alert to possible political repercussions. After all, our 
constitutional traditions are essentially Diceyan in character. There 
is much therefore to be said for the conclusions of Professor Hogg in 
his study of the liability of the Crown that the ordinary law of the 
land Can "work a satisfactory resolution of the conflict between public 
and private interest", and that"Dicey's "idea of equality" although it is 
not and never can be completely realised, still provides the basis of 
a rational, workable and acceptable theory of governmental liability. 3 11 
Concentrating upon our own system, the defects are bound to strike. 
us more forcibly than the good points. We are apt to turn to France to 
seek particular remedies for particular defects. On some occasions we 
may actually find solutions. On other occasions, particularly if we 
1. Street, Governmental Liability, p.a. 
2. "Public and Private Law" [1978] P.L. 230, 237. 
3. Op.cit., p.2. 
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concentrate on broad principles without considering their application 
to particular cases, we may think we see solutions where in fact we 
ought to see parallels. A survey of the principles applied by the 
French administrative courts and their application to particular cases 
does not suggest that English law is especially deficient in dealing 




Fault sanction and deterrence  
The last chapter shows that, in both England and France, the 
liability of the administration is tightly tied to fault. Even in 
France, where risk liability is at least respectable, fault must be 
proved in perhaps as many as 2/3 of all cases. At the same time, extensions 
of the doctrine of vicarious liability or faute de service have vir- 
tually eliminated true personal responsibility. The occasions on which 
an individual who is not covered by insurance will personally suffer 
the financial consequences of civil liability by satisfying a judgment 
must be numerically rare. The needs of the victim push the courts 
increasingly down the path of 'deep pocket' theories of vicarious 
liability and of 'negligence without fault', 1 Yet this development 
attacks the very rationale of fault liability, by eliminating the 
elements of sanction and deterrence which tie it to the moral standards 
of the community and justify its choice as the basis of civil liability. 2 
 We soon reach the position that risk liability of corporations, seemingly 
the most effective method of compensation, becomes the most logical and 
even the fairest choice for the standard of civil liability. 3 
1. Ehrenzweig, Negligence without Fault: trends towards an enterprise 
liability for insurable loss, 1951; "A psychoanalysis of Negligence" 
(1953) 47 N.W. Univ.L.R. 855. Glanville Williams, "Vicarious Liability 
and Master's Indemnity" (1957) 20 M.L.R. 220 and 437, 445. 
2. Holmes, The Common Law, 3rd edn. 1923, pp.112-114. 
3. See Keeton, "Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts", (1959) 72 Harv. 
L.R. 401 for an explanation of the move towards strict liability in 
terms of the community's changing ethical standards. 
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Yet the theories of government liability which were discussed 
in the first chapter contained more than a hint of sanction and deterrence. 
These ideas were current.in the community and 	. were generally under- 
stood. Dicey did not find it necessary to explain why individual 
officials should accept personal liability for their torts. Like his 
distinguished contemporaries, Bentham, Austin, and later Salmond, he 
simply accepted that "one who by his fault has caused damage to another 
ought as a matter of justice to make compensation." 1 	Nor was it 
actually  
thought necessary to prove that personal liability/deterred. It 
was assumed that "fear of personal sanction is, for a public servant, 
assuredly a much more powerful brake than the ultimate liability of the 
service by which he is employed." 2 
If the aim of civil liability is really to deter, however, then 
both English and French law might be moving in the wrong direction. 
Vicarious liability and state liability protect the victim's right to 
compensation but at the same time they protect the wrongdoer from the 
consequences of his wrongdoing. The incentive to refrain from wrong-
doing or "to avoid doing the harm before being held responsible for it" 3 
is stripped away. 
At the same time, as increasingly during this century tort law has 
become a vehicle for accident compensation and the intentional torts 
have declined in number and importance, it seems less clear that wrong- 
doing can be deterred. And even if it can, it is not always the individual 
1. Glanville Williams, "The Aims of the Law of Tort", [1951] 4 C.L.P. 
137, 140. 
2. Lemonnier, C.E. 26 July 1918, S 1918-19.111.41 coml. Blum. 
3. Holmes, op.cit., p.144. 
who is in the best position to prevent accidents but the corporate 
entity which employs him. Legal theorists expressed hostility to the 
idea that corporate entities were capable of fault; it was surely the 
individual employees, 	the"arms and legs"of the institution„who . 
 could be deterred. Now it begins to seem possible that the 'anonymous' 
concept of faute de service, introduced for compensatory reasons, might 
also depict more accurately the administrative life and provide a 
closer picture of how torts come to be committed. 1 
Lawyers are, however, notably resistant to the idea that legal 
rules may be virtually irrelevant to shaping human conduct and that the 
prospect of civil liability may do nothing to encourage a personal sense 
of responsibility. They are not even willing to admit that "the question 
is at bottom empirical and the empirical work has not been done."2 To 
lawyers it is not a matter of proof,but of commonsense that liability 
must have a deterrent effects if it were otherwise, the very function 
of law might be threatened. Courts therefore constantly seek to rein,- 
troduce into the rules of civil liability an element of sanction which 
they conceive in terms of fault. This is done, for example) by the use 
of the contributory negligence principle 	where a driver who is not 
wearing a seat belt or protective helmet is deprived of his damages. 3 
Apportionment of loss in this way is particularly common in French 
administrative law. It may be done in another way, by permitting the actual 
1. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, p.78, See also "One hundred Fatal 
Accidents in Construction", Health and Safety Executive, H.M.S.0.1978 
which suggests that management was responsible for 680 of 100 accidents 
in the building industry. 
2. Posner, "Strict Liability: A Comment" (1973) 2 Jnl.of Legal Studies, 
205, 211-2. 
3. Froom v. Butcher [1975] 3 All E.R.520; O'Connell v. Jackson [1972] 1 Q.B. 
270. 
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wrongdoer to be pursued by the employer in a recursory action. This, 
too, has been tried in the courts of both countries. 
The truth about civil liability and deterrence is extremely 
obscure and little or no empirical evidence exists by which the cherished 
beliefs of lawyers may be tested. Even in the area of the police function, 
Which is better documented by sociologists than the more central area 
of administrative behaviour, the pattern is far from clear. Sometimes 
it seems that individuals possess very large amounts of discretion and 
exercise personal choices. Sometimes it seers that all these choices are 
dictated by the system to an extent that they can no longer be classified 
as personal. The courts, too, seem to act ambivalently, now imposing 
stringent sanctions, now seeminglyrelaxing all controls. All that can 
be done is to note the interaction of the various parties to the game. 
If the evidence is not forthcoming it might be argued that the 
case is not worth making. I believe that some discussion as to the 
secondary, non-compensatory role of civil liability is useful for two 
reasons. In the first place, tort law, which was not seriously questioned 
at the time of Dicey, is now increasingly under attack. 1 Public lawyers 
seem hardly to have recognised this fact. If tort law is really functional 
in the area of government liability then we must not let it be dismantled 
in the name of cost effectiveness. It may still have a function to 
fulfil- and we may have to tolerate its continued existence. As Professor 
Linden has put it: 
"As the task of reparation becomes 
increasingly superfluous in the modern 
welfare state, it may well be that the 
Ombudsman function may dominate the 
1. Veitch and Miers, "Assault on the Law of Tort", (1975) 38 M.L.R. 139. 
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future of tort law ... we may choose 
to let it live in peaceful coexistence 
with social insurance. By opting for 
such a solution, tort law could con-
tinue to serve society, alongside 
whatever new techniques are devised."  
At the same time that we assess the role of tort law, we must 
search for and assess the "new techniques!' to which Professor Linden 
glancingly refers. If we do not do this we may find that we have 
inadvertently created a caste of untouchable public servants. If dis-
ciplinary proceedings, for example, are rarely used, one cannot rely on 
them for deterrence. An attempt to do so will almost certainly invite 
a retaliatory response from the judiciary. We may, on the other hand, 
find that tort law itself is not fully effective either because the 
judges will not make it so y or because the courts cannot enforce their 
rulings. In this case tort law itself may have ceased to be functional 
and we may need to buttress it by new techniques. 
The one point which does emerge clearly from the tangled evidence 
about sanction and deterrence is that the court's most severe and 
stringent caselaw may in practice be quietly demolished by those who 
have to operate it. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in 
the case of the employer's recursory action for an indemnity from his 
guilty employee. 
In Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Comany, 3 a van driver 






Canadian Tort Law 1977, p.28. See also "Tort Law as Ombudsman" (1973) 
51 Can. Bar Rev., p.155; "Public Law and Private Law: the frontier from 
the perspective of a Tort Lawyer" (1976) 17 cahiers de droit 831. 
2. For the way in which French administrative law is rendered more inno-
cuous and palatable to the administration, see Maestre, Le Conseil 
d'Etat: protecteur des prerogatives de l'administration, 1974. 
3. [1956] 2 Q.B.180 (C.A.); [1957] A.C.555 (H.L.); and see Atiyah, Vicarious 
Liability, 1967 PP.4q-427i Glanville Williams "Vicarious Liability and /220 	Master's Indemnity" (1957) 20 M.L.R,/ & 437; Parsons "Individual Respon- sibility versus Enterprise Liability" (1956) 29 Aus. L.J. 714. 
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The van driver was found to be negligent and his employers held 
vicariously liable. The employers then turned against the negligent 
employee, claiming damages for the breach of an implied term in the 
contract of employment to use due care. In the Court of Appeal, Denning 
L.J. denied liability, pointing to the danger that the insurer might 
use the subrogatory action without the employer's consent, to the 
detriment of good labour relations. It was unfair, in any case, that the 
insurer should be entitled to claim from an employee in respect of the 
a 
very risk which has been underwritten. But/majority of the Court of 
Appeal held the negligent employee in breach of contract. The deterrent 
theory which underlies their conclusion is evident in the following 
passage from the judgment of Romer L.J.: 1 
"It is not, in my opinion, in the 
public interest that workmen should 
assume that, whoever else may be 
called upon to compensate the victims 
of their wrongdoing, they themselves 
will be immune. I say this for two 
reasons. First it is not in accordance 
with contemporary thought that any section 
of the public should be free from any 
liability to which the people as a whole 
are subject. Secondly, such freedom would 
tend still further to diminish that sense 
of responsibility which all should feel 
towards one another, but which can scarcely 
be regarded as an outstanding characteristic 
of modern life." 
This decision was subsequently confirmed by a majority of the House of 
Lords though, in a strong dissenting judgment, Lord Somervell emphasised 
the 
that in his view punishment was properly/function of criminal rather than 
the civil law. 
1. At p.213. 
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The controversial Lister decision was quickly reduced to a dead 
letter. A committee set up to investigate 1 could discover only 7 cases 
in 20 years, and in 2 subsequent actions 2  the inferior courts showed 
their hostility by confining the operation of the rule as far as possible. 
Private insurers entered into an agreement not to exercise their rights 
in cases of personal injury to an employee of an insured caused by a 
fellow employee,unless collusion or wilful misconduct were clearly shown. 
The inter—departmental committee showed that, in the public service, 
subrogatory rights were seldom exercised. In the National Health Service, 
following the decision in Jones v. Manchester Corporation3 in which it 
was held that, in the discretion of the court, a subrogatory action 
might be brought by a hospital against its medical officers, a regulatory 
circular was issued by the Ministry. 4 Today hospitals do negotiate 
with those doctors who are members of defence societies, but for tactical 
reasons, they do not do this in court. 
Nationalised industries do not claim indemnities against their 
employees. The one exception revealed to the Committee was the case of 
the National Coal Board, which, they found, "has infrequently brought 
proceedings against employees guilty of gross negligence; but in these 
cases there was a special circumstance: it is the policy of the Board 
to enforce strictly compliance with Mining Safe Regulations." 5 During 
	110.111■001. 
1. Report of an Inter—departmental Committee on Lister's case reported 
(1959) 22 M.L.R. 652. 
2. Harvey v. O'Dell [1958] 2 Q.B. 78; Morris v. Ford Motor Co. [1973] 
Q.B. 792. 
3. [1952] 2 All E.R. 125. 
4. See Hepple and Matthews, op.cit., p.266. 
5. Loc. cit., at p.653. 
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the 1960s the policy of the Board gradually changed and today recursory 
actions are brought only where deterrent action to enforce the safety 
regulations seems essential, or where the Board suspects collusion 
between defendant and plaintiff. The decision is taken at board level, 
has only been used in a handful of cases and is for all practical purposes 
superseded by the Health and Safety legislation. 1 
Both the civil service regulations and the standing regulations 
of the Greater London Council provide that the employer shall have a 
discretion whether or not to defend actions brought against employees. 
In practice, however, this is automatic, provided only that the officer 
in question is acting in good faith. Neither the Treasury Solicitor's 
department nor the unions concerned can remember any such case arising 
nor, they believe, is it likely that it ever would. 
The BBC differentiates between contracts of employment and free — 
lame contracts to the extent that freelance writers are asked to warrant 
that their work contains no defamatory matter. Following a single case 
in which the BBC stood on its rights and, having settled a libel claim 
out of court I claimed E220 from the author, the standard contract was 
amended to protect writers in all cases where, in the opinion of the BBC, 
there has been no negligence. Each oase is decided on its merits. 2 
To summarise the actual position, the public servant might 
occasionally be personally liable if he were found to be acting'in bad 
faith s — a test of liability which coincides with that recommended for 
theoretical reasons by Professor Glanville Williams. 3 In practice, 
1. Information supplied to the author by the legal department of the N.C.B. 
2. C.H. Rolph, Living Twice, 1974, pp. 191-194. Information as to current 
practice supplied by the legal department of the BBC. 
3. Op.cit., p.231. 
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however, the public service is more generous and will stand behind 
the servant whenever he is acting "for the ends and purposes or in the 
interests of the service". To adopt a narrower test might result in 
the plaintiff losing his damages. To join the employee as joint tort- 
feasor is almost unheard of except in the case of the medical profession 
and this exception operates only where the employee is insured. 
This does not mean that public employees who engage in dangerous 
practices and cause accidents escape scotfree. It is simply that 
employers prefer other methods of enforcement. Disciplinary regulations 
can be used to enforce regulatory schemes of accident prevention such 
as the Health and Safety Legislation and there is always the further 
possibility of criminal liability. For example, many serious railway 
accidents are attributable to drivers drinking on duty, and the rapid 
increase in the number of these accidents understandably concerns British 
Rail. In 5 years prior to 1974, 800 disciplinary cases were brought and 
120 men, including 10 drivers, dismissed. A statutory offence of being 
drunk on duty also exists with a maximum fine of E200 or 2 months' 
imprisonment. 1 Thus the practice of the National Coal Board in claiming 
a contribution to damages in severe cases of breach of disciplinary regu-
lations could be seen as superfluous as well as unnecessarily severe.,  
Indeed, Glanville Williams has argued that tort law always lags far 
behind the criminal law as a deterrent because, being victim-oriented, 
in any given case the sum awarded in damages will be too great or too 
small to serve as a fitting 'punishment'. He prefers the compensation 
order because it is "educationally superior to a fine: it teaches a moral 
lesson."2 Today criminal courts in England do possess powers to make 
1. The Times, 15 July 1977. 
2. Op.cit., 4 C.L.P. 137, P10.147-9. 
113 
compensation orders - although the results are not always what 
Glanville Williams might have hoped for. 1 
In France, with its long tradition of personal immunity, it is 
not surprising to find in the administrative courts from an early date 
a contrasting attitude to personal liability. State liability repre-
sented,first, an insurance for the victim that he would receive the 
sums awarded by the court l and secondly, a major weapon in the battle for 
control of government. The introduction of personal liability into 
this intense relationship between administrator and judge might have 
had unfavourable repercussions on the principle of legality. In 
2 /siorT.t Loumonnier-Carriol the Government Cornmi4/that time the cele-
brated jurist Laferriere, made this clear: 
"It must not be forgotten that the 
recours pour exAs de pouvoir which 
has been so greatly developed by the 
progressive(and praetorian) caselaw 
of the Conseil d'Etat would suffer a 
serious setback if it were thought to 
entail, as a necessary corollary, the 
personal pecuniary liability of officials. 
The Conseil d'Etat would hesitate to annul 
if this were to be the consequence." 
The steady expansion of the doctrine of personal fault did in 
fact endanger individual public servants. Once the notion of 'personal 
fault' ceased to mark the jurisdictional frontier and was allowed to 
overlap with criminal liability on the one side and personal civil 
liability on the other, the public servant was placed in an obscure and 
ambivalent position. He might be prosecuted in a criminal court, or sued 
in a civil court, in which case his personal funds would be at risk; on 
1. Below, pp.IN-q. 
2. T.C. 5 May 1877, D 1878-3-13 concl Laferriere. 'Praetorian' means 'judge-
made'. 
the other hand, the State might be sued in an administrative court in 
which case he would be protected. 
Criminal liability is a real possibility today and exists in a 
wide variety of cases. Leaving aside the obvious example of driving 
offences, prosecutions of doctors for failure to render assistance to 
someone in trouble under Art.63 and Art. R.30 of the Penal Code or for 
homicide through culpable negligenceare not uncommon in France. Again 
Arts. 114-122 of the Penal Code create a number of offences specifically 
designed to protect the citizen from abuse of police powers, and further 
offences punish other abuses of power by public officials including 
judges. Art. 136 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that the 
civil courts shall be exclusively competent in such cases. 1 The 
existence of II2L-1122127.1121 procedure means that criminal responsibility 
may entail an obligation to compensate the victim. 2 
a 
A need for/recursory action to protect public servants who had 
been found liable to damages in civil or criminal courts therefore arose. 
It is probable that a right to be covered for such damages is an implicit 
term of the contract of employment of public servants; it has also been 
called by the Conseil d'Etat one of the "general principles of law". 3 
However, this may be, the right to an indemnity by the State is now 
enshrined in statutes which provide that public authorities must cover 
any public servant who has been successfully sued by a third party unless 
ipmellumlarinmeamemoloweasosmemeow.•• ■•• 	
1. De la Murette T.C o 27 Mar 1952, R.D.P. 1952-757 n. Waline; Audin C.E. 
11 Jan 1978, A.J.D.A. 1978 p.329. 
2. The procedural mechanics of these jurisdictional overlaps are more 
fully discussed below,t,p.M0-1V-t 
3. See Leroy C.E. 5 Apr 1974, D 1974 p.649 n.Iti7upli ty for the former, and 
	 hospitalier 	de Besancon C.E. 26 Apr 1963, S 1963 p.338, 
for the latter explanation. 
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he is guilty of "a personal fault detachable from the exercise of his 
functions." 1 Similar legislation in the private law field prevents 
the insurer of an employer from turning against the guilty employee. 2 
Thus personal financial irresponsibility is really a rule and a rule 
sealed with legislative approval. 
Some time after the Second World War a current of hostility 
began to manifest itself to the security and immunity of public servants. 
It is probable that public lawyers were representing a general public 
sentiment and that this resulted from very grave irregularities which 
had been committed by public officials in important positions during the 
war. In any event, the distinguished Vice—President of the Conseil 
d'Etat, M. Rene Cassino ordinarily the most generous of men, was moved 
to remark that "no officials could in practice commit the most prejudicial 
acts 	without running the slightest financial risk." 3 
Disciplinary sanctions were probably perceived as inadequate to 
fill this gap because they had never been widely utilised except, 
perhaps, in periods of political crisis to mask scandal. The rules 
were applied sparingly and only to individuals with bad records. For 
some reason the authorities felt "the arbitrary power which they possess[o(] 
As an embarrassment rather than a source of strength" and showed "great 
tolerance to poor employees".4 
1. Art.14 of the Law of 19 Oct. 1946, now Art.11 of Ord. of 4 Feb.1959 1 
extended to local authorities by Art.9 of Law of 28 Apr.1952, now 
Art. 428 of the Code of Cbmmunal Administration. 
2. Art. 6 para '3 of the Law of 13 July 1938. 
3. (1958) 12 E.D.C.E. p.15. 
4. Thuillier "Le droit disciplinaire au 19e. siecle dans les ministeres" 1977 Rev. adm. 26. 
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The revelation shortly after the Second World War of serious 
fiscal irregularities exacerbated public opinion. A special court was 
established to try and impose fines in cases of fiscal improprieties. 1 
A feeling that administrative law was 'soft! on officials led the 
legislature when establishing nationalised industries to insist that 
their directors must be personally responsible for their torts according 
to the rules of civil law. 2 The public mood found expression in an 
influential article by a senior public lawyer who pointed to a (wartime) 
case in which the State had paid out FI45.000 in respect of a flagrantly 
illegal arrest and detention. He argued that the public prosecutor 
could never be relied upon to prosecute such malefactors and that dis-
ciplinary proceedings were too cumbersome to be generally used. He 
proposed personal civil liability as an alternative. 3  
Probably in response to these pressures, the Conseil d'Etat 
shortly afterwards reversed its caselaw in two important leading cases. 4 
 In Laruelle an army driver borrowed an army vehicle without permission 
and caused an accident while using it for his on purposes. The Conseil 
d'Etat subsequently awarded damages against the State on the ground that 
the failure to prevent the driver from removing the vehicle without per-
mission amounted to a faute de service. The. State then claimed full 
1. Law of 25 Sep 1948 (D 1948.354). The criteria for prosecution of 
English civil servants in case of theft or fraud are contained in 3rd 
Report of Public Accounts Committee, H.C.321 (1953-54); H.C.124 (1955-56). 
2. Lescuyer, "La Responsabilite'civile des dirigeants d'entreprises pub-
liques", 1974 R.D.P. p.975, 977-8. 
3. Waline, 	ltirresponsabilite- desfonctionnaires pour leurs fautes 
personnelles et des moyens city remedier" 1948 R.D.P. p.5. 
4. Laruelle et Delville C.E. 28 July 1951, S 1952.3.25 n. Mathiot; S 1953. 
3.57 n. Meurissej R.D.P. 1951, p.1087 n. Waline. For further discussion 
see Thgry l :Competence et fond du droit dans le contentieux de la res-
ponsabilite pecuniaire des fonctionnaires", (1958) 12 E.D.C.E. p.73; 
Long, "La responsabilite,de l'Administration pour les fautes personnelles 
commises par ses agents a l'occasion du service" (1953) 7 E.D.C.E 0 80; 
Soulier "Leavenir de la responsabilite de la puissance publique" 1969 
R.D.P. p.1039 at p.1102. 
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indemnity from the driver who appealed from this ministerial decision. 
The Conseil d'Etat found him liable to repay the whole sum on the ground 
that "the faute de service was wholly due to the subterfuges in Which 
the applicant had indulged with the motive of deceiving the director 
of the garage." 
In DelVille,  the companion case, a ministry driver caused an 
accident for which he was found liable in a civil court. The accident 
was attributable equally to D's drunkenness and to the faulty brakes of 
the state owned lorry. D 'brought a recursory action in the adminis-
trative courts claiming an indemnity from the State. He succeeded only 
in part, the Conseil d'Etat holding him personally liable for the costs 
of his defence together with one half of the damages awarded. 
From a doctrinal point of view these twin decisions are open to 
criticism as adding to the already complicated concept of personal fault 
a supplementary complication. The classic concept of personal fault is 
both jurisdictional and substantive It is introduced at a preliminary 
stage of the action to regulate (i) the question of jurisdiction and 
(ii) the substantive obligations of the wrongdoer to his victim. The 
'new personal fault', as it has been called, adds a secondary stage to 
the action and a third dimension to the concept whicharises at the 
secondary stage to regulate the obligations of the wrongdoer to the State 
or of the State to the wrongdoer. It is also. regrettably imprecise 
Moreau despairs of defining it s saying: "the content of this modern con-
cept of personal fault is rather amorphous, and it is perhaps unwise to 
• attenpt too precise a classification." 1 Finally, because the 'new personal 
1. "Responsabilite pour des agents publics et responsabilite de l'adminis-
tration" Juris,Adm. Faso. 705, Para 47. 
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fault' is disciplinary rather than tortious in nature - in other words, 
"the fault committed is a fault against the discipline of the service" 
rather than against the victim - an unduly wide test of causality, which 
would not recommend itself to a civil court, may be employed. 1 In 
Jeannier2  for example, six soldiers, out on a spree, borrowed an army 
lorry without permission and a fatal accident was caused. In a criminal 
prosecution,the driver was convicted of dangerous driving and damages 
were awarded against him. Having satisfied the judgment, the State demanded 
reparation from each of the six soldiers who had participated in the 
affair. The Conseil d'Etat held that each was liable to the extent of 
the loss which flowed directly from his actions. 
These doctrinal difficulties could no doubt be remedied. More 
directly relevant to our theme is the validity of the social policy 
Which underlies this punitive caselaw. A minority of writers supports 
the rule on the ground that it permits the balance,which had been tilted 
too generously in favour of the agent,to be re-established between 
administrative liability and personal liability. 3 A majority, however, 
deplores the rule, a variety of reasons being offered. The recursory 
action is inequitable and risks paralysing all initiative; it creates 
a distinction between civil law, where the employer's insurer cannot sue 
the employee, and public law, where the employee can be sued; too wide 
a discretion is left to the administration; it is an unauthorised fine 
which allows disciplinary procedures to be bypassed, and so on. 
1. Huet "Observations sur le recours de l'administration contre l'agent 
public ou la faute du lampiste", 1970 Rev. Admin.523. 
2. C.E. 22 Mar 1957 Rec. 1976 concl. Kahn 1957 D 748 n. Weil; see further 
Moritz T.C. 26 May 1954 Rec. 708. 
3. Mathiot, loc.cit., above. 
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Of all attacks on the recursory action,the most telling is that of 
M. Kahn, Government Commissioner in the Jeannier case. He objects to 
the imprecision of the rule, which he believes to be capable of indefinite 
extension from 'disciplinary fault' in Laruelle et Delville,to 'grave 
fault' (the civil law test) ) and so on down the scale of fault. 1- He 
objects to the wide discretions left to administrative authorities either 
to demur to the jurisdiction or to leave the malefactor to a civil court; 
to claim indemnity or forego repayment altogether. He objects because 
the rule penalises subordinates, creating a 'subaltern's liability'. 
If this liability were to be expanded, the court could expect to see 
before it 
a large number of corporals and 
cornet players who, when all is said 
and done, are guilty of having done 
on some unlucky day what others, at 
the top of the hierarchy, do and get 
away with every day." 
These predictions as to the use of the Laruelle et Delville rule 
proved only partially accurate. The administration has on occasion 
attempted to use the right to an indemnity in a repressive and arbitrary 
fashion. In Chedru, 2 for example, some young and impecunious soldiers 
during their period of compulsory military service caused a traffic 
accident in which they themselves were injured. The military authorities 
attempted to claim from them the amount of their medical expenses and of 
the sick pay to which they were entitled while in hospital. Again, all 
1. Thery (loc.cit.) has suggested a test of deliberate wrongdoing for 
liability at the second stage which would closely resemble the test 
suggested by Professor Glanville Williams in the context of the Lister case 
2, c.E. . Mr/ Igbb Re 6;,,310 
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the cases which I can discover concern humble members of the armed 
forces or military policemen, 1  with the exception of one unsuccessful 
/ recursory action against a fireman, 2  (also usually categorised as a 
disciplined force). This was an action brought by a local authority 
ordered to pay damages in respect of an accident caused when the fireman, 
a 
who did not possess/licence and who was drunk on duty, undertook to drive 
a private car. It can hardly be argued that adequate disciplinary 
measures are not available for use in such situations. 
In respect of the likely numbers, however, M. Kahn's prediction 
was strikingly inaccurate and the French and English caselaw has met 
with an identical fate. The courts of each country have created an 
employer's right to indemnity. In each country the rule is honoured in 
the breach not the observance. So rarely is it utilised that its very 
existence creates the possibility of injustice since to use it at all 
is arguably discriminatory. Like the sword of Damocles, the right to 
an indemnity constitutes a threat; like the sword of Damocles, the threat 
is purely mythical. 
The fate of the punitive Laruelle et Delville caselaw shows that 
administrative courts with a specific mandate to review and control 
administrative action, to check and correct abuses of power and to impose 
uniform standards of administrative morality are unable to restore the 
disciplinary element to delictual liability. If, therefore, we find 
this element to be missing and believe it to be vital, it is probable 
1. See Collin T.C. 22 Nov 1965, D 1966.195 coml. Lindon;Bart C.E. 
23 Apr 1975 mentioned Rec 878. 
2., 	 23.2Commude.02E. C.E. 9 Oct 1974 Rec. 477. 
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that we shall have to try alternative techniques. In the case of 
accident prevention the supervisory techniques of the Health and Safety 
at Work legislation with its qualified inspectorate seem most likely 
to be successful. 1 But although a high proportion of actions against the 
administration does concern accidents these are hardly the prototypes 
which we envisage as characteristic of administrative liability. In dis-
cussing personal liability therefore, I prefer to confine myself to the 
key areas of 'bureaucratic negligence' and police activity. I shall 
limit the discussion of accident prevention to the single case of medical 
negligence because it seems a special case distinguishable from traffic 
accidents and from industrial injuries. 
The case of medical liability is an interesting one because it 
suggests that, unusually, the insurance industry may be making a. 
contribution to the prevention of accidents and helping to extract the 
1. The Robens Committee Report Cmnd. 5034 (1971-72) paras 430-441; the 
/1974 Health & Safety at Work Act6 Report of the Health and Safety Commission 
for 1977-78 ? H.M.S.O. 1978, Figures of industrial accidents reported 
to the Rause of Commons and reproduced in the table below, show a 
gradual decline in the accident rate after the passage of the Health 
and Safety at Work Act. 
Fatal Accidents in 1st 	All Industrial 
6 months of each year in hundreds accidents for 1st 
6 months of each year 
in thousands 
1972 340 178,576 
1973 372 187,708 
1974 331 169,150 
1975 272 166,040 
1976 236 159,657 
1977(provisinnal) 264 161,314 
H.C. Deb 26 Oct 1977 col 883. 
The number of fatal accidents reported to the Health & Safety Executive 
also fell as did the total accidents reported. 
Year Fatal Accidents All Accidents 
1973 763 371,307 
1974 639 336,927 
1975 611 327,717 
1976 569 323,933 
1977 514 326,182 
Report of Health and Safety Commission, Appendix 10. 
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consequences of tort decisions. The Medical Defence Union, an asso-
ciation which provides for the medical professions insurance cover and 
an advisory service, is well informed about recent court decisions and 
trends in civil liability. It circulates to more than 70,000 members in 
the United Kingdom and overseas abstractsof cases in its Annual Reports. 
The Union does not hesitate to use the decided cases in conjunction with 
its own statistical records to recommend improvement in hospital and 
medical practices and to make recommendations as to safety precautions. 
The Union also promotes and circulates films on accident prevention. 
In 1960, a committee was set up by the Union to consider the problem of 
operations on wrong patients or on wrong limbs. In 1961, the report of 
this committee was issued in a memorandum sponsored jointly by the Union 
 and the Royal College of Nursing. 1  This memorandum was given wide pub-
licity in professional journals and otherwise and has been reissued 
several times. The advice was circulated to hospitals in the form of a 
film and, with the approval of the DHSS, resulted in a major review 
and overhaul of hospital procedures. Despite this serious effort, 
however, the Union in 1972 recorded 17 cases of operations on the wrong 
patient, the wrong side or the wrong digit,surely a very high number 
when the precautions to be taken are so simple. In 1978, the Union drew 
attention once again to a Canadian claim by a patient whose big toenail 
had been removed by mistake for the little toenail, a claim which was 
settled for 23,068. The Annual Report contains the following acid comment: 2 
1. Annual Report of the Medical Defence Union for 1972, pp.31-32. 
2. Annual Report of the Medical Defence Union for 1978, p.32. At p.33, 
a similar dental case is recorded in which the wrong child had teeth 
extracted. The claim was settled for 297. 
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"The mistake would not have occurred 
if the recommendations of the revised 
MDU/RCN joint memorandum on Safeguards 
against wrong operations ... had been 
followed 	Despite the Uhion's efforts 
by means of films, the memorandum and an 
exhibition, 20 to 30 reports of operations 
on the wrong patient, side, limb or digit 
are received each year." 
The Union makes no attempt at instilling caution into careless 
medical staff by premium loading or by demanding additional subscriptions. 
In this respect it may, however, be atypical, since the Union is not an 
insurance company properly so called buba mutual benefit association of 
professional people which meets claims from its own resources and reinsures 
some risks with commercial insurers. 
The Union's experience may also be atypical in that its clientele 
consists wholly of professional people, highly conscious of the risk 
of accident. Unusually, therefore, it can be argued that liability is 
aimed at the people best fitted to deter accidents. The Unionts experience 
does demonstrate very clearly ; that not even a high level of expertise, 
a staff fully alive to the consequences of error and to the likelihood 
of civil and criminal liability, and a carefully designed programme of 
re—education, are sufficient to eliminate stupid and easily—preventible 
launders. 
Although I am not able to parallel this information for France, 
one anecdote suggests' that medical insurers are well informed concerning 
the caselaw of the two jurisdictions and exercise a very similar role 
in trying to forestall liability by preventing accidents. Until the late 
1960s, claims in respect of failure to prevent suicide or suicide attempts 
1. Revue hospitalitre de France, Feb 1972, p.34. The first successful 
action seem to be about 1967 in the administrative tribunals and 1969-70 
in the Conseil d'Etat. In the period immediately before several actions 
failed. 
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by hospital patients were extremely rare. For example, in 1972, 
7-10% of hospital accidents concerned suicides yet in only 2-3% of 
these cases was any claim made. But the sudden liberalisation of the 
caselaw frightened insurers, who realised that premiums could not be 
augmented indefinitely since hospitals were not in a position to pass on 
the increase to their clients. The insurers therefore mounted an 
intensive preventive campaign advising for example, the installation of 
new windows and the replacement of lavatory chains in an effort to fore-
stall intending suicides. Whether the campaign was successfUl I am not 
in a position to say. Cases of attempted suicide have not vanished from 
the reports, however. 1 
Even in this unusual case where personal responsibility by skilled 
staff is unusually high, a query must arise whether personal or vicarious 
liability is best suited to accident prevention. There is after all, 
a limit to what can be done by employees. It is hospital authorities 
who design hospital layouts and effect even minor repairs.,not the staff 
who will later be blamed for permitting suicidal patients to throw 
themselves from the unlatched windows. A recent report by the Royal 
College of Nursing2  showed how little can be achieved at 
the most elementary level where overworked or underpaid staff have to 
deal with overcrowded hospitals housed in inadequate buildings. Deterrent 
theories of civil law have little to offer in such circumstances, even 
though, as the laW stands staff might be held personally liable for 
unhygenic conditions and lack of adequate nursing. 
1. For discussion of the problems raised for the medical profession by 
the imposition of civil liability and the difficulty of preventing 
suicide see 2nd Report of Select Committee on P.C.A., H.C.311 (1978-79), 
pp.5-6. 
2. Reported in the Guardian, 24 August 1979. 
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To move from the area of accident prevention into the more central 
area of administration and maladministration is to encounter a total 
dearth of empirical data. This means that the argument is inevitably 
conducted at the level of guesswork, the danger being that prejudices 
may be presented in the guise of fact and so fed back into the argument 
and used to distort it. 
Judges do express their fears quite often that the imposition of 
civil liability may indirectly fetter the decision-making powers of 
the administration or create a drain on public funds. There is very 
little evidence to enable us to assess this possibility. 
Events which followed the two leading cases of Dutton v. Bognor 
Regis U.D.C. 1  and Anns v. Merton L*B.C. 2 do suggest some of the ways in 
which public authorities might react to judicial decisions. In both 
- actions, liability was imposed on local authorities for the negligence 
of their surveyor in the exercise of supervisory powers under the Building 
Regulations. In both actions, judges largely discounted the danger 
that claims would esallabeand result in constituting the authority an 
unpaid insurer for negligent builders. 3 Yet the leading insurers shortly 
afterwards reported 350 claims amounting to Z1.4 millions. 4 The 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities became worried as to insurance 
1. [1972] 2 W.L.R. 299. 
2. [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024 (above p. 	) • 
3. [1972] 2 W.L.R0314, 322 (Lord Denning M.R., Sachs L.J.); [1977] 2 W.L.R. 
1046 (Lord Salmon). 
4. See Ganz [1977] P.L. 306. 
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cover and suggested a system of fees to cover the cost of premiums. 
Subsequently Counsel's opinion was obtained as to how the advisory and 
supervisory schemes established under the Building Regulations could 
best be remodelled in such a way as to avoid tortious liability. Some 
architects complained, too, that it was difficult to persuade local 
authorities to inspect or to express any opinion as to the adequacy of 
the foundations of new buildings. But 0In absence of compelling empirical 
evidence is typical of the debate. 
The standard academic argument against real personal liability 
has always been that it will result in a timid and passive civil service 
afraid of personal initiative and responsibility. 1 No evidence is 
tendered in proof of this bland assertion. It is true that it might be 
possible to construct rules of civil liability which would encourage 
inertia and inefficiency. For example, in France the refusal by a 
public servant to obey a legitimate order is a disciplinary fault for 
which he may be punished. Superior orders, on the other hand, constitute 
a defence to liability, because the existence of a hierarchical order 
may have the effect — though this is not an invariable rule — of trans-
forming what might have been a personal fault into a faute de service. 2 
Such rules might encourage decision taking to creep upwards. Certainly, 
1. Jennings, op.cit.,(1937) 21 Minn.L.R. 263; Pannaa, "Torts under Uncon-
stitutional Statute" (1966) 5 Melb.Univ. L.R. 113, 124; Benjafield 
and Whitmore, Principles of Australian Law, 4th edn. 1971, p.295; 
Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality, Ch. VI, p. 146. 
2. Auby et Drago, op.cit., Vol. I, p.416; Osmont 28 May 1969 Rec. 189. 
Moreau, op.cit., Juris.Admin. at No. 79, puts this more strongly. 
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in the Marseille survey Blum found 1 that the main complaints levelled 
by 'consumers' at the administration were of inertia, apathy, delay 
and impoliteness, lack of concern or interest. This he attributed to 
lack of real responsibility in the sense of a share in the decision making 
process. He advocated -allowing more decisions to be taken at a lower 
level,but suggested that changes to the 'statut de la fonction oubliquel 
or conditions of the public service would be necessary first. 
his information suggests a way in which the influence of civil liability 
could be tested by an objective survey. 2 At present however, it is impor-
tart to stress that these reactions of 'consumers' have themselves never 
been tested and may represent no more than a commonly held prejudice 
concerning the nature of bureaucracy. 
The Fulton Committee, also accepting unquestioningly the myth; 
of bureaucratic inertia, concluded that lack of personal involvement 
might be to blame. They believed that the doctrine of ministerial res- 
ponsibility played a part in promoting administrative inefficiency because 
"Decisions often have to be referred to 
a higher level than their intrinsic 
difficulty or apparent importance merits; 
this is because they involve the respon-
sibility of the Minister to Parliament 
and may be questioned there." 3 
What is interesting, however, is that the Fulton Committee, like 
other management surveys, stressed involvement rather than sanction 
and punishment. The trend in modern management is to foster a sense of 
1. Frayssinet, Guin et Blum, Administration et Justice administrative face 
aux administres„ 1972, pp.127, 132 and 167. 
2. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, 1964,provides a possible model. 
3. Report of the Fulton Committee on the Civil Flervice, Cmnd. 3638, 1966-68 
Ch. 5 paras 145-191. The passage cited is from para 146. 
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initiative and involvement by positive means rather than to rely upon 
the negative-6.°f sanction and punishment. The elaborate controls 
designed to eliminate corruption which were perhaps, the outstanding 
feature; of the 19th century, are gradually being replaced by more modern 
techniques of personnel management. Ironically, at a time when the 
movement for legal control of discretionary power gathers strength, the 
role of discretion in promoting personal responsibility and involvement 
at comparatively low levels in the service hierarchy has been recognized. 
It is precisely this balance which might be upset by the intrusion of 
personal tortious responsibility. In line with this belief in the 
carrot rather than the stick, the Fulton Committee recommended the 
establishment of 
"accountable units within government 
departments — units where output can 
be measured against costs or other 
criteria and where individuals can be 
held personally responsible for their 
performance.° 
This ideal was accepted by the Expenditure Committee in 1978, which 
again referred to the importance of motivation. They pointed out that 
the traditional approach towards civil service efficiency was negative 
rather than positive, the controls being designed to prevent corruption 
rather than promote efficiency: 
"Efficiency in the civil service is dependent 
as in business, on motivation, and whereas 
in business one is judged by overall success, 
the civil servant tends to be judged by 
failure. This inevitably conditions his 
approach to his work in dealing with the 
elimination of unnecessary paper work, and 
in eliminating excessive monitoring, and 
1. Ibid para 150. 
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leads to the creation of an 
unnecessary number of large committees, 
all of which leads to delay in decision 
taking and the blurring of responsibility."  
Thus there may be a historical link between the deterrent theories 
of civil liability fashionable at the end of the nineteenth century and 
.negative management techniques, fashionable at the same period and 
directed at the elimination of fraud and grave malfeasance in the 
public service. The modern bureaucratic phenomenon has, however, pro- 
moted bureaucratic vjces of inertia and timidity which modern management 
techniques are designed to combat. Partly for this reason and partly 
because bureaucracies develop their own corporate life and are relatively 
impervious to outside influences, negative techniques have fallen into 
disfavour. They are revived only occasionally when some major scandal 
creates a demand for vengeance. This pattern is illustrated by the 
in recent years decline/in England of the practice of surcharging councillors with 
expenditure thought to be unreasonable, 
,which 	(except for a few trivial cases). is only rarely 
revived as, for example,in the notorious "Clay Cross" affair. 2  Similarly, 
in France the fiscal sanctions created after the last world war are,like 
the Laruelle-Delville caselaw, seldom employed in practice and are 
generally said to be "purely academic". 3 
A further diffficulty arises because maladministration seems to 
be systemic or anonymous rather than personal in character. It is best 
described as a sort of chronic inefficiency endemic to bureaucracy and 
1. llth Report from Expenditure Committee, H.C. 	(1977) Ch.XI. The 
passage cited comes from the oral evidence of Sir Derek Rayner, see 
para 124. 
2. Redcliffe-Maud and Wood English Local Government Reformed, 197 p.117; 
Av$WMitchell, ° Vim" Cross" 	(1974)Apol.Quarterly 
165 and Asher_ v. Environment Secretary [1974] 2 W.L.R. 466. 
3. Colliard, D 1949 Chr.65; Maestre, op.cit., p.200. Lescuyer, op.cit., 
above cites one notorious case in the Paris transport authority (R.A.T.P.) 
and some modern cases are cited by Fabre at 1978 Rev. Adm.688. 
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affecting every level. For example, for many years now the departments 
which figure most prominently in the PCA's reports have been the Inland 
Revenue and the D.H.S.S. Many of the complaints have featured the 
Supplementary Benefits System, the administration of which has ? since 
1975, been regularly monitored by the Supplementary Benefits Commission. 1 
 Their first report showed that in December 1975, 2,793,000 people were 
receiving supplementary benefits which entailed 30,000 staff in local 
offices calculating benefits for 2,825,000 claimants (approximately one 
member of staff for 94 claims). In 1976, their review was expanded to 
include an examination of 3,687 casepapers selected by a random process. 
No interviews were conducted, but examination of the files showed that 
17.5% of casepapers contained errors either in the calculation of the 
9s basic supplementary benefit or in 55% of he/cases, in the award of dis- t, 
oretionary additions. 45% of all errors found were in deciding heating 
additions, the criteria for awarding which had recently been changed. 
The resultant complex instructions to staff had apparently not yet been 
properly assimilated. In 1977, 4,008 casepapers were selected and it 
was found that the rate of error had fallen to 11.6%. The reduction 
was attributed to a fall in the number of errors in the discretionary 
heating awards, perhaps because the instructions were by now fully 
assimilated. 
The high rate of error seems to have several explanations including: 
the complexity of the scheme; the element of discretion in certain areas 
of the scheme; the rapid turnover of staff (as many as 20% leave within 
2 years, especially in the London area); and the constantly rising number 
1. The figures are extracted from the Annual Report of the S.B.C. for 
1975, Grand. 6615 (1975) p.96 e.s.; for 1976, Cmnd.(71(0(1977), pp•185-6; 
for 1977, Cand• 7392 (1978) p.106 e.s. 
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of applicants leading to chronic understaffing. Thus in November 1977, 
there were 2,991,000 people receiving benefit and about 5.7 million 
claims were received. Staff increases were not proportionate. 
The Inspectorate noted that many of the errors recorded involved 
less than R.1, hardly the stuff of an action in damages, and that in 
any event many of the errors would have been corrected by an internal 
review. Of those errors which survived many would be corrected by an 
appeal to a Supplementary Benefits Appeal Tribunal. OthersArould. be  
competently dealt with by the Parliamentary Commissioner, whose procedures 
have the advantage that he may negotiate dirctly with the department 
concerned and in many cases secures amelioration of the administrative 
system. Civil liability,on the other hand; can provide no supervision 
facilities. A final check to this system of administrative controls is 
provided by the possibility of appeal to the High Court on a point of 
law or application for a prerogative order. One can deduce therefore 
that civil liability is hardly likely to play a major role in this area; 
on the contrary, its functions are likely to be increasingly assumed 
by the Ombudsman. 
Any attempt to drop a net into these bureaucratic waters and 
trawl for wrongdoers is likely to result in arbitrariness and injustice. 
Two modern cases of maladministration illustrate this very clearly. 
The first was the inquiry into the tragic death of Maria Colwell. In 
1973, Maria Colwell, a child of 7, died from brutal injuries inflicted 
by her stepfather who was subsequently convicted of her manslaughter. 
Since Maria was in the care of the local authority, it was widely felt 
that there must have been some failure on the part of the agencies 
involved in supervising Maria and the Secretary of State set up a public 
inquiry to investigate the matter. The Committee failed to agree, and, 
in the course of a detailed and scrupulous dissenting report, Miss Olive 
137 
Stephenson, an experienced social worker, pointed to the dangers of 
erecting"a hierarchy of censure" in cases which seize the public 
imagination. She said: 1 
"As a social worker, my education 
and experience has taught me that in such 
matters, there is no one truth; in con-
sidering the subtpties of human emotions 
everyone is subjective. One's feelings, 
attitudes and experience colour one's 
perception 	And when one is dealing 
with events now some time in the past, 
drawing to a large extent on records for 
evidence, and inevitably affected by the 
eventual tragedy, the probability of 
distortion in interpretation is all the 
greater." 
The majority of the Commission found it appropriate to censure 
"a failure of system compounded of several factors of which the greatest 
and most obvious must be that of the lack of, or ineffectiveness of, 
communication and liaison"; but they too deliberately refrained from 
allotting individual blame. They found that it was 
H ... quite impossible, and indeed 
unfair, to lay the direct blame for 
such inadequacies in the care and super- 
vision of Maria upon any individual or 
indeed upon any small group of individuals. 
Many of the mistakes made by individuals 
were either the result of, or were contri-
buted to by,inefficient systems operating 
in several different fields, notably 
training; administration, planning, liaison 
and supervision." 2 
Following the Colwell inquiry, the Department of Health and 
Social Security undertook, with the aid of local authorities, a major 
review of the practices of social service departments in preventing 
child abuse. Reports from 105 Area Review Committees were co—ordinated 
1. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Care and Supervision pro-
vided in relation to Maria Colwell, H.M.S.O., 1974, at p.88. 
2. At p.86. 
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by the Department. Detailed procedural notes were subsequently devised 
and circulated to all concerned with the aim of securing some uniformity 
of practice. 1 Thus the Colwell Inquiry was extremely influential 
in securing administrative change, perhaps the more so because of its 
self-restraint in the allocation of blame. 
There are some lessons to be learned here about the deterrent 
functions of civil liability. First,the public inquiry and the civil 
action in a court suffer from procedural defects which may actually 
impede their deterrent and preventive functions. They look back on 
the event, which means that they tend to deduce cause from effect. 
It is tempting to knit threads until a rope of causation has been plaited. 
The temptation will be the greater in any case which arouses public 
indignation because catharsis is not achieved unless a suitable scape-
goat can be provided. 
Secondly, the publicity, inevitable in the case of court pro-
ceedings, may hinder the efforts of the inquiry to discover the truth, 
as with the accident inquiries discussed above. In an inquiry into a 
case of child abuse in Perth subsequent to the Colwell Inquiry, in which 
Richard Clark, a child of 4, was assaulted by a foster parent and reduced 
to a vegetable condition after a cerebral haemorrage, the decision was 
resultant 
taken to hold the/inquiry in private. Commenting on the fact that there 
had been public criticism of this decision, the Committee defended the 
decision in the following tams: 
"We think it proper to record that 
having heard the evidence and noted 
the demeanour of the witnesses we have 
absolutely no doubt that this direction 
materially contributed to the relaxed and 
1. DHSS circulars LASSL (74) 13 / CMO (74) 8; LASSL (76) 2, amo (76) 2, 
C Na. 76 (3). 
1.3J 
frank way in which the evidence was 
presented to us. Had the witnesses, 
who were not on oath, been subjected 
to the daily glare of publicity we 
doubt whether such a very full account 
of the events would have been furnished 
to us." 1 
A second and very well known case is that of the Vehicle and 
General Affair. 2 The Board of Trade possessed powers underthe 
Insurance Companies Acts of 1958 and 1967 to supervise insurance companies 
in order to insure their solvency and in e±treme cases to intervene 
and suspend operations. In March 1971, following the crash of the 
Vehicle and General Company, much public criticism of the Board of 
Trade was heard and a Tribunal of Inquiry was established by the Home 
Secretary in April 1971 to inquire into the responsibility of the Board 
of Trade. Not only did the Tribunal conclude that there had been 
'misconduct' and 'negligence' on the part of the Board of Trade officials 
but it went so far as to allocate responsibility to several officials 
including the Under—Secretarystating that "his performance as a whole 
fell so far below the standard which could reasonably be expected from 
someone in his position and with his experience (or opportunity to acquire 
experience) that it cannot escape the description of 'negligence". 
The Vehicle and General Inquiry presents a number of interesting 
parallels with an action for civil liability which suggests how civil 
liability and administrative conduct may interact. The common features 
1. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the consideration given and 
steps taken toward securing the welfare of Richard Clark by Perth Town 
Council and other bodies or persons concerned, H.M.S.°. 1975, p.37. 
2. Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into certain issues in 
relation to the circumstaans leading up to the cessation of trading by 
the Vehicle and General Company Ltd., H.C.133, H.L. 80 (1972). The 
citation is at p.341. 
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were (i) that the Inquiry was conducted by a panel of eminent lawyers 
(ii) that it held public hearings (iii) that witnesses were legally 
represented and legal submissions were made (iv) that the civil law 
concept of 'negligence' and legal notions of "causality' were used to 
found responsibility and (v) that responsibility was attributed to 
individuals. The Tribunal met with 	hostile criticism 
on all these points. Writers singled out for particular criticism the 
decision to allocate responsibility to a single individual. One commen-
tator thoughtthat it would "encourage the level of decision making to 
creep upwards which is the very thing the Tribunal feared." 1 A second 
writer expert in the field of public administration believed the 
Tribunal's efforts to be amateur) remarking: 2 
"The approach adopted by the Tribunal 
of asserting the responsibilities of 
an official part-way up a line of 
command without, apparently, fully 
investigating the actions and'attitudes 
of higher officials, therefore appears 
to disregard, without any reason being 
given, both classical principles of 
formal organization theory and the ethos 
and traditions of British public adminis-
tration, which has favoured concentration 
of responsibility at the top, i.e. at the 
level of Permanent Secretary ... Further-
more, a charge of negligence in the public 
service should be seen in,relation to 
environmental factors which condition the 
way work is actually done, and in this 
particular case this includes the provision 
of staff and other resources for doing the 
work." 
These are exactly the type of criticism which can be levelled 
at the efforts of courts to sanction what they see as maladministration 
1. Ganz, "Compensation for Negligent Administration Action" [1973] 
P.L. 84, 94. 
2. Chapman, "The Vehicle and General Affair: Some Reflections for Public 
Administration in Britain", (1973) 51 Pub. Adm. 273, 286. 
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by means of the blunt-edged weapon of tortious liability. Tortious 
liability suffers from all the same defects. It is deduced retros-
pectively; it is imposed by a judge, who is unfamiliar with administrative 
techniques; it involves no thorough investigation of'the administrative 
lifer; the proceedings take place in public, in the hostile atmosphere 
of the courtroom s finally, civil proceedings are unlike a public inquiry 
of the type we are considering in that they are not aimed at discovering 
the truth but at compensation of the victim by means of pinpointing 
individuals to whose actions the loss can be attributed. The compen-
sation aim and the deterrent aim are thus schizophrenic, pulling the 
court in different directions. 
Even where maladministration can be reliably located and allocated 
to specific individuals forprocedural reasons an investigation by the 
PCA or CLA is likely to achieve much better results. In one such affair 
investigated by the PCA a regular army officer complained to the PCA 
of serious errors in calculating his war pension. Subsequent investi-
gation revealed 24 similar cases, the discovery of which prompted the 
PCA to publish a special report stigmatising the malpractices involved 
as "improper and deceitful". Prompt restitution followed for every 
victim. 1 But this affair also illustrates that it is public disquiet 
over the ineffectiveness of disciplinary proceedings which sparks off 
demands for a greater degree of real individual responsibility and tempts 
the courts to intervene by way of sanction theories of tortious liability. 
Even though the PCA. had revealed a classic example of deliberate mal-
feasance and abuse of power, no retaliatory measures resulted. The PCA 
1. 4th report of P.C.A., "A War Pensions Injustice Remedied", H.C.312 
(1977-78). 
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has no mandatory powers nor powers of sanction; the Director of 
Public Prosecutions decided, after investigation by the Police, not 
to prosecute; the Minister, on the other hand, decided that disciplinary 
proceedings would be inappropriate because "those concerned have 
already suffered the anxiety of being subject to prolonged police 
investigation". 1 This. result suggests that, in all probability, the 
recommendation of the Salmon Commission that, as a measure against 
corruption, 2 all the Ombudsmen should be empowered to transmit to the 
police any evidence of criminal conduct which they discover, would, like 
the French audit procedures, provide a purely nominal sanctionMe do 
know that in England disciplinary measures are occasionally enforced 
against public servants, because the House of Commons was recently 
informed that 670 civil servants were dismissed on disciplinary grounds 
between January 1975 and July 1978. Lesser disciplinary measures were 
not recorded, and no information was given as to what faults merit dis-
ciplinary sanctions other than the statement that there is no "rigid 
code automatically assigning particular penalties to particular offences." 3 
This information cannot, therefore, be interpreted. 
Rare examples may be culled from the reports of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner. In one case4 a complaint was made about the failure of 
a Factory Inspector employed by the Health and Safety Executive to 
investigate an accident although it was reported three times. The P.C.A. 
1. The Times, 13 April and 14 Nov 1978. 
2. Salmon Commission on Standards 
(1976) para 264. 
3. H.C. Deb 3 Aug Vol 9.55 col 511 
Reports of the Chief Inspector 
disciplinary proceedings which 
of Conduct in Public Life, Cmnd. 6524 
(written answer). [Similarly the Annual 
of Constabulary contain statistics of 
cannot be interpreted]. 
4. 5th Report of PCA, H.C. 524 (1977-78) Case No. 5/267/77 p.53. 
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found the Inspector guilty of "personal negligence" of a kind which 
would normally, be the subject of disciplinary action. But no discip-
linary action was actually taken as the Inspector had already resigned. 
Nor was any compensation forthcoming. Both the PCA and the Department 
took the curiously legalistic attitude that no loss could be proved 
as "the possible value of an Inspector's report to either side [in 
civil litigation] can only be a matter of speculation". The victim 
had to content himself with an apology, a rather unsatisfactory result. 
'Unfortunately, however, there is no evidence to show that a court could 
achieve a better one. 
One area in which the curious interaction between decisions of 
the courts and administrative behaviour is relatively well documented 
is the case of the police. All studies of police behaviour emphasise 
the group ethos which prevails. Both internal and external pressures 
combine to produce this group - morality. The policeman feels cut off, 
alienated from the public at large, "isolated in a minority of one - 
in' essence the loneliest man on the street". 1 His role has been des-
cribed as that of a "sub-professional working alone ... in an environment 
that is apprehensive and perhaps hostile". 2 His task, normally per-
ceived by him in terms of public order, is difficult and, on occasion, 
even dangerous. It is natural that the policeman should rely for 
support and seek approval from his fellows and superior officers. 
The structural organisation of the police force reinforces this 
natural tendency. Generally speaking, the individual policeman is a 
believer in authority; if he were not, he would not be doing the job. 
But this characteristic is accentuated by the structure of the police 
1. Bowden, Beyond the Limits of the Law, 1978, p.23. Also Cain, "On the 
Beat", in Images of Deviance, ed. Cohen, 1971. 
2. Wilson, Variations of Police Behaviour, 1968, p.38. 
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force on which he relies for his authority and physical safety. He 
functions in an "authoritarian, disciplined, hierarchically organized 
and cohesive unit." 1 One American study goes much further in calling 
the American police force "a punishment centred bureaucracy [in which] 
the use of negative sanctions and the threat or fear of their use 
pervades the day to day operation" of the force. 2 In such an atmos-
phere it is hardly surprising if the policeman gives precedence to 
the views of his colleagues and superiors. Of the three sets of minis — 
legal norms; behaviour acceptable to the public; and behaviour acceptable 
to the force — to which the.policeman is subject, it is the last which 
is most influential. There is 
1111 
eel* a strong tradition in the police 
of self—discipline rather than of dis-
cipline imposed from without. A man 
who offends what is virtually an unwritten 
code of behaviour suffers heavily at the 
hands of his equals and immediate superiors, 
although the matter may never be taken to 
the stage of giving him an official caution 
or reprimand ..."3 
The 'unwritten code' to which the policeman's conduct must 
conform may in fact diverge substantially from the legal rules by which 
his conduct is theoretically regulated. K.C. Davis 4 once suggested 
that if the New York narcotics squad ware to reduce its unwritten practices 
to a written code of rules, their blatant illegality would become 
immediately apparent. On a more serious note, Harding5 in a study of the 
1. Bowden, loc.cit. above. 
2. McNamara, "Uncertainties in Police Work.: The Relevance of Police 
Recruits' Backgrounds and Training" in Bordua ed., The Police, 1967, 
pp.177-9. 
3. Martienssen, Crime and the Police, Penguin 1953, p.243. See, for the 
classic exposition, Sir Robert Mark, In the Office of Constable, 1977, 
Chaps. 10, 19 and 20. 
4. Discretionary Justice, Illeni Books edition. 1971, pp•95-96• 
5. Police Killings in Australia, 1970, p.227. 
Australian police identifies three categories of deviant police 
behaviour: disciplinary offences not amounting to a crime:: criminal 
behaviour alien to police group standards; and finally "conduct which 
amounts to an ordinary crime, harms the public interest in exactly the 
same way as an ordinary crime, and is acce table to and arises out of 
  
police group standards". In the latter class may fall serious criminal 
offences such as assault or even homicide. 
The tendency of the police to cut corners in procuring evidence 
of crime or making arrests is too well—known to require elaboration 
here. The rules of search and seizure are particularly subject to 
misuse and the excuse is regularly advanced that the powers allowed by 
the common law are wholly inadequate and the police are entitled to 
ignore them, the public interest in the prevention of crime being 
paramount. 
One reason why civil liability is not in England a powerful 
deterrent in restraining abuse by the police of their legal powers is 
the attitude of the courts. In marked contrast to their brethren in 
the United States, 1 English judges have resolutely refused to allow 
either the law of tort or the rules of evidence and criminal procedure 
to be welded into an effective deterrent instrument. The rules are 
imprecise and constantly extended by the cases to the profit of the police. 
The courts shut their eyes to what they see as technical infringements 
of the legal rules, and too much is left to the good sense of the police 
1. Yet even in the U.S. the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule 
are uncertain: see,for the impact of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 
U.S. 436 7 "Interrogations in New Haven: the Impact of Miranda" (1967) 
76 Yale L.J. 1519; Griffiths and Ayres "A postscript to the Miranda 
Project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters" (1967) 77 Yale L.J. 3009; 
Seeburger and Weitick "Miranda in Pittsburgh, a Statistical Study" 
(1967) 29 Univ. of Pittsburgh L.Rev.l; Meddlie, Leitz and Alexander 
"Custodial Police Interrogation in our Nation's Capital: the attempt to 
Implement Miranda" (1968) 66 Mich. L.Rev. 1347. 
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and the discretion of the courts. In Ghani v. Jones, for example, 
Lord Denning M.R. said: 1 
"I would start by considering the law 
where police officers enter a man's 
house by virtue of a warrant, or 
arrest a man lawfully, with or without 
a warrant, for a serious offence. I 
take it to be settled law, without citing 
cases, that the officers are entitled to 
take any goods which they find in his 
possession or in his house which the  
to be  
in relation to the crime for which he is 
arrested or for which they enter. If in 
the course of their search they come upon 
other goods which show him to be implicated 
in some other crime, they may take them 
provided theY act reasonably and detain 
them no longer than is necess ary . 
In Frank Truman Ex ort Ltd. v. Metro olitan Police Commissioner . 2  
this imprecise principle was extended. Officers of the Fraud Squad 
entered a solicitor's officer under the authority of a valid warrant 
issued under section 16(1) of the Forgery Act 1913 and took away docu-
ments alleged to be forgeries. They also took away further documents 
which did not clearly fall within the warrant and the solicitor subse-
quently asked_ for an interlocutory injunction ordering their return. On 
the previous law, implied extensions of the powers of search and seizure 
had probably been limited to the case where the owner of the goods or 
premises was implicated in the crime charged, or at least in some crime. 
This case was distinguishable because the solicitors were in no way 
implicated in any criminal activities. An injunction was nonetheless 
refused, on the ground that the dictum of Lord Denning was not to be 
1. [1970] 1 Q.B.693, 706. (my italics). See also Chic 	Fashions West 
Wales) Ltd. v. Jones , [1968] 2 Q.B. 299; Elias v. Pasmore 1.1934- 2K.B.164. 
2. [1977] 3 W.L.R. 257. 
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interpreted strictly as though it were statute or regulation and that 
in any event Lord Denning had not been considering a case in which the 
police had taken away the documents with the consent of the owner of 
the premises. The customary judicial caution was administered to the 
police, but as usual in terms so vague as to be incapable of practical 
enforcement. The police were warned not to interpret the decision as 
meaning that 
... police entering a solicitor's 
office under a search warrant should 
regard themselves as having an unlimited 
licence to search all his documents 
meticulously for evidence of any crime 
that his client may have committed. In 
the present case I have found that the 
police acted reasonably because Mr. Wood 
consented to hand over all his files of 
papers dealing with these clients for the 
police to search and sort. What is reason- 
able when conducting a search in a solicitor's 
office must depend on the circumstances. 
What is reasonable in a man's house may well 
not be reasonable in the offices of his 
solicitor ..." 1 
The protection .of the civil law, already limited in character, 
may be still further reduced according to this decision if the police 
take the elementary precaution of acquiring the owner's 'consent'. The 
case cannot fail to suggest to the police that 'consent may be notional 
rather than real. The judge expressly found that the respectable Mr. Wood 
had been "very shocked and felt that he must be suspected of impropriety; 
that he said words to the effect that he would plead privilege were it not 
that he thought the search warrant entitled the police to look through 
the documents and that he could not prevent it"; 2 despite this finding, 
1. At p.269. 
2. At. p.261. 
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the judge was prepared to hold that Mr. Wood had 'consented' to the 
trespass. 
This impression of unreality is confirmed by the subsequent case 
of Jeffrey v. Black 1 in which the defendant was arrested by two members 
of the Drug Squad for stealing a sandwich from a public house. The police 
then accompanied the defendant to his room, entered, and, on searching, 
found cannabis. The justices found that the defendant had not consented 
to the search and refused to allow the evidence to be admitted in criminal 
proceedings. The prosecutor appealed to the Divisional Court which accepted 
the finding that there had been no consent and held the search to be 
illegal.. Lord Widgery C.J. said 
"I do not accept that the common law has 
yet developed to the point, if it ever 
does, in which police officers who arrest 
a suspect for one offence at one point 
can as a result thereby authorise them-
selves, as it were, to go and inspect his 
house at another place when the contents 
of his house, on the fact of them, bear no 
relation whatever to the offence with 
which he is charged or the evidence required 
in support of that offence." 
Yet despite this clear statement of the law the Divisional Court 
returned the case for rehearing before a differently constituted bench 
on the ground that justices would not be justified in exercising their 
discretion to exclude evidence favourably to the defence simply because 
the evidence had been illegally obtained. They should do so "only 
rarely", and the Divisional Court was not persuaded that the justices 
had properly considered the extreme nature of their action. 
Far from using civil liability as a deterrent, the courts have 
removed its sting, reducing its practical efficacy to a minimum by their 
1. [1977] 3 W.L.R. 895, 899. 
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refusal to issue injunctions. The police are left with th-; maximum 
room for manoeuvre and, in contrast to internal directives or dis-
ciplinary regulations, the imprecise and vague court rulings do nothing 
to structure the use of police discretion. 1 The police gain further 
ground for manoeuvre through their right to initiate prosecutions. By 
preferring minor criminal charges for assault or obstruction of a police 
officer in the execution of his duty they are able to transfer the 
action to the noticeably pro—police terrain of a criminal court. 2 In 
this way they may even obtain an extension of their legal powers. 
The absence of any strict exclusionary rule in criminal cases 3 also 
operates to the benefit of the police because it is unlikely that a 
convicted criminal will obtain worthwhile damages for technical trespass 
and he may even be left to pay his own costs. By moving in this way to 
an offensive position the police are able to push the likelihood of a 
civil action still further into the distance.. They are well able to 
draw the right conclusions. One author was told frankly by a London 
detective, that, in a case where the owner of property refused permission 
to search,the police would 
H 	just go ahead and kick the door down. 
He can sue you for trespass. But lawyers 
aren't keen — they're just interested in 
the criminal legal—aid money, not civil 
actions. Generally you don't have to 
worry unless he's acquitted." 4 
1. See for fuller consideration of the real relationship between courts 
and police, MacBarnet, "Arrest: the Legal Context of Policing" in 
Holdaway ed. The British Police, 1979. 
2. For a blatant case (which misfired) see ReatLyzsjonesonnel [1978]R.TZ, 
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3. Kuruma v. The een1955] A.C.197; ISjya :Et :_Theeen [1969] 1 A.C.304; 
Callis v. Gunn 1964 1 Q.B. 495.• 
4. Laurie, Scotland Yard, Penguin 1972, pp.263-4. 
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Even where a civil action is brought, the corporate morality 
will help to shelter individual wrongdoing. Evidence is hard to come 
by, because, 
"When irregularities are committed by 
one police officer, a defendant has no 
chance of persuading another officer 
to testify to them, even if the latter 
was not personally involved. The spirit 
of esprit de corps [sic] is too strong.. 
The work of the police involves them in 
danger and isolates them from the rest 
of the community. There is therefore, 
a powerful sense of solidarity which leads 
the police to back each other up. When 
the culprit is a senior officer, he is in 
a position to influence the promotion 
prospects of others." 1 
A further weakness of tort law as a deterrent is that it assumes 
abuse of police procedures to be an isolated act of individual wrong-
doers rather than systematic in character. Certainly until the 1970s, 
this myth was assiduously propagated and generally believed in England. 
Laurie, 2  for example, felt able to assert that 
"The very fact that bribery is hardly 
discussed is, I think, quite strong 
evidence that, it is almost as rare 
among the Metropolitan Police as its 
senior officers claim." 
Such a confident assertion can hardly survive the traumatic prosecUtions 
of the CID during the reign of Sir Robert Mark as Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner. These revealed to an astonished public that bribery, 
oorruption, graft, perjury and other vices were as endemic to the CID as 
was allegedly the case in the United States. In 1976, Sir Robert Mark 
announced3 with some pride that 82 officers had during the past four 
years been dismissed following disciplinary proceedings, while 301 
1. Glanville Williams, "Authentication of Statements to the Police" 
[1979] Crim.L.R. 6, 13. 
2. Loc.cit., p.276. 
3. quoted in Cox, Shirley and Short, The Fall of Scotland Yard? 1977, p.213. 
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had left voluntarily and 12 were suspended pending disciplinary 
inquiries. 10 more officers were awaiting trial, while 24 further 
cases were under consideration by the D.P.P. The very same senior 
officers who had made exaggerated claims for the 'rarity' of bribery 
must have known it to be common even if they were not actually involved. 
The nature of the police force as a disciplined and hierarchical 
body makes it likely that wrongdoing will be systemic in character and 
attributable to the force rather than to individual miscreants. In 
the police force "any general wrongdoing creates a conspiracy: the 
individuals concerned do it as individuals; they are driven together for 
moral and practical support." 1 
In a clear case, 	superior officers are able to cover up for 
the individual and defuse potential political scandal by the tactical 
device of settlement out of court. Settlement may also prevent exposure 
of dubious police practices by preventing an opportunity for appellate 
- courts to make a ruling. Laurie was told 2 during the 1960s ; that 
although "the power to detain has never been tested in the House of Lords, 
the Solicitor to the Metropolitan Police settles such claims out of Court, 
because, of all abuses, none is so easy to detect or prove". A secondary 
motive might be to prevent just such a test case from ever reaching the 
House of Lords. 
Information on the practice of ex gratia payment is, however, 
sheltered by the Official Secrets Act and, difficult to come by. Although 
the suspicion must necessarily arise that the power is being used to stifle 
	aoromemleteowas..0111. 
1. Laurie, loc.cit., p.267. 
2. Ibid., p.262. 
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scandals nothing can be proved. The annual total of ex gratia payments 
excluding settlement of traffic accident cases made by the Metropolitan 
police alone is very considerable and has increased sharply in recent 
years. 1 Yet a Member of Parliament who set down a parliamentary question 
requesting details was told only that "reasons for payments could not 
be provided without diaproportionate cost." 2 
Although internal disciplinary proceedings are likely to prove 
more effective in remedying systematic police misconduct than external 
sanctions — Sir Robert Mark resigned, after all, on this very issue — 
the police are not wholly impervious to public opinion. Of the United 
States Wilson sensibly writes: 3 
"Police chiefs do not as a rule lose their 
jobs because crime rates. go up; indeed, 
rising crime rates may make it easier for 
them to get more money and manpower from 
city councils. But they often get into 
trouble and sometimes lose their jobs 
because a particular officer takes a bribe, 
steals from a store, associates with a 
ganster, or abuses a citizen who is capable 
of doing something about it." 
If public opinion is to be an effective influence, however, the 
citizen must be provided with simple machinery for 'doing something 
1. 	Annual totals are as follows: 
Year 	No. of Payments 
1968-9 25 6,871 
1969-70 12 350 
1970-71 128 316 
1971-72 12 672 
1972-73 29 9,018 
1973-74 21 1,050 
1974-75 26 4,132 1975-76 16 1,174 
1976-77 28 95,079 
1977-78 42 56,541 
2. H.C. lob. 23 Mar 1979 Col 	65 (written answer). My own private 
researches met with a similarly negative response. 
3. cp.oit., p.69. 
about itt. Throughout the protracted debates on police complaints 
procedure, civil liberties organisations have expressed the view that 
tortious liability is wholly inadequate in this respect, because it is 
too costly, too difficult to set in motion. 1 Those most in need are 
least able to avail themselves of its protection. Criminal sanctions, 
on the other hand, are also inadequate, because they may be too severe. 
Many police misfeasances are, after all, trivial irregularities o the 
type which come before the Parliamentary Commissioner. It is enough 
for the citizen to complain. To ask him also to bear the expenses of a 
civil action, provide evidence, and sustain the burden of proving the 
case is too much. Complaints procedures are essentially fairer and 
17, also more effective. But the first reports of the Police Complaints 
Board are not particularly comforting reading. In its first year, the 
Board received 2103 complaints of which 489 concerned minor incivility. 
There were, however, 330 allegations of assault, 14 of corruption, and 
276 complaints of oppressive conduct or harrassment. 307 complaints of 
- assault, 8 of corruption and 27 of oppressive conduct were, during the 
same period, thought sufficiently serious to be referred to the Director 
of Public Prosecutions. Disciplinary proceedings were brought in 3 of 
the assault complaints; but in 2074 of the 2083 complaints which had not 
already been the subject of disciplinary charges, the Chief Constable 
concerned decided not to initiate disciplinary charges. In the second 
year of operation, disciplinary charges were preferred in 59 out of 11,940 
complaints and the Board recommended action in a further 15 cases. Yet 
not all cases are trivial; indeed the Board expressed concern about the 
high proportion of assault cases. 2 
1. See the memorandum of Justice to the Working Party on "Handling of 
Complaints against the Police", Grand. 5582 (1973-4) at p.57. 
2. H.C.359 (1977-78); H.C.4 (1978-79). These ambiguous results entirely 
confirm the criticisms of Sir Robert Mark that the machinery established 
by the Police Act 1976 was structurally unsound and likely to prove 
ineffective, cumbersome and expensive: Mark, op.cit., pp.198-216. Fturther 
statistics are contained in the Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of 
Constabulary, but again-no details of disciplinary charges are given. 
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The Report of the Bennett Inquiry into Police Interrogation 
Procedures confirms the unsatisfactory nature of complaints procedures. 1 
Indeed, the Committee implies that these can hardly be functioning 
satisfactorily since they had notably failed to bring to light serious 
abuses of interrogation procedures which the Committee found to be 
systematic and established. The Report criticises the uncertain relation-
ships between those responsible for investigating complaints (the police); 
those responsible for prosecution (the Director of Public Prosecutions);-
and those responsible for disciplinary proceedings (Chief Constables). 
Because these procedures are not properly meshed in many culprits 
escape scotfree and this naturally encourages abuses of the system. 
Criminal proceedings are rarely successful — no successful prosecution 
was brought between 1972-78 in Northern Ireland2 — and civil proceedings 
are not much better. "In 5 of the cases: where officers were acquitted, 
damages were paid in civil claims brought by victims in respect of the 
same incidents."3 
Disciplinary proceedings were hardly more satisfactory. The 
Committee blames the 'double jeopardy' rule which prohibits disciplinary 
proceedings after an unsuccessful prosecution and which, by administrative 
action, has been informally extended to cases referred to the Director 
in which he decides — without giving reasons — not to prosecute :1. The 
1. Cmnd. 7497 (1978-79) Pp•96-122. 
2. 19 officers were prosecuted arising out of 8 incidents but only 2 con-
victions resulted and these were set aside on appeal: See p.52. 
3. Ibid. 
4 { Pp.120-121, and pp.1323. See further 2nd Report of the Police Complaints 
Board for Northern Ireland, H.C.141 (1978-79) PP•5-8• 
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Committee also blames the structure of the code of discipline itself. 
Yet the Bennett Committee, although it points to defects in 
existing complaints machinery,does not suggest that abuses would best 
be eliminated by strengthening criminal and civil law l -nor by radically 
reforming complaints procedures and disciplinary proceedings. The 
emphasis is laid on supervision and preventive techniques such as closed-
circuit television and viewing lenses. 1 It is fair to deduce, therefore, 
that the shift from deterrence and sanction to prevention and supervision 
is not confined to the case of the Health and Safety Executive and the 
Factory Acts but must be seen as a general feature of modern adminis-
trative techniques. It is likely to prove more effective than criminal 
and civil liability. It is also likely to become a permanent feature 
of the administrative scene. 
Ought we to deduce then, that deterrent theories of civil liability, 
or even tort law is wholly outmoded and superseded? 
The unsatisfactory law of civil liability can, on occasion, pro-
duce a startling success to balance its depressing record of failure. 
One such case was mentioned by Mr. Ian Mikardo M.P. in the course of the 
Commons debate on the Police Bill. 2 In a case in which a constituent had 
been 'savagely beaten up' by police officers who were totally exculpated 
by an internal investigation, the victim sued the individuals responsible 
and was awarded damages. No disciplinary action was taken against the 
malefactors. A year later, 3 Mr. McNair Wilson called for an adjournment 
1. General Conclusions pp.135-140, esp. 136. 
2. H.C. Deb. 5 Dec 1975 Vol 901 cols 2097-8. 
3. H.C. Deb. 28 July 1976 Vol 916-I col 808 ("Police Disciplinary Offences'). 
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debate on behalf of one of his constituents who alleged assault by the 
Merseyside police. After the first four days of a civil hearing, 
£2,500 damages were agreed in a negotiated settlement. The Minister of 
State for the Home Office confirmed that disciplinary proceedings would 
not be taken. The case was four years old and the settlement did not 
entail any admission that there had been an assault. "In essence the 
sum' paid was in respect of inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff in 
the course of the said inquiry." Since the inconvenience in question 
amounted to 12 hours in custody all that can be said is 3that if the 
explanation afforded is true, the settlement was wildly out of line with 
the standard Home Office practice in cases of wrongful conviction. 1 
Both these cases do suggest, therefore, that, at least in this area of 
police malpractice, the civil action may sometimes provide a remedy 
superior to disciplinary proceedings with all the attendant advantages 
of publicity. It is by no means certain that the introduction into 
administrative complaints procedures of an element of external investi 
gation can supply the deficiency revealed by this type of case. 
To generalise about the function of tort law on a basis of such 
scanty data would be extremely unwise. One might suggest tentatively, 
however, that personal liability is based on a. misconception about human 
behaviour. Corporate fault is not, as Duguit insisted, merely a metaphor. 
In some curious way institutions acquire a corporate personality whiCh 
transcends that of the individuals of whom they are composed. The anony-
mous concepts of 'maladministration' or Ifaute de service' do therefore 
reflect a truth about the nature of bureaucratic or institutional negligence. 
1. Below, pp. 217'306 
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If this is the case, it is possible that fault liability is wholly 
misplaced and that we should consider a move in the direction of 
liability without fault. In the area of administrative liability this 
conclusion invites us to consider the possibility of risk liability for 
all invalid or illegal administrative action (Chap.5)'or alternatively, 
the idea of basing liability on the principle of Equality (Chap.6). 
We might even go further by using administrative compensation schemes 
as the normal machinery for the provision of reparation (Chap.7). 
Each of these solutions suggests that the compensatory and 
deterrent functions of civil liability need to be separated. We shall 
have to find new machinery to supply the deterrent element. We can 
begin to see how this may be done by the use of investigatory techniques 
such as Ombudsman investigations, or occasionally public inquiries. 
These could be buttressed by more effective disciplinary procedures or 
by allowing the Ombudsman greater powers of injunction. As a last 
resort, criminal rather than civil sanctions could be used to deter grave 
misdemeanours. 
Yet even if tort law cannot be shown to be effective as a deterrent, 
nor can the possible alternatives such as the PCA or the Police Complaints 
Board. Judges do not use the law of tort consistently for deterrent ends 
nor do they always choose appropriate cases. Experience suggests they 
are prone to single out for reprimand a few miserable 'cornet players' 
while ignoring major abuses of the system. On the other hand, the 
judicial process may sometimes provide an excellent weapon because of the 
relative independence of the judiciary from political pressures and the 
high status of the common law judge. The tort action possesses an 
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additional advantage because it is perceived as private rather than 
public in character. In Professor Linden's words l i "the tort route 
permits ordinary citizens to take the initiative instead of making 
them wait for some civil servant to make up his mind to move." No 
other machinery possesses these twin advantages and it may be that they 
would prove both essential and irreplaceable. 
1. Canadian Tort Law, p.23. 
CHAPTER 
Unity or Duality?  
Institutions once created tend to be self—perpetuating. The 
existence in France of a separate jurisdiction came to be justified in 
terms of the need for special rules; this in turn encouraged the belief 
that the rules were special. To put this slightly differently, the 
'autonomy' of the system was justified by its 'uniqueness' at the same 
time as the 'uniqueness' seemed to justify the 'autonomy'. This was 
the circular reasoning exposed by Eisenmann. 1  Eisenmann argued that 
the rules of public and private liability are in all material respects 
similar and the differences of approach minimal. Furthermore, the 
choice of law is in France determined on a haphazard basis according to 
technical rules of jurisdiction, and not by the nature or needs of the 
individual case. Thus it cannot be maintained that public and private 
law are 'autonomous' either in the sense that the substantive rules 
applicable are radically different, or in the sense that all public 
authorities are at all times subject to the special rules. Eisenmann's 
first proposition, amply confirmed by the studies of Cornu and Chapus, 
was discussed in the second chapter. It is his second proposition which 
concerns us here. 
If a genuine need for special rules of liability exists, then 
it must be possible to isolate the cases in which these are applicable; 
again, if the solution to the problem of government liability is a 
separate system of courts, then jurisdictional criteria will have to be 
1. Page iO3 above, 
devised. Eisenmann 	. hints not only at possible deficiencies in 
existing classifications, but suggests as well that more relevant 
criteria may be difficult to devise. 
At the outset, one is faced with two choices. The justification 
for separate rules of liability may lie in the existence of characteristic 
governmental functions for which private law presents no adequate parallels 
but which, as we saw in the first chapter, are difficult to isolate. 
Alternatively, we have to accept that it is the unique character of 
the State which dictates the choice of special theories of government 
liability in which case logic demands that the special rules must apply 
to all actions in which the State is concerned. 
The jurisdictional test of 'public service , associated with the 
Blanco decision adopts the second alternative. The choice was approved 
and justified by Duguit, who believed that no characteristic government 
function without a parallel in private law could be identified. As he 
himself said: 
there is today not a single 
activity carried on by the agents of 
the State which one cannot imagine 
being carried out by individuals. The 
police function, for example, which is 
always presented as essentially a govern-
mental function (service atautorite), 
could very well be and in fact sometimes 
is exercised by private individuals. 
Even justice itself may be handed down by 
individuals; and at certain periods, the 
whole of the judicial function has been 
carried out by private individuals."1 
The use of this test has, howeVer, brought the administrative 
jurisdiction face to face with the very problem which bothered the English 
1. Traite, Vol. 2, p.350. 
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House of Lords as early as 1866. 1 Third parties dealing with bodies 
the 
which carry out on/face of things ordinary commercial activities and 
behave according to normal commercial practices, find themselves for 
obscure constitutional reasons subjected to different legal rules of 
administrative tort and contract. 
This problem received the attention of the Tribunal des Conflits 
in 1921 in a leading case. 2 A ferryoperated by the colonial government 
of the Ivory Coast as a commercial service, sank. One person was drowned 
was 
and damage caused to a number of motor vehicles. An action was brought 
in the civil courts of the colony but the Prefect demurred to the juris-
diction and a reference was made to the Tribunal des Conflits. The 
court ruled that the ferry service was a commercial service and that, 
in the absence of legislative provision to the contrary, the civil courts 
were competent. 3 
This decision, which seemed surprising at the time, was followed 
in a later case where a rubbish cart belonging to the Corporation of 
Paris got out of control and ran away causing a traffic accident in which 
the plaintiff was injured. 4 The driver was convicted of dangerous driving 
plaintiff 
and the 	 made an application to the criminal court for compensation, 
1. The Mersey Docks , case, discussed above. 
2. Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain (Bac d/Eloka) T.C• 22 Jan1921, 
S 1924.111.34 concl Matter. 
3. To the English reader this situation is indistinguishable on its facts 
from the Blanco case. It may be distinguished,however, because the manu-
facture of tobacco has always been a State monopoly in France and is 
therefore not an ordinary commercial service. 
4. Dame Melinette T.C. 11 July 1933, D 1933:3.65 concl Rouchon—Mazerat 
(contraires) n. Blaevoet. 
-16 4, 
stating that: 
"the said lorry was entrusted to the 
driver for the purposes of a service 
carried on in conditions identical to 
those in which a public industrial 
service is carried on. The said driver, 
without taking the necessary precautions, 
had left his vehicle 2 to drink in a ca%fe." 
This reasoning is open to criticism. Rubbish collection is not 
usually considered an ordinary commercial service but a service to the 
community or public service. Again, the court seems to be implying 
that, by sitting in the cafe drinking, the driver was not acting in 
the exercise of his duty, hence was guilty of a personal fault. This 
involved the paradox that, for the purpose of jurisdiction, the driver 
was not acting in the course of his duty; but for the purpose of finding 
the municipality vicariously liable, he was. (The judgment in this way 
affords to the foreigner a neat illustration of the dual purpose of 
the criterion of personal fault). More importan4I the reasoning exposes 
the underlying purpose of the decision: the creation of "blocks of com-
petence" in the civil and criminal courts which would effectively group 
like, cases together. 
This rationale became more obvious in the next year when two 
cases with very similar facts were decided along the same lines, by the 
Conseil d'Etat. 1 In a note, Waline attacked the new jurisdictional 
criteria on the ground of their imprecision. He went on to say that 
the decisions undercut the holistic theories of the "very nature and 
essence of the State ... one recognises the old, classical, liberal theory. 
It is an economic and political theory and not a juristic theory of a 
1. Verbanck et Mabille C.E. 9 Feb 1934, D 1934.3.9• n. Waline. For a 
modern case see 2aziL9„AiLodepazu T.C. 13 Dec 1976, AJDA 1977 
p.438 n. Dufau (accident on an escalator at Paris airport). 
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kind which ought to receive the blessing of the courts." 
I have treated these rather technical cases at some length 
because they seem to me to epitomise the practical difficulties which 
arise from the implementation of Duguit's holistic theory of the state 
in the area of liability. If all state activity is to be subject to 
special rules then it is likely that very similar activities will be 
subjected to two series of rules implemented by two hierarchies of 
courts. The result will be to cut across other, more realistic,classi-
fications with the result that victims suffering identical injuries 
receive different awards of compensation, the award being determined 
not by the nature of the injuries, but by the status of the defendant, 
and accordingly, the jurisdictionfimpleaded. As increasingly the law of 
tort becomes a vehicle for accident compensation, it becomes more victim 
orientated1 and this objection becomes more potent. As Cornu argues: 
if there are any cases in which 
the legal rules ought to be the same 
it is those in which the fact situations 
are absolutely identical. A traffic 
accident has the same characteristics 
in private and in public law. What does 
it matter if the vehicle belongs to a 
private individual or the State? It is 
the victim who is the important con-
sideration and his interests are similar 
in both cases. At this level, the frontiers 
between public and private law necessarily 
disappear." 2 
It was the realisation that this was so which led the French 
legislature to intervene by a law of 31 December 1957 and transfer to 
the civil jurisdiction all actions for damages in respect of accidents 
caused by vehicles belonging to the administration. This legislative 
1. See Moreau, Ltinfluence de la situation et du comportement de la 
victime sur la responsabilite administrative (1956). 
2. Op.cit., p.74. 
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move confirms the "block of competence" solution of the earlier 
caselaw. 
The argument for uniformity is not, of course, unique to road 
traffic accidents, but is applicable to any case which affords an 
opportunity of direct comparison with the work of civil courts. Even 
a cursory look at the work of the French administrative jurisdiction 
shows that the majority of claims do afford such an opportunity. I 
propose to illustrate my point by a rough and ready analysis of all claims, 
whether on appeal or at first instance, which reached the Conseil dtEtat 
during the period 1970-75 and which the Conseil found worth preserving 
in their records. 
The classification system is a little imprecise and is not designed to 
provide a typology of the administrative litigation. Furthermore, some 
cases may be filed under more than one head. Despite these deficiencies, 
however, a clear picture of the typology does emerge. 
Despite the law of 31 December 1957 referred to above, 47 claims 
involved traffic accidents. This is because accidents arise not only 
through bad driving but also from failure to maintain the highway. It 
is always tempting for an injured party or his insurers to recoup their 
losses by suing the administration, a problem which may be further com, 
plicated if the accident arose from roadworks (travaux publics) executed 
by private contractors on behalf of a public authority. Difficult juris-
dictional points may then arise. 
This means that, despite the law of 31 December 1957, a traffic 
accident may still give rise to multiple actions in diverse courts 
although there is, today, less chance of divergent rules being applied. 
It is worth noting here that many such actions are recursory and subrogatory 
actions by insurers. 1 
Sixty-four claims concerned accidents in the course of medical 
care or hospital treatment. Similar claims are heard both by civil 
AY and/criminal courts whenever a personal fault is alleged. Once again, 
the question of the joint responsibility of hospital authority and 
doctor, important for insurance purposes, and in England dealt with 
through private, out of court,settlements, 2  is complicated in France 
by the dual jurisdiction where a recursory action by an insurer raises 
jorisdraiontil 
a complex/ oint recently settled in favour of the administrative juris- 
diction. 3 
Sixteen further cases involved accidents in schools where, by 
legislative choice, the jurisdiction is shared with the civil courts. 
There were actions, too, concerning accidents caused by failure to main-
tain public works (travaux publics). At first sight this category may 
seem specific to public law. When it is realised, however, that the 
prototype is an accident in a municipal swimming bativI on a handball 
court; or in a lift or escalator situated on public property;the picture 
changes. Public ownership hardly changes the nature of a drowning 
accident and a defective lift remains a lift whether it is situated in 
a department store or an airport. FUrthermore l similar actions, are 
handled by the civil courts and give rise to complaint if the damages 
awarded are not roughly similar. In one such case, 4 for example, the 
1. E.g. Cie d'Assurances  le Soleil C.E. 22 Nov 1972, Dame Ill C.E. 25 
July 1975 also Cie des Assurances La Providence (above p.7' ). For an 
explanation of the rules of subrogation see Forde, "Foreign Social 
Security Institutions and the Collateral Benefits Rules in Britain" 
(1979) 42 M.L.R• 389. 
2. Hepple and Matthews, Cases and Materials on the Law of Tort, p.666. 
3. Ste'Houitaliere d'Assurances Mutuelles c. Heritiers Assemat C.E. 5 Feb 1975, AJDA 1976, p.100 n. Moderne. 
4. Hebert June 14, 1963, D 1964 p.326 n. Lalumiere. 
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Conseil d'Etat awarded 25,000F to parents of a child drowned in a 
municipal swimming baths. In a note, a commentator remarked that, 
unusually, the administrative jurisdiction had outstripped the tariff 
of the civil courts, making a comparison with a similar accident in a 
private swimming pool wire the parents had recently received only 15,800E-
from the Paris.Cour d'Appel. I cite this case because it shows how 
keen the commentators are to unearth discrepancies between awards by 
the two hierarchies. 
A second class of public works liability which comprises 23 cases 
in the records, is directly comparable to civil law cases of nuisance 
or negligence: e.g., cases in which a rubbish dump has spontaneously 
ignited (C.E.20 Nov 1974V a ship has suffered damage while docking 
resulting from failure to maintain the port (C.E. 20 Feb 1970); or where 
drainage ditches beside a road have overflowed (C.E. 25 June 1971). 2 
 These nuisance cases afford an interesting comparison with one recent 
3 English case in which a Saxon burial mound situated on land owned by 
the National Trust slipped gradually down into the property of a neigh-
bouring landowner, threatening her house. If England were to adopt the 
solution of a separate jurisdiction, such a case might give rise to a 
jurisdictional dispute since the National Trust, although a private 
charity, exists to carry out the public service function of preserving 
the national heritage. A functional application of the 'public service' 
criterion would constitute the National Trust as a creature of public - 
law, strictly liable for failure to maintain 'public works'; on the 
other hand, a stricter organic interpretation would 	view the 
1. Compare Job Edwards Ltd. v. Birmingham Navigation  [1924] 1 KeBe 341. 
2. Compare Langbrook Properties Ltd. v. Surrey C.C. [1970] 1 W.L.R.161. 
3. Leakey v. National Trust [1978] 2 W.L.R. 774. The point is briefly 
discussed by Wedderburn (1978) 41 M.L.R. 589. 
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National Trust as a private law body, liable under the principle of 
nuisance. 
Seventeen cases involved maladministration or "bureaucratic 
negligence", ranging from cases of inadequate advice to applicants from 
the planning services (0.E. 10 June 1970 and 28 April 1971) or technical 
advice to local authorities over School buildings (C.E. 20 June 1973); 
to cases of incompetent use of the government's supervisory powers over 
private companies (C.E. 9 April 1975); and miscellaneous errors such as 
the loss of the applicant's marriage certificate by a government depart- 
ment (C.E., 30 Nov 1973) or a clerical error by deleting the applicant from 
a list of people seeking work (C.E. 19 Jan 1973). These cases certainly 
do not justify a special system of rules. There is little distinction, 
for example, between the negligent operation of a private bank account 
that of 
and / the Post Office in relation to 	a savings bank account (C.E. 
17 March 1971); indeed thebanking facilities offered by the Post Office 
really amount to a commercial service. Moreover, I have already referred 
to Rubinstein's view that in England, private law is perfectly able to 
cope with this situation — even if in practice we prefer to direct such 
matters towards the Parliamentary Commissioner and the Commission for 
Local Administration. 
Not even those actions which relate more obviously to the "public 
services" are quite without private law parallels. The two prison 
actions, for example, (C.E. 12 Feb 1971 and 19 Nov 1973) are for personal 
injuries, one of which concerned injuries suffered by a prisoner during 
a riot and one a suicide. These cases are directly comparable with an 
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English case 1  in which a sexual offender brought an action against 
the Home Office alleging negligence by prison officers in failing to 
supervise him. Tharesult was that a fellow prisoner assaulted him. 
The court found no difficulty at the theoretical level in coming to 
grips with this fact situation even if the action did not, in the event, 
succeed. 
Two classes of case do seem to posses fspeciall public law charac-
teristics. There were only 27 actions for loss caused through the 
planning process. This is not very surprising, since, as in England, 
planning compensation is regulated by a statutory scheme. The adminis-
trative courts therefore hear only peripheral cases or cases in which 
the applicant sees a chance of obtaining greater compensation than the 
statutory scheme allows. The majority of cases were complaints of 
incorrect advice 2or procedural errors. There were only three applications 
for compensation for breach of the principle of Equality before public 
charges (C.E. 29 May 1974, 27 Nov 1974, 14 March 1975). To these we 
may add one further successful case which did not concern the planning 
process but involved loss caused to individuals because of diplomatic 
immunity granted by the French State in accordance with an international 
Treaty. 3 Even if these figures are not wholly reliable, they do tend to 
1. Egerton v. Home Office [1978] Crim.L.R. 494. See also Bryson v. North-
umbria Police Authority, [1977] 2 C.L.176 (whether duty of care owed by 
police to person arrested for drunkenness when released on bail). 
2. This class overlaps with the 17 maladministration cases. 
3. Min. des Affaires e-tran 	C.E. 29 Oct 1976 
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confirm the statistical surveys, including the Annual Report of 
the Section du Contentieux du Conseil dvEtat,which report cases founded 
on the Equality principle as rare in the extremel y 
I have left to the last the actions against the police because 
. of the inconvenient demarcation line which divides jurisdiction over 
the police. Actions against the administrative police are heard by 
the administrative courts; those against the judicial police are heard 
by the civil courts. 'Judicial police' are normally those officers of 
police detailed for service under the supervision of the judiciary 
rather than organic. 
in the investigation of crime. The jurisdictional test is functional / 
If officers are engaged in collecting evidence of a crime or searching 
for its authors (in terms of Art. 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code) 
then the civil courts are competent; if they are engaged in maintaining 
public order then the administrative courts are competent. Thus, the 
jurisdictional line is extremely fine and, in the course of a single 
theoretically 
operation, officers might/cross the jurisdictional boundary several times. 
This might be important because of the complexity of the substan-
tive law. The normal adminibtrative law rule is that liability is for 
gross fault, but this requirement is limited to situations defined as 
'urgent' i.e. where the police are carrying out their functions of main-
taining order or combatting crime. In the case of minor everyday functions 
such as traffic control a simple fault will suffice for liability. 
Where a 'dangerous weaponlJis in use, however, the Conseil d'Etat has 
1. The Report is published annually in Etudes at Documents du Conseil 
d'Etat (E.D.C.E.). No consistent breakdown of the liability cases is 
made, but references to liability for breach of the Equality principle 
are extremely rare. Prieur (op.cit. above) mentions no example. 
Drago, "Etude relative aux d6Cisions rendues par le Tribunal adminis—, 
tratif de Versailles (1967-8); E.D.C.E. 1968 p.165 mentions 11 Egalite 
claims and 1 case of liability without fault out of 148 cases. In a 
second survey of the Conseil d'Etat in 1965-66 (E.D.C.E. 1967 p.147) 
he mentions only one case. 
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substituted risk liability. Theoretically, therefore, a plaintiff 
injured by a shot from a revolver would be at an advantage in the 
administrative courts, while a plaintiff beaten up during interrogation 
would be at an advantage in the civil courts, where simple fault is 
the normal standard. But this result would not be tolerable. The 
civil courts have therefore adjusted their caselaw to bring themselves 
into line with the administrative jurisdiction by admitting public law 
as the standard of liability, a deviation from the normal civilian rules. 1 
Not only do these jurisdictional complexities in themselves 
provide ample evidence of the truth of Eisenmannts assertion that, in 
France, not all administrative bodies are subject to the administrative 
courts and to their substantive rules, but they show also just how 
arbitrary the allocation may be. Moreover, they distort the picture 
where actions against the police are concerned. My survey revealed only 
6 police cases in the Conseilts files, 4 of which concerned accidents 
resulting in death with police firearms (21 July 1970, 26 Oct 1973, 
12 March 1975, 23 April 1975). The last two were rather different. 
The first was a successful action against the police for failure to 
enforce parking regulations; 2 the second was a claim against the police 
for failure to intervene during a strike by factory workers (6"0E4 18 June 
1975) which would normally be dealt with as a brdach of the Equality 
principle. 
1. Plantey, "La responsabilite du fait de la force publique (1973) 26 
E.D.C.E. p.71 at pp.81-2. 
2. Marabout C.E. 20 Oct 1972 Rec. 664, R.D.P. 1972 p.832 n. Waline. Com- 
are R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metro  olizex *Blackburn No.3 
L1973 Q.B. 241 which suggests the correct remedy if one exists in  England is by prerogative order. 
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This informal survey does not support the thesis that govern-
mental liability is 'special' in character. On the contrary it shows 
that, in the area of tortious liability, as many as 60% of appeals to the 
supreme administrative court ; involve personal injuries. Cases with 
"special" characteristics are exceptional, and the majority of cases offer 
the litigant an opportunity of direct comparison with the work of civil 
tribunals. This is significant, because a modern sociological survey 
shows that 50% of all appeals from the Marseille administrative tribunal 
to the Conseil d'Etat concern tortious liability. The authors suggest 
that this is only partially beoausitAlarge sums of money are involved: 
an equally important factor is the possibility of comparison with civil 
courts. They say: 
a ... this is also an area in which 
the litigants possess grounds for 
comparison thanks to the decisions 
of the civil courts. Litigants are 
very unwilling to accept differences 
in the assessment of damages by the 
two jurisdictions."' 
In this area of liability, where the two jurisdictions largely 
duplicate each other's work, it seems t 	that they are under constant 
pressure to harmonise their practice in assessing damages. Equally the 
substantive rules of liability must be harmonised if justice is to be 
done to individual victims in identical or closely similar fact situations. 
This is an important proposition and one worth illustrating from 
another angle. In a leading case 2 four people were found asphyiiated 
1. Frayssinet, Guin et Blum, op.cit., 1972 at p.69. 
2. This litigation is reported in Trdsor public c. Giry Cass. civ. 23 Nov 
1956,.Bul1.II.407, D 1957 13•341 concl. Lemoine, G.A. No. 98; Commune de Grim' C.P. 11 Oct 1957 Rec. 524, R.D.P. 1958 p.306 coral. Kahn; Commune 
de Grigny C.E. 6 June 1958 Rec. 323, S 1958 p.319 concl. Chardeaa. 
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in a small hotel (one morning in 1949) by some visitors who alerted 
the police and also called a private doctor, Perrier who, arriving 
first, made an examination, and as he left the hotel met his colleague 
Giry, the police doctor. The two turned back to make a further 
examination, only to be gravely injured by a violent gas explosion, 
the cause of which was never explained. 
Three actions followed. P sued the municipality in the adminis-
trative courts on the ground that he was an "occasional collaborator 
assisting in the operation of public service". 1 By virtue of the 
Cames caselaw this claim would succeed on the basis of risk and without 
proof of fault. G sued in the civil courts, claiming that he had been 
summoned to the scene by the judicial police, for whose acts the 
Ministry of Justice was vicariously liable. The rules of civil law 
normally in such cases require proof of fault and GIs action there-
fore failed in the Court of Appeal. 
Faced with this situation, in which two litigants injured in the 
same explosion seemed likely to obtain dramatically contrasted prizes 
from the forensic lottery, the Cour de Cessation changed course to 
enable G to succeed. It was held that the appeal court had been wrong 
to apply the provisions of the Civil Code in respect of delict and quasi 
and that might not 
delict;/these / be invoked to found the liability of the State. On 
the contrary, the Court had, in the instant case, the power and duty to 
apply the rules of public law. G was therefore found to be an "occasional 
1. An"occasional collaborator" is someone who is temporarily acting on 
behalf of the public service normally without receiving remuneration. 
Members of the public have a duty to assist e.g. in firefighting or 
carrying out an arrest and, in this capacity, would be "collaborators". 
For further explanation, see Chapter 2 above. 
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collaborator" to whom the State was liabile to make compensation. 
In the administrative courts, P had succeeded in his action 
against the municipality on identical grounds. He was awarded sub-
stantial damages by the administrative tribunal, including a large sum 
in respect of exceptional pain and suffering (technically the pretium 
doloris). On appeal, the municipality challenged this head of damages, 
arguing that, in administrative law neither the pretium doloris nor the 
pretium affectionis (damages for mental suffering and grief) were 
available. This time it was for the Conseil d 2Etat to come into line 
with the practice of the civil courts, which it did by upholding an 
award of 400.000F for pain and suffering as a 2 .L.etiumcialori.s. 
Of the Giry case, one of the 
most brilliant public lawyers in France writing 20 years after the 
decision I lk. Jean Kahn, Conseiller d'Etat and himself Government 
Commissioner in one of the appeals, said: 
"It was the fashion, immediately 
after the gia decision, to speculate 
on the application of public law by 
the civil courts, as if public]aw 
was the complement of private law and 
civil justice a possible substitute for 
administrative justice. 
This is to misunderstand the nature of 
law and of the judicial function. Civil 
courts arbitrate, in the light of 
unchanging rules, in conflicts submitted 
by generations of litigants who come and 
go. The administrative judge hears only 
one single suit: that of the administration. 
Each hearing provides an opportunity to 
rediscover the same contendant and to 
continue the same debate adjourned yester- 
d4Y." 
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I cite these remarks because they seem to me to illustrate a point 
I made in the first chapter that, to French public lawyers, the principal 
rationale of le recours de pleine juridiction is its value as a sanction 
for maladministration!that is to say, as the second limb of the 
recours pour exces de pouvoir. This is indeed a position of principlg(to 
use Eisenmannts phrase) and one, moreover, which seems far removed from the Giry affair. It 
is as though the wretched victim of a gas explosion has somehow found 
himself a pawn on a board on which is being played a match between 
grand masters. 
over 
I pass/ the procedural deficiencies implicit in this litigation 
and concentrate on the two substantive points, the first of which is 
the basis of liability. The classic justification of the administrative 
jurisdiction is that it is 	free to develop new rules; the Ela 
decision dispels this illusion and demonstrates how limited are the 
options open to the courts. For one of two blameless victims in the 
same accident to succeed while the second fails is not acceptable. 
The courts will have to prevent such a result even if it means bending 
the rules. A multiplicity of actions and divergent legal rules make it 
harder for the courts to ensure fair play to victims. 
My second point concerns the assessment of damages. If the 
theoretical basis of administrative liability is really the mutual 
assurance principle, then, as Duguit argued, 1 claims against the State 
resemble a claim for compensation rather than an action for damages. 
The award of compensation need not necessarily follow the civil law 
pattern of damages, where the "commitment to fault and to full compen-
sation seem to go hand in hand." 2 The refusal of the administrative 
1. Below, pala 
2. Blum and Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law problem, 
1965, p.38. 
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courts to follow the principles of civil law and their desire to 
husband public resources may be theoretically justifiable, since there 
is no particular reason why the State should undertake to guarantee to 
individuals total security, by undertaking to compensate for intangible 
losses such as loss of amenity, grief, or psychological suffering. 
Arguably, to accept such a duty is itself inequitable, since it dis-
criminates against those who suffer under equal disadvantages but whose 
loss is not legally ob-ibatWe..to the State. Yet nothing has done more 
in practice to lower the French administrative courts in the public 
esteem than their frugal attitude towards damages. Today Gjidara calls 
this divergence "one of the greatest obstacles to unification of the 
jurisdictions" , 1 (a unification which he incidentally believes to be 
desirable). 
An identical point could be made about the Criminal Injuries Com-
pensation Scheme established in 1964 by the U.K. government to provide 
compensation on an exgratia basis for the victims of violent crime. 
The rationale for this scheme was never considered to be legal liability 
on the part of the State. The White Paper which preceded the scheme 
emphasised the aspect of social solidarity, "public sympathy" for the 
innocent victims of violent crime. It followed logically that the 
measure of compensation was not necessarily common law damages since 
"... the level of compensation which may 
reasonably be awarded and the conditions 
which are imposed to ensure that money 
does not go to the undeserving are very 
much a matter for decision from time to 
time in the light of the country's resources 
and the need to distribute them equitably." 2 
1. La fonction administrative contentieuse, 1972, p.381. See for 
further examples ? Harlow, op.cit., [1976] P.L. at p.240. 
2. "Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence", Gmnd. 2323 ( 19 64) 
and "Review of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme: Report of an 
Interdepartmental Working Party", H.M.S.°. 1978, p.3. The terms of the 
Scheme are reprinted as Appendix 4. 
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Despite this reasoning, the Scheme specifically provided (para 10) 
that compensation should be assessed on the basis of common law damages 
and should take the form of a lump sum payment. The Board (C.I.C.B.), 
whose Chairman is a distinguished lawyer, takes this requirement 
seriously and conducts joint assessment exercises with the Bench and 
Bar to ensure that awards keep broadly level. 1 Despite their efforts, 
complaints are constantly heard that the C.I.C.B.Is awards are below 
that of the courts. One of the main reasons for this is however, that 
the terms of the Scheme itself impose an upper earnings limit and 
preclude the award of punitive damages, 2for the very reason given above 
that the basis of the State's obligation to compensate differs from 
the legal liability of the offender himself. 
Since 1972, this position has been made more complicated by a 
power allowed to the criminal courts to order offenders to compensate 
their victims for personal injury, loss or damage resulting from a 
criminal offence. There are today three avenues open to the victim of 
a violent crime for securing compensation: via the civil courts (usually 
profitless exercise); via the criminal courts; and via the C.I.C.B. 
Unfortunately, however, neither the legislation nor the Report on 
which the legislation was based, 3give3any clear guidance as to the 
use of the powers by criminal courts as part of the sentencing process. 
1. 14th Report of the C.I.C.B., Gmnd. 7396 (1978) pp.12-13, where the 
Board points out that in rape cases its awards exceeded those of the 
commam lawyers. 
2. Review, pp.43-49• 
3. "Reparation by the Offender" Report of the Advisory Council on the 
Penal System, H.E.S.0. 4 1970 para 137; Walik "The Place of Compensation 
in the Penal System" [1978] Cr.L.R. 599. The governing legislation is 
now the Powers of Criminal Court6 Act 1973, ss. 35-38. 
The Report does hint that the powers are not entirely compensatory in 
character, since it suggests that, in making the orders, courts should 
have regard to the offender's means and the chances of enforcement. 
The subsequent caselaw stresses that compensation orders are 
primarily punitive in character and, although they may occasionally 
provide an effective alternative to a civil action, they should be used 
only where liability is clear and not in cases of disputed fact. To 
make an excessive order is, from the penal point of view, likely to 
be counterproductive. 1 
There is a further ambiguity. The legislation gives no guidance 
on the relationship between civil liability and compensation by a 
criminal court. It is, therefore, possible for a court to order com- 
pensation in a case where the defendant would be under no civil liability 
to the victim/plaintiff. On this point the caselaw as yet affords 
no guidance. 2 
In view of the ambiguities left by the legislation and the conse-
quent difficulty experienced by superior courts, it is hardly surprising 
that magistrates have shown some hesitation in making use of 
their new powers. The first studies showed both magistrates and Crown 
courts to be uncertain when compensation orders could properly be made. 
The uncertainty was most acute in the area of personal injuries where 
courts were inexperienced and where relevant medical evidence might not 
be available. There was, however, considerable variation both in the 
number of orders made and in the amounts awarded. 3 Softley found, for 
1. Miller [1976] Cr.L.R. 694; Stapleton and Lawrie [1977] Cr.L.R. 366; 
OlDonobaaeand.asCoe (1974) 66 Cr.ApNRep.116. 
2. Atiyah, "Compensation Orders and Civil Liability" [1979] Cr.L.R,504. 
3. See Softley, Compensation Orders in Magistrates/ Courts, Home Office 
Research Study No. 43 f ILM.S.0.1978 1 p.29• 	Tarling and Softley, 
"Compensation Orders in the Crown Court" L1976] Cr.L.R. 422; 
Vennard, "Magistrates' Assessments of Compensation for Injury" [1979] Cr. L.R.510. 
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example 1 that, in magistrates) courts only 9% of people convicted of 
wounding and assault were ordered to make reparation as compared to 90 0 
 of defendants convicted of criminal damage and approximately 60% of 
defendants convicted of offences of dishonesty. Finally, the Magis-
tratest Association stepped in, publishing a table of guidelines. 2 
There was an immediate outcry from practising solicitors, who claimed 
the Guidelines were a "dangerously misleading simplification" which might 
mislead the victims of criminal assaults into accepting lesser sums 
than they could easily have obtained via the civil courts. 3 
Although this fear is probably unwarranted ? since magistrates 
rarely make compensation orders of over Z50 in cases of personal injury, 
and the typical order is for Z10-30 as reparation for slight cuts and 
bruises, 4 Softley could not help feeling "the incongruity of harnessing 
to criminal proceedings a procedure for compensating the victim or 
loser."5 It is probable that not all the difficulties with the inter-
locking procedures have as yet manifested themselves. 
A further complication in the same area is provided by Sec.55(1) 
of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 as amended in 1969. This 
provision permits a court to make an order against the parent or guardian 
of a child or young person found guilty of an offence to pay a fine, 
damages or costs. After the 1969 legislation came into operation, 
1. Op.cit., (1978) p.10. Table 2 and text. 
2. The Times, 6th September 1978. 
3. The Times, 7th September 1978. 
4. Vennard, op.cit., p.518. 
5. Softley„ op.cit., 1978 p.30. 
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magistrates, probably influenced by a feeling that the law was 
insufficiently 'hard' on juvenile offenders, began to make compen-
sation orders against local authorities in respect of children in the 
care of local authorities who absconded from community homes and caused 
damages on the ground that the staff had paid too much attention to 
their function of rehabilitating their charges and insufficient to the 
interests of the public. The Divisional Court promptly intervened, 1 
reminding the magistrates that such an order could only be made in the 
case TAhere the guardian had "conduced to the commission of the offence 
by neglecting to exercise due care and control" of their charges. Such 
a finding should not be lightly made. Faced with a statement by 
magistrates that they were only applying the principle of the Dorset 
Yacht case, the Chief Justice stated his view that this civil law 
principle was wholly irrelevant. The line of cases seemed to end. 
In a recent civil action for negligence, however, the Dorset  
Yacht principle was applied. An action was brought against the Essex 
County Council 2 for breach of its duty of care in that the staff of a 
community home had allowed a child committed to its custody to escape. 
The child set fire to a church, causing E99,000 of fire damage and the 
Council was held liable. The court found that, in the given circum-
stances, the staff should have kept "a strict watch" on the child com-
paring this duty with that of "a reasonable parent". 
	0141••••■•IIIMNI 
1. Reg. v. Croydon Juvenile Court ex p. Croydon B.C.  [1973] 2 W.L.R. 61 
(fine), omerset C.C. v. Brice L1973j 1 W.L.R. 1169 (fine)' Somerset C.C.  
v. Kin scot: EIM 1 W.L.R. 283 (compensation order). See especially 
pp. 288, 290 (Lord Widgery C.J.). 
2. Reported in The Guardian, 3 April 1979. See also p.q3 above. 
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The criminal law right of compensation depends on "neglect" by 
the parents or guardians, the civil law liability depends on "negligence". 
Curiously these two standards appear to differ. The civil law duty 
requires "a strict watch" to be kept while a finding of '*neglect" should 
never be lightly made by a criminal court. Unless these two standards 
can be harmonised, confusion is certain to result. Moreover, there 
is likely to be dissatisfaction with a rule which sends litigants 
in relatively trivial cases to knock at the door of civil courts. 
This is not a detour. What we are observing here is the same 
phenomenon as the French experience with their parallel hierarchies. 
Where concurrent remedies are provided for the same 'wrong' in separate 
courts there is an inevitable pressure towards harmonisation. Litigants 
• are not impressed by an argument that the remedies are designed for 
different purposes nor can the public easily accept that the victim of 
a criminal assault might receive in compensation one sun if he used 
civil procedure and another sum from a criminal court. To the victim 
this can only seem as though his injury has been differently valued by 
different valuers. 
Since the victim's interest is naturally in obtaining the maximum 
compensation, divergent legal rules as to liability or assessment of 
compensation, lead to the practice of 'forum shopping'. By this I mean 
that litigants use the variants and play off the procedures to secure 
the best results. This may be done to obtain the benefit of more 
generous rules of liability or more generous assessment of compensation. 
'Forum shopping' may equally be used to secure technical, procedural 
advantages. In France partie civile procedure may be used to discharge 
the burden of proof. This is often helpful in medical cases where it is 
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notoriously difficult to overcome the twin problems of professional 
solidarity and professional secrecy. If he can persuade the authorities 
to institute criminal proceedings and himself appear astpartie civile', 
the victim finds proof much easier in cases of medical negligence. An 
expert has said of this phenomenon: 
"The plaintiff relies on the 
prosecutor and examining magistrate 
to assemble his evidence for him. 
The weapons at the disposal of the 
private individuals cannot begin to 
compare with the powers of search and 
seizure possessed by magistrates. 
Even if the prosecution finally breaks 
down, the plaintiff has a good chance 
of leaping the hurdle of professional 
secrecy. He can present the dyil court 
with a relatively complete casefile, in 
which experts will find the information 
which would never have been forthcoming 
in civil proceedings." 1  
I would like to suggest a further parallel with English law. 
The Panliamentary Commissioner and Health Service Commissioner (P.C.A.) 
to 
possesses wide powers to examine departmental documentsznoAaik to wit- 
nesses during the course of his investigations (Section 8 of the Parlia-
mentary Commissioner Act, 1967). This is particularly useful in the 
case of hospitals whereit may be difficult for reasons of professional_ 
privilege to obtain discovery of documents and medical records unless 
there is at least a strong suggestion of negligence. 2 A temptation 
exists, therefore, to institute a PCA investigation in order to assemble 
evidence for a civil action. Amongst the first complaints to the 
Health Service Commissioner was the case 3 of a girl paralysed during a 
1. P. Monzein„ Les problemes de la responsabilitTmjclicale sur le plan 
penal, 1971, p.6. 
2. Dunnin v. United Liver ool Hos•itals Board of Governors [1973] 1 W.L.R. 
58•590 contains generous dicta per Lord Denning M.R. And see Melvor 
v. Southern Health Board [1978] 1 W.L.R. 757 (H.L.). 
3. lst Report of the P.C.A. for 1972-73, H.C.18 (1973) Case No. C2461G, 
p.114. 
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routine tonsillectomy. There was no evidence of negligence and no 
proceedings were at the time pending, the limitation period having 
expired. Although he has no jurisdiction in cases of clinical negligence 
the PCA investigated the case. He concluded that the hospital would 
not have been legally liable, but went on to discuss with the D.H.S.S. 
the possibility of an ex gratia payment. 
Slightly earlier the Select Committee had shown awareness of the 
possible interaction between the courts and the PCA. The Chairman 
expressed anxiety that the PCA's powers to investigate might be abused 
by "a really adroit citizen who is intending in the long run to sue a 
government department in the courts to get evidence which he could not 
otherwise have got via the Parliamentary Commissioner. The PCA promised 
to bear this point in mind in using his discretion under sec 5(2)(b) of 
the Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967, to investigate cases in 
which the complainant might possess a legal remedy and the practice 
seems to haVe developed of asking for an assurance that complainants 
were not contemplating legal action before certain investigations were 
undertaken. This did not bring 'fishing' investigations to an end. 
In a later case the PCA was asked to investigate a complaint that a 
young woman had been sterilised without her consent being obtained. The 
complaintant assured the PCA that she would not take legal action. 
Following the investigation, however, a writ was issued. 2 The different 
limitation periods (one year for the PCA, three years for personal injuries ; 
litigation) mean that a shrewd legal adviser should at least consider 
the advantages of seising the PCA before issuing a writ. 
1. 1st Report of the Select Committee 1970-71, H.C.240 (1971) PID.39-48. 
The citation is from p.48. 
2. Second Report of the Select Committee (1977-78) H.C. 372 (1978), pp.xi, 
60. 
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It is not always the plaintiff who benefits from 'forum 
shopping'. Technical jurisdictional points are often used in France 
to cover administrative scandals, shelter guilty officials, deter 
litigants and stifle public criticism. This technique is particularly 
valuable in the case of actions against the police, where the divided 
jurisdiction and the uncertain caselaw may allow a long period of 
respite to elapse while the courts debate the jurisdictional refinements. 
There are many notorious cases; indeed, one author maintains that the 
Prefect's power to demur to the jurisdiction may be used "systematically ... 
as a delaying tactic": In one case, for example, where a man died in 
the course of a police interrogation, the Prefect, having successfully 
blocked criminal proceedings, entered a demurrer in the course of the 
civil action brought by the widow. The guilty officer apparently 
obtained a respite of 7 years. 2 An equally celebrated, but more modern 
example, is the Aadin affair i 3  in which the plaintiff was the widow of 
a young man seized for interrogation by the military during the crisis 
in Algeria in June 1957. He "disappeared" leaving no trace and in 1963 
a declaration of presumed death was obtained from an Algerian court. 
Unfortunately, the widow failed to submit her claim for damages against 
the State before the limitation period had elapsed. 4 In 1968 she did, 
1. Maestre, op.cit., pp.210-211, 309-311. 
2. Dame Veuve Rersktin T.C. 19 May 1954, J.C.P.1954-2-8244 n. Vedel. 
3. C.E. 11 Jan 1978, A.J.D.A. 1978 p.330 n. Plouvin. 
4. The limitation period in actions for contractual or extra-contractual 
liability is governed by the rule of 	 n2eau.adriennaladech6a 1.s 
which extinguishes debts of the administration 4 years after the 1st 
January in the year in which the act creating the debt occurred. If 
a request for compensation is interposed and refused by the adminis-
tration, however, the refusal must be challenged within two months of 
its being made. If four months elapse with no reply, the request is 
deemed to be refused (See further Auby et Drago op.cit., Vol.2 p.200. 
Commune d'Antibes„ C.E. 21 Feb 1975 mentioned Rec. 939)but the limitation 
period is not activated and the four year period applies. 
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however, submit a claim on behalf of herself and her minor children. 
Instead of making a generous ex gratia settlement the.Minister appealed 
to the Conseil d'Etat on the technical grounds (i) that the limitation 
period had expired and (ii) that the civil courts were alone competent. 
Although the court found for the plaintiff on the first ground, they 
felt unable to follow the advice of their Government Commissioner, 
M. Genevois, and accept jurisdiction to decide the substantive issue of 
compensation. Thus, 20 years after the initial wrong, the case was 
returned for trial to the civil courts where, no doubt, it will ultimately 
reach some conclusion which will profit minor grandchildren. 1 
I do not wish to overstate my case by suggesting that these pro-
cedural defects all flow necessarily and inevitably from the decision 
to allocate cases involving the liability of the administration to 
separate courts. Many of them spring from idiosyncracies of the French 
legal system which could be obviated by slightly different structures. 
Power could be given, for example, to a court wrongly seised to transfer 
the file to the correct court. The Tribunal des Conflits could be given 
a power to decide substantive issues once a reference had been made. 
The decision of a court to accept jurisdiction, even though incorrect, 
could be held binding and unappealable. 
1. I am informed that it is not the practice of the Law Officers to 
take technical points of this type but they are by no means always 
blameless as the history of the Crown proceedings shows: See Conway 
v. Rimmer [1968] 11.C.910 where the doctrine of Grown Privilege was 
allegedly used to stifle an action in tort. See also Town Investments 
v. Min. of Environment [1977] 2 W.L.R.450 for a similar, technical 
point. 
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But such improvements would not affect the basic issue. Under 
the present French system, civil and administrative courts are operating 
in the same area, hearing identical cases to which they are applying 
broadly similar rules. Not only is Eisenmannts thesis intrinsically 
correct, it is also self-explanatory. Administrative liability is not, 
and never can be, independent of civil liability so long as the two 
jurisdictions are covering the same field. So long as cases are allocated 
not according to valid, functional criteria but arbitrari, haphazardly 
and in random fashion, so long will the courts be pushed relentlessly 
towards uniformity in the legal rules. 
A clean division between civil and administrative courts and 
between public and private law might be tolerable if it were the only 
division but of course it is not. The civil jurisdiction is itself 
divided in both England and France into civil and criminal courts,both 
of which have powers of compensation. Both France and England, too, 
rely heavily on statutory and administrative compensation schemes. 
There is therefore a second sense in which administrative liability 
is neither unique nor autonomous. It has to fight for place with a 
multiplicity of compensation schemes with which the principles of adminis-
trative liability 	be co-ordinated and aligned. The difficulty is 
the greater because the schemes prove on examination to be themselves 
disparate, based on no easily discernible principle, incoherent and 
each atypical. We are accustomed to seeing this picture in England. 
One of the standard criticisms of English courts is, indeed, that they 
treat administrative law generally as an occasion for the exercise of 
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perverse ingenuity in statutory interpretation, no general principles 
being discernible. One of the major arguments for adopting a specialised 
system of courts is, on the other hand, that this will enable the 
system to be unified and co-ordinated. The need for diverse and disparate 
statutory schemes will thus disappear. It is surprising, therefore, 
to find that this is not the case in FXance. 
In the leading survey of the subject in France, 1 the author 
identified dozens of different statutory provisions dealing with adminis-
trative compensation some of which derived from pre-Revolutionary pro- 
visions 2 and others of which, enacted during the transitional period of 
1789-1800, are today still partially in force. These provisions have 
been amended, re-amended, extended and amplified continuously by a 
succession of legislatures into the immediate present. 3 The schemes 
are, not surprisingly, lacking in all coherence and, after a survey of 
some 500 pages, the author felt unable to construct any coherent pattern. 
As Professor Vedel put it in his introduction to the work, 
the effort at structural 
rationalisation proved disappointing. 
Despite the unwearied search for 
rationality Conducted with vigour, 
not to say stubborness by the author, 
the hoped for synthesis did not emerge ..." 4 
 words, Mme.Brechon-Moulents 
In other/' fOund that the legislative interventions followed no 
consistent pattern and many, rather like our own Crown Proceedings Act, 
1. Brechon-Moule.nes, Les regimes legislatifs de responsabilite'publique, 
1974. 
2. E.g. the.case of the postal service, given limited exemption by an 
Edict of 1627 confirmed in 1759, op.cit., p.28. 
3. See. Analytical Index, op.cit., pp.525-542• 
At p.ix. 
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were designed merely to remedy particular deficiencies which from 
time to time revealed themselves. 1 The legislator was not consistent 
in allocating jurisdiction to civil and administrative courts respectively. 2 
 Nor did the legislator consistently opt for either civil law principles 
or administrative law principles of liability. 3  Even the theoretical 
public law bases of administrative liability could not be traced con-
sistently through the provisions. 4 The author could deduce from this 
tangle only that "the drafting of the legislation making provision for 
public liability is largely ad hoc in character". 5 The legislator left 
much for the judge to do, sometimes designedly, on other occasions 
inadvertently. 
The task of the judge is a hard one. Not only must these dis-
parate provisions be co-ordinated, but they must also be woven into the 
general principles of liability created by - the judges so as to provide 
a more or less coherent pattern. 
This process of harmonisation which falls to the judge to perform 
is difficult and delicate. Inevitably it results in blurring of the 
general principles of liability and usually also creates a tangle of 
cases in which no general principle is easily recognised. The judge is 
then criticised for having discarded principle in favour of a miscellany 
of statutory glosses. The difficulties are well explained by M. °dent, 
himself President of the Section du Contentieux of the Conseil d'Etat and 
1. Pp. 213-240. 
2. Pp.87-110. 
3. Pp. 126-128. 
4. Pp. 128-137. 
5. At p.241. 
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an experienced judge, in his standard text: 
"Various texts set out the con- 
ditions in which persons are entitled 
to compensation by virtue of the fact 
that special laws have caused loss to 
them. The Conseil d'Etat has held 
that the legislator l having taken a 
decision as to the nature and the extent 
of the right to compensation open to the 
victims of special statutory provisions, 
intended to exclude rights created by 
the general principles of administrative 
liability, even where these rules would 
have been more favourable to the victim. 
The result is sometimes paradoxical. 
The legislator in any given area may wish 
to expres6 sympathy for certain categories 
of victim, yet he risks actually reducing 
their rights or placing a limited class in 
a situation less favourable than that 
created by the general principles of liability." 
The author gives several examples in the area of war damage, finding 
particularly shocking the case of certain people detained during the 
occupation whose rights to compensation depended entirely upon laws 
first annulled then subsequently validated retrospectively for certain 
classes of detainees. The result was that those subject to house arrest 
rather than detention obtained no compensation. 1 
Where the court decides to take the opposite course and compensate 
the victim, the result may be to allow a measure of sympathetic over- 
7In Gonfond 2  for example, the military was called upon to assist 
the mayor of a local municipality when a serious forest fire broke out. 
A soldier,cperhaps driving carelessly.,through exhaustion, was seriously 
injured when his vehicle was involved in an accident. He subsequently 
1. Odent, op.cit., p.1052-3; Giraud C.E. 4 Jan 1952 Rec 14. 
2. C.E. 9 July 1976, concl Gentot (contraires) R.D.P. 1977 p.529 n. de 
Soto, A.J.D.A. 1976 Chr. Nauwelaers et Fabius p.560. 
retired with an 80% military invalidity pension, the amount of which 
seemed to a commentator to have been "calculated with military miser-
liness" and which "bore no relation whatsoever to the injury suffered". 
The soldier sued the municipality in the administrative courts, claiming 
to be an "occasional collaborator" in the work of the public service. 
His claim failed on the ground that he remained a permanent servant of 
the military authorities whose services were placed by the authorities 
at the disposal of the municipality. He was not, therefore, an 
"occasional collaborator". 
This decision, heavily criticised by the commentators and delivered 
against the advice of the Government Commissioner, seems inequitable if 
weighed against Giry. It is, however, correct. Any other solution 
would mean that a soldier injured on active service might receive less 
than one detached on civilian duties, a still less equitable result. 
If military pensions are "parsimonious" the solution lies with a general 
Upgrading rather than alleviation of a single distressing case. 1 It is 
the Gir decision which is wrong because it allows the plaintiffs to 
receive a double benefit from mutually incompatible principles of adminis-
trative and private law. The risk assurance principle, which relieves 
the plaintiffs of the burden of proving fault, when coupled with the 
more generous civil law principles of damages which are inextricably 
linked with the fault principle, here permit a measure of sympathetic, 
but illogical, overcompensation. 
1. It may be that an identical criticism should be made of the way in 
which police officers on duty are allowed to avail themselves of the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. 15% or more of all awards are 
made to serving police officers: Annual Report for 1976. 
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A second case1 concerned the provisions of a law which provided 
pensions for the widows of the personnel of the fire service. The 
statute did not extend to unmarried dependants. A fireman killed in an 
accident while on duty left a mistress who was dependant on him and 
who had lived with him for several years. She brought an action in the 
administrative courts claiming damages from the municipality as employers 
of the deceased. The Conseil dtEtat held that she had sufficient 
interest to support her claim. 
The question now arose as to what was the basis of liability. 
The answer logically should have been that liability was without fault 
under the Games principle on the ground that, in French law, the depem-
dantis claim is purely parasitic and the mistress should therefore be 
treated as standing in the shoes of the deceased. The difficulty with 
this solution was 	that mistresses would be placed in a position 
superior to that of widows,whose rights were limited to the statutory 
pension. Mistresses, on the other hand, would obtain full damages 
modelled on the Giry principle. The Conseil dtEtat withdrew from the 
logical solution and substituted liability for gross fault, treating the 
plaintiff as a third party injured by an operation of the public service. 
They went on to deny the plaintiff her damages on the ground that she 
could produce no evidence of gross fault. In this way the court 
(i) harmonised the civil and administrative caselaw by extending pro-
tection to permanent liaisons which fall short of marriage (ii) retained 
their own moral position on the rectitude of such liaisons (iii) upheld 
the superior status of widows protected by the statutory scheme. The 
1. Dame Mugsser, veuve Lecompte C.E. 3 March 1978, A.J.D.A. 1978, pp.232 
and 210 chr. Nauwelaers et Dutheillet de Lamothe. Compare Adams v.  
War Office [1955] 3 All E.R. 245. 
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annotators were left to cavil at their manipulation 
of legal logic, 
Thus the French system, far from representing a logical and 
coherent systematisation as we have been led to expect,presents the 
same picture of a plethora of systems, some mutually exclusive, some 
cumulative 7  of which Professor Atiyah complains: 
"If there was any rational 
pattern to the various compen- 
sation systems as a whole it might 
have been possible to construct a 
hierarchy of systems under which a 
man should be compensated by system A, 
if that were possible, and if not, he 
should then be relegated to systems B, 
C and D in turn. But this is not how 
things have developed. In fact each 
system by and large decides whether 
it is willing to shoulder a burden, 
irrespective of other compensation 
available, or whether it wishes to push 
the burden onto another system or whether 
it is willing to share the burden. But 
the whole process is one of almost 
unbelievable complexity.”1 
The sole distinction is that, in France, the picture is rendered 
even more complex by the dual jurisdiction. All this achieves in the 
field of tortious liability is the drawing of a line, not even a straight 
line, through the middle of the terrain of civil liability. A further 
complexity is added by the creation of a machinery to resolve juris-
dictional disputes which is competent only to deal with jurisdictional 
points and not to decide issues of substance. Nor is the situation 
ameliorated in any way by antagonism between the two hierarchies and by 
illegitimate 'poaching' on the territory of the other jurisdiction. 
1. Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 2nd edn. 1975, p.392. See also 
D. Williams "State—financed Benefits in Personal Injury Cases" (1974) 
37 M.L.R. 281 
The inability to join as parties in the litigation persons or 
bodies subject to the jurisdiction of the alternative hierarchy means 
a multiplication of litigation. Recursory actions are brought by the 
administration against its agents and by agents against the State. 
Subrogatory actions by insurers are not infrequent. Sometimes, the 
State, in the person of a locally organised Caisse de Securite ' Sociale-
has already satisfied the victim and the ludicrous spectacle is seen 
of the two agencies pursuing each other through the courts for accounting 
purposes. In Abamonte,1  for example, a small boy fell into a disused 
quarry in the depths of a forest owned by the State. The victim sued 
in the administrative courts and an obscure jurisdictional point arose 
whether the forest formed part of the 'private property' (domaine nrive) 
- of the State, in which case the civil courts were competent, or whether, 
in the interests of the litigant, the administrative courts, which had 
been seised, could hear the case. 3i years were spent in establishing 
that they could not. In the meantime (fortunately for the victim) the 
social security system was maintaining him and was subrogated to his 
rights. 
Perhaps such difficulties might be avoided if a 'functional' 
test were employed instead of the 'organic' test chosen by French 
administrative law. 
To use a 'functional' test, attempting to limit the special rules 
to a limited category of cases in which the government is exercising 
its 'sovereign' or 'governmental' powers,is not much more logical. In 
my first chapter I have attempted to show how little agreement there 
1. C.E. 28 Nov 1975, A.J.D.A. 1976 p.148 n. Julien Laferriere. 
really is over which administrative functions are truly governmental. 
There might be limited agreement in theory over President Pompidou's 
residual category of defence, law and order. In practice, even this 
category could be dismantled. The judicial function may be exercised 
on occasion by arbitrators, as Duguit himself pointed out. A clearer 
example is, however, that of the police power. 
France envisages the police power as inherently 'governmental: 
vesting it in the State. On the other hand, this characterisation does 
not automatically entail the jurisdiction of the administrative courts 
because of the division between the ladmindtrativel and 'judicial* police. 
Thus, France has tacitly to admit that rules of civil liability adminis-
tered by civil courts may adequately cater for the police function. 
England, on the other hand, characterises the police function as 
inherently personal, subscribing to the fiction of the individual police 
officer as a 'citizen in uniform'. No governmental police power is 
admitted. Moreover, the State does not always claim a monopoly. Police 
powers are frequently exercised by individuals or by private companies 
such as Securicor, whose services may be contracted for by the State or 
by private corporations such as banks, indifferently. 1 A private security 
organisation has, for example, been employed to carry out the work of 
detaining immigrants by the Home Office. 2 Some public enterprises, such 
as British Railways or the dock and airport authorities also employ their 
1. On the security industry see Draper, Private Police, 1978. 
2. For use of a private security organisation by the Home Office to 
detain immigrants, see 15th Report of the Expenditure Committee, 
H.C. 662-1 (1977-78). 
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own, private police forces. By way of contrast, the police force 
proper is permitted to contract with private individuals to carry 
out private functions, such as the maintenance of order at political 
meetings or sporting occasions. 1 
In mixed societies, government functions are not precisely defined 
and governmental powers are not rationally allocated. Besides central 
and local goverment, functions may be hired off to autonomous bodies; 
similarly they may be exercised on behalf of the government by private 
bodies. In a recent English case, - for example, the Crown's power as 
'parens patriae' to watch over the upbringing of young children and 
ensure their safety was found to be exercised alike by police, by local 
authorities and by private charitable organisations. 2 In a second 
similar case, the nature of the Bank of England was questioned and one 
judge at least wished to classify its functions as primarily commercial) 
Today the tentacles of the State are everywhere. The public and 
private sectors can no longer be disentangled. As Kamenka and Tay have 
put it: 
"The major sphere of social life 
passes from the private to the public, 
not merely in the sense that more and 
more activity is state activity but 
in the sense that more and more 'private' 
activity becomes public in its scale and 
its effect, in the sense that the oil 
company is felt to be as 'public' as the 
State electricity authority utility, the 
private hospital and the private school, 
with their growing need for massive state 
1. Glasbrook Bros. v. Glamorgan Corp. [1925] A.G. 270. 
2. D. v. N.S.P.C.C. [1977] 2 W.L.R. 201. 
3. Burmah Oil v. Bank of England [1979]1 141, R  413, lPaCr/ 0,1DriA 
Dert1141 	WsSere tin.9) 
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subsidies, as public as the muncipal 
hospital and the state school.° 
In such societies it is as difficult to distinguish the 'public' 
from the 'privatel.organism as to distinguish thelgovernmental'from 
the 'civilian' function. It is infinitely simpler therefore that all 
parties should be amenable to the same courts and subject to the same 
principles of liability. Special cases may sometimes need special 
treatment. It is the prerogative of the Legislature to provide for 
these needs. 
	vil•■••••■■11.•111■11■•••11 
1. Kamenka and Erh—Soon Tay, "Beyond Bourgeois Individualism: the 
contemporary Crisis in Law and Legal Ideology" in Kamenka and Neale, 
Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond, 1975. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Illegality and Liability 
All that we have so far succeeded in establishing is the self—
evident proposition that not all government torts differ radically in 
character from the torts of private individuals and that, where they do 
differ, the concepts of civil liability are perfectly adequate to 
the 
determine the liability of the administration or/State. This is easily 
admitted when the wrongful act is clearly attributable to an individual — 
for example, when a negligent driver causes a traffic accident — in 
which case the State is cast in the role of employer and its liability 
can be assessed according to the normal principles of vicarious liability. 
But it is equally true in many cases where the tortfeasor is the State 
itself. We have seen that an accident on publicly owned property does 
not differ in kind from an accident on privately owned property. It 
is better to leave such situations to the rules of civil liability which 
is perfectly able to cope with them. To do otherwise results in dis-
crimination between victims through the operation of disparate rules of 
legal liability. 
Implicit in these propositions is the deduction that "actions in 
tort against persons exercising authority do not always involve an 
examination of the validity of their acts." 1 In many cases of govern— 
ment torts, however, the reverse is true and the validity of the adminis— 
trative actions is central to the success or failure of the action. 
In other words, central to the theme of administrative liability is 
the idea of abuse of power. 
1. Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality, 1965, p.122. 
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It is here that administrative liability has the greatest claim 
to be unique in character and it is here, too, that the concepts of 
private law are likely to be least able to provide a solution. To 
cite Hauriou, never an ardent supporter of the autonomy of State liability, 1  
H... the true autonomy of adminis-
trative liability is manifested when 
the Administration avails itself of 
purely governmental powers for which 
civil law provides no parallel." 
It is in this limited area that Hauriou believed that the concept 
of fault would have to be abandoned. if it were not to be unduly strained, 
and replaced by theories of liability without fault, which, he admitted, 
would be difficult to devise. 
Invalidity and abuse of power cause similar problems for our 
common law system. Damage attributable to administrative action does 
not always fall squarely within the old, common law categories. In 
the words of 	Denning L .7: I 
where the damage complained of 
does not result in trespass to person 
or property some difficulties arise. 
In th)first place, there is no recog- 
nized category of the law of tort under 
which the action can be classified. Where 
a licence is illegally revoked or refused, 
the very gist of the action consists in 
showing an unauthorised exercise of 
authority which causes damage. Unlike 
actions of trespass, the cause of action in 
this case is peculiar to actions against 
public officials and bodies ..." 
1. Precis de droit administratif, 10th edn. 1921, p.381. 
2. Abbott v. Sullivan [1952] 1 K.B. 189, pp.200-202. (Denning L.J. dissen-
ting). 
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LordLElenning went on to ask the question whether such an action 
could be maintained independently of any recognized head of tort, to 
which question he gave an affirmative answer. "I should be sorry to 
think", he said "that if a wrong has been done, the plaintiff is to go 
without a remedy simply because no one can find a peg to hang it on." 
To Rubinstein, the absence of such a peg 
H... leaves unactionable a whole host 
of administrative functions which do not 
result in direct interference with 
person and property. In the age of welfare 
states and controlled economies, such 
spheres as the distribution of social 
benefits and all licensing functions are 
excluded from the orthodox rules of 
liability.”1 
Among public lawyers there would be general agreement that a system 
of administrative liability which makes no provision for compensation 
in cases such as these is, inadequate. If one were to press the point 
and ask what should be done, it is probable that the problem would be 
analysed as a need to provide for legal liability for excess or abuse 
or misuse of power. A slightly more abstract formulation might be that 
there should be liability for illegal or invalid administrative acts. 
At this point the difficulties begin )because, deceptively simple and 
precise as these statements seem, in reality every term used is ambiguous, 
imprecise and complex. The term 'abuse' for example, is normally defined 
as meaning 'to make a bad use of  and seems to possess some pejorative 
sense. In common parlance an 'abuse' would probably be thought of as 
graver than a 'misuse'. Yet the dictionary defines a 'misuse' as an 
'improper use or application to a bad purpose' which suggests that the 
two terms are interchangeable and that they may be emptied of their 
1. Op.cit., pp.145-6. 
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pejorative content and stretched to cover the apparently more neutral 
term of 'excess of power'. In the modern law of ultra vires the latter 
is the sense in which the terms/are normally used. Lord Denning has 
recently explained that 
"... When discretionary powers are 
entrusted to the executive by statute, 
the courts can examine the exercise of 
those powers to see that they are used 
properly,, and not improperly or mis- 
takenly. By "mistakenly" I mean under 
the influence of a misdirection in fact 
or in law." 
Slightly later, he remarked 
"To my mind such a procedure was never 
contemplated by the statute. The Secretary 
of State was mistaken in thinking that he 
could do it. No doubt he did it with the 
best of motives 	Nevertheless, he went 
about it, I think, in the wrong way. He 
misdirected himself as to his powers. And 
it is well established law that, if a dis-
cretionary power is exercised under the 
influence of a misdirection, it is not 
properly exercised, and the court can say so." 
A. very similar ambiguity is associated with the expressive French 
phrase 'detournement de pouvoir' which literally possesses the meaning of 
a misdirection or diversion of power from its proper ends. Yet the 
term has developed a strong pejora tive sense. Odent refuses to define 
it on the grounds that it is "supple, fluid and essentially evolutionary." 
He also remarks: 
"By reason of the nature of the assess-
ments involved, detournements de pouvoir 
are always delicate to investigate. A 
subjective and sometimes a disparaging 
assessment of the administration and its 
representatives is involved, and their 
loyalty and good faith are suspect." 2 
1. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Dept. of Trade [1977] 2 W.L.R. 234, 250-251. 
2. Odent op.cit., pp.1581-3. 
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Similarly, in connection with liability, a leading author 
correctly asserts that dgtournement de pouvoir is always actionable 
because it is "one of thegravest of illegalities". 1 We can deduce that 
the reason for this is that daournement de pouvoir contains a sub-
jective or mental element and that in imposing liability the court is 
sanctioning wrongdoing or 'abuse' of power. 
Increasingly, however, judicial review in. both England and France 
has been moving from the 'subjective' to the 'objective'; that is to say, 
in assessing the legality of administrative action, the interest has 
moved from the administrator's intentions, aims, motives, goals and 
purposes, to the objective assessment of his acts in the framework of 
the enabling legislation. In the leading case of Padfield v. Minister 
of Agriculture it was said that: 2 
"Parliament must have conferred the 
discretion with the intention that it 
should be used to promote the policy 
and objects of the Act; the policy and 
objects of the Act must be determined 
by construing the Act as a whole and 
construction is always a matter of law 
for the court." 
Modern cases show a clear intention to narrow the ambit of dis-
cretionary power. In bringing discretionary power under control, however, 
the judge hopes to avoid "the role of censor of those persons whose good 
or bad intentions he weighs and whose motives he finally assesses." 3 
This is done by substituting (so—called) objective criteria for assess-
ment. It is assumed that public authorities will expect to act inside 
1. Moreau, "Dommages causes par des decisions administratives entachOs 
d'excbs de pouvoir", Jur.adm., fasc.720 p.10. 
2. [1968] A.C.997, 1030 (Lord Reid). See further, Austin, "Judicial Review 
of Subjective Discretion — At the Rubicon; Whither Now?" (1975) 28 C.L.F.150. 
3. Breart de Boisanger C.E. 13 July 1962, D 1962 p.664, concl. Henry. See 
also Smith v. East Elloe R.D.C. [1956] A.C. 736 at pp.769-770 (Lord Radcliffe) 
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the legal framework of legislative and regulatory provisions and that 
they will 
"make their discretionary decisions 
responsibly and for reasons which 
accord with the statutory purpose ... 
If they do not exercise their dis-
cretion in this way they can be 
challenged in the courts."' 
By moving towards the objective, judicial review in England has 
taken a first, cautious step towards creating a concept of 'illegality', 
a development which has so far been impeded by the orientation of English 
law towards rights and remedies. But English law is still very uncertain 
about the nature of 'illegality' and whether it should be defined 
objectively from the viewpoint of the nature and quality of the act 
impugned, or subjectively from the standpoint of the victim and the avail-
ability of a remedy. To put this somewhat differently, if we start from 
the point that an 'illegal' or 'invalid' act is one which is 'ultra vires', 
then we are still left with an ambiguity. We may interpret the act 
objectively by giving it a substantive content and saying that an illegal 
act is one which is vitiated by some excess of power,  irrespective of 
whether it is reviewable. An act which is merely 'voidable' then becomes 
an ultra vires act. If, on the other.hand, a subjective procedural test 
is used, an illegal act is one which is capable of being reviewed for  
ultra vires. This approach is really summarised in the celebrated dictum 
of Lord Radcliffe that "an order, even if not made in good faith, is still 
an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity 
upon its forehead." 
Since it has the demerit of bestowing 'legality' on a number of grave abis.-9  
1. Anne v.Merton L.B.C. [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024, 1035 (Lord Wilberforce); see 
also Kahn, Le Pouvoir discr6tionnaire et le juge administratif, op.cit.. 
abave. 
2. Smith v. East Elloe R.D.C. [1956] A.C. 736 769. 
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of power for purely fortuitous procedural reasons, many would disagree with 
this dictum. Moreover, it is clear that by manipulating the unstable 
concepts of 'voidness' or 'nullity' and tvoidability' l the courts can 
vary the nature of the twinned concepts of 'illegality' or 'invalidity' 
A leading judge has assured us that their motive in so doing may be 
more closely linked to the question of liability than of legality. 1 
If we turn to the concept of 'liability' a similar ambiguity is 
noticeable. 'Fault', a noticeably flexible cOncept„ is traditionally 
defined 	as an objective standard of care. Running throu&h the law of 
torts, however, is a strongly subjective cross-current which springs 
from the notion of torts as 'wrongs'. Nowhere is this more obvious 
than in the imprecision of meaning of the term 'malice', something which, 
- like the idea of reasonableness in ultra vires, may range from deliberate 
and wicked wrongdoing to the nearly objective standard of conscious 
negligence. As a leading writer has said 
"'Malice' in this context discloses an 
uneasywireckless indifference, and bad 
faith are not interchangeable ideas; it 
would seem that none of them is para-
mount 	Recklessness is properly des- 
cribed as a variety of negligence in 
which the actor is aware of the risk but 
resolves to "chance it". It is conscious 
negligence."2 
/conjunction of ideas. Inten-tion to injure 
Thus, when a distinguished French writer tells us in sibylline 
tshion that "it is undeniable, that illegality and liability are funda-
mentally different in character and difficult to compare"3 he may really 
be circumnavigating the unpalatable truth that neither concept has any 
1. Below, p.131 
2. Milner, Negligence in Modern Law, 1967, p.69. 
3. Delbez, De l'exAs de pouvoir comme source de responsabilit6, 1932 
R.D.P. p.441, 488. 
fixed content. The word 'liability' conceals behind it a number of 
subsidiary concepts, such as 'famlt' l 'intention' and "malice', which 
can be varied at will from the subjective to the objective. The same is 
true of the concept of illegality. Indeed, the latter is not so much 
a concept as a number of points on a scale of values. 
Worse still, both illegality and liability are 'schizophrenic' 
in the sense that each serves a number of ill—defined purposes which 
pull in opposite directions. The main aim of tortious liability is 
considered to be compensation; not only does it possess a number of 
subsidiary ends but the victim's needs have to be balanced against those 
of the defendant. Judicial review of administrative action 
also has two goals: to punish (or sanction) 	illegal administrative 
activity and to provide 	a remedy to injured parties. In any 
system of administrative law or, for that matter, in any given case, 
priority may be given to one or the other of these goals. It is painfully 
clear, then, that the concepts of illegality and liability may vary 
according to the use which, at the time, is being made of them. To 
attempt to marry the schizophrenic characteristics of one concept is 
hard enough for a court; to link the two is to create the potential for 
nuclear fission. 
However illusory, the synthesis between illegality and liability 
is an attractive one which has been influential in the Ehglish caselaw 
from an early date. It derives from the idea, traceable to the Case of 
the Marshalsea1 that a judicial officer is protected when acting within 
his jurisdiction but may be liable in trespass when he exceeds his 
1.1.1131011■111■110111.11•• 	 .NOINNOM 	
1. (1613) 10 Co.Rep. 68b. And see further, de Smith, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action, 3rd edn. 1973, p.95; Rubinstein, "Liability in 
Tort of Judicial Officers" (1964) 15 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 317. 
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jurisdiction. At this stage 'legality' is merely a defence to the 
strict liability of the action for trespass. In more abstract terms 
we could say that the notion of legality is a barrier which the defen-
dant sets up against the plaintiff's allegation of an invasion of his 
protected rights, legality being defined in terms of jurisdiction. 
With the growth of judicial review by means of the ultra vires 
principle, the idea of jurisdiction spread from the limited field of lia-
bility of judicial officers into the wider field of general discretionary 
power. The connection between ultra vires and liability could on 
occasion be used to secure the most perverse results. .In Duncan v.  
Findlater1 for example, the Lord Chancellor felt able to argue that an 
administrative body could never be liable for intra vires acts unless 
the statute itself provided fcr compensation. But neither could it be 
liable for ultra vires acts, since any officer acting in excess of his 
1 powers would naturally also be acting in excess of his functions. 
At a later date the supremacy of the civil law of liability was 
reasserted by the creation of a judicial presumption that Parliament l in 
granting statutory powers, could never have intended to authorise negli- 
2 
gence in their exercise. But the heresy has never been entirely scotched. 
The leading case of Everett v. Griffiths 3 concerned the power of a magis-
trate under the Lunacy Act 1891 to sign a reception order if he was 
1. 6 Cl and F 894, 7 E.R. 934. The passage is cited above p.39 where 
I have argued that the case is wrongly decided. Moreover, since the 
case concerned 'operational' negligence i.e. a pile of rubble left 
in a road, it can hardly be an authority on the exercise of discretionary 
power. 
2. Geddis v. Proprietors of The Barn Reservoir (1878) 3 App.Cas. 430 at 
p.456 (Lord Blackburn). 
3. [1921] 1 A.C. 631, 657. 
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"reasonably satisfied" that this was necessary. In the House of Lords 
it was held that no duty other than the duty to act honestly and in good 
faith — the ultra vires test of reasonableness — could be implied. Lord 
Haldane said: 
"If [the magistrate] does his best 
to act fairly within the limits laid 
down for him, he has acted up to the 
standard prescribed and I do not think 
he can be made liable to an action at 
common law for want of care beyond this. 
For assuming that he has actually satis- 
fied himself, acting honestly and bona 
fide in arriving at his conclusion and 
proceeding on it, he has done the very 
thing which the statute told him to do, 
and no further question arises". 
Similar reasoning was easily refuted by Atkin L.J. dissenting in 
the Court of Appeal. 1  Arguing for the superimposition on the statutory 
power of a common law duty of care he reasserted the supremacy of the 
,negligence test of reasonableness, saying: 
"The statute obviously assumes that 
persons believing that they are acting 
within their jurisdiction will consider 
themselves bound to exercise reasonable 
care." 
In East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent 2 Lord Romer again 
denied that public authorities could owe a duty of care in respect of 
an exercise of discretionary power. He said: 
"If in the exercise of their discretion 
they embark upon an execution of the 
power the only duty they owe to any 
member of the public is not thereby to 
add to the damage;_ which he would have 
suffered had they done nothing. So long 
as they exercise their discretion honestly, 
it is for them to determine the method by 
which and the time within which and the 
time during which the power shall be 
exercised and they cannot be made liable 
1. [1920] 3 K.B. 163, 212. 
2. [1940] 4 A11 E.R. 5 27, 543. 
20G 
except to the extent to which I have 
just mentioned for any damage which 
would have been avoided had they 
exercised their discretion in a more 
reasonable way." 
A very well known passage of Lord Atkin, once more driven to 
dissent, demonstrates the failure of logical analysis inherent in this 
reasoning: 1 
"I cannot help thinking that the 
argument did not sufficiently dis- 
tinguish between two kinds of duties: 
(i) a statutory duty to do or abstain 
from doing something, and, (ii) a 
common law duty to conduct yourself with 
reasonable care so as not to injure persons 
liable to be affected by your conduct." 
goes 
None of these dicta / so far as to leave the individual affected 
by a misuse of power entirely without remedy. Liability is however, 
restricted to the case where there has been an ultra vires use of power, 
the question being how this requirement should be interpreted. Initially, 
and perfectly correctly, the emphasis had been on the character of the 
right which the plaintiff set up against the defendant's powers. In 
Ashby v. White2 the celebrated judgment of Holt C.J. suggested that 
any deliberate interference with the plaintiff's right to vote would 
be sufficient to found an action. 
"Supposing then that the plaintiff had 
a right of voting and so appears on the 
record, and the defendant has excluded 
him from it, nobody can say that the defen-
dant has done well; then he must have done 
ill, for he has deprived the plaintiff of 
his right; so that the plaintiff having a 
right to vote, and the defendant having 
hindered him of it, it is an injury to the 
plaintiff." 
1. At p.533. 
2. (1703) 2 Ld. Raym.938; 92 E.R. 126, 136. 
Once again, however, the later cases diluted the principle by 
substituting for a 'deliberate' act - a minimal requirement as to 
intention paralleled in the law of trespass - two narrower tests. The 
first was the idea of 'malice", a slippery term whose place in the law 
of torts has never been clear; 1 the second, borrowed from the law of 
judicial review or ultra vires, was the idea of 'honesty and good faith" 
referred to in Everett v. Griffiths and the Kent case. These different 
gradually requirements / 	became confused until in David v. Abdul .0aderl 2 
in a passage hardly conspicuous for clarity, Lord Radcliffe said of 
an action for refusal to grant a licence 
"The presence of spite or 
may be insufficient in itself to 
render actionable a decision which 
has been based on unexceptionable 
grounds of consideration and has not 
been vitiated by the badness of the 
motive." 
Disentangled, this seems to mean that a malicious or spiteful 
motive is not enough to found an action provided that it is only a 
subsidiary motive. Malice has acquired a technical meaning and has 
been equated with the concept of ultra vires. 
If the courts were using the ultra vires doctrine in the area of 
civil liability to restrict liability for loss flowing from the lawful 
exercise of power, they ought then to have admitted as a logical coro-
llary that a breach of a statutory duty by a public authority would 
found an action for damages by an individual who had suffered loss. In 
this way the equation would have been completed to read: 
Illegality in the shape of an ultra 
vires exercise of statutory power or 
a breach of statutory duty entails 
1. , "Malice in the Law of Torts", (1958) 21 M.L.R. 495. Friedmann'  
2. [1963] 1 W.L.R. 834, 840. See further Harlow, op.cit., 39 M.L.R. at 
PP. 526-539• 
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civil liability for damage caused: 
but intra vires or legal exercise of 
power does not. 
At first this logic was accepted as a matter of course. In 
Ferguson v. Kinnoul 1 Lord Lyndhurst declared 
"When a person has an important 
public duty to perform, he is bound 
to perform that duty; and if he neglects 
or refuses so to do, and an individual in 
consequence sustains injury, that lays 
the foundation for an action to recover 
damages by way of compensation for the 
injury that he has so sustained." 
This position was maintained in the later case of Couch v. Steel, 2 
an action by a seaman against the master of a ship who had, contrary 
to statutory provisions, failed to provide him with medicine. The 
position was complicated by the fact that this statute provided for a 
penalty, but Lord Campbell C.J. confidently disposed of this objection, 
saying: 
"Az far as the public wrong is concerned, 
there is no remedy but that prescribed 
by the Act of Parliament. There is 
however, beyond the public wrong, a 
special and particular damage sustained 
by the Plaintiff by reason of the breach 
of duty by the Defendant, for which he has 
no remedy unless an action on the case at 
his suit be maintainable." 
By the time Atkinson v. Newcastle Waterworks Co. 3 fell to be 
decided, however, the courts seem to have repented of their original 
generosity in the matter of breach of statutory duty. Doctrines such as 
the principle that an alternative remedy provided by the statute bars 
recovery; and the concept of 'public' rights, or rights owed to the 
1. (1842) 9 Cl and F 251, 8 E.R. 412, 423. 
2. (1854) 3 El and Bl 402; 118' E.R.1193, 1197. 
3. (1877) 2 Ex. D 441. 
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public at large but not enforceable by any single individual, were developed 
to restrict liability. 1 The link between illegal administrative action 
and civil liability, once clearly acknowledged lwas diluted by a confused 
application of other, more general rules of tortious liability. Finally, 
it became possible to argue that no civil action for breach of statutory 
duty existed independently of negligence. 2 
The traditional emphasis of the law of torts on protected interests 
is visible both in the early actions for misuse of statutory powers and in 
the early actions for breach of a statutory duty. It could, of course, 
like any other principle, be used restrictively. In an early licensing case, 
which epitomises rather well the necessary relationship between a protected 
interest and the legality of administrative action, the plaintiff unsuccess-
fully sued licensing justices for refusal to grant him a licence. The 
action failed on the ground that the plaintiff had no property right 
which the law could protect. The court said: 
"The plaintiff here has no right to 
have a licence unless the justices think 
it proper to grant it, therefore he can 
have no right of action against the judges 
for refusing it." 3 
Street has admirably summarised the correct position in regard to 
statutory duty when he says: 
... it is abundantly clear that a 
plaintiff who merely proves that the defen-
dant broke a statutory duty is far from 
having established the tort. The emphasis 
should be, as a few eminent judges have 
pointed out, on the nature of the interest 
of the plaintiff ... The problem of tortious 
liability is not solved by asking whether 
there was a breach of a statutory duty: 
one must discover whether the statute 
created in the plaintiff an interest which 
was to be protected against interference 
1. Street on Torts, pp.269-275. See also Watt v. Kesteven C.C.[1955] 1 Q.B.408. 
2. See further Fricke "The juridical nature of the action upon the Statute" 
(1960) 76 L.Q.R.240; Glanville Williams, "The effect of penal legislation 
in the law of tort" (1960) 23 M.L.R. 233; Street on Torts, p.268. 
3. Bassett v. Godschall (1770) 3 Wils.K.B.l2l; 95 E.R.967,968. See now Malone 
v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1979] 2 W.L.R.700 for a modern 
example of similar reasoning. 
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Hhe defendant by an action in tort." 1 [51a3 
This is also the light in which the English law of tort struck a 
distinguished French public lawyer. Concluding his survey of State 
liability in Ehgland„ M. Levy said 2 
"The law of liability in England 0.. 
does not present the same logically 
simple picture as the French law of 
civil liability. Its primary object is 
not solely the re—establishment of the 
status quo ante by means of indemnity or 
even the determination of the body 
on which the cost of the loss will 
ultimately lie. 
The law of liability in Ehgland must 
actually be read as a system for the 
protection of rights. In the last resort, 
it is always a question of finding out 
whether the victim possesses rights which 
can be set off against the author of the 
damage. The concepts of fault or guarantee 
thus play only a secondary part, because 
the centre of gravity in the system is to be 
found in the rights of the victim." 
It is convenient at this stage to summarise the argument, which 
runs as follows. Initially, the concept of legality was introduced into 
the law of torts to circumscribe the strict liability of the law of 
trespass by providing a defence. A parallel development was the creation 
of a civil action for illegality in the shape of breach of a statutory 
obligation. These actiongo which focussed on the plaintiff's rights,were 
capable with a modicum of judicial creativity of developing into an 
excellent system of remedies for the abuse, misuse or excess of adminis-
trative power. In fact, however, the courts proceeded to restrict 
liability. This could be done in the first instance by limiting the 
interests recognised by the common law as worthy of protection — that is 
1. Street on Torts, p.268. The author cites in support of his views 
Holt C.J. in Ashby v. White; Bramwell B in several cases; and Lord 
Atkin in various cases. 
2. Op.cit., p.349. 
to say, by limiting the number of pegs on which actions could be 
hung — and disallowing actions for which no apposite label seemed to 
exist. 
The second approach was to shift attention from the plaintiff to 
the defendant. The negligence principle restricted liability to cases 
in which a duty of care was owed and,by allowing this concept to invade 
the area of statutory duty, the stricter obligation imposed by the 
statute could be diluted. In similar fashion, the ultra vires principle 
could be used to restrict liability to cases in which administrators 
had exceeded their powers or acted unlawfully. Since the ultra vires 
test was thought to be more generous to public authorities than the 
common law duty of care, this test of illegality could be superimposed 
on the common law duty of care to restrict liability for negligence. 
Ironically, the test of illegality in England law produced a restriction 
in the ambit of the civil law of liability. Confirmation that this was 
a deliberate act of judicial policy comes from the leading modern apologist 
of the equation of liability with illegality, Lord Diplock„ when, in the 
Dorset Yacht case he listed a variety of reasons why in his view, 1 
"... the public law concept of ultra 
vires has replaced the civil law con- 
cept of negligence as the test of the 
legality, and consequently of the 
actionability, of acts or omissions of 
government departments or public authorities 
done in the exercise of a discretion con-
ferred upon them by Parliament as to the means 
by which they are to achieve a particular 
public purpose. According to this concept 
Parliament has entrusted to the department 
or authority charged with the administration 
of the statute the exclusive right to determine 
the particular means within the limits laid 
down by the statute —by which its purpose can 
best be fulfilled. It is not the function of 
the court, for which it would be ill—suited, 
	V•••••■■•■•••■• 	 
1. At pp.1183-4. The reasons are discussed at a later stage in the 
argument. 
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to substitute its own view of the appro-
priate means for that of the department 
or authority by granting a remedy by way 
of a civil action at law to a private citizen 
adversely affected by the way in which the 
discretion has been exercised. Its function 
is confined in the first instance to deciding 
whether the act or omission complained of 
fell within the statutory limits imposed upon 
the departmdnt's or authority's discretion. 
Only if it did not would the court have juris- 
diction to determine whether or not the act 
or omission, not being jusitifed by the 
statute, constituted an actionable infringe-
ment of the plaintiff's rights in civil law." 
The leading modern case 1 takes up this reasoning. It was alleged 
that the defendant council was negligent in that it had allowed builders 
to construct a block of flats on inadequate foundations either because 
the council had been negligent in the exercise of its statutory powers 
of inspection or because it had failed to make any inspection at all. 
The Council appealed to the House of Lords, arguing that it was under no 
duty of care to the plaintiffs as lessees of the defective property, 
because a had no statutory duty to inspect. The House dismissed this 
contention holding that the Council did owe a duty of care. This duty 
was not to be delimited, however, solely by reference to the "neighbourhood" 
principle of Donoghue v. Stevenson hecause so to do "would be to neglect 
an essential factor which is that the local authority is a public body, 
discharging functions under statute: its powers and duties are definable 
in terms of public not private law." 2 To get round this problem and to 
avoid curtailing the greater freedom bestowed by the ultra vires or 
illegality principle, the court proposed to slice discretionary power 
horizontally into "an area of policy or discretion" and an "operational area". 
1. Anns v. Merton L.B.C. [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024. The case was decided on 
a preliminary point of law and finally settled at the door of the 
Court some eighteen months after the House of Lords decision. 
2. At p.1034 (Lord Wilberforce). 
2 1 
Thus while the court was prepared to admit that "there might be room, 
once one is outside the area of legitimate discretion or policy, for 
a duty of care at common law ... in the case of a power, liability 
cannot exist unless the act complained of lies outside the ambit of 
the power." 1 
To define the two areas is not easy, 	even at the level 
of principle. Lord Wilberforce says: 
"Although this distinction between the 
policy area and the operational area is 
convenient, and illuminating, it is 
probably a distinction of degree; many 
"operational" powers or duties have in 
them some element of "discretion". It 
can safely be said that the more "operational" 
a power or duty may be, the easier it is to 
superimpose upon it a common law duty of 
care."2 
The trouble comes when this rule is applied to specific fact 
situations. Of the inspector's function,Lord Wilberforce says somewhat 
hesitantly: 
"But this duty, heavily operational 
though it may be, is still a duty arising 
under the statute. There may be a dis-
cretionary element in its exercise -
discretionary as to the time and manner of 
inspection, and the techniques to be used. 
A plaintiff complaining of negligence must 
prove, the burden being on him, that the 
action taken was not within the limits of 
a discretion bona fide exercised, before he 
can begin to rely upon a common law duty of 
care ..."3 
Not only is this confusing passage so wide as to save all the 
existing caselaw, including the ill-fated failure of the catchment board 
1. At p.1037 (Lord Wilberforce). 
2. At p.1034. 
3. At p.1035. For criticism of this test as used by the American courts 
see Ganz "Compensation for Negligent Administrative Action" [1973] 
P.L.84. For a general critique of the caselaw see Craig "Negligence in the Exercise of a Statutory Power" (1978) 94 L.Q.R.428. 
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in Kent's case1 to drain the plaintiff's land competently, but it 
totally eliminates any purpose for the distinction, originally intro-
duced to delimit the respective spheres of the civil law of negligence 
and the public law of ultra vires. 
Faced with such reasoning, it is easy to suggest a wholesale 
defection to the French concept of faute de service easily able to 
deal with such situations. 2 In fact, 	the answer lies in 
reasserting the common sense of the common law by breaking the delusive 
free rein to 
and illusory link between illegality and liability, and allowing/the 
much less complex and/flexible negligence concept. 	This is JL. 
immediately clear from the judgment of Lord Salmon in the Anns case 
itself. 
Dismissing the reasoning of the Kent case as unsatisfactory and 
adopting a passage from the dissenting judgment of Lord Atkin, Lord 
Salmon deduced that the council, through its inspectors, was under a 
duty to exercise reasonable care and skill. That is simply to confirm 
that: 
"Every person whether discharging a public 
duty or not is under a common law obligation 
to some persons in some circumstances to 
conduct himself with reasonable care so as 
not to injure those persons likely to be 
affected by his want of care. This duty 
exists whether a person is performing a 
public duty, or merely exercising a power 
which he possesses either under statutory 
authority or in pursuance of his ordinary 
rights as a citizen."3 
1. East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent [1941] A.C.74 expressly 
approved by Lord Wilberforce at p.1036. 
2. Schwarz, loc.cit., Ch.2 above. 
3. East Suffolk River Catchments Board v. Kent at p.89 (Lord Atkin) 
approved by Lord Salmon at p.1046: 
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Lord Salmon dismissed with scorn the idea that the imposition of 
notional liability for negligence might tempt the council to inertia 
and inaction. In any event ? remedies existed in such a case. He said: 
"I find it impossible to conceive that 
any council could be so irresponsible 
as to pass any such resolution. If 
it did? this would ? in my view? amount 
to an improper exercise of discretion 
which ? I am inclined to think? might be 
corrected by certiorari or mandamus. I 
doubt however whether this would confer a 
right on any individual to sue the council 
for damages in respect of its failure to 
have carried out an inspection." 
In short ? 
/it is important to bear in mind that this link between liability 
and illegality in the exercise of discretionary power by no means 
represents the common law orthodoxy. There is a strong current of 
opinion ? to which a number of our greatest judges have subscribed and 
do today subscribe ? to the effect that illegality and liability are 
wholly separate concepts designed for different purposes. 
It may be that French administrative law has always been in a 
better position than English to create a universal remedy for all 
illegal or invalid administrative activity. The general civil law 
principle of fault ? as Levy reminds us ? was itself objective in character. 
A. natural link was possible with review of administrative action which ? 
in France though not in England ? concentrates attention on the legality-
of the administrative action rather than the plaintiff's right or 
1. At p.1042. For an identical argument by the Conseil d'Etat in the 
case of failure by a municipality to provide adequate warning to 
skiiers of an approaching avalanche see, Lafont C.E. 28 April 1967 ? 
 D 1967.434 Ooncl. Galabert. 
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interest. 1 This made synthesis of the two parallel actions easier. 
Secondly, the existence of a separate administrative jurisdiction com-
petent in contract and tort fostered the growth of the idea of a link 
between the liability concept and the legality concept. Joinder of 
actions was a concrete reminder of this link. Finally, French publicists 
were alive to and attracted by the theory of risk. Conditions were 
therefore favourable for a move towards liability in all cases of illegal 
administrative action. The interesting thing is that this has never 
occurred. 
Like the common law, the French rules have crystallised around 
pre-existing causes of action recognised by the civil law. The para-
mount concept is that of fault: to quote Moreau 2 "It is the system of 
faute de service which is applicable in this area". But a right of 
- action is also admitted in all cases of grave abuse cf power (detournement  
de pouvoir). This action is undoubtedly based on the civilian law 
In the 
principle of abuse of right. / Olivier et Zimmermann decision,(in which, 
it will be remembered, an action was brought against the Prefect by the 
owners of land on which illegal gravel digging operations had been 
carried out for grave abuse of his powers and manipulation of legal and 
administrative procedures), it was held that the right to implement an 
administrative procedure without recourse to the court was of such 
significance that it could be taken only at "the risks and perils of the 
administration". But in a very careful commentary on the case, 3 Hauriou 
pointed to the Conseilts use of the phrase "A number of abusive measures" 
1. For the evolution, see Auby et Drago, op.cit., Vol.2 pp.235-238; Gazier, 
"Essai de presentation muvelle des ouvertures du recours pour exces 
de pouvoir en 1950" (1951) 5 EDCE p.77. 
2. "Dommages causes par des decisions administratives entachees d'exces 
de pouvoir", Juris.classeur administratif, fasc.720, p.8. 
3. Olivier et Zimmermann C.E. 27 Feb 1903, S 1905.111.17 n. Hauriou. 
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(un ensemble de mesures abusives  from which he deduced a reference to 
the principle of abuse of right. According to this civilian principle 
of liability,rights can be exercised only for the purpose for which 
they are intended. To borrow Josserand's classic definition 
"An abuse of power is an act contrary 
to the aim of an institution, to its 
spirit and to its ends.D 1 
Although Hauriou discerned slight differences between the civilian 
theory of abuse of right and the adninistrative law doctrine of abuse 
of power (6tournement de pouvoir),the concepts largely overlapped and 
it was safe to say that "in every case of abuse of power there is an 
abuse of right and the possibility of compensation". 
In this affair, there could be no doubt over the Prefectts 
intention. A later case carried the doctrine further into the area of 
illegal administrative activity or excess of power. In Compagnie des 
Mines de Sigurfa colonial mining company claimed compensation from the 
French government on the ground that its concession had been wrongfully 
withdrawn by the Colonial Governor. Mining was permitted only on minis-
terial authorisation and at deep levels. The company during its activities 
excavated a crater which prevented native mining at shallow levels, and 
its concession was thereupon withdrawn. In view of the encouragement 
given to the company by the Governor and the fact that no complaints had 
been received from the native miners whose interests were allegedly 
affected, the Conseil d'Etat felt that this sanction was disproportionate. 
The Government was thus ordered to make reparation. 
1. De ltEsprit des droits, p.292 ("Ltacte abusif est l'acte contraire au 
but de l'institution, "5, son esprit:b, sa finalite'").  
2. C.E. 22 Nov 1929, S 1930.3.17 n. Bonnard. 
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In his note on the case,Bonnard, a proponent of the autonomy 
theory of public law, argued that this decision extended beyond the 
doctrine of abuse of right which always requires intention to injure. 1 
A new head of liability for abuse of power had been created and this 
could be stretched to all cases of excess of power, i.e. every case in 
which the applicant would be theoretically able to apply for annulment. 
It is worth noting the exact parallel to the expansion of the common law 
definition of malice. 
In these two cases, the Conseil delEtat had, the basis of a theory 
of liability which would correlate administrative liability with 
illegality and even go so far as to transfer the risk of all illegality 
to the administration. Since the court had allowed joinder of the two 
applications for review and compensation since 1911, the way was open 
for collateral review of administrativeaction by way of an application . 
for compensation, something which would have permitted the short limitation 
period of two months to be evaded. Hauriou immediately prophesied that 
joinder would become common practice to a point where the recours pour, 
exces de pouvoir would be swallowed up by the recours de pleine juridiction. 2 
Delbez suggests3 that this was not really the natural solution. 
There were really three remedies for illegality: annulment; damages; 
and annulment plus damages under the Blanc procedure, the main significance 
of which was the circumvention of the limitation period. Illegality and liability 
1. This is a debatable point. For the authorities see Lawson, op.cit. 
above,pp. 15-20. See for a fuller study Chapus, op.cit., pp. 381-392; 
Cornu, op.cit., pp. 151-177. 
2. Blanc C.E. 31 March 1911, S.1912-1913.3.129 n. Hauriou (above 	) 
3. Op.cit., above p. 488. 
mi7ght 
were not really Siamese twins and to correlate them / result in 
limiting both. To expand this somewhat cryptic explanation, one might 
say that 'fault' is essentially wider than 'illegality' in that it is 
capable of concerning those cases of 'operational' negligence by agents 
of the administration in which the validity of administrative action 
is not at stake. On the other hand, illegality is frequently wider 
than 'liability' because 'liability' implies damage while 'illegality' 
does not always result in damage to an individual. 
all 
What in fact caused/these ingenious theories to fall down was 
the stubborn adherence of the caselaw to the fault principle. 
Opinion varies as to the precise relationship between fault and illegality 
although the caselaw makes it clear that the correlation is not absolute. 
The classic position, supported by Delbez, Duez, de LaMoagre and 
°dent, is that illegality creates a rebuttable presumption of fault. 
As Odent himself puts it: 
"The illegality of an administrative 
decision is a condition precedent without 
which the decision cannot amount to a 
fault capable of entailing the liability 
of the State, but this condition is not in 
itself sufficient for liability." 
Some writers, in the light of the latest cases, would prefer 
to reverse the presumption. Moderne, 2 for example, prefers the following 
formulation: 
"One starts from the proposition that a 
decision tainted with illegality may 
amount to a fault which will entail 
liability and that, on the contrary, 
where there is no illegality, there can 
be no liability." 
1. Op.cit., p.1085. My translation is rather a free one. 
2. Moderne, "Megan-be- et responsabilite- pour faute de service; vers de 
nouvelles relations", Rev.adm. 1974 p.29; see also Moreau, loc.cit. 
2 
The failure to correlate illegality with fault is 
explicable in terms of a deSire to preserve a maximum area of judicial 
discretion. 	Consistently, trivial irregularities are held not 
capable of creating a right to compensation. The game of exclusion may 
be played in several ways: the decision may be held to be justified on 
another ground; it may be said to be a mere error in assessment of the 
facts, incapable of giving rise to liability; the error may be too 
trivial to bBworthy of annulment; the fault may be held not to be the 
cause of the damage; a requirement of gross fault may be imposed; or 
finally, the applicant may be held to have suffered no injury to a 
legal right. 1 
To give some simple illustrations. In Neher2 a student cm-
plained of the illegality of the decision of a Iconseil de classes  
which, on considering his academic record, advised him to change courses. 
The Conseil d'Etat held that there was no liability on the ground that 
the decision was an assessment based on a fact situation and could not 
be reviewed in the absence of a grave error or a detournement de pouvoir. 
In dher words, the complaint_ was too trivial to found liability. In 
Clement 3 it was held that liability could not be based on a peripheral 
procedural error because if the administrative procedure had been regular, 
the annulled permits could have been legally granted and in fact would 
have been so granted." In Sucrerie CoarezylizaAaricole de Vie-Sur-Aisne 4 
	1.0•11•01MITN.I•NO 
1. Moreau, op.cit., pp.12-13. The question whether there must be an injury 
to a legal right is obscure (ibid. p.14). A common lawyer reading 
Societe Beccaria C.E. 13 Tov 1974 Rec 557 in which damages were 
awarded in a licensing case for loss of "a serious chance" to get a 
licence would probably say not. The issue was sidestepped in the earlier 
case of Sodiete Laitiere Metropolitaine C.E. 6 July 1966, AJDA 1966, 
p.678 concl. Rigaud. 
2. C.E. 1 Dec 1965 Rec 648. 
3. O.E. 11 Oct 1961 Rec 559. 
4. C.E. •0 Feb 1974 Rec 121. 
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the customs authorities gave erroneous advice to the company which led 
them to acquire a large quantity of sugar which they were unable to 
sell, with disastrous financial consequences. The Conseil dlEtat found 
that the letter of advice was illegal in the sense that it was capable 
of annulment. It followed that it also constituted a faute de service. 
Damages were not awarded, however, on the ground that the applicants 
had failed to submit a certain application form and their dotage was 
attributed to this failure rather than to the departmental error. 
All these tricks of legal reasoning are instantly recognisable 
to the common lawyer who could probably provide parallels for every 
example of hedging. To confine myself to one example in McClintock 
v. Commonwealth, 1 M delivered his pineapples for processing to a statutory 
committee under the terms of a scheme which he later claimed was invalid. 
He thereupon sued for damages in conversion. The High Court of Australia 
disallowed his claim, their reasoning being rather unattractive. 
Either the scheme was valid, in which case M had received compensation 
and had suffered no loss; or the scheme was invalid, in which case. M, 
having delivered his pineapples voluntarily, was bound by his mistake 
and there was no conversion. In this way, the central issue of legality 
or illegality could be sidestepped. 
It is not quite fair to pass on from this rather negative discursus 
without clearly making the point that the recovery through the courts 
of compensation for loss caused by invalid administrative action is much 
less painful in France than England. The spread of liability is wider; and 
there is less hesitation over the imposition of liability for the use 
of licensing powers and of supervisory powers such as ministerial powers 
1. (1947) 75 C.L.R. 1. 
to supervise private companies, prefectoral powers of tutelle, or social 
worker's supervisory powers. The latest cases 1 go a long way towards 
providing a remedy in damages for all illegal decisions other than the 
most trivial. 
But even in this public law system where the two parallel actions 
provide every excuse for synthesis, a total correlation has never been 
made. The preference for fault is fairly easy to explain. A first 
explanation lies in the ethos of sanction which pervades French adminis-
trative law and which is epitomised: in the picture presented by 
M. Kahn of an endless dialogue between the judge and administrator in 
which the latter becomes ever more cunning and the former more creative. 2 
 By clinging to the fault principle the judge preserves his discretion 
to sanction administrative excesses and overlook minor procedural 
deficiencies. In this way, the necessary balance between administrative 
morality on the one hand and freedom of action on the other is preserved. 
This is particularly important in the area of discretionary power, where 
minor procedural irregularities cannot be allowed to inhibit all adminis-
trative action. 
The second reason lies in what I have termed the schizophrenic 
nature of tortious liability. The judge in the area of administrative 
liability has to balance the two irreconcilable objectives of compen-
sation of victims and prevention of too great a drain on public funds. 
The first objective is most easily served by a transfer to risk liability 
the second by preservation of the selective fault principle. As Soulier, 
1. Min. de. ltE4uipement c. Bourasseau C.E. 31 Jan 1969, AJDA 1969, p.194 
concl. Guillaume; Min.de l'Interieur c. Lambert C.E. 16 July 1976 
(unreported). 
2. Le pouvoir discretionnaire at le juge administratif„ 1978, p.9; 
Cited above, p.I73 
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who criticises the Conseil d'Etat for its parsimony, has said: 
"The judge remains attached to 
the idea of fault because he is 
afraid to arrive at any excessive 
generalisation of State liability. 
The fault principle, because it is 
so malleable, allows him great 
freedom to accelerate or to brake 
the flow of compensation." 1 
A. third reason, which cannot be too greatly stressed, lies in 
the absence of mandatory remedies in French administrative law. Where 
Courts possess no injunctive powers, the only real remedy for individual 
victims? and the only real deterrent against wilful disobedience by 
recalcitrant public authorities lies in an award of damages. Courts which 
do possess injunctive powers may refuse to encourage actions for damages 
on the ground that they do not provide a final solution. Aprero- 
gative writ could speedily dispose of an administrative illegality in 
a single application; actions for compensation might result in a vast 
number of trivial suits which would drain away public funds without termin-
ting the trouble. Some early cases show the English courts very much alive 
to the advantages of mandatory remedies. In one typical action brought against 
a local authority which had neglected to maintain the river Crane with the 
4. Glossop v. Heston and Isleworth Local Board  (1879) 12 Ch.D. 102, 115. 
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result that untreated sewage flowed through the plaintiff's grounds, 
James L.J. said: 
0If the neglect to perform a public 
duty for the whole of the district is 
to enable anybody and everybody to bring 
a distinct claim because he has not had 
the advantages he otherwise would be 
entitled to have if the At had been 
properly put into execution, it appears 
to me the country would be buying its 
immunity from nuisance at a very dear 
rate indeed by the substitution of a far 
more formidable nuisance in the litigation 
and expense that would be occasioned by 
opening such a door to litigious persons, 
or to persons who might be anxious to make 
profit and costs out of this Act of Parlia- 
ment. It appears to me the only remedy 
would be by an application for mandamus." 
In a slightly later cas4 Lopes L.J. returned to this theme 
saying: 
"There are insufficient sewers and no 
doubt this may affect private individuals; 
but it also affects the whole district. 
If there is a right ce action in individuals 
affected, there might be a number of actions 
in which they might obtain damages, and put 
the money in their pockets, but the mischief 
might still remain." 
The court held, therefore, that the duty to make the sewers WAS 
only enforceable by means of the statutory complaints system, a line 
of reasoning adopted in a later case 2 against a catchment board for 
leaving rubble on the river bank which caused flooding which in turn 
damaged the plaintiff's bridge. The statute contained provision for 
compensation and this fact proved decisive. Singleton L.J. said: 
1. Robinson v. Workington Corpn. [1897] 1 Q.B. 619, 622. A contemporaneous 
case, Peebles v. Oswaldthistle U.D.C. [1897] 1 Q.B. 625 decided that 
mandamus will not lie. 
2. Marri e v. E. Norfolk Rivers Catchment Board [1950] 1 K.B. 284, 298. 
The case was framed in nuisance and the court held that negligence in 
carrying out the work might have founded a good cause of action. 
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"My impression is that the intention 
of Parliament was to avoid lengthy and 
costly litigation on questions of this 
kind and to ensure that anyone who 
suffered damage in consequence of work 
done under the powers given by the 
section should have a right to compensation." 
It is time to ask::14401aler there isgnylor0Spect of rationalisation 
in England. That there exists a long tradition in the English caselaw of 
liability for the malicious exercise of discretionary power, has already 
been suggested. To some, who prefer to classify tortious liability under 
nominate torts, this caselaw suggests an embryonic tort, to be designated 
"misfeasance in public office". The leading authority suggests, however, 
that "this tort is not firmly anchored in the English caselaw" and that 
its outlines are amorphous. 1 
Whether by way of a nominate tort or by way of a general principle, 
rapid development would be perfectly feasible. Akey decision here could 
be the Canadian case, Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 2  in which the law of England 
and France met, for once, on fertile ground. An independent commission 
had been established in Quebec, empowered to issue or revoke liquor licencea. 
The plaintiff, who had held such a licence for more than 30 years, was 
a Jehovah's Witness, and had regularly stood surety for members of the sect 
on minor public order charges. The Premier of Quebec, who was also Attorney— 
General, directed the Commission to revoke the plaintiff's liquor licence. The 
1. De Smith op.cit., p.297. See also Hogg op.cit., pp. 81-85; Gould 
"Damages as a Remedy in Administrative Law" [1972] N.Z. Univ. L.R. 105; 
and Farrington v. Thomson and Bridgland [1959] V.R. 286. 
2. (1959) 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689. 
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plaintiff brought an action for damages under Art. 1053 of the Quebec 
Civil Code. This article provides, in terms comparable to the French 
Civil Codel that: 
"Every person capable of discerning 
right from wrong is responsible for 
the damage caused by his fault to 
another ..." 
The defendant was found liable for the substantial losses suffered 
by the plaintiff on the grounds that he was guilty of 4a gross abuse of 
legal power" which amounted to "a fault engaging liability within the 
principles of the underlying public law of Quebec". At this stage, 
the reasoning seemed closer to French law than English and could 
be said to parallel decisions such as Compagnie de Siguri or Olivier et, 
 Zimmmermann.  One commentator- felt that the result had been 
achieved only by equating "the finding of illegality with delictual 
1 responsibility", something which he thought could not have been done in 
the framework of the common law. But the judgment of Rand J. proves 
conclusively that this assertion is incorrect and that the common law 
is capable of reaching an identical result. Basing himself on a classic 
line of English cases, the learned judge held that the defendant had 
acted outside the scope of his powers and 'maliciously'. His definition 
of malice was an extended one, readily identifiable to an administrative 
lawyer: "Malice in the proper sense is simply acting for a reason and 
purpose knowingly foreign to the administration, to which was added here 
the element of intentional punishment by what was virtually vocation 
outlawry". 2 Although better expressed, this definition is very similar 
to the passage of Lord Radcliffe in the nearly contemporaneous case of 
David v. Abdul Caser which has already been discussed. 
1. Wade, (1951) 29 Can.Bar Rev. 665, 669-670. 
2. At p.706. 
The learned judge went on to define good faith in similarly 
wide terms: 
"[Good faith] means carrying out the 
statute according to its intent and 
for its purpose; it means good faith 
in acting with a rational appreciation 
of that intent and purpose and not with 
an improper intent and for an alien 
purpose; it does not mean for the pur-
poses of punishing a person for 
exercising an unchallengeable right; it 
does not mean arbitrarily and illegally 
attempting to divest a citizen of an 
incident of hiS civil status." 
This wide and flexible definition of malice is all very well and 
few would object to its use in cases such as Olivier et Zimmerman or 
Roncarelli v. luplessis. It does, however, entice the courts down the 
road of collateral challenge of administrative action and oblique review 
which is fraught with danger. 1 One modern commentator who deplores the 
new development feels that it may result in unnecessarily tramelling 
administrative action. She argues: 
"The court can considerably narrow the 
area of discretion by reading in limi-
tations from the context of a statute 
and knowledge of this limitation by the 
administrator can be assumed. Malice 
comes to mean any purpose which the court 
considers improper 
It could on the other hand be argued that the cases do not go far 
enough in divorcing tortious liability from a subjective mental element. 
The trend of judicial review in both England and France is objective not 
subjective and in both countries review which depends on value judgments 
as to subjective states of mind   
1. See Central Canada Potash Co. v. Government of Saskatchewan (1978) 88 
D.L.R. (3d) 609 where the Supreme Court of Canada refused unanimously 
to equate ultra vires acts with intimidation. 
2. Ganz, "The Limits of Judicial Control over the Exercise of Discretion" 
[1964] P.L. 367, 375. 
is unfashionable. It follows that to enter the field of discretion 
obliquely is dangerous because of the uncertain ambit of the existing 
law of torts and its basis in intention. Unlike continental countries, 
England does not possess a doctrine of abuse of right 1  which could 
serve as a foundation for tortious liability and which, because it 
permits rights to be used only "in satisfaction of a serious and legiti-
mate interest", could help liability to move in the objective direction 
of review of purposes introduced by Padfieldts case. 
We are thus thrown back on the doctrine of malice and the con-
tentious torts of conspiracy, intimidation and inducement of breach of 
contract. These necessarily involve the court in precisely the sort of 
value judgment which the modern so—called objective principles of 
judicial review are designed to avoid. One recent case actually links 
these two controversial, political areas. 	In Meade v. Haringey L.B.C., 2 
an industrial dispute arose in the course of which school caretakers 
employed by the defendant went on strike. The response of the local 
authority was to close all schools. The plaintiff, a parent, sought to 
challenge the decision,asking for a declaration that the decision was 
ultra vires and unlawful, together with a mandatory injunction and an 
interim injunction. The action was dismissed,since by the time of the 
M,R . 
appeal the schools were already open. Lord Denningk however, took the 
opportunity to suggest to parents that an action for conspiracy might be 
open to them. His reasoning, if unsubstantial, is relevant to the argument 
1. This is the unfortunate result of Bradford Corporation v. Pickles [1895] 
,A.0. 587 and Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor Gow 1892_ A.O. 25. 
2. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 637, 648. 
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because he seems to think that this tort could be founded on agreement 
to break a statutory duty, which is, once more, an equation of illegality 
with liability. Lord Denning said (obiter): 
"There is another way of putting the 
case. On the evidence so far, it would 
appear that, at the behest of the trade 
unions, the council agreed with them 
that the schools should be closed. Now 
seeing that it was a breach of statutory 
duty (fbr the schools to be closed) this 
agreement was nothing more nor less than 
an agreement to do an unlawful act, or at 
any rate to use unlawful means. Such an 
agreement, if it results in damage to 
anyone, is an actionable conspiracy ..." 
If this ill—considered dictum of Lord Denningts were to be acted 
upon, it would lead the courts straight back to the most contentious. 
area of modern English law. 
Recently, in commonwealth jurisdictions, courts have been asked 
to take vital and substantial decisons concerning the use of discretionary 
power at ministerial level in a collateral fashion by means of an action 
in damages rather than application for judicial review. Not surprisingly 
the courts are not very willing to entertain such applications, pre-
ferring to remain within the ambit of the traditional law of negligence. 
In Takaro Properties v. Howling; the New Zealand courts were asked to 
take jurisdiction in an action for damages against the Finance Minister, 
later Prime Minister, for excess of discretionary power in refusing 
permission to the plaintiff company to sell shares to a Japanese company. 
An improper collateral purpose of retaining for New Zealand owners an 
area of outstanding natural beauty was alleged. The court struck out all 
causes of action not based on malice or negligence and the judgment of 
1. [1976]2N.Z.L.R. 658 confirmed [1979]2N.Z.L.R.34. 
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Beattie J. was onfirmed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal. 
In a rather similar Canadian case, 1 a court was asked to award 
damages for conspiracy and intimidation for loss caused by directives 
issued by the Minister of Mineral Resources in Saskatchewan for the 
control of the potash mining industry in the province. The directives 
were subsequently found to be invalid, but the court refused to hold 
that this invalidity was enough for tortious liability. 
Some cases suggest that the effect of the link between illegality 
and liability is not, as Ganz feared, to narrow the range of discre-
tionary power available to the administration, but to reduce the 
efficacy of review. 
Delvolve alleges 2 that the ability to award compensation for 
breach of the Equality principle (discussed in the next Chapter) has 
led the courts to refuse annulment in certain, sensitive cases. Pro-
. fessor Weil takes this criticism further saying: 3 
"Up until this point we have been 
considering discretionary power from 
the angle of review of legality. It 
seems to me that we should also think 
about the question of liability. Take 
the Navarra Case.4 Here one finds a 
Government Commissioner saying that, 
in refraining from demolishing a building 
built without planning permission l .the 
administration had shirked its duties 
disgracefully. However, he suggestt to 
the Conseil d'Etat - who accept the 
opinion - that they should not categorize 
1. Central Canada Potash Co. v. A-G for Saskatchewan (1978) 57 D.L.R. 3d 
123; and 1978 88 D.L.R. 3d 609. 
2. Le Principe dlEgalite- devant les Charges Publiques, 1969, pp.388-9. 
3. "Le pouvoir discrgtionnaire et la justice administrative" in Le pouvoir 
discrgtionnaire et le juge administratif, op.cit., 1978 at p.47. 
4. Ministre de itmailam-Laimaa C.E. 20 March 1974 Rec.200 concl. 
Rougevin,Bauille; 1974 R.D.P. p.926 n. de Soto. 
this act as a fault but should limit them-
selves to awarding damages for the injury 
caused to the plaintiff by the illegal 
building. This can only mean: that the 
administration can do what it pleases, 
tut it is to compensate for the injurious 
consequences of its decisions. If the 
law is going to evolve in this way, the, 
hoped for expansion of administrative non-
fault liability will bring in its wake an 
embryonic but nonetheless favourable 
extension of the discretionary power of the 
administration. This, I think, is an aspect 
which one should not altogether disregard as 
of no account." 
Rather similar game-playing can be observed in the English case 
of Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Environment Secretary, 1 *here, in the course of 
an interlocutory application, the legal status of a ministerial 
statutory order made under statutory authority was raised. In a strong 
dissenting judgment, Lord Wilberforce accused the courts of manipulating 
the concepts of nullity or voidness and voidability to avoid payment 
of compensation. He said: 
"In truth when thacourt says that an act 
of administration is voidable or void but 
not ab initio this is simply a reflection of 
a conclusion, already reached l on unexpressed 
grounds, that the court is not willing in 
casu to give compensation or other redress 
to the person who establishes the nullity. 
Underlying the use of the phrase in the 
present case, and I suspect underlying most 
of the reasoning in the Court of Appeal, is 
an unwillingness to accept that a subject 
should be indemnified for loss sustained by 
invalid administrative action. It is this 
which requires examination rather than some 
supposed visible quality of the order itself." 
1. [1974] 3 W.L.R. 104, 125. Compare Lord Diplock in the Dorset Yacht  
case, cited above p.2.11 And see the Central Canada Potash case, (above) 
where the court expressly approved the reasoning of the majority judg-
ments in Hoffmann-LaRoche. 
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In short, the extension of administrative liability may actually 
weaken judicial review. This is a very real possibility and a result 
which we may not desire. 
Procedural difficulties over ouster and limitation also complicate 
the issue. In Smith v. East Elloe R.D.C., 1 the plaintiff complained 
of bad faith in the making of a compulsory purchase order. A preclusive 
clause provided that, after the expiry of a six wa.160 period, the order 
should not be questioned in any legal proceedings whatsoever. An 
action for damages for trespass and a declaration was held to be barred. 
The, decision has been much criticised, yet any other solution would 
seem to invite the result which Hauriou feared would flow from the 
Blanc decision: i.e. the swallowing up of the application for judicial 
review in the action for damages. Early cases on statutory duty make 
it clear why the courts fear such a result. 
I have left to the last one interesting case 
which goes much further than the English caselaw in developing an action 
for 'misfeasance in public office'. Indeed, it goes about as far as it 
is possible to go in diluting the notion of malice or deliberate wrong-
doing and substituting the old, nominal, trespass test of intention. 
2 This case is Beaudesert Shire Council v. Smith. In this case the 
1. [1956] A.C.736; Wade 85 L.Q.R.198; de Smith [1969] C.L.R.161; Alder 
"Time Limit Clauses and Judicial Review — Smith v. East Elloe Revisited" 
(1975) 38 M.L.R.274, 287-291; Gould, op.cLt., 112; Fridmann op.cit., 
above. See also Smith v. Pywell 1959 C.L.Y.3215; Reg.v. Environment 
Secy. exp. p. Ostler (1976,. 	3 W.L.R. 288. 
2. (1966) 120 C.L.R. 145 (High Court of Australia); Dworkin & Harar4 
"The Beaudesert Decision — Raising the Ghost of the Action upon the 
Case" (1967) 40 A.L.J. 296, 347 argue that the decision introduces a 
"prima facie" tort doctrine into this area of law. 
municipal council, acting under a mistaken belief that it was authorised 
so to do, extracted gravel from a river bed, indirectly damaging the 
respondent's well. Although a licence could have been obtained, this 
had not been done, and the operations were technically illegal. The 
council was held liable on the ground that "a person who Suffers harm or 
loss as the inevitable consequence of the unlawful intentional and 
positive acts of another is entitled to recover damages from that other." 
The court hinted that a still wider proposition could be justified. 
Thus technical procedural irregularity was equated with liability. The 
case affords the courts of the common law jurisdictions the same chance 
of substituting risk liability for fault as the Olivier et  Zimmerman 
ruling offered to the Conseil d'Etat, a chance which we have seen, the 
Conseil d'Etat never used. 
It is now clear that a link between illegality and liability is 
capable of producing two diametrically opposed results. First, it may 
be used, as in England, to restrict liability. This is an undesirable 
effect, which some of the greatest of our common law judges have rightly 
rejected. Secondly, the link may be used to transfer to the government 
the risk of all loss flowing from invalid administrative action. 
In practice, however, we have no idea what the cost of such a 
change would be because the present preference of the judiciary for the 
fault principle is concealing the cost and disguising the number of 
potential claims. The cost could be great? as the Hoffmann—La Roche 
affair, discussed in the next chapter, reminds us. 1 It is, of course, 
possible that a model, based on compensation in planning cases, could be 
1. The decision of the French President to revoke 5 legal grants of 
planning permission cost the French State F100 million in 1976-8 and 
further claims of F4 million were expected: Le Monde, 21 Nov. 1978. 
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designed to help calculate the costs. In the absence of hard data, 
however, we must be careful not to discount the cost of a change to 
risk liability. 
Secondly, we ought not to underrate the effect on our legal system. 
The inevitable result of a new right to compensation for invalid 
administrative action would be an increase in judicial discretion. 
Manipulation of legal concepts such as causation, voidness or voidability 
and illegality would certainly ensue. This is also discussed in the 
next chapter. Such a radical change would entail a major change of 
heart on the part of the administration and the judiciary, each traditionally 
cautious in the use of public funds. The danger is that the judiciary 
may be tempted, because of government inertia, to walk down the 
alluring path unawares. 
We ought not to accept too quickly that such a move is :desirable. 
6%er The argument is usually foundedon profit and loss theories of liability 
or 	, on the principle of Equality before Public Charges. To use 
Lawbadf'ireS formulation: 
"The basis of administrative liability 
can actually be traced to the following 
idea: the public services operate in 
the interest of the community at large ... 
It is only fair that the community, 
which derives benefit from these 
services, should support the cost of 
compensation where the operation of a 
given public service causes special 
damage to an individual." 1 
••■■■•••■■■■011.0 
1. de Laubadere, Traite de droit administratif 6th edn., 1973 Vol.1, p.679; 
Eisenmann, op.cit., above; Berna l "Les fondements de la responsabilite 
civile en droit public franpais", R.D.P. 1951 p. 685; Soulier, op.cit., 
above.  
2 
On the other hand, the warning of Professor Weil must not go 
unheeded. There would almost certainly be a change in the nature of 
judicial review. Review might easily be weakened if the administration 
were allowed:regularly "to purchase illegality". This undesirable 
practice ought emphatically to be discouraged because of its detrimental 
effects in the area of civil liberties. 1 
Finally, the political consequences of a move to risk liability 
must be considered. The effect of paying compensation in every case of 
invalid administrative action would be to create a large but necessarily 
incalculable class of potential claimants whose rights to compensation 
would depend not on the governMent but on the judiciary. The result 
could only be a diminution of the governmerds power to control public 
expenditure and a considerable increase in the discretionary powers of 
the judiciary. Whether one wishes the judiciary to undertake this type 
of decision depends not only on one's political views but on one's assess-
ment of the legal process as an efficient , machine for deciding questions 
of general policy. In the next chapter I shall argue against its 
efficiency. 
1. See further Harlow, op.cit. [1977] P.L. 227, 234. 
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In the course of the last chapter it was argued that it was desirable and 
legitimate to sever the restrictive link between illegality and liability. For 
the pmposes of this argument ; an illegal act was assumed to be one which is ultra 
vires and unreviewable, or in the terminology of the Anns case and the Dorset. 
Yacht case, an act which is contrary to the rules of 'public law'. 	This narrow 
definition was seen to be capable of ambiguity. . It may be given a substantive 
content: if an illegal act is one vitiated by some excess of power irrespective 
of whether or not it is reviewable, then Smith v East Elloe R.D.U. is correctly 
classified as a case of compensation for the illegal use of power. 	If, on the 
other hand, a procedural test is used and an illegal act is one which is capable 
of being reviewed, Smith v las-11122t_c. is instantly converted to a. case of 
compensation for the legal use of power. 	It is the. prospect of such a reclassi- , 
 fication which worries those who find 'liability' in respect of 'legal' admini-
strative actions an unthinkable contradiction in terms. 
At a semantic level this difficulty can quickly be untangled since 'illegality' 
is not customarily defined solely in terms of 'public law' or ultra vires. 	It 
is an inherent part of the common law tradition to define a legal act as one 
which is in conformity with statute and the common law. An act which involves 
the breach of an obligation imposed by the common law is in this sense 'illegal'; 
indeed, tortious liability has been defined as "the breach of duty primarily 
fixed by the law". 1 Thus, in imposing a duty of care the court effectively 
circumscribes the area of legality and declares the administrative act 'illegal'. 
1 Winfield, Province of the Law of Tort, p. 40. 
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To take another simple example, a conspiracy at common law is defined as an 
agreement to commit an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means and 
it has long been admitted that an 'unlawful" act can be construed to include acts 
which amount to torts or even breaches of contract as well as criminal acts. 1 
Were it otherwise, the courts would lose most of their lawmaking powers in the 
area. Agaip 3the prerogative powers are traditionally defined as "the residue 
of discretionary or arbitrary authority which at any given time is legally left 
in the hands of the Crown." 2 It is well—known that this allows to the courts 
the power of delimiting the ambit of the prerpgative poWers in the same way as 
they delimit the ambit of statutory powers by the practice of statutory interpre-
tation. 3 
At this purely semantic levelit is probably more logical to correlate 
'illegality' with 'liability' than to impose liability for an act which the 
court states at the same time to be 'legal'. Certainly the English courts have 
always favoured this approach. Yet it has its problems for the judicial 
conscience since, to impose liability, the judge has to make a finding of 'illegality'. 
This seems to result in cutting down the area of discretion possessed by the 
government or by administrators. This in turn is seen as an unwarranted 
departure from the rules of 'public law' or 'ultra vires": first, because the 
imposition of liability seems to have narrowed the concept of 'ultra vires' 
secondl3i because the_court seems to have broken an old and accepted convention 
that courts will not slip inside the charmed circle of politics or policy by 
questioning the manner in which governmental (including prerogative) power is 
exercised or by substituting their own discretionary decisions for the discretionary 
decisions of an administrative body. It is difficulties of this kind which led 
1 Street on Torts p. 348;  Marrinan v Vibar.t [1963] 1 Q.B. 528; Rag, v Kamara [1973] 3 W.L.R. 198. And consider Shaw v DPP [1962] A.C. 220; Reg v 
Knuller [1973] A.C. 435. 
2 Dicey, the Law of the Constitution, p. 424. 	See also Markesinis "The 
Royal Prerogative Re-visite(V,(1973) Cam. L.J. 287. 
3 ..1.acAr Airwlys v Department of Trade, [1977] Q.B. 643. 
to tIe doubts expressed by Lord Dip,l,ock in the Dorset Yacht case. 
Why should this be so difficult? By phrasing the debate in formalistic 
legal terms I believe we have obscured its real nature. Behind these twin 
concepts of "legality' and 'illegality' lies concealed the reality of 
Sovereign power and we cannot divest the debate of its political dimension 
simply by asserting that "maladministration is not in the true modern 
sense of the word 
Largely for historical reasons, the frontier between the 'political' 
and the 'justiciable' — if it exists at all, whiCh some would deny — has 
been left deliberately obscure. The historical experience of the Conseil 
d'Etat, or of the United States Supreme Court, both countries with a 
tradition of written constitutions, suggests that this may have something 
to do with the difficulty of devising appropriate legislative formulae. 
At a more theoretical level, the power of the judiciary to define its own 
jurisdiction is clearly seen as an essential corollary of the doctrine of 
Separation of Powers. To allow the legislature to have the last word on 
jurisdiction allows it to encroach upon, or even swallow up, the judicial 
function. Thus many Commonwealth constitutions provide that judicial functions 
may only be entrusted to "courts" and even in England where theories of 
mixed or balanced government are preferred, 2the legend is not without 
potency. On those occasions when the legislature attempts to curtail the 
jurisdiction of the superior courts, the political opposition frequently 
of judicial independence. The legislature 
argues that these attempts threaten the cherished tradition/ prefers on 
1 Mitchell "Administrative Law and Parliamentary Control" (1967) 38 Pol. 
Quarterly, 360. 
2 Vile, Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers, 1967. 
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balance to let well alone or, at the most, to resort to the oblique techniques 
of directing cases to administrative tf4bunals and of ouster of judicial review. 
Such deviceshowever can never be final. The courts are well aware of this 
and have occasionally played some very dangerous games in order to repossess 
themselves of their ultimate right to "declare the law". 1 
The judges are perfectly alive to the dangers of the games which they 
play and prefer to avoid head—on conflict by the exercise of judicial self—
restraint. OccasionallyI warning shots may be fired, as in a recent case 2 where 
counsel ,for the Hote OffiCe . allogedly told the Court of Appeal that, in the 
event of the court deciding against him,"it would not be long before the powers 
of the court would be called in question." The Master of the Rolls, an astute 
politician, took care to draw attention to this piece of rhetoric, piously 
hoping that it was "not said seriously, but only as a piece of advocate t s 
licence." Such exchanges are, however, exceptional. Normally a tacit under-
standing or constitutional concordat prevails. On the one hand,it is accepted 
that the government will obey the law by conforming to the judgments of the courts. 
On the very rare occasions when it fails to do,so the Rule of Law myth is prayed 
in aid to rally public opinion to the support of the courts. 3 On the other 
1 Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.G. 147. 
2 Congreve v Home Office [1976] 2 W.L.R. 291, 308. 	The exchange'inyCk 
some public response see The Times, 9 December, 1975. 
3 See particularly, the Clay Cross case, Bernard Levin, The Times March 26 
and April 8 1975; the Burmah Oil case discussed below.'And see Harlow, 
"Administrative Reaction to Judicial Review"[1976] P.L. 116; Griffith, 
"The Political Constitution" [1979] 42 M.L.R. 1, 15. 
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hand, the courts agree to respect the privileges of Parliament and not to 
impinge too greatly upon the freedom of the government to govern. If they 
do not restrain themselves, then the courts (and the Rule of Law') will be 
endangered because the government may use its legislative superiority to strip 
the courts of their powers. 1 The superior role of Parliament is supported 
and furthered by the legend that judges are never lawmakers and that their 
function is to expound the law which they do simply by 'interpreting' the wishes 
of Parliament2.  
All we are saying is that judges in fact possess an undefined and 
indeterminate political role which they may be anxious to disguise. The 
political role of the Supreme Court in the United States has, of coursel been 
recognised for many years. In France, too, academics have for many years 
stressed the political role of the Conseil d'Etat and pointed to the special 
ethic which the Conseil seeks, through the medium of the caselaw, to impose on 
governments and administrators. Not only is this function admitted quite 
openly, but it appears to be a matter of pride. 3 The position was summarised 
by Waline in a well-known article in which he said: 4  
I See Lord Parker, the Lord Chief Justice, in a speech reported in The Times, 
8 April 1971. 
2 Lord Hailsham,'The Dilemma of Democracy, disgnosis and prescription, 1977 
Chap, XVI, p e 104. 
3 Loschak, Le /tie politique du juge administratif franyais, 1972 contains 
a very full bibliography; Hanson, Judicial Control of Administrative 
Discretion, 1956; Kessler, LeCbnseil d'Etat, 1968 is a sociological study of 
the attitudes of members of theConseil d'Etat and of its effects on public 
life. 
4 Waline "L'action deConseild'Etat dans la Vie fran9aise", Livre Jubilaire 
duConseild'Etat 1950, p. 131. 
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"Thus, throughout its history, theConseil dtEtat has been involved 
in the great events of French political life, and, more particularly, 
it has in many respects contributed to the moulding of general 
social conditions and of economic affairs. Viewed as a whole, its 
role has been to soothe political passions and to create the legal 
conditions for social and economic progress." 
1 Professor Rivero 7  in a later article ) referred to the French administrative 
judge as a "judge who governs" and went so far as to use the phrase "government 
by judges". 	In the area of administrative law, Rivero submitted that politics 
and'law were inextricably linked. This was partly attributable to the 
absence of codification which — and the parallel with the unwritten common law 
is self—evident — permitted to the judge an unusually creative role. Rivero 
also pointed to the unwillingness of the administrative judge — and again the 
parallel with England is obvious — explicitly to set out the ethos or credo 
on which its interventions were based or, in other words, to admit to his 
normative function. He said: 
1... it is to the Civil Code that the civil judge must, above all, 
turn for principles; the administrative judge, on the other hand, 
has nowhere to look except to a particular understanding of the 
relationship between the individual and power. This is derived 
from the judgets consciousnessand his conscience, and, in his eyes 
and for those purposes, it comes to embody the Just Man. The 
administrative judge has never made any claim to having created this 
embodiment of justice. 	Indeed, until very recently, he never took 
the trouble to elucidate his ideal, simply because it seeTed to go 
without saying and to embody a general public sentiment." 
1 "Le juge administratif fran?ais: un juge qui gouverne?" D. 1951 Chr. 21. 
2 Loc. cit. above. Compare Lord Devlin "Judges, Government and Politics" 
(1978) 41 M.L.R. 5011. 
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But it is not only that the administrative judge "governs". He may 
admittedly on occasion use his powers to deaden the impact of what he sees 
as "the sudden changes introduced into our public life by the caprice of our 
lawmakers and the innovatory tastes of our constitution makers and, in so 
doing lto blunt the cutting edges of French political life.! It is more that 
the political function of the judge is inescapable because i. flows inevitably 
from the nature of his task. In other words: 
"It is quite certain that the very material of his task leads 
the administrative judge towards options of a political nature. 
As judge of the relationships between the State (Pouvoir) and 
citizens, between the governers and the gaverned„he is led by 
the force of circumstances to pass judgements,the repurcussions 
of which will be felt at the political level.° 
Rivero? in a cynical and witty pastiche of Voltaire, has pointed to the 
essentially ambiguous nature of the declaratory theory of law. 2 It may be 
used on the one hand, to deny the role of the judge as lawmaker and to refute 
allegations of "government by judges". Equally, 1_ 	it can be used as 
an excuse for the relative impotence of the judge in securing obedience to 
his orders or, to use the English terminology, in ensuring the Rule of Law. 
Once again, however, this deficiency may be read as a deliberate move in 
a political game. By robbing decisons of their practical efficacy ) it is 
possible to reassert the justiciability of political issues and preserve the 
1 Weil, "LeConseil d'Etat stataant au contentieux: epolitique jurisprudentielle 
ou jurisprudence politique" Annales de la Paculte de droit d'Aix, 
1959, p. 281, 282. 
2 "Le Huron au Palais—Royal: ou reflexions naives sur le contentieux adminis-
tratif" D 1962 chr. 37. Clearly this has been important in political 
theory since the Revolution: see the ideas of Troper, discussed above 
moral supremacy of the court without risking its continued existence. 1 
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Such a 
E...olution is likely to be a particularly attractive option in any system where 
the paradigm of 'L'Etat lgall rules just because.in such a system l it is of 
primary importance that the widest possible range of issues shall be justiciable. 
The unwillingness of the English judiciary to admit the extent of their 
political role may be largely due to their exposed position in the absence of any 
constitutional protections for the judicial function. A further constitutional 
factor is the importance which attaches in a system of mixed government to the 
ideal of judicial independence. 	It seems shocking to advocates of the 'balanced' 
constitution that the State may in fact be monolithic rather than dualist. The 
idea of "the political constitution",in which Professor Griffith has presented his 
vision of the game of politics as a "jeu sans frontieres l I thus becomes a dangerous 
heresy. 	The idea of "the politics of the judiciary"2 is, however, no less shocking, 
because the myth of the independence of the judiciary may be linked to the declaratory 
theory of the judicial function to drain decisions taken in a court of law of their 
political content. The consequences of this are enormous in terms of public 
support. 	Accepting the myth a little too easily, Le'vy writes: 3 
"...the English judge is placed in an infinitely more favourable 
position in respect of the administration than are French civil 
courts. He enjoys all the prestige which history has imparted 
to the English judicial function as well as a well—dBserved 
reputation for impartiality which gains for him the support of 
public opinion [in a society] which has an appreciation of its 
rights and duties. It would be absolutely unthinkable for a 
public servant even to consider refusing to execute a court order. 
If he did so,he would certainly go to prison however senior he 
was and nobody would find anything to criticise in this result." 
1 Mestre, LeConseil d'Etat, protecteur des prerogative de l'administration, 
1974 ,pp.  59-83; Rivero, loc. cit. 
2 Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary 1977. 
3 op.cit. pp. 
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But a member of the Conseild'Etat has pointed to the similarity between 
the High Court and theConseil d'Etat. Again accepting too easily the myth 
of impotence' before the administration which so often masks connivance ? Pepy 1 
 points to a number of structural similarities between the two great institutions 
in matters such as: the esprit de corps of Bar and Bench; irremovability and 
independence; and the high status of the judge.P;py concludes that the role 
of the Conseil is nearer to that of the Supreme Court )but that its "atmosphere 
is nearer to that of the Law Courts than to that of the Palais de Justice." 
The English courts ? in other words "could an' if they would". Something 
seems on occasion to hold them back. 
To summarise the argument at this stage ? I believe the modern Conseil 
d'Etat and High Court to be rather similar institutions which embark upon their 
task with rather similar advantages. I believe too ? that it is immaterial 
whether courts assert their jurisdiction by granting 'compensation' for 'legal 
administrative action' or by imposing 'liability' for 'illegal' administrative 
action. Their goal is the same even if they follow a different path 4and the 
game is the same. even if there is minimal variation in the rules. 	It is the 
assumption of jurisdiction which offends. The debate cannot — and ought not 
to be — obscured by legal subterfuge. The main dangers can ? of course ? be 
avoided by a refusal to assume jurisdiction. But although I have suggested 
that judges as well as lesser mortals know which side their bread is buttered 
on? I would not wish to deduce that such decisions are always the coward's way 
out. The court's motive in decliningjurisdiction may be to force back into 
1 	"Justice anglaise et Justice administrative fran9aise" (1956) 10 EDGE p. 159 ? 
166. 	The piece is a review of Hamson's Judicial Control of Administrative 
Discretion ? which may have misled its author in certain respects. 
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the conventional political system decisions which it believes can more conveniently 
be taken there. 
I descend rather gratefully from this esoteric atmosphere to an examination 
of the actual caselawl in which many of these arguments are openly discussed. 
In Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate/ the valuable oil installations 'of the appellant 
company had been destroyed on the orders of the Crown during the 2nd World 
War to prevent their falling into the hands of the advancing Japanese. After 
the war, the company, in common with many others who had suffered loss by war 
damage, was awarded ex gratia compensation of X44 million. It would have been 
normal practice for the Crown to demand an indemnity from the company, but 
this was not done to avoid prejudicing forthcoming legal proceedings in the 
Burmese courts. It was at all times made clear by successive Governments, 
however, that the award was final. 
Many years later, the company brought an action for damages in the 
Scottish courts, and it was argued on behalf of the Crown that there had been 
a lawful exercise of the prerogative right to sequestrate private property 
in defence of the country in time of war. The Scottish courts, relying on 
the civilian concept of 'eminent domain', held that, with the single and 
severely limited exception of 'battle damage', private property cannot be 
expropriated or used for public purposes without compensation by use of the 
prerogative powers and without express statutory authority. 
This decision was upheld by a majority of the House of Lords. The 
reasoning is unassailable. In declaring that the prerogative power of 
sequestration automatically entails a right to compensation, the court is 
delimiting the extent of the royal prerogative and narrowing the area of 
executive immunity. By stating that sequestration is legal only if compen- 
1 	[1954] 2 All E.H. 348. 
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sation is made, the court in effect asserts that, at common law, the admini-
stration may act only if it is prepared to pay. If it is not prepared to 
pay, it must seek the help of the legislature. If it fails to do so, and 
subsequently refuses to pay,or if a dispute over compensation arises, then 
a justiciable issue exists. 
In the Burmah Oil, case, the principle of compensation was not in issue; 
indeed,the company had already received an ex . gratia payment. The quantum 
of compensation was admittedly in dispute, but, more important, the nature 
of the appellant's claim, legal or equitable , ex gratia or as of right, 
was at stake. The real issue was nothing less than the justiciability of 
the claim. 
That the court understood the dimensions of the affair is made very clear 
in the dissenting judgement of Lord Radcliffe who said, 1 
"It is just in that distinction between what is expected 
by public sentiment and what is actually obtainable by 
legal right that our present difficulty lies. We know 
that by long tradition private property appropriated for 
public use is treated as the subject of compensation and 
we look to the government to secure this, either by moving 
Parliament to provide it or by some ex gratia payment which 
will afterwards receive Parliamentary sanction 	 
Lord Radcliffe went on to justify his preference for extra—judicial redress 
on the grounds of convenience and public policy: 
"Such damage [i.e. war damage] is a matter, being unpredictable 
in extent and range, that must be controlled by that 
department of the sovereign power that is responsible for 
the raising and expenditure of public money 	 None of 
this is an argument against the propriety or indeed urgent 
desirability of the state providing compensation schemes to 
take care, so fax as possible, of all war damage, of person 
or property. It is for those who fill and empty the public 
purse to decide when, by whom, on what conditions and within 
what limitations,such compensation is to be made available." 
1 	At pp. 371, 375-6. 
An equally powerful intuition that the government of a democratic 
	247 
society ought not to rely on archaic residual provileges in addition to the 
plenitude of legislative powers which it possesses today, prompted the 
rejection of this argument. This intuition was probably correct, although 
the heat generated by the ensuing collision with the legislature deflected 
attention from the merits of Lord Radcliffe's argument. 
This was doubly unfortunate, because the court, although admitting the 
principle of compensation,had expressed doubt about proof of damage and 
causality. 	Thus, the matter might have been resolved by the courts them— 
selves without recourse to the unpopular method of retrospective legislation. 
Secondly, as the parliamentary debate makes plain I there was much merit in 
Lord Radcliffe's argument. 
Speaking in the House of Commons, on behalf of the government, Niall 
MacDermot pointed to the hidden dimensions of Burmah Oil's claim, the 
inappropriateness of damages as a means of redress t and the possibility of 
injustice; He said: 2 
"...the scale of losses in total wars in this century 
has been so formidable as to make the idea of their 
reparation in full impossible 	There has, therefore, 
emerged 	the concept of sharing the burden of losses 
in the country as a whole, on whatever scale the country 
as a whole can reasonably be held to afford. 
This carries two implicationW1 first, there must be some 
equitable scheme for distributing such compensation as 
may be afforded in relation to the losses suffered by 
individuals; and secondly, opportunity must not be 
left open to any special groups amongst those who have 
suffered loss to claim redress on a preferential scale. 
Any entitlement to compensation on an indemnity basis of 
common law would, in effect, give preferential treatment 
to those enjoying it." 
1 	p. 362 (Lord Reid);P. 394 (Lord Hodson). 
2 H.C. Deb vol. 705 cols. 1092-3 
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I have cited this passage at length 3 because it seems to me to epitomise 
the issues which arise in cases in which one departs from the classic fault 
based actions for civil (tortious) liability. First, the argument is not 
really one about ends but means. The principle of compensation is not 
denied but the choice of the courts as a means of distribution is disputed. 
Secondly, the measure of compensation is in issue. The obligation to 
compensate is there, but full reparation on the basis of legal damages is not 
necessarily appropriate. 	It has to be shown, if the courts are to be given 
jurisdictioni that they are capable of devising a model different to the 
damages model. 	Finally, the basis of compensation, as in the case of Elhe. 
Criminal Injuries Com pensation Scheme, lies not in the idea of tort or 
wrongdoing, but in notions of equity and solidarity. 
Mitchell, criticising the Burmah Oil decision for its lack of legal 
logic, 1  suggested that a better basis for liability would have been the 
French principle of 'Equality before Public Charges' which many publicists 
suggest to be the basis of all government liability. This criticism may 
be dismissed at the outset. Admittedly, in the Burmah Oil decision, there 
was much reference to the Scots law principle of 'eminent domain which 
clearly parallels (and may easily spring from the same root as) the Equality 
principle. English law is, however, quite capable of throwing up similar 
principles. The House of Lords specifically approved in the Burmah Oil 
case the dictum of Lord Moulton in an earlier English decision that it is 
"equitable that burdens borne for the good of the nation should be distributed 
over the whole nation". 2 This is a clear formulation of the Equality 
1 	[1968] P.L. 201. 
2 	v De Keyser's Royal Hotel [1920] A.C. 553, 554, cited [ 1964] 
2 All E.R. at p. 355 (Lord Reid). 
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principle, accepted as the rationale of liability notonly by the courts but, 
as I have pointed out, by Parliament. 
In France, the principle of 'Equality before public charges' derives 
essentially from Article 13 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man 1789, 
which states: 
"For the maintenance of the forces of law and order 
and for the expenses of administration a general 
contribution is indispensible; it must be equally 
shared between citizens according to their means." 
This Article is obviously no more than a principle of taxation which 
contains a tacit reference to the greatly resented practices of the Ancien 
Regime, of distributing the tax burden inequitably by exempting certain 
classes of the population — particularly the nobility — from liability. 
Coupled with this dislike of the inequitable burdens of the tax system, 
went resentment at the failure of the .oyal government to make reparation 
for damage caused by state operations such as public works, and for war 
damages. 	This resulted, very quickly after the 
Revolution, in legislation to provide compensation for expropriation and 
damage caused by public works. 1  The underlying rationale of the Equality 
principle therefore lies in the protection of private property and in this 
sense has much in common with the more limited common law maxim that "a 
statute should not be held to take away private rights of property without 
compensation unless the intention to do so is expressed in clear and 
unambiguous terms. ,±2 " 
1 	Kocehlin, op.cit. abovej paras. 306-319. 
2 Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners  
[1927] A.C. 343, 359 (Lord Warrington);De Smith op.cit. p. 87. 
The emphasis of the 1789 Declaration was on civil liberties, but it has bee 2 5 0 
said that the social order which resulted was "profoundly individualistic and 
weighted in favour of a minority of property owners". 1 This society was capable, 
gradually and at a later dater of transforming the statutory schemes into a 
general principle of liability which, in the words of Duguit, tended "to 
recognise the liability of the State in every case where its intervention, 
although legal and without fault, imposes on an individual or a group a charge 
heavier than that imposed on others." 2 
Not only is this a relatively late developmentI but it is supported on a 
fragile base, since the texts of the laws are themselves wholly inexplicit as 
to the basis of compensation, while the caselaw is silent 	) as to the 
derivation of the principle. .It may be, therefore, that the 'transformation' 
of the Equality principle into a basis for liability is largely due to Duguit 
himself, and that his edifice existed largely in his own mind. 	Duguit' s.  
espousal of the cause seems to have sprung from his doubts over the compat ibility 
of liability with Sovereignty and his belief that the State, as a corporate 
entity, was incapable of fault. 	Seeking a new basis for liability in public 
law, he found it in the theory of 'mutual assurance' saying: 3 
"Finally, since the public service is established and ought to 
function in the interest of everyone, if special damage is 
caused to an individual through its irregular operation, it is 
legitimate that the cost of reparation of the damage should be 
supported by the goods which are assigned to the use of the 
public service in question." 
1 Kamenka and Ehr — Soon — Tay, "Beyond the French Revolution: 
Communist Socialism and the Concept of Law" (1971) 21 Univ. of Tor. 
L.J. 109, 114. 
2 Transformations, p. 228. 	See further Delvolve, Le principe d'egalite 
devant les charges publiques, 1969, pp. 8-15. 
3 Traite, vol. 2, p. 69; and see vol. 4, P. 468. 
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Elsewhere Duguit formulates his theory in terms of risk: 1 
	it is in no way this pretended fault of the State 
which founds its liability. 	It is not a question of 
liability arising from the legal doctrine of causation 
(imnutabilite) but merely a question of finding out 
which funds (natrimalye) will finally support the risk of 
damage flowing from the operation of a public service." 
Radical as these propositions sound, and concerned as Duguit was to deny 
the link with fault, it is quite possible in practice to square both propositions 
with the fault-based liability which formed the staple fare of the caselaw. 
The use of the term "irregular operation" suggests either fault or illegality 
and in another passage Duguit implied that the "risk" supported by the public 
funds would normally be the risk of fault. Speaking of liability to the 
victims of miscarriage of justice ; acquitted on appeal--surely the paradigm 
case for application of the Equality principle- 2  Duguit argued that 3 
"The State is not liable because, at the end of the day, the 
judicial system has functioned perfectly. The innocent 
person has been acquitted by the operation of the legal 
appeals machinery and he who owed nothing has received a full 
and complete satisfaction. Thus no one has anything to 
complain about. if the first instance judge is guilty of a 
personal fault, this could entail his personal liability; 
but this is quite a different matter." 
This passage seems wholly to undercut-TVgait l s 'mutual 
assurance' principle and to reveal the theory in its true colours as an 
alternative explanation for, or perhaps an underlying rationale for, the 
legal liability ofthe ,9t ,7, te assessed along traditional lines. 
The same observation could be made of the Equality theory propounded by 
Cornu. At the end of an exhaustive comparison of civil and administrative 
liability which led him to deduce their inherent similarity in virtually every 
1 Transformations, p. 231. 	The translation is rather a free one. 
2 Street, Government Liability, P. 41; Delvolvei, op.cit. p. 362. 
3 Transformations, p. 251. 
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respect, Cornu advanced the view that both public and private liability derived 
from a right to personal security. 
"This requirement penetrates to the heart of modern 
consciousness in one of its fundamental aspirations. 
In this craving for security, one can see mankind's most 
fundamental effort to find the surroundings or climate 
in which his activities will be able to expand freely. 
Thus security is not an end in itself but a means which 
will permit individuals to realise their goals. 
Individual human beings have an indefeasible right and a 
natural duty to act, and to act they need security." 1 
Cornu goes on to explain that the victim is entitled to restoration of his 
'security' when this is invaded by another individual. 	In civil law, the 
basic equality between the parties means that reparation will normally follow 
only in the case of fault. 	In public law, on the other hand, the parties 	are 
always, by definition,Unequal while the individual's right to security, 
measured against the right of other individuals as represented by the collectivity, 
is relative. The measures of the relativity are the concepts of'normality; 
quality'and'protit. 
Cornu argues: 2 
"If the collectivity owes equal security to everyone, this 
equivalence involves a measure of proportion. There is 
no question of absolute equality but only of equality 
calculated with reference to the victim's own situation as 
against the service or activity which causes the damage. 
This procedure alone allows one to establish the "personal 
equation" of victim and service and to balance the profit 
which the victim obtained against the loss which he has 
suffered." 
These passages seem to have more to do with moral philosophy than with 
legal liability. They do, however, illustrate two of the themes which run 
through the public law theories of administrative liability. First, every 
theory has to grapple with a number of disparate heads of liability which, 
1 	op.cit. pp. 271-1272. 
2 At p. 279. 	The principle is used to justify the distinction between 
third parties and users of the service so important in the caselaw of 
theConseil d'Etat. 
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ultimately springing from statutory authority, have been freely developed by 
a very creative caselaw, and provide a coherent explanation of this phenomenon. 
Secondly, the three apparent explanations of administrative liability — fault, 
risk, and Equality — in fact may be reduced to two, since the authorS are able 
at will to explain Equality in terms of .risk'or'profit and loss'or, vice versa, 
to explain risk in terms of l Equality/ or'mutual assurance. Worse still, it 
is possible, as Duguit does, to explain fault in terms of riskl or, as Blaamet 1 
does, to explain both risk and equality in terms of fault, i.e. a failure by 
the administration to preserve the equality of individuals. Ultimately these 
syntheses appear to depart so greatly from reality as to be almost valueless. 
In the final conclusions to his study, adopted as the classic work by 
French public lawyers, M. Chapus confirms this suspicion: 2  
"We conclude that the principle of the equality of citizens 
before public charges is, in the state of the actual law 
today, totally devoid of any relevance to the problem to 
which it purports to be relevant. 	It seems that v in placing 
this principle as the foundation stone of the liability of 
public authorities, the theorists have succumbed to the double 
gratification of justifying every case of liability in terms 
of a single idea and of labelling the practical results of the 
caselaw of theConseil d'Etat with one of the fundamental 
principles of our public law® They have no doubt been led 
further down this road by the fact that the liability of 
public authorities (or at least the pubic law of the liability 
of public authorities) could in this way be clearly distinguished 
from liability in private law ) and this provided an admirable 
illustration of the dogmatic principle so dear to the heart 
of public lawyers, i.e. the principle of the autonomy of public 
liability." 
This conclusion of M, Chapus points to the likelihood that a single, 
unitary explanation is not possible for all cases of government liability which 
1 "De l'anormal devant les hautes juridictions civile et administrative" 
1946 JOE' 560. 
2 	Op.cit. p. 346. 
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do not in reality share common features. One ought therefore to accept 
theoretically "a multiplicity of solutions as natural to civil liability." 1 
 This deduction would have the merit of harmonising with the practice of the 
courts,where pragmatic solutions are usually acceptable. 
Two celebrated decisions establish the Equality principle in the judicial 
vocabulary of administrative liability. Although they differ as to detail, 
they are so closely connected that one author calls them "two branches spring-
ing from the same trunk". 2 Significantly, each case involves judicial trespass 
on a hitherto sacrosanct area of governmental activity, and in each case 
the Equality principle is invoked to minimise this trespass. In the first 
I 3 case, Couiteas t the applicant was the owner of a large estate in Tunisia, 
which was actually occupied by 8,000 nomadic tribesmen. He obtained an ' 
order from a civil court for possession of his estate, but when he called upon 
the authorities for help in enforcing the decision they were understandably 
reluctant to act. He demanded compensation. Some years later the Conseil 
d'Etat found in his favour. The judgment declares the refusal of the 
Government to act perfectly lawful, but adds: 
"...the loss which results from this refusal, if it exceeds 
a certain length, cannot be said to be a charge falling 
normally on the party, and it is for the court to determine 
at what point the community must take over responsibility 
for the loss." 
There are two remarkable points here, First, the court prefers to 
create a right to compensation rather than to annul for illegality. This 
may be because of the nature of the case, an act of government policy 
1 Bernal "Fondements de la responsabilite civile en droit public fran9ais" 
RDP 1951, p. 685, 701. The author rejects this conclusion favouring 
a single explanation for government liability of "Socialisation of risk", 
however. 
2 Kahn, "L'evolution de la jurisprudence relative a la responsabilite 
du fait des lois", (1962) 16 EDGE p.63. 
3 Collit46, C.E. 30 Nov. 1923, S 1923.3.57 n. Hauriou C.A. No. 45. 
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equivalent to an Act of State. Secondly, the court allows itself a consider-
able latitude to determine the point at which liability accrues and even if it 
accrues at all. In this respect, the decision presents a marked contrast 
to the Burmah Oil case which gives clear directions as to the use by the 
executive of the prerogative powers. The court here seems to acknowledge an 
equitable'claim% a chance to apply to a court for compensation, rather than 
a legal 'right?. In Dworkin's terminology the case establishes a 'principle'' 
rather than a 'rule': it "does not even purport to set out conditions which 
make its application necessary." 1 
The decision of La Fleurette2 in 1938 extended the Couiteas rule. 
The applicant company made an artificial cream, the, manufacture of which 
was subsequently prohibited by a statute intended for the protection of the 
dairy industry. The legislation in question made no provision for compen-
sation, but the Conseil d'Etat held that an indemnity was nonetheless due. 
Conscious of the dangers of its chosen course, the court was careful to 
make reference to the supposed intention of the legislature stating that: 
"nothing, whether in the text of the law itself, or in the 
travaux pr4Paratoires, or in the surrounding circumstances 
of the affair, could lead one to suppose that the legislature 
intended that this charge, which would not normally be borne 
by the applicant, should in this instance fall upon him". 
The logical deduction to be made from the absence of provision in a 
given statute for compensation — or for compensation for loss a given kind — 
is that the legislature did not intend that loss to be compensated. 3 
1 Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, p. 26. 
2 Ste ano e des roduits 1 'tiers "La Fle rette" C.E. 14 Jan 1938, 
R.D.P. 1938 p. 87 concl. Roujou n. Jeze. 
3 	 v Brand (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 171. 	See also the remarks of the House of Lords in Buchanan v Babco Forwarding k_Shipping (U.K.) Ltd. 
[1977] 3 W.L.R. 907. 
To cite Teissier: 1 
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"Legislation is the prime example of an act of 
Sovereignty and the damage which it causes to 
individuals, in the absence of provision to the 
contrary, cannot give rise to an action for 
damages against the State". 
A court which intervenes to fill such gaps is trespassing on legislative 
territory,and the substitution of the term 'compensation' for 'liability' 
or 'legal' for 'illegal' administrative activity cannot disguise this fact 
any more than it can be disguised by deferential references to the legislative 
intention. If it attempts to apply the compensation principle generally, 
the court inevitably provokes a conflict with l and invites retaliation from, 
the elected legislature. It is not surprising to find for example, that the 
celebrated La Fleurette rule has been applied only once thereafter; that the 
second decision was never implemented by the government; and that it involved 
the Conseil d'Etat in a struggle exactly comparable to that provoked by the 
Burmah Oil decision. 2 Conscious of this ever present danger, the court seeks 
to escape by creating a series of casuistic exceptions to the supposed rule. 
In this respect the French cases which attempt to formulate the conditions in 
which the Equality principle becomes operative 3 are directly comparable to 
the illogical and contradictory English rules concerning liability for breach 
of statutory duty. 4 The Equality principle is seldom held to apply 5 and 
1 La Responsabilite de la Puissance publique 1906 no. 17; to the same 
effect LaferrAre l Traits, cited G.A. p. 236. 
2 	Caucheteux et Desmonts C.E. 21 Jan 1944 Rec 22, and C.E. 2 May 1962, 
RDP 1963 p. 279 n. Waline. 
3 	For an excellent precis see G.A. pp. 236-242. 	See further, Delvolve 
op.cit.„ pp. 246-276; Odent op.cit. p. 1122 et seq. 
4 	Street on Torts, pp. 269-276, discussed above pi, 2.09'-2.10. 
5 	The rule has been applied in a handful of cases: Ste la cartonnierie  
C.E. 3 June 1938 Rec 251 concl. Dayras; 
Bract C.E. 22 Jan 1943 Rec 19; Min de l'Ecruipeme  - 	C.E. 25 Jan1963 Rec 53; Perruche G.E. 19 Oct Rec 555; E.D.F.c l_Farsat 
Min de 1'E. '.eme tc. Navarra above); 	de_Pordeaux c t  Sastre below ; 
142Sm4=222azig_ 	See G.A. loc. cit. 
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even where lip service is paid to its applicability, the applicant's claim is 
often dismissed on the merits. 1 
It is not possible to be certain why the Conseil d'Etat prefers the 
circuitous route of compensation for valid administrative action. Not every— 
■ one favours its approach. In his note on Couiteas, 2  for example, Hauriou 
censures the court claiming that it has abandoned its proper task of control 
of administrative action by delimiting the boundaries of legal administrative 
activity. He goes further than this, pointing out that such a theory of 
governmental liability obliges the State in principle to "guarantee to each 
individual the balance of the credits and debits of communal life" and threatens 
to submerge the court in a series of economic and political judgments which are 
sufficient to sink it. Furthermore, the theory opens the way for a continual 
see—saw process of challenge to government action in the courts. As Morange 
has said of liability in respect of legislation: 
"to admit the principle of compensation for those 
who have been sacrificed would often be to reopen 
the apportionment itself and introduce anarchy into the 
State by paralysing its"3 
This reasoning is basically sound and it seems that the Conceil e'Etat 
may agree, since it reserves the Equality principle for a tiny minority of 
'hard cases' which seem insoluble by recourse to other principles. 
Delvolve confirms that the courts seems to prefer compensation to 
annulment, seeking "to make good on the plane of liability what it abandons 
on the plane of legality". This could be construed as a relaxation of 
1 For example the celebrated case of 2124_, 
C.E. 30 Mar 1966 Rec 257 G.A. No, 107, 
awarded and which was never applied for 
Burgat, (below). 
2 	S. 1923. 3. 57, loc. cit. above. 
3 Morange, "L'irresponsabilite t de l'Etat legislateur", D 1962.1.163. 
den. d'energie radioelectrique  
in which no compensation was 
10 years: Min de l'Etranger c.  
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'control'. On the other hand )we must never forget that, in the absence of 
injunctive powers, the imposition of liability is the only way in which the 
academic 'ought' may be translated to the pragmatic 'shall'. 
Delvolve defends the practice on another ground arguing that 
"The general interest sometimes demands that a charge shall 
be imposed, but it is not necessary for it to bear only on 
certain citizens: there is then no link between the general 
interest and inequality. Thus the burden, however justified 
it may be on the plane of legality, must be lightened by an 
indemnity designed to re—establish equality". 
This proposition does not really advance the debate, however, since the 
author assumes the court's inherent right to make the assessment and does not 
attempt to distinguish 'political' from 'justiciable' issues. 
If we could establish some rational foundation for our innate belief that 
'political' and 'justiciable' issues are distinguishable and that "some issues 
are inherently or properly of one kind or the other whoever decides them or 
by whatever means"2 the argument would be advanced. It would then become 
possible to establish criteria for distinguishing the two categories, and 
matters could be more rationally assigned to one or the other. The 
difficulty is to find any point of departure; and thiS in turn is directly 
attributable to the problem in defining the judicial role. To indulge in 
punning once more, to attempt a division between the 'political' and 'judicial' 
is to devise frontiers for the '121_jeu sans frontPeres". 
1 Op.cit. pp. 258-259. 	This is, of course, the Burmah Oil, principle. 
2 Marshall, "Justiciability" in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 1st series 
ed. Guest, 1961, p. 265, 267. 
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Like Lord Radcliffe in the Tiumah Oil case ) judges are sensitive to a 
need to distinguish the 'legal' from the 'equitable or moral' claim — i.e. to 
distinguish the 'justiciable' from the 'non—justiciable' — but they seldom pause 
to explain the reasons for their superficial classification as explicitly as 
Lord Radcliffe did. In the Ocean Island case 1 for example, an action was 
brought in the High Court by native inhabitants of Ocean Island against the 
Crown for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust. The colonial government 
had permitted, nay urged, the islanders to assign their rights in phosphate 
mining to a mining commission in exchange for derisory royalties. Ultimately 
the island was rendered uninhabitable and the islanders, grown more sophisticated, 
claimed compensation. An action was filed in the High Court ) but the claim 
failed. Despite the moral validity of the islanders' claim, the judge felt 
obliged to hold that the Crown owed only a moral obligation which was not 
justiciable in the courts. Nonetheless, so strongly did he feel that justice 
had not been achieved Ithat he asked the Attorney—General to mention his 
impression to the Government, observing that "the Crown is traditionally the 
Fountain of Justice, and justice is not confined to what is enforceable in 
the courts  
We can immediately dismiss the idea that this claim foundered because 
of the inability of a private law system to provide an apposite conceptual 
peg on which to hang it. The equitable principles of fiduciary duty and 
breach of trust, well developed, and undoubtedly more precise that the 
Equality principle, were perfectly appropriate. The hesitation of the judge 
was due to his doubts concerning Jurisdiction: in other words, his lack of 
1 Tito, v Waddell (No. 2) [1977] 2 WLR 496. 
2 At p. 616. 
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confidence in his mandate. He chose not to confide the reasons for his 
doubts, a modesty which characterises the English judiciary when faced with 
such questions. 
It is convenient to take a second point shortly, although it,is a 
digression from the main theme. Both the Burmah Oil case and the Ocean Island 
case suggest that unless the courts can develop new principles of assessment of 
compensation, they are unlikely to make a success of their jurisdiction in 
such cases. In the Burmah Oil case, considerable uncertainty arose as to 
how the damage was to be quantified. 1 
To quantify the damage caused by the total destruction of an island in 
the Pacific is, obviously, virtually impossible. And even if the principles 
of civil liability were thought to be applicable and were applied, the sum 
would, like the damage of two World Wars mentioned by Nial MacDermott in the 
Burmah Oil debate, exceed all reasonable bounds. I reiterate the point that 
the rationale of special systems of administrative liability is to provide 
fair and equitable 'compensation' rather than 'damages' assessed on the civil 
law principle of restitutio in integrums. 
The courts are not unaware of the importance of this distinction,but 
normally use it to draw a boundary between legal rights enforceable in courts, 
and equitable or moral claims which are not justiciable. To bring the 
distinction inside the legal framework is difficult becauseit is likely to 
lead to invidious discrimination between victims which, as I showed earlier, 
occasions great resentment. In one recent case, 2 however, the Privy Council 
1 This emerges clearly from the parliamentary discussions of appropriate 
figures. See especially H.C. Deb vol. 712 col. 594 (Mr. Gardner) and 
H.C. Deb vol. 705 cols. 1094 (Mr. MacDermot) and col. 1185 (Mr. Wall). 
For Ocean Island see Tito v Wadde NC. 2 (Note)[1977] 3 WLR 972 and 
H.e. Deb 24 May 1979 cols. 1267 et seq Sir Bernard Braine) and col. 1317 
(Mr. Skeet). 
2 Maharal v Atto ne -Gene Trin d Tob 	2 [1978] 2 WLR 902 (P.0 
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did 	attempt a distinction between 'damages' and 'compensation'. A 
barrister committed for contempt of the High Court of Trinidad and Tobago,by 
a committal order subsequently declared invalid 4 claimed damages for wrongful 
detention and false imprisonment under the Trinidadian Constitution,which 
provided for 'redress' in cases of deprivation of liberty. 
Lord Hailsham(dissenting) found himself incapable of grasping the nature 
of the plaintiff's claim or of accommodating it within existing legal categories. 
Expressing all the doubts of an administrator as to the wisdom of drawing a 
line between victims of miscarriage of justice generally, and those victims of 
judicial error deprived of due process, Lord Hailsham said: 1 
iv% "I must add that I find it difficult to accommodate withLthe 
concepts of the law a type of liability for damages for the 
wrong of another when the wrongdoer himself is under no 
liability at all and the wrong itself is not a tort or delict. 
It was strenuously argued for the appellant that the liability 
of the state in the instant case was not vicarious, but some 
sort of primary liability. But I find this equally difficult 
to understand. It was argued that the state consisted of 
three branches, judiciaLv executive and legislative, and that 
as one of these branches, the judicial, had in the instant case 
contravened the appellant's constitutional rights, the state 
became, by virtue of section 6,responsible in damages for the 
action of its judicial branch 	could understand a view 
which said that because he had done so the state was vicariously 
liable for this wrongdoing 	What I do not understand is 
that the state is liable as a principal even though the judge 
attracts no liability to himself and his act is not a tort....." 
This judgment — which to those who, like Lord Hailsham, favour a judicially 
monitored Bill of Rights must make depressing reading — illustrates the 
failure of the common lawyer to come to terms with any State liability which 
is not based (i) on personal responsibility, and (ii) on fault or tort. 
is, however, a dissent, and the majority l for whom Lord Diplock spoke l did 
admit to a liability of the state which "is not vicarious liability; it is 
liability of the state itself". Lord Diplock thought it right, however, to 
classify this liability as a 'claim' rather than a 'right'. It followed 
that "compensation' not 'damages' was the measure of 'redress' available. 
1 	At p. 921. 
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"The claim is not a claim in private law for damages 
for the tort of false imprisonment, under which the 
damages recoverable are at large and would include 
damages for loss of reputation. It is a claim in 
public law for compensation for deprivation of liberty 
alone. Such compensation would include any loss of 
earnings consequent on the imprisonment and recompense 
for the inconvenience and distress suffered by the 
appellant during his incarceration. Counsel for the 
appellant has Stated that he does not intend to claim 
what in a case of tort would be called examplary or punitive 
damages. This makes it unnecessary to express any view 
as to whether money compensation by way of redress under 
section 6(i) can ever include an exemplary or punitive 
award." 1 
This was an unusual case decided by a commonwealth court. If English courts 
were to persevere in this course, they would certainly attract criticism. 
Only the legislature has authority to single out classes of complaint and 
state that the plaintiff 'not be entitleeto damages based on the well 
established principles of common law but to some lesser sum to be denominated 
'compensation'. The attempts of French administrative courts to prune damages 
have always ended in failure. It is most unlikely that our own courts would succeed, 
Let us return to the main theme by attempting to provide a more 
precise classification which the judges could use to identify justiciable 
issues. Marshall 2 tentatively identifies the characteristics of judicial 
process as: objectivity of decision making, independence of the decision 
maker from administrative or popular pressure and finality of conclusion. 
Perhaps then7 we should reserve for the judicial process cases which seem 
primarily to demand these characteristics, adding, as an afterthought, those 
cases which are unlikely to be resolved by the political process because 
they "cannot easily and immediately be made the subject of political agitation 
1 At p •  913. For the general rule as to exemplary damages see Rookes v 
v Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, 1223-4. 
2 Op.cit. pp. 271-287. 
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and redress": Such a division would leave to the political process those 
issues which entail the exercise of discretion or involve 'policy'. 
tPolicy'is another slippery work which the judiciary has been notably 
reluctant to explore. One judicial attempt to identify 'policy' issues and 
distinguish the changes which may properly be introduced by a court is to be 
found, however, in the recent case of Launchbary v !Organs. 2 Here the House 
of Lords had to consider a major extension of the doctrine of vicarious liability 
to cover the case of the "family car". Lord Pearson summarised the difficulties 
succinctly, saying: 
"It seems to me that these innovations, whether or not they 
may be desirable, are not suitable to be introduced by 
judicial decision. They raise difficult questions of 
policy, as well as involving the introduction of new legal 
principles rather than extension of some principle already 
recognised and operating. The questions of policy need 
consideration by the government and Parliament, using the 
resources at their command for making wide inquiries and 
gathering evidence and opinions as to the practical effects 
of the proposed innovations •0. Any extension of car owners' 
liability ought to be accompanied by an extension of 
effective insurance cover. How would that be brought about? 
And how would it be paid for?...It seems to me that, if the 
proposed innovations are desirable, they should be introduced 
not by judicial decision but by legislation after suitable 
investigation and full consideration of the questions of 
policy involved." 
This passage suggests that prospective changes in the law ought not to 
• be made through judicial process; 2 a principle which correlates with the 
principle that legislative action is properly prosoective rather than 
retrospective. This deduction in turn helps to explain the insistence on 
the finality of judicial decisionoand implies that the Parmah Oil, case, being 
1 	'bid, p. 287. 
2 [1972] 2 WLR 1217, 1228, also 1222 (Lord Wilberforce) 
3 See however Nicol "Prospective overruling: a new device for English 
courts?" (1976) 39 M.L.R. 542; Ohayes "The role of the judge in Public 
Law litigation" (1976) 89 Harv. L.R. 1281, 1302 et. seq. 
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purely retrospective in character, did contain a justiciable issue. If 
this reasoning is correct then the reversal of the decision by the War Damages 
Act 1965 was illegitimate, the proper course of action for the legislature 
being to amend the law prospectively, leaving to Burmah Oil the fruits (if 
any of their victory in the courts. It is only fair to add that this is the 
course usually taken by the legislature, the Burmah Oil decision being unusual 
in this respect. 
Could one reverse this argument so as to reserve for the political process 
all decisions involving radical changes in the law which are prospective in 
character? Such a classification seems at first to preclude the imposition 
of liability in the DorsetyashI case or the Anns case. One might argue that 
these cases are distinguishable. They involve the application of established 
principle to new fact situations; it is the introduction of new legal 
principles to which Lord Pearson objects. But if there is a line to be drawn 
here, it is one which is likely to prove difficult to operate in practice. 
Courts render themselves particularly vulnerable if they intervene to 
award compensation for loss caused either by government policies which are 
designed to regulate the economy, or by planning laws. The danger is that by 
imposing liability the court will "neutralise the effect of deliberately 
discriminatory measures."2 Nary years ago l Bohlen suggested3  that "it is a 
fundamental principle that taxation shall be laid equally upon all who benefit 
by the expenditure of the fund realised thereby." This phraseology is 
misleadingv and gives to the Equality principle an extended, substantive meaning 
which it was never intended to bear. The Equality principle demands equality 
of treatment; it creates a presumption against singling out individuals and 
1 Harlow, op.cit. [1976] P.L. 116; Prosser "Politics and Judicial Review: 
the Attkinson Case and its aftermath" [1979] P•L• 59• 
2 Loschak op.cit. p. 234. 
3 Studies in the Law of Torts, 1926 p. 430 (discussed abovep). 
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subjecting them to taxes which others in the same class , are not expected to 
bear. It does not create any presumption against subjecting particular 
classes to differential rates of taxation, nor does it prohibit subsidisation 
of the poor at the expense of the rich. This is often called 'formal' or 
'procedural' equality and, according to one modern writer can be 
"...expressed in the following double—barrelled 
principle: 
(a) good reason has to be shown for treating one 
person or group of persons differently from any 
other person or group of persons. In the 
absence of such a reason all persons or groups 
of persons should be treated similarly. 
(b) Like cases are to be treated as like and unlike 
cases as unlike." 
Even if a good case can be constructed for application of this principle 
in the field of welfare — and it is by no means clear that it can — the 
principle is clearly wholly antipathetic to the very notion of planning, 
subvention and grants, and 	economic regulation generally. Loschak 2 
 explains this by defining Equality in terms of 'neutrality', a virtue — or 
vice according to one's political standpoint — traditionally associated with 
"the liberal conception of the limited role of the State." Equality and 
interventionism are natural enemies because "neutrality implies the absence 
of discrimination, while the intervention of the State is necessarily 
characterised by selective action to adapt the economy to the needs of the 
public interest." 
1 Weale, Equality and Social Policy, 1978 p. 11; Dworkin, op.cit. ) and 
"Liberalism" in Public and Private Morality ed. Hampshire 1978 p. 113. 
Delvolve, op.cit. pp. 416-418' 
2 Op.cit. p. 229. 
. The results of applying the Equality principle to economic subvention 2 
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have, according to Hayward,  already been experienced in France. He says: 
"Thus the multiplicity of government grants are not 
merely the instruments of central control but the 
result of local pressures 	This has led to the 
phenomenon of Sanoa.udrage — the dispersion of public 
investment grants in egalitarian, unselective 
profusion, giving a little of everything to everyone 
— which is politically rational in the present 
system but 	economically irrational." 
It could be said that theAntervention of courts in such an area tends 
to repeat the phenamenon of tEgazwdaga.et by creating a series of vested 
interests which, once created, are not easily disestablished. The available 
funds are than dispersed and do not reach their intended destination. 
For this reason, the courts of both countries prefer to confine their 
interventions in the field of economic intervention to the minimum 	control 
of ensuring procedural fairness l in the narrowest sense of preventing arbitrary 
or block decisions and imposing some procedural formalities in the shape of a 
hearing or a right to reasons. 2 
Some would go further l and conclude that judicial procedures are not 
appropriate to this area,as there is no real mechanism for ensuring that the 
interests of third parties or the public interest are. protected. 3  However 
that may be, and I do not propose to take sides in the dispute, judicial review 
by means of the ultra vires principle (:22carmureLorz escleouvoir2} is 
far more appropriate then the imposition of liability for breach of the 
Equality principle. The Conseil d'Etat is well aware of this. 	A Government 
1 The One and Indivisible French Republic, 1973 p.20. 
2 De Soto "Recours pour exces de pouvoir et interventionnisme economique", 
(1952) 6 EDGE p. 64. 	St4 "Maison Genestal" C.E. 26 Jan 1968 Rec 62 cbr► sl. 
Bertrand; Yeritish,Oxvgen_v Board of Trade, [1970] 3 All E.R. 165; 
Loschak, op.cit. pp. 228-235. 
3 See further Ganz, Government and Industry, 1977 p. 31-34; 292th-lai 
Co. (Intern ation2,1) v National Enterprise Board L1978] 3 All E.R. 624. 
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Commissioner,in a case where the applicant firm claimed compensation in 
respect of vines destroyed in compliance with some new government' 
regulations which prohibited retention of such stock ? explained: 
	it should be noted that we are in one of those areas 
of economic activity in which during the last few years 
your caselaw has tended to exclude all indemnity by the 
State. In view of their object, there cannot be any 
State liability in respect of laws or regulations which 
deal with such matters, always provided that the correct 
legal formalities have been observed".1 
Compensation was refused. 
In the planning field, similar arguments apply. The Conseil d'Etat 
is not happy to allow compensation without proof of fault in this area, 
and prefers to restrict liability to cases of fault or clear illegality: 2 
The English courts have adopted a similar restrictive attitude. A court may 
be very tempted to rectify an apparent injUstice, for example, by imposing 
'some limit to the time land can be 'blighted' by the refusal of planning 
permission"9 or by filling other supposed lacunae in Acts of Parliament. 
To do so is self—indulgent; a court which embarks upon evaluation of the 
factors "personal sacrifice versus public benefit" 4 usurps the functions of 
legislature and government. The fact that no compensation has been provided 
must be assumed to represent a conscious decision as to economic priorities 
which it is well within the competence of Government and Parliament to make 
and which should be respected accordingly. This is not an area for the 
,Equality principle. It is a political rather than justiciable area. 
1 OitTju.CE. 26 Oct 1962 R.D.P. 1963 p. 79 conc4 Heumann, It seems that 
the regulations did not necessitate the destruction and the court found 
that the applicant caused its own loss; compare MoClintooX v Commonwealth 
(discussed above p.2 11 ). 
2 Min de l'EauiDemerlt c Navarra C.E. 20 Mar 1974 Rec. 200 coml. 
Rougevin—Baville; 	 C.E. 
14 Mar 1975 Rec. coml. Dondoux; Leduc C.E. 12 May 1976, R.D.P. 1977 
p. 207n. de Soto. 
3 Westminster Bank v Beverley C.C. [1970] 1 All E.R. 734, 744 (Lord pilhorne)1 
contrast Hall v Shoreham—by—Sea U.D.C. [1964] 15 P & CR 119; compare 
E D F. c Farsat C.E. 23 Dec 1970, AJDA 1971 p. 96 coml. Kahn. This was 
an exceptional case. 
4 Wade, op.cit pp. 657-8 in a criticism oflagazzaitaLa ilthaai v Brand (above), which I respectfully suggest is entirely misconceived. 
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I have already mentioned the link between the Equality principle, liberal 
economic theory and vested interests. 	The demand for increased government 
liability may clearly be part of the political game. Proponents of increased 
liability are seeking, quite deliberately, to use the judicial function "to 
drain decisions taken in a court of law of their political content" in the 
knowledge that courts are likely to use their powers "to neutralise the 
effect of deliberately discriminatory measures". In this way the status quo 
is maintained through the liberal "Rule of Law" myth of respect for the 
s, integrity of the judicial decisions (inviolabilite de la chose dugee). 
As , Professor Griffith might put it, 1 political t claimb t are transmuted 
into legal 'rights'. 
As one would expect from a game without frontiers,this machinery may 
easily be set into reverse. The classic liberal assumption concerning the 
protection of human rights is that the courts are the sole bulwark between 
the individual and the "perfidy of Governments who destroy property to obtain 
their own very proper ends for the good of the nation and then, when the day 
2 of reckoning l comes try to find loopholes for escape". 	It is not so generally 
realised that recourse to the courts may itself on occasion represent such a 
loophole. The assumption of jurisdiction by a court may mitigate against a 
complete soIution,by insulating the government from political criticism and 
concealing the necessity for political control of what is essentially a 
political mechanism. Two examples, one from each country, illustrate this 
particularly well. 
1 	Op.cit. 42 M.L.R. pp. 17 -18. 
H.C. Deb. vol 705 col. 1158 (Mr. Thorpe) 
2 6 In 1953, the French government embarked upon a major reorganisation o 	_ 
national wholesale markets. This was brought into operation in the Bordeaux 
area by a decree of 7 November 1962,which instituted a new wholesale market 
at Bordeaux—Brienne to which all existing wholesalers were instructed to remove. 
Unfortunately, they failed to obey. The Mayor of Bordeaux,with the support of 
the Prefect,instituted criminal prosecutions; at the same time, the legality 
of the decree was referred by objectors to the Conseil d'Etat. On 4th June 
1964,the criminal chamber of the Cour de Cassation held on appeal that no 
offence had been committed by wholesalers who refused to cooperate since the 
relevant regulations were invalid. On 4th December 1964,the Conseil d'Etat 
upheld the validity of the decree. No machinery exists for the resolution of 
such deadlocks. The mayor was left either to enforce the decree indirectly 
by the withdrawal of vehicle permits, or to intervene forcibly. In the 
event, it was thought preferable to change the boundaries of the market. 
Certain retailers, arguing that they had suffered loss of profits 
during the interim period, now claimed compensation from the municipality 
and the State. 	In December 1967,both defendants were held liable for a faute 
de service by the Bordeaux administrative tribunal on the ground that they 
had failed to implement the legislation by force. 
On appeal, however, the Conseil d'Etat reversed the decision of the 
administrative tribunal and denied fault on the part of the mayor. The 
right to execute a decision by force was exceptional and not available in this 
case. Furthermore, the administration possessed a discretion as to how laws 
or decisions should be implemented, and this could not normally be reviewed 
by the courts. The mayor's decision to proceed solely through the criminal 
courts could not be accounted a fault. 
The alternative was to impose liability without fault, and the Govern-
ment Commissioner indeed recommended liability for breach of the principle of 
Equality before Public Charges. The Conseil d'Etat rejected his opinion, 
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contenting themselves with declaring that there could be in theory "liability 
without fault". They took the unusual course of remitting the affair to a 
commission of experts for assessment of damages andto determine whether the 
State or City of Bordeaux was to be liable. 
The experts predictably failed to resolve the issues (partly ) it must be 
admitted due to the uncooperative attitude of the traders, who afraid of 
prejudicing their tax liability, refused to reveal their trading figures to 
the commission). The administrative tribunal was driven to hold) on 13th April 
1973 )that there was insufficient evidence of loss for the imposition of liability. 
But ; in 1976. the Conseil d'Etat replaced this judgement, holding the City of 
Bordeaux liable on the tenuous grounds (i) that the Mayor had responsibility 
for maintaining order in market, a ground which in any event implies fault, and 
(ii) that the loss was attributable, not to the failure of certain retailers to 
obey the law, but to "the creation of a national wholesale market at 
Bordeaux—Brienne". 1 
Twelve years of litigation did little to resolve this problem. 	The 
mayor of Bordeaux received the blame for a series of events which he could 
hardly have avoided. The rate payers of Bordeaux were subjected to a charge 
which was never rightly theirs. Prompt political intervention through the 
creation of a special compensation scheme to deal with all claims submitted by 
tradesmen in a similar case could have resolved the issues expeditiously and 
expediently. 
1 This litigation is reported at: qyndicat general du marchl des Canucins  
Borcleallz C.C. 4 Jun 1964 D 1964. 	555 rap. Costa; C.E. 4 Dec 19 64 
RDP 1965, 272 n. Waline; Ministre des Finances et Ville de Bordeaux c. 
Sastre C.E. 23 June 1971 Rec. 335, noted Waline R.D.P. 1971 p. 443, Losohak 	1972. 1.2246; Ste Etab. Omer—Decugis C.E. 4 Feb 1976, 
RDP 1976 p. 1515 n. Waline, A.J.D.A.. 1976 p. 373 n. Daval. 
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The Thalidomide affairs is not a true case of government liability 
becauseat a period before the establishment of the Committee on the Safety of 
Drugs, it is difficult to see how liability could be imputed to the government 
in any strict, legal sense. This does not render the decision not to intervene 
and take over liability less shameful; indeed, if any case invited government 
intervention on the basis of Equality before public charges,it is this case. 
The doubt over the prospect of successful litigation served, however, to deflect 
attention from society's obligations. Morse still, the remote prospect of 
litigation was used to stifle public comment and criticism of the defendants, 
and, indirectlyl of the government. This immunity from publicity disadvantaged 
the plaintiffs considerably. The Sunday Times showed that, following its 
intervention on the side of parents, the defendants raised their offer of 
settlement from Z3 to R20 million. nAt, the saga was never really satisfactorily 
concluded. It resulted in legislation to amend the common law on a temporary 
basis (the Personal Injuries (Congenital Disabilities) Act 1976); a Royal 
Commission on Personal Injuries Litigation (the Pearson Commission); not to 
say protracted litigation finishing in Strasbourg between the Sunday Times and 
1 the Government over the law of contempt of courts. 	But it never really 
resolved the compensation issue. Some twenty years later, after an invest-
igation by the ex-Ombudsman, Sir Alan Marre, a measure of State compensation 
was recommended. Significantly, Sir Alan found that the long delays in 
themselves constituted an injustice which had prejudiced some of the parties. 
This factor was taken into account in the settlements. 2 
1 A-G v Times Newspapers Ltd. [1973] Q.B, 710 (C.A.) [1973] 3 All E.B. 54 (H.L.); 
The Sunday Times case April 26 1979, Eur. Ct. of Human Rights. And see 
The Thalidomide Children and the Law, A report by the Sunday Times, 1973. 
2 Statement by the Minister for the Disabled, 3 Aug. 1978, DHSS No. 78/79; 
Report on Thalidomide 'Y' children by Sir Alan Marre l HMSO, 1978. 
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By way of contrast )the popular campaign mounted in favour of the victims 
of vaccine damage, waged strategically in Parliament and the press rather than 
in the courts resultedinarapid offer by the Government of E10 1 000 to any 
child who "on the balance of probabilities" had suffered vaccine damage. 1 
Ironically, this settlement may have influenced the Government's decision to 
implement Sir Alan Marre's recommendations for some of the thalidomide victims. 
It can, of course, be argued that the absence of any principle of law 
like the Equality principle which would have enabled legal liability to be 
imposed on the State was a decisive factor in the Thalidomide disaster. I 
doubt if that is so. Examination of the French caselaw suggests (i) that 
the Conseil is disinclined to use the Equality principle in cases where large 
sums of money are at stake or a multiplicity of defendants is involved and 
(ii) that the court is unwilling to.impose liability in cases where the damage 
is totally independent of any governmental or administrative act or omission: 
in other words where the damage is not legally attributable (imputable) to 
the administration. The Sastre case itself illustrates this unwillingness. 
The case of liability to vaccine damaged children provides an interesting 
example. Since vaccination is compulsory in France, there is a clear argument 
for state liability on the basis of mutual assurance or Equality before Public 
Charges. Liability in medical cases was l howeverl founded on gross fault or 
faute de service. During the 1950s 7 sa(teral administrative tribunals 
deliberately switched to risk liability in vaccination cases. The Conseil 
d'Etat, however, refused to move. 2 Finally the legislature intervened in the 
1 H.G. Deb. 14 June 1977 cols. 239-247. H.Q. Deb 9 May 1978 vol. 949 
cols. 973-985. 
2 Especially influential were two cases noted by Savatier„ an expert in the 
field of medical liability,Ascensio et Giralla T.A. Lyon 14 June 1963, D1964.343 
n. Savatier. 	See also Devious C.E. 7 March 1958, 51958.182 n. Golletyl and 
and Lastroioli G.E. 13 July 1962 D1962.727 n. Lemasurier. 
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dispute by providing a 'no-fault' compensation scheme. 1 
The real lesson of the Thalidomide affair is to show that 
litigation is a relatively_ ineffective vehicle for compensation. Teff and 
Munro feel that "In Britain, court procedure compares unfavourably in many 
respects with, for example, the scheme for administering industrial injuries."2 
Even if it is true in the United States that under-privileged groups do better 
in the courtsobecause they "have no alternative access to the levers of power 
in the systemtI ,3  the same is emphatically not true of Britain where litigation 
The result of allowing the courts 
to dispense compensation may be that a costly and unsuitable court procedure 
is either substituted for, or incorporated as a step in, a political and 
parliamentary process. 
In the Ocean Island case, for example 	million was expended in costs 
before agreement was reached on a settlement. The fact finding procedure of 
the court,was cumbersome and largely irrelevant. In the Hoffmann-La Roche  
case ) a dispute arose concerning a report of the Monopolies Commission which 
accused Hoffmann-La Roche of pricing Librium and Valium too highly. £8 million 
was mentioned as the possible loss of profits and agreement was reached on the 
basis that the company would reimburse to the government Zai million Of,excess 
profit l and that the Governtent would in exchange revoke the Order implementing 
the offending report and allow an offset of £8 million in respect of supposedly 
diminished profits. The threat of interminable litigation was one strategic 
factor in inducing the Government to abandon a case in which their actions 
were probably both 'legal' and 'legitimate'. 4  
1 Law of 1 July 1964, see BreChon-Moulenes, op.cit. above p. 223. 
2 Thalidomide, The Legal Aftermath, 1976 p. 142„; 
3 Chayes, op.cit. p. 315. 
4 See [1974] 3 WLR 104, 122 (Lord Wilberforce); H.G. Deb 12 Nov 1975 cols. 
1544-6. 
is the weapon of Goliath rather than David. 
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English critics have pointed out that 'exceptional' or 'abnormal' losses 
will prove exceptionally difficult to identify, and, in view of the fact 
that the Conseil apparently leans favourably towards the more trivial 
cases, their suspicion is probably correct. 
Gilli believes that the Conseil d'Etat, despite its purported reliance 
on the Equality principle and its vaunted tradition of legal logic, is 
exercising a purely equitable jurisdiction in such cases. He says: 
"Whenever [the court] grants compensation 
to the victim of a measure taken in the 
general interest he is making a direct 
application of equitable norms: conscience 
has passed directly into law, and morality 
becomes law." 
The imprecise and vague formulations of the Conseil d'Etat with 
their unwillingness to make reference to the Equality principle certainly 
support, this concluSion. 
Since 1973 3 the Divisional Court has possessed a power to award 
damages on an application for review where the applicant could have 
succeeded in tort. This could be extended. Such a power would automatically 
resolve a proportion, though not all, of the existing hard cases. It would 
be possible to extend the power by allowing the Divisional Court to award 
compensation where "injustice" or "exceptional loss", though not necessarily 
illegality, was shown. Such an extension of jurisdiction would admittedly 
necessitate legislative intervention, which, as successive governments have 
indicated, is hardly likely to be forthcoming. Whether such a power would be 
1 Hogg, op.cit. p. 85; Street, Government Liability p.78. 
2 "La Responsabilite d'Equitg de la Puissance Publique", D1971 Chr.125 1 129. 
See also Berth-elemy, Droit administratif, 7th edn. 1913, p.79. 
3 Amended Order 53, Rule 7(1)(b). 
4 For the reasons, see Law Comm. No. 20 Cmnd. 4059 (1969); Law Comm.Working 
Paper No. 40, Remedies in Adminibtrative Law (1971); Law Comm. No. 73, 
Cmnd. 6407 (1976). 
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desirable is another matter. It is my personal view that the court might be 
left to struggle with difficult political decisions without any adequate guidelines 
as to the likely effect of their awards or as to the appropriate measure of 
compensation. 
The Equality principle is a political principle and a principle of moral 
philosophy which has long dominated Western thought. That is not to say that 
the principle ought to be transmuted into a legal rule. As Dworkin remarks: 1 
"When politicians appeal to individual rights they have 
in mind grand propositions about very abstract and 
fundamental interests like the right to freedom or 
equality or respect. These grand rights do not seem 
apposite to the decision of hard cases at law....and 
even when they are apposite they seem too abstract to have 
much argumentative power." 
The Equality principle is just such a "grand proposition": it is too 
vasme, too general and too ambiguous to be used in the resolution of legal 
disputes. 
The bases of the Equality principle are not very secure. 
As Scanlon says: 2  
	considerations of fairness and equality are 
multiple. There are many different processes that 
may be more or less fair, and we are concerned with 
equality in the distribution of many different and 
separable benefits and burdens. These are not all 
of equal importance 	[and] do not seem to be 
absolute. Attempts to achieve equality or fairness 
in one area may conflict with the pursuit of these 
goals in other areas 	In such cases of conflict 
it does not seem that considerations of fairness and 
equality as such, are always dominant. An increase 
in equality may in some cases not be worth its cost 	 I' 
1 	Op.cit. p. 89. 
2 "Rights, Goals and Fairness" in Public and Private Morality 
op.cit. above p. 100. 
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This leaves for the Equality principle only those cases which Marshall 
suggests cannot be easily resolved by the political process because they 
cannot be made the subject of "political agitation". While these are not 
likely to be easily identified, I suggest that in precisely these cases the 
Conseil d'Etat does assume an equitable jurisdiction based on the Equality 
principle. To exemplify, in one case,  a canal syndicate responsible for the 
annual soaking of the vines quite properly prolonged the period in the interest 
of the majority of growers. Certain specially delicate vines succumbed. An 
indemnity of the value of the vines was awarded. A second case 2 implements 
a famous decision of the Conseil d'Etat concerning liability for the treaty 
making power. The applicants had let their flat to a UNESCO employee who 
absconded and when pursued in the civil courts claimed diplomatic immunity. 
The applicants claimed compensation from the French government and were, rather 
surprisingly, awarded damages which included loss of rent, costs in the civil 
proceedings and "troubles in the conditions of existence", a head of damage 
particularly associated with the civil law. In a third case,  loss was suffered 
by a landowner when Electricite de France, after long delays, reversed their 
decision to expropriate his land. Compensation was awarded because the 
threat of expropriation had induced the landlord to refrain from exploiting 
his land over a period of many years. 
It is hard to detect any stable legal principle which justifies inter-
vention in such cases although some writers favour the principle of 
'abnormal loss' which, lilaevoet argues, creates a presumption of fault. 4 
1 -§ZLE1...i9;QLSL2SLnldeSull,--------10S12Ae R onele----a-----IA9S1A----Paclsseslinesomel 
C.E. 5 Feb 1969 Rec 66. 
2 MALLIpsalfairestiaDAres c Burzai C.E. 29 Oct 1976 RDP.1977 p. 213 
concl Nassote 
3 §L.egjziailL422rausa...a2azmA C.E. 23 Dec 1970, AJDA 1971.96 concl Kahn. 
4 op.cit. above. 
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Obviously the absence of legal redress may leave hard cases. The mistake 
is to assume that the legal process is the only mechanism by which injustices 
can be rectified, and that it must be all—embracing. The 
parliamentary process has sometimes been effectively deployed in individual 
cases though the procedure is somewhat cumbersome. 1 We have also in England 
a longstanding tradition of ex gratia compensation. For these political 
mechanisms political principles are desirable, and it is in this field that 
Equality principle might be able to take root and even blossom. 
1 	See H.C. Deb 1 Apr. 1977 cols. 829 and 833 (debate concerning compensation 
for wrongful imprisonment in the Glastonbury and Long cases)• H.C. Deb. 
1977 col. 1243 (debate concerning Whocling cough vaccination, 
the case of Tanya Price) H.C. Deb 7 Mar 1977 cols. 1143-1157 (Case of 
Constitutent who had to use a nursing home because no hospital bed was 
available: no award). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Grace and Favour, 
There is a prevalent and not entirely inaccurate picture of public 
servants in England assecretive to the point of furtiveness and dedicated 
to the preservation of discretionary power under the guise of "flexibility". 
Recently, for example, discussing access to official information, the 
periodical "Public Administration" said: 
"The greatestresistance to change in the civil 
service is not so much a habit of secrecy... but 
a desire to retain full flexibility in deciding 
what shall be disclosed to whom." 1 
When coupled with the traditional hostility ofaawyers in this country 
to administrators and to the notion of discretionary power, secrecy may 
do the public service a disservice by creating a suspicion of arbitrary 
and underhand practices. Public lawyers are all too prone to dismiss ex 
gratia administrative compensation as a relic from the days of Crown 
immunity preserved in stubborn defiance of the wishes of the legislature 
embodied in the Act. Reflecting this opinion Levy wrote of the Act: 2 
"English public servants were generally opposed to 
the Crown Proceedings Act. Accustomed as they were 
to deciding themselves on the liability of their own 
department, they were afraid that, in practice if not 
strictly in law, the intervention of the courts might 
bring about serious difficulties in -the working of the 
public service". 
1. (1978) 56 Pub. Adm. 257 (Editorial by Michael Lee) 
2. Op. cit., above p.3S0 
27i) 
Levy attempts no comparison with French practice and in approaching 
this topic, I have found it necessary at the outset to restrict myself 
to England. Although the rules of French administrative law expressly 
provide that no action for damages can be brought against the admin- 
istration in France without a demand for compensation being first made 
to the relevant public service) in order to allow an opportunity for 
administrative redress, a tradition exists that ex gratia payments 
are not made by the French public service. The scarcity of material 
makes it impossible to confirm or refute this. For example, the 
leading work on non—litigious administrative procedure 1 makes no 
reference to the subject and the well known administrative lawyer, 
Professor Drago, regrets the dearth of information, noting in his survey 
of the decisions of the Versailles tribunal that: 
"It would be particularly interesting 
in this respect to know how many of 
the applications for ex gratia payments 
'(recours 2racieux) result in the satis-
faction of the applicant and thus never 
arrive at the stage of litigation." 2 
1. Isaac, La procedure administrative non-contentieuse, 1968 
2. Drago n Etude relative aux decisions rendues par le tribunal 
administratif de Versailles, 1967-68 (1968) E.D.(.E. p. 165, 
28U 
No such figures seem to exist. 
There are in fact a number of reasons why in France the administration 
might not be drawn towards ex gratia techniques. First, the low cost of 
administrative justice in France inclines public servants to treat it as 
the standard mechanism for dispute settlement. Secondly, the budgetary 
and disciplinary functions of the Cour deiComptes and the Treasury act 
as a distinct disincentive to settlement out of court or ex gratia pay-
ments. All ex gratia payments are checked annually by the Cour de Comptes 
and I wotstoldl that the Court often criticises public servants who settle 
outside the limits of the decided caselaw and may also blame them for not 
litigating or even for not appealing. I was told also that the Cour deb' 
Comptes may recommend disciplinary proceedings and would not sanction 
payments made on behalf of an employee acting technically 'outside the 
course of his employment'. This practice contrasts greatly with the 
attitude of the Treasury Solicitor's office. Despite these disincentives, 
however, the majority of traffic claims in Paris are settled out of court 
(although the same is not true of municipalities and departments). 
This suggests that the practice of French Ministries may vary, some-
thing confirmed by the legal adviser of another Ministry who told me in 
an oral interview that, of approximately 450 claims in 15 years, she 
could remember only two negotiated out of court settlements. The practice 
of this Ministry is to rely strictly on their legal rights, including 
technicalities of procedure such as expiry of the limitation period. Even 
where they feel an administrative tribunal has made an error of law no 
settlement is made: indeed, only in cases of gross fault do they settle 
and then at as low a figure as possible. Although inconclusive, this 
1. Oral information supplied by the legal adviser to a French ministry 
responsible for settlement of rad accident cases. There are about 
100 claims per annum in Paris. The State does not insure. 
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information bears out certain academic writers who allege that the 
aaministration employs litigation as a delaying technique to deter 
litigants. 1  Again it contrasts with the attitude of the Treasury Solicitor. 
Occasionally the Conseil d'Etat may recommend an ex gratia pay-
ment in a case where no legal liability exists. If a case arises 
which seems to lie on the boundary or just outside the limits of legal 
liability — for example, because the plaintiff cannot prove fault though 
fault is suspected,or because statute does not seem to cover the case 
and hardship is caused — the court may report the case to the Conseil's 
Commission du Rapport 2 which may then negotiate a settlement with the 
department or public authority in question. 
It may be that the practice of ex gratia settlement in France 
is more widespread than is commonly imagined and that, with the advent 
of the M6diateur, more information will emerge. In the meantime, it 
would be unwise to make general deductions from the scanty material. 
I shall confine myself, the,efore, to noting in passing one or two 
interesting parallels with English practice. 
	1•1111013•10 
1. Amson et Lindon„ "Un Ombudsman pour France" (1970) J.C.P. 
pp 2322, 2453. 
2. Oral information from President du Commission du Rapport. 
For the function of the Commission see Harlow, op. cit, [1976] 
P.L. at pp 128-130; Mane:Tintervention du juge administratif 
dans. l'exeCution des ses decisions", (1968) 21 	p. 41. 
2 8 
In England the advent of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration, Health Service Commissioner (both for convenience abbrev-
iated as PCA) and the Commission for Local Administration (CLA) is 
beginning to provide a wealth of information on the practice of ex' 
gratia payment. This material casts doubt on some of the old prejudices. 
Ex gratia payments are not really arbitrary in character but formalised 
and structured by rules. Nor are they characteristically small—scale 
and individual in character. Often large numbers'of identical claims 
are received and need to be processed. 
One initial distinction can be made. Although negotiated settle-
ments are sometimes classified as ex gratia payments, they are really 
a response to threatened legal liability. Ex gratia payments properly 
so called are made only in cases where no legal liability exists. It 
is convenient ' 	to discuss these two categories separately. 
It is not possible at the outset, however, to go much further in class- 
ification. I have therefore made a second division of convenience between 
'individual® cases on the one hand and 'class' cases on the other, 
while admittint•that the two classes necessarily overlap. I have then 
grouped the cases loosely together in order to see whether any general 
principles do in fact emerge from the cases or are applied consistently. 
I admit at the outset that these groupings are rough—and—ready. 
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A. Settlement in res onse to 1 1 liabilit 
It is the general practice of government departments in England to 
settle out of court all cases in which liability is admitted and no 
dispute over the amount of damages arises. I am informed that perhaps 
no more than 1) of claims actually get to court and probably as many as 
5O are settled without even the threat of litigation. The Treasury: 
Solicitor, who is normally consulted, believes that the Departments might 
settle more sympathetically than would an insurer; 1 for example, the Crown 
would not wish to stand upon technical points of limitation or Crown 
Immunity. 2 The Crown also acts in accordance with the principles of the 
Motor Insurer's Bureau Schem e3 although it does not insure its vehicles. 
Whether a department will settle or refuse liability, seems to be 
entirely a matter of expedience. 
On one occasion, when an Area Health Authority refused payment in 
obedience to advice from their legal advisers, the following exchange is 
recorded before the Select Committee on the PCA.4 The Chairman (Mr. 
Antony Buck) thought it surprising that no payment had been made and asked 
the authority whether, on mature reflection, the decision was right. He 
received the response: 
1. Information supplied by the Treasury Solicitor. 
2. See, for confirmation, 3rd Report of Public Accounts 
(1971-2) paras. 2631, 2645. 
3. For the text of the Scheme which explicitly excludes 
6(1)(a) see Hepple and Matthews pp. 678-683. 
4. H.C. 372 (1977-7 8) p. 58 (discussed further below) 
Committee H.C.447 
the Crown at para. 
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"I have said that in my opinion it would have been 
expedient to have made this payment immediately" 
"I am a little puzzled by your use of the word 
'expedient'. Would it not have saved you a lot of 
bother in coming here and being asked a lot of 
questions by Members of Parliament?" 
"It would certainly have saved a lot of questions." 
"It would have been expedient in the sense not only being 
convenient from your point of view but also the right thing 
to have done?" 
"I do not know. I seem to have said this so often: 
we are very nervous of the consequences of making an 
ex gratia payment; I am referring to the long—term 
consequences. I repeat that in 20 years' experience in 
the Health Service we certainly have never made one. 
Perhaps others have." 
This exchange also seems to confirm a public expectation that public 
authorities will act "as an honest man" and will bear in mind factors 
other than the question of legal liability. Public authorities in general 
do seem to live up to this expectation; for example, immediately after the 
Moorfields underground disaster, London Transport announced that they would 
not contest' liability; 	again, the National Coal Board settled after the 
Aberfan Coal tip disaster. 1 On the other hand, there are many striking 
examples of legalism and ungenerosity. 
To stand on legal rights may actually be considered maladministration. 
The case from which I have just cited concerned wrongful detention in a 
mental hospital. 	At consultant in a mental hospital 
had signed an order discharging a patient upon which she went on a vol-
untary basis to a private nursing home. Due to an administrative muddle, 
she was subsequently arrested by the police, detained, readmitted to the 
1. Oral information from the N.C.B. 
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original hospital a4t a formal patient and confined in a locked. ward. The 
PCA found maladministration and recommended. a substantial ex gratia pay- 
ment on the basis of wrongful detention for 29 days. 1 
The regional authorities in question agreed a figure of X150 ) on 
the basis of legal advice which admitted unlawful detention, only for 
one day. Their representatives were sharply questioned by the Select 
Committee, but refused to change their minds on the grounds(i) that a 
clinical judgment of a consultant psychiatrist was involved (ii) that 
the sum paid was in accordance with the legal adviser's advice (iii) 
that no maladministration was involved and (iv) that detention had been 
only for one day. In response to the last point a committee member ob- 
served drily that X100 per by was a dangerous precedent to establish.2  The 
Committee expressed their great regret that the PCA's recommendation had 
been rejected3 and even hinted that the complainant's M.P. might take the 
matter up or regidbr a second complaint 4 of maladministration. In the 
absence of injunctive powers, they could go no further. 
There is an interesting parallel to this hospital case in a case 
investigated by the French Mgdiateur. A patient was found wandering under 
the influence of anaesthetic and the staff tied her to the bed and left. 
The staff were dismissed 7but only on condition that the patient initiated 
litigation. The Mgdiateur was greatly shocked by this attitude saying: 
1. Second Report from Select Committee on the PCA ' H.C. 372 (1977-78) 
PP 9 - 25 
2. At p. 13 (Q73 Mr. Jones). 
3. At p. viii 
4. At p. 15, QQ 87-89. 
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"There is another aspect of the attitude of the 
administration to justice which merits comment, namely, 
that the administration withdraws behind the concept of 
justice in order not to pay his just dues to the 
applicant. Despite the fact that it admits the debt, the 
administration prefers to send the applicant to the courts. 
Such practices are obviously very blameworthy and the 
Government ought immediately to issue an instruction to 
put a stop to them. The Mgdiateur intends to draw the 
practice — which particularly concerns Prefects — to 
the attention of the Prime Minister." 1 
This passage suggests that the Mgdiateur may have been insufficiently 
aware of the difficult position of the public servant, trapped between 
his generous impulses and the power of the Cour des Comptes. The English 
public servant is in an equally ambivalent position. On the one hand his 
training inclines him to give a high priority to thrift and scrupulous care 
with public funds. These attitudes are fostered by the rules of government 
accounting, by the activities of the Comptroller and Auditor—General and 
the control of the Public Accounts , Ommittee. The intervention of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner (or Mgdiateur) and of the Select Committee 
creates a powerful pull in the opposite direction. This tension cannot 
always be resolved. 
In cases where legal liability is not clear, the Department may 
stand on its legal rights. The attitude of the PCA is then that 
(i) he will normally exercise his discretion to investigate and (ii) if he 
finds maladministration, he will recommend a settlement. In one case 2 
a county court registrar misfiled and mislaid a cheque with the result that 
1. Annual Report 1976 pp 29-30 and Case No 11-2429 p. 231. 
2. Report of PCA for 1 697-7% H.C. 144 	(1977/78), 
Case 15/599/77, p. 232. 
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thecomplainant was unable to cash it before the company went into liquid-
ation. The Treasury Solicitor advised against accepting liability. The 
PCA agreed to investigate and negotiated a settlement on the ground that 
hardship had been caused. He explained that, although the department: 
"had formally denied liability they accepted that the 
legal position was by no means clear, and they con- 
sidered in any event that it was wrong for them to stand 
upon a denial of liability since it was clear that the complain-
ant's difficulties were caused substantially by carelessness 
in the County Court office." 
In a second,rather similar case, 1 a blunder by the lopartment of 
Health led to a man being wrongly accused in affiliation proceedings. 
The suit was naturally dismissed and, the court, refusing costs, suggested 
a civil action against the DHSS. The man's legal adviser was dubious, and 
instead referred the complaint to the PCA. The DHSS admitted responsibility 
and suggested reimbursement of the costs of X43.20. But after further 
negotiation the PCA secured an ex gratia payment of £150, on the ground 
of hardship, worry and troublel not to say possible injury to the complain-
ant's reputation. 
Probably the best knownof such cases are the "Duck 'Vaccine case" and 
the "Green Honey case".2 In both cases the complainants alleged that 
negligence on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture had led to financial 
loss. Although there was a strong possibility of legal liability and the 
PCA does not normally have jurisdiction where a court or tribunal affords an 
alternative remedy, he used his discretionary powers under section 5(2)(b) 
1. 1st Report of PCA H.C. 37 ( 1975-76) Case No. 0130/V: p. 142 
2. Annual Report of PCA for )970-71, H.C. 261 (1970-71) case C 133/L 
PP 10-16 and C 694/L pp 16-23; 1st Report of Select Committee, 
H.C.240 (1970-71) pp. 39-43/ 43-48. 
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of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 and investigated. Maladmin 
An 
istration was found andkex gratia payment recommended. At this stage 
a dispute broke out over the amount of compensation in the "Green Honey 
Case." To cite Gregory and Hutchesson: 1  
"The Department eventually offered Major Wheeler R130; 
he estimated his Losses at E1,400, and described the 
Ministry's offer as 'scandalous' and 'sheer impertinence'. 
After the M.P. concerned had made further informal 
representations to the Minister, the Department subsequently 
made a fresh offer, which the complainant described as a 
'vast improvement'; though the actual figure was not 
disclosed." 2 
Had no better offer been forthcoming ) : 	the position would have 
been very difficult, The complainant might have instituted legal 
proceedings or he might have tried a fresh complaint to the PCA about 
the amount offered. This is a doubtful remedy in the authors' view: 
"In this situation — which has never yet occurred —
it is not clear, however, whether the Commissioner 
would feel that it was in principle open to him to 
criticise the department for not providing a satisfactory 
rememdy, or whether he would regard the department's 
decision about the sum to be offered as a discretionary 
decision immune from further criticism if it had been 
reached after due consideration and following the proper 
procedures." 
Although this seems at first an unduly pessimistic view of the PCA's 
powers and probable reaction, later cases do suggest that the authors 
may have some grounds for their fears. In a later case where a com-
plainant did complain of the adequacy of the sum offered the PCA con- 
cluded: "It does not rest with me to determine how lare the offer of that 
ex gratia payment to the complainant should be." 
	,06,0W1111 
10 The Parliamentary Ombudsman, 1975, pp 168-9 
2. Ibid. 
3. 1st Report of PCA, H.C. 49 (1974-75) Case No. C305/J pp. 173-4. 
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It may be that, in the particular case, the PCA felt inadequate to 
make an assessment or felt the sum offered was not inadequate. On 
other occasions, as with the case of wrongful detention referred to 
the Select Committee, he can be sharply critical of administrative 
parsimony. The difficulty does, however, illustrate a weakness of 
PCA. procedure which often exasperates lawyers. In the strongest case, 
the PCA can %o no further than a recommendation. He has no mandatory 
orders at his disposal to push recalcitrant departments into obedience. 
A second case in which a department will settle in accordance 
with legal liability,though not strictly a negotiated settlement, is 
wheai a High Court judgment applicable to an individual case has im-
plications for a wider class of people. 
Following the dedision in Judd v. Ministry of Pensions, Ifor example, 
the Ministry.reexamined its files to ensure that all pensioners who might 
have benefited from this decision were contacted and their pensions 
reassessed. 1 A later PCAreport refers to the 	High Court decision 
in Marshall v. Ministry of Pensions. The PCA secured an ex gratia pay-
ment for an applicant who showed that l following the judgment in 1948, 
he had had no adequate opportunity to show that he should benefit from 
the decision. 2 We can probably conclude that a departmental failure to 
apply a High Court ruling generally rather than to the specific case 
will be considered a maladministration. 
On occasion, the implication'of a High CouTt decision may be 
extremely complicated. .This is well illustrated. by a-series of oases 
1. [1965] 3 All ER 642. See Annual Report for 1972, H.C.72 (1972) p.8. 
2. [1947] 2 All ER 706. See 1st Report of PCA H.C. 49(1974-75) Case 
C.466/7 p.71. 
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concerning the application of the provisions of the Limitation Acts in 
the cases of certain industrial diseases. The original rule was that 
the right of action accrued and time started to run at the moment when 
the damage (i.e. the disease) was caused. 1 Statute and caselaw gradually 
amended this rule to the point that time started to run only when the 
material facts on which his action was based became known to the plain-
tiff i.e. when the plaintiff knew he had the disease. 2  Publicity given 
to the decisions in which this extension was sanctioned led to 30,000 
claims against the National Coal Board by victim. of pneumoconiosis alleg-
ing negligence and breach of statutory duty against their employers. 
The Court of Appeal3 then extended the law again by holding that time 
started to run only from the date when the plaintiff learned that he 
possessed a potentially worthwhile cause of action. A new class of 
potential litigants was immediately created,although the issue of 
liability was far from clear because each plaintiff would need to prove 
negligence or breach of statutory duty. Settlement was difficult, 
because the Board was not prepared to admit that any one case was suf-
ficiently typical to serve as a test case on the issues of liability or 
damage. 
1. Cartledge v. E. Jooling and Sons Ltd E1963] 
2. limitation Act 1963 s:, 1(4(3) as amended by 
aneous Provisions) Act 1971 s.1(1), 2(1)(2) 
National 
	:199: 




discussed in Pickles v. 
v. Central Asbestos Co. 
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A single decision1 may have unseen implications for the destiny 
of many other individuals which the legal process cannot easily unravel. 
The parties are not all before the court, their rights have not been 
considered and legal decisions are not always adequately publicised. 
A test case of this type is thus capable of creating injustice through 
unequal treatment of like cases. Administrative intervention can often 
provide an effective answer. In the pneumoconiosis cases discussed 
above, the government at first authorised settlements by the Board to 
which it contributed. In the end, however, a statutory framework for 
state compensation was created. 2 Cases of this type are quite unsuit-
able for ex gratia settlement procedures because they involve vast 
sums of money and delicate policy decisions. It is wrong in principle 
for public servants acting on their on initiative to accept respon, 
sibility for making such decisions. Responsibility rests inevitably on 
the government and the legislature. 
1. Compare the Sastre case, discussed above, p.2 4p1 
2. See now the Pneumoniconiosis Etc. (Workers' Compensation) Act 1979. The information concerning claims, settlement and neg-
otiation was kindly supplied by the National Coal Board. 
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B. Ex gratia Compensation 
1. Individual Cases  
The normal rule is that ex gratia payments are wholly exceptional 
in character and they will not be made in cases where there is neither 
legal liability nor, since 1967, evidence of maladministration. Depart-
ures from this rule are said to be few and far between - though official 
statistics do not seem to exist - and are usually based on "hardship" 
"exceptional circumstances" or "companssion". Thus each case is in 
 and it is hard to discern any common factor. In this sense, 
they closely resemble the small claims to which the Conseil d'Etat some-
times applies the Equality principle and which Gilli explains as cases 
of "Conscience and Equity". 1 The obvious danger is that the administration 
will in fact act in an arbitrary fashion and that the traditional con-
stitutional checks will prove inadequate. This is the class of case in 
which Professor Michell's denial that maladministration is "truly 
political" is most obviollsly correct and which, because of its small 
scale and tone.off' nature 7may escape the political process. Today, how-
ever, an additional check is provided, by the Ombudsmen. 
In several cases the PCA has been critical of the miserly attitude 
of government departments. In the Watchford Festival case, 2 a farmer 
suffered damage caused by visitors to a "Pop Festival' which took place 
at Watchford. The Crown was advised that there was no legal liability 
1. Above p. 274 
2. 
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and the Home Office thereupon refused to pay. The PCA felt that there 
was "a strong moral obligation" to reimburse the farmer who would 
probably be unable to recoup himself from the festival organisers and 
the Home Office then offered an extra gratia payment of ROO. This case 
can only be classified under the heading of 'hardship' or 'abnormal loss'. 
Another very similar case1 is that of a dairy farmer robbed by a burglar 
of a number of books of milk tokens which he had not yet cashed. Not 
only did the Department refuse to reimburse him but they tried to hold 
him liable for the cost of replacements. The PCA secured an ex gratia 
payment. 
In one interesting case, 2 the PCA secured an ex gratia payment 
for intangible loss suffered by a prisoner on remand who had been wrongly 
classified and lost his privileges for a short period. The PCA was 
advised that "failure to observe the Prison Rules does not provide a 
basis for legal action." Nevertheless he secured a payment of £100 which, 
he explained, was "not confined to damage for loss measured in money 
but really for loss of character."" 
In individual settlements the French Mediateur has also criticised 
the administration for its legalistic attitude. In one case a young boy 
blown up by a mine or grenade in 1945 failed in the administrative courts 
to establish a right to a pension because he was himself held to be at 
fault in picking the object up. 3 Consulted by the Mgdiateur l the Conseil 
1. 1st Report of the PCA 1970-71, H.0.261(1970-71) Case No. C.679/L 
(Scottish Home and. Health Department) r., RnoS seri- t itre c,tassiC ats, 14 c zit C 	ci-fio) Case Alc..11.1125e(lff .") (tvni revisa Non fo Site. devitormeni) 
2. Report of the PCA H.C. 119 (1968-69) Case No. C.442/68 p. 45; Report of the Select Committee H.C.385 (1968-69) p. 84. 
3. Annual Report of the Mediateur for 1974, pp 26-7, ease No. 1-291. 
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d'Etat upheld the correctness of the decisioni but despite this opinion 
the Mediateur asked the Ministry to reopen the case. They declined on 
the ground that the caselaw was clear and to depart therefrom might 
be discriminatory. The Iddiateur used his powers of recommendation 
with the result that the Ministry backed down and, thirty years too late, 
awarded a pension. 
This French example closely parallels an English case in which 
a woman complained to the PCA because she had been awarded only 
E1,000 from the estate of her brother—in—law who had died intestate. 
The relevant statutory provisions invested the Crown with a discretion, 
ary power to make payments to relatives. The PCA's investigation 
revealed the existence of departmental guidelines. Grants should have: 
"the object of redressing hardship. The granting 
practice is not a set of hard and fast rules, but 
it sets out grounds on which applications for grants 
can be considered so as generally to remove griev , 
 ances and to avoid inconsistency of treatment 
between applicants." 
Since the Department had adhered to its own guidelines, the PCA expressed 
himself satisfied. 1 
It seems fair to conclude that administrators in general are 
very much concerned with the ideal of "class equality" or distributive 
justice. They are more prepared than courts, lawyers, and perhaps the 
general public to accept that individuals may have to be sacrificed on 
occasion to the public interest. They are more inclined, therefore, to 
see the shadow of a class claim behind any given individual application. 
This leads us naturally on from individual cases 
which appear to the administration to raise any point of general 
	 tomMION•11=0.101•111■10111111•006.1.. 	 
1. 	4th Report of PCA H.C. 405 (974-75) Case No. C 478/J p. 181. 
See, on this point, British Oxygen Co. v. Board of  Trade [1971] 
A.C. 610. 
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principle and which are usually settled on grounds of hardship or 
maladministration to class cases, in the sense of cases which raise a point of 
general principle. and which may affect the rights of third parties who 
are not involved in the original application for compensation. 
2. anamatntion 
To attempt a classification of class oases is a far more difficult task. 
The first general point to make is that all ex gratia payments (other 
than those made on the grounds of equity and hardship to government 
contractors) are subject to control by the Treasury except in the case 
that an individual department has, like the Home Office, delegated 
authority to settle certain cases itself within a given money limit. 
This control is said to be aimed not only at ensuring control of govern-
ment expenditure but of ensuring broad uniformity of treatment between 
government departments. 1 Whether it is capable of achieving this last 
result is, one supposes, extremely doubtful. 
(i) Negligence and Maladministration 
As in the individual cases, compensation is always the exception 
and never the rule. Thus, the first principle applicable is that, 
except where compelling reasons to the contrary exist, the administration 
is unlikely to offer compensation where there is no evidence of negligence 
(which would in any event found legal liability) or of maladministration. 
1. See "Treasury Control of Losses and Special Payments" reprinted in 
Epitome of the Reports from the Public Accounts Committee 1938-69, 
H.C.187 (1969-70) pp•426-431. 
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One of the areas in which this rule is most stubbornly and, I think, 
recalcitrantly applied is in the case of miscarriage of justice. I 
use the word 'recalcitrant' because it seems to me that not only are 
the criteria themselves stringent but they are applied harshly and 
without generosity. 
In one case1 an immigrant from Pakistan successfully contested 
in an Immigration Appeals Tribunal a decision to exclude him from the 
U.K. By the time the case was heard, however, the applicant had returned 
to Pakistan. The Home Office refused to pay his return fare and the 
PCA was unable to help. He reported: 
"The Home Office tell me that any request for an 
ex gratia payment is considered on its merits, 
but it is normal practice to decline to pay for the 
return passage where the immigration officer had 
reached a reasonable conclusion on the evidence 
before him at the time. 
It might well be different if a case should arise where it 
could be substantiated that the immigration officer had 
not applied his mind fairly to the passenger's case, 
or had been motivated by prejudice or discrimination, 
or had arrived at a wholly unreasonable conclusion. The 
Home Office maintain that this was not the situation in 
this case, pointing out that the immigration officer's 
decision was endorsed by the adjudicator and by one 
member of the *ribunal." 
2 At first sight, no more than an extremely hard case, this affair does 
involve a serious issue of general principle and the solution thawev-er 
inequitable it may seam„is entirely in line with the attitude of the 
Home Office to loss caused by a miscarriage of justice. 
1. 1st Report of PCA H.C.49(1974-5) Case No. C311/J pp 127-8. 
2. Payments to immigrants seem to be extremely unusual: see 
H.C. Deb 30 Ju,ne.19781col..707 written answer. 
Vol, q52. 
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Compensation for misoarri es of .ustice 
The decision to exclude all liability for loss arising through 
the operation of the judicial services from the terms of the Crown 
Proceedings Act means that the only recourse is government bounty. 
In principle, this is an extremely unsatisfactory position and one which 
is out of line with the practice of other European countries where 
statute permits a measure of compensation in such cases. 1 
Even if allowance is made for oases in which costs have been allowed 
on acquittal it is ludic4ous to suppose that the tiny handful of cases 
in which compensation is awarded represents more thah -a‘fraCtion of the cases 
in which defendants in fact suffer serious loss from detention before 
trial or from wrongful conviction. The explanation lies in the extremely 
restrictive criteria for a grant. These criteria were revealed to the 
Select Committee on the PCA in 1971 by Sir Philip Allen on behalf of 
the Home Office. Sir Philip stated that of some 2,000 odd remands per 
annum there had been 5 cases of compensation in the last 3 years. He 
continued: 2 
"There is no statutory provision covering this. But we 
have with Treasury agreement over the years made ex gratia 
payments in certain circumstances and haveha.d. to devise 
rules in accordance with. which those payments are made." 
1. Borchard (1913) 3 J. Crim Law 684 lists some early American State 
statutes. For Germany see Boing (1977) X Modern Law and Society 
p. 27. For France see Ardant, La Responsabilite de ltEtat du fait 
de la fonction juridictionnelle, 1954; Br4Ohon-Moulenes, op. cit. 
PP. 482-4. See also below. 
2. Report of Select Committee, H.C.240 (1970-71) pp. 70-71. 
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The guidiines Sir Philip gave were: that payments should be made in 
cases where a court or the Court of Appeal acquits and the victim can 
show particular hardship,or where there is some evidence that the case 
has been mishandled. When the Home Secretary grants a free pardon, 
however, 
"...there is a feeling that the State has gone so badly 
adrift and the man has suffered so much, that compensation 
is payable quite apart from any question of negligence." 
Questioned on the possibility of extending their practice, Sir Philip 
continued: 1 
"...this is so small that I do not think anyone 
takes objection to this being handled ex gratia 
in this way. 
If we were to go in for this in a big way or some 
sort of routine basis, one would need statutory powers." 
The reason for the refusal to expand the scheme was expounded 
further in a parliamentary answer in 1968: 2 
"The Department decided that so long as the onus of 
proof remained upon the prosecution, it would be 
difficult to justify automatic compensation on 
acquittal, and that any procedure allowing for the 
payment of compensation only in selected cases would 
involve an inviduous discrimination which would reflect 
upon those not compensated." 
The Home Office have steadily held this line. 
In 1976, asked by MiVs Hayman to make a statement, the Home 
Secretary set out the following guidelines: 3 
1. At pp 74-5• 
2. H.C. Deb 20 Mar 1968 Vol 761 cols 553-564 and see Annual Report of. 
PCA for 1970, H.0.261 (1970-71) Case No. C.550/L at p. 127. 
3. H.C. Deb 29 July 1976 vol 916, written answers; cols 328-9. 
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EX Gratia Payments to Persons Wrongly Convicted 
or Charged: Procedure for Assessing the Amount 
of the Payment 
A decision to make an ex gratia payment from public funds 
does not imply any admission of legal liability: it is not, 
indeed, based on considerations of liability for which 
there are appropriate remedies at civil law. The payment 
is offered in recognition of the hardship caused by a wrong-
ful conviction or charge and notwithstanding that the cir-
cumstances may give no grounds for a claim for civil damages. 
2. Subject to Treasury approval, the amount of the payment 
to be made is at the discretion of the Home Secretary, but 
it is his practice before deciding this to seek the advice 
of an independent assessor experienced in the assessment of 
damages. An interim payment may be made in the meantime. 
3. The independent assessment is made on the basis of written 
submissions setting out the relevant facts. When the claimant 
or his solicitor is first informed that an ex gratia payment 
will be offered in due course, he is invited to suibmit any 
information or representations which he would like the assessor 
to take into account in advising on the amount to be paid. 
Meanwhile, a memorandum is pmpared by the Home Office. This 
will include a fall statement of the facts of the case, and 
any available information on the claimant's circumstances and 
antecedents, and may call attention to any special features 
in the case which might be considered relevant to the amount 
to be paid; any comments or representations received from, 
or on behalf of, the claimant will be incorporated in, or 
annexed to, this memorandum. A copy of the completed memorandum 
will then be sent to the claimant or his solicitors for any 
further comments he may wish to make. These will be submitted, 
with the Memorandum, for the opinion of the assessor. The 
assessor may wish to interview the claimant or his solicitor 
to assist him in preparing his assessment and will be prepared 
to interview them if they wish. As stated in paragraph 2 above, 
the final decision as to the amount t be paid is a matter entirely 
for the Home Secretary. 
4. In making his assessment, the assessor will apply principles 
analogous to those governing the assessment of damages for civil 
wrongs. The assessment will take acount of both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary loss arising from the conviction and/or loss of 
liberty, and any or all the following factors may thus be 
relevant according to the circumstances: 
Pecuniary Loss 
Loss of earnings as a result of the charge or conviction 
Loss of future earning capacity. 
Legal costs incurred. 
Additional expense incurred in consequence of detention, 
including expenses incurred by the family. 
Non-Pecuniary loss 
Damage to character or reputation. 
Hardship, including mental suffering, injury to feelings and 
inconvenience. 
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When making his assessment, the .assessor will take into 
account any expesnes, legal or otherwise, incurred by the 
claimant in establishing his innocence or pursting the claim 
for compensation. In submitting his observations a solicitor 
should state, as well as any other expenses incurred by the 
claimant, what his own costs are, to enable them to be in-
cluded in the assessment. 
5. In considering the circumstances leading to the wrongful 
conviction or charge the assessor will also have regard, 
where appropriate, to the extent to which the situation might 
be attributable to any action, or failure to act, by the 
police or other public authority, or might have been contributed 
to by the accused person's own conduct. The amount offered 
will accordingly take account of this factor, but will not 
include any element analogous to exemplary or punitive damages. 
6. Since the payment to be offered is entirely ex gratia, and 
at his discretion, the Home Secretary is not bound to accept 
the assessor's recommendation, but it is normal for him to do 
so. The claimant is equally not bound to accept the offer 
finally made; it is open to him instead to pursue the matter 
by way of a legal claim for damages, if he considers he has 
grounds for doing so. But he may not do both. While the offer 
is made without any admission of liability, payment is subject 
to the claimant's signing_Ja form of waiver undertaking not to 
make any other claim whatsoever arising out of the circumstance 
of his prosecution or conviction, or his detention in either 
or both of these connections. 
This position was maintained in 1977 in the case of a police con-
stabaD dismissed the force after conviction, and later acquitted by the 
Court of Appeal. The Under-Secretary of State explained: 1 
"...it would be unrealistic to contemplate the compensation 
as a matter of course, of every acquitted . defendant. I 
say "every acquitted defendant" because the same principle 
would logically apply to defendants acquitted at trial and 
to successful appellants. Reasons for acquittal are many 
and various. Sometimes the decision may depend on the inter-
pretation of a difficult point of law; sometimes it may be 
a mere legal technicality. More frequently it is because the 
prosecution has failed to satisfy the jury beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
Our legal system provides that in criminal cases the onus of 
proof rests upon the prosecution, and as long as an accused 
person is not required to prove his innocence it is difficult 
to justify automatic compensation on acquittal." 
1. H.C. Deb. 1 April 1977 cols. 835-840. 
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Unsatisfactory as these reasons are„ theydo at least represent a 
considered policy decision, taken at a high level in the Home Office. What 
is harder to justify is the paltry sums awarded to successful claimants. 
'In their bbok "Wrongful Imprisonment" 1 Brandon and Davies listed 
the following awards: 
Year Number of Payments Amounts 
1956 3 (27 months in prison) £400; £300; £300 
1963 1 (7 months Borstal) £200 (offer not accepted) 
1965 3 (8 months 'prison) £1,400;£1,850; £1,600 
1969 1 (42 months in prison) E4 / 000 
1970 1 (10 months in prison) £1,500) 
To this table we may add the following statistics given in answer 
to a parliamentary question2  . 
1968 3 E250;123;100 
* 1969 1 £5,000 
1970 2 1850; £1,500 
1971 3 1750;E1,250;e2,250 
1974 1 £17,500 
1975 2 £1,500; £2,000 
	
*1 1976 	5 	 £500; £10,000 1977 13 1300;11,100;11,500; 2 ,550 
 * Appears not to tally with figure used by Brandon and Davies above 
** Provisional assessments. 
3. 	Brandon and Davies, Wrongful Imprisonment, 1973, p. 201. 
2. 	H.C. Deb 6 July 1978, Written answers col. 247 
3 0 g., 
At the date of writing, Brandon and Davies thought the sums 
paltry when compared with the awards of civil courts. They stated: 1 
"The civil courts make even more generous awards 
against the police or prosecution witnesses on 
charges of false accusation; without imprisonment 
being involved at all." 
and went on to cite two well—known cases of malicious prosecutioniin 
which sums of £5,200 and 0,000 respectively had been awarded with costs 
to successful plaintiffs in the civil courts. 
Some order has been introduced into the chaos thowever, by the 
appointment of the Chairman of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 
to act as independent assessor to the Home Office. His first task 
was to establish a starting point. This he did by asking members of the 
Bench and Bar to participate in assessing compensation for "a respectable 
man:wrongly imprisoned for one year". The consensus figure was £5,000. 
This figure may be adjusted to the facts of individual cases and 
joined to an additional sum for loss of earnings. 2 There, is however, no 
easy way to verify that the principles are being adhered to. 
This suggests a far more sensible solution. 'All such ex gratia pay-
, tents should be formalised in'this area and juriSdiction -giVen to the 
CICB which is well able to deal with it. The prerogative nature of the 
Scheme would preserve flexibility during a trial period — the main advantage 
of extra—statutory over statutory schemes — while participation of the 
CICB, which has acquired general respect and which issues regular reports, 
would allay public anxiety over injustices perpetrated. 
1. At p. 203 
2. Letter from the Chairman of the CICB to the author. 
There are several principles which could be adopted as a basis for 
liability, some less generous than others. The French scheme currently uses 
the Standard of "gross fault". 1 If this were selected — and the only 
thing to be said in its favour is that it is a start — then it would be only 
fair to distinguish between cases of detention and other cases t on the 
ground that imprisonment without good cause is a grave wrong. Amore 
sensible criterion for compensation. would be that of 'abnormal loss' or, 
in the Ehglish phrase, 'hardship'. Art. 149 of the Law of 17 July 1970 
concerning pre—trial detention in France permits compensation in all cases 
where temporary detention in the course of a preparatory investigation by 
an examining magistrate ends in an order for discharge or acquittal and the 
detainee "has suffered nmanifestly abnormal and particularly grave hardship 
through the detention." 
The joinder of these two requirements is severe and the test could 
with advantage be softened by an assumption comparable to that made by the 
Home Office at present in cases of free pardon: that every case of imprison-
ment constitutes abnormal hardship. Compensation would then be assessed on 
the basis of the tariff currently applied. 
The standard justification advanced for the absence of a regular 
compensation scheme that compensation cannot be general so long as the 
burden of proof rests with the prosecution,is not really a very good one. 
Yet it does contain within it the real explanation for the failure to institute 
1. See Vedel op. cit. p 853. Addendum, where he argues that this codif-
ication represents a step backwards from the existing caselaw of the 
administrative courts. 
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reform of this long-standing injustice. There seems to be a widely held 
view amongst police and public that the rules of criminal procedure are 
designed mainly to facilitate the escape from the arms of the law of a large 
number of 'villains". As Sir Robert Mark lias put it: 1 
"Because of its technicality and its uncertainty, the 
criminal trial has come to be regarded as a game of 
skill and chance in which the rules are binding on 
one side only". 
To introduce compensation tends to be viewed as the presentation of 
prizes to successful players, an additional difficulty being that awards 
may contrast favourably with those made to policemen who suffer injury in 
the course of duty. 2 n additions the Criminal Injuries I 
Scheme is itself regarded by some as "a state-financed insurance scheme 
for the victims of intentional torts." 3 To introduce compensation for 
miscarriage of justice would seem to tip the balance too far in favour 
of 'villains' and the best that can be hoped for is to pluck a handful of 
hard cases from the general run and permit an exceptional, ex gratia hand-
out. 
1. In the Offee of Constable, 1978, p. 157, a citation from his Dimbleby 
lecture delivered 3 November 1973. 
2. In 1974 1,557 awards to policemen on duty were made by the CICB; in 1975 the figure rose to 1,928 and in 1976 to 2,298. These awards 
represented respectively 14.7% 15.4% and 16. 0 of all cases resolved. 
Annual Report for 1976 (12th Report). 
3. Miers, Responses to Victimisation: a comparative study of compensation 
for criminal violence in Great Britain and Ontario 1978, p. 197. The 
CICB can ask to be subrogated to the victims rights in a criminal court. 
In 1975-76 359 orders resulted in the recovery of E7,420; in 1976-77 
540 orders resulted in recovery of E12,265; in 1977-78 735 orders resulted 
in recovery of £14,720. Whether the practice is economically justified 
is probably immaterial, the consideration being primarily a moral one. 
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There are nonetheless rational responses to these difficulties. There 
are several ways of excluding the thoroughly undeserving from the operation 
ot, the scheme. The present Criminal Indies Scheme already uses the fault 
principle. Paragraph 17 provides that: 
"The Board will reduce the amount of compensation or 
reject the application altogether if, having regard to 
the conduct of the victim, including his conduct 
before and after the events giving rise to the claim, 
and to his character and way of life it is inappropriate 	1 that he should be granted a full award or any award at all." 
SUrprisingly, this somewhat arbitrary provision has given rise to 
little obvious difficulty and the Working Party concluded that "the Board 
has the experience to evolve working rules, which demonstrate the'principles 
which they apply within the broad framework of the [scheme]". 2 It would 
be perfectly possible to introduce a similar limitation in a scheme for 
compensation for the victims of miscarriage of justice. 
A second solution could link recovery to the criminal trial itself 
by requiring a certificate from the trial court or. Court of Appeal before 
the victim could apply for compensation. This would mean in effect that 
minor claims could be eliminated at a preliminary stage by compliance with 
the current Practice Direction on Costs 3 which provides that costs should, 
as a matter of "normal practice" be awarded to a successful defendant "unless 
there are positive reasons for making a different order." Amongst such 
reasons, the Direction numbers the cases: 
"(b) Where the defendant's own conduct has brought suspicion 
on himself and has misled the prosecution into thinking that 
the case against him is stronger than it really is... 
and 	(c) Where there is ample evidence to support a verdict of 
guilty but the defendant is entitled to an acquittal on 
account (4. some procedural irregularity..." 
1. This paragraph has been expanded in guidelines published by the CICB 
(Review pp 105-6). See also R v. .........4.111auri sp......Crimina ,tionBoard 
ex. p. Ince [1973] 1 WLR 1334• 
2. Review pp 62-63. 
[1973] 1 WLR 718 and Thoresby, "Costs on Acquittal" •1973] 36 MLR 643. 
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The theoretical objections can thus be easily disposed of and the 
primary consideration must necessarily be one of cost. At present, the 
sums involved are trifling. .Formalisation of the scheme would certainly 
increase the sums, by how much one does not know. It should not however, 
be beyond the capacity of the Home Office to provide a reliable estimate. 
When this is done a reasoned policy decision will be possible. 
(ii) 	Policy Decisions 
The sentiment expressed by Sir Phillip Allen that the administration, 
like the courts, ought not to assume important policy decisions with 
serious financial implications, really represents a second criterion for 
administrative compensation: "the administration serves in a purely oper-
ational or executive capacity and must not depart too far from the prov-
isions of,statute or regulations. Moreover, schemes which imply policy 
decisions or drastic change in policy ought normally to be made by the process 
of legislation or at least ministerial regulation. 
A notorious battle between the Inland Revenue on the one handand the 
PCA and Select Committee on the other2 admirably illustrates this point. 
The PCA became concerned at injustice caused to taxpayers through delays in 
assessment and refusal to waive back payment of taxes. He reported to the 
1 Select Committee the Revenue Practice,which was to make compensation only 
in cases where a departmental error had occasioned hardship to an individual. 
though this contrasted with the practice of ,Other departments ) the Revenue main 
tained that "they could ppy nothing unless they were covered by a legal 
1. 	1st Report of Select Committee, H.C. 240 (1970-71) p. 23 
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enactment" and they found it impossible to draw up the terms of a legal 
provision to cover such a payment. A government concession later followed, 
the terms of which were rather strictly adhered to by an unrepentant 
Revenue department. 1 Whether the Revenue was justified in this case I 
find it hard to judge. A more valid example concerns a complaint of 
failure to pay compensation for destruction of stocks of pig feed after 
swine vesicular disease had necessitated slaughter of the pigs. 2  The 
department explained: 
"The Government's policy on such consequential loss is 
long-established. It has been reviewed by two independant 
committees of Enquiry... both of which recommended firmly 
in favour of continuing to limit compensation to animals 
and things which had been destroyed on instructions from 
the Ministry's veterinary officers." 
The PCA thereupon refused to find maladministration. 
An example of a case in which a department took a rather stubborn line 
is that of the Home Loss payments initiated by the Land Compensation Act 
19733 . This Act provided a limitation period of six months in respect of 
claims for Home Loss which subsequently proved to have been too short a 
period in view of the fact that the compensation was novel in type. A 
very large number of time-barred claims WtrIreceived by local authorities 
some of which they wished to settle. The Department of the Environment, 
however, blocked their path 7by using its powers under section 161(1) of 
the Local Government Act, 1972 to refuse permission for ex gratia payments by 
1. Cmnd 4729 (1970-71). For a later case see 4th Report of PCA, H.C.413 
(1976-77) Case No. C.346/K p. 175. 
2. 1st Report of PCA H.C. 37(1975-76 ) Case C 320/J p. 4 at p. 
3. For a fuller account, see Harlow, [1977] P.L. 301 
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a local authority. Complaints were made both to the PCA and CLA. The 
matter finally reached the Select Committee 1 where the Department argued 
that to permit settlement in all cases was to encourage deliberate cir-
cumvention of a recent statute and to create a statutory obligation not 
created by the statute to'inform applicants of their rights in all cases. Same-
what-pmgenuously, they argued that it was up to Parliament to amend the 
law, though how this was to be done in the teeth of their own opposition 
Was not explained. The explanation satisfied nobody and neither the CLA 
nor the PCA backed down. 
For several reasons the departmental decision seems wrong. In the 
first place, it conflicted with a previous policy statement concerning the 
role of central government in connection with ex gratia payments by local 
authorities. In an earlier case 2 the Department had said that ex gratia 
payments were "a matter for the authority and not something on whiCh the 
Department can exert more than moral persuasion". Secondly, the decision 
manifestly conflicted with the intentions of Parliament in establishing the 
CLA. This became clear shortly afterwards when section 161 was repealed 
by the Local Government Act 1978. Finally, while clinging to the letter of 
the 1973 statute, the department frustrated its spirit, a point made by the 
Select Committee very sharply in a later case of maladministration by the 
Department and the Ministry of Transport together in the operation of the 
same provisions. 3 
A complaint was made that inadequate publicity had been given on the 
occasion of road works in Bexley with the result that certain property owners 
in Rochester Way, Bexley, found their claims for Home Loss payments time 
1. Second Report of the Select Committee, H.C. 524 ( 1 976-77) 
2. Report of the Select Committee H.C. 379 (1973-73) p.x. 
3. 6th Report of PCA, H.C.598(1977-78); 3rd Special Report of the Select 
Committee, H.C. 666 (1977-78); Ist Report from the Select Committee, 
H.C.91 (1978-79) 
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barred. The PCA upheld their complaint and recommended extra—statutory com-
pensation but the two departments, claiming that they had taken legal advice 
and Treasury advice, refused to budge. The Committee accused the department 
of ignoring "Parliament's main intention [which] was that people should 
be enabled to claim compensation from funds set aside for that purpose." 
They recommended extra—statutory payments or, failing that, amendment to 
the Act. 
The Ministry of Transport fell back on accounting difficulties, explain-
ing1 that ex gratia payments were "exceptional in character" and could not 
be used "on a general basis". In other words, "... there is a limit to 
which an accounting officer can go in authorising an•exzaALE. payment." 
The Chairman asked whether this position squared with other cases of 
error and misleading advice and was told that it did: 
"It is exactly in line with the rules laid down in Government 
accounting, as interpreted and expressed by the Treasury, and 
endorsed by repeated expressions of view over thepars by 
the Public Accounts Committee. The doctrine is that an ex pratia payment can be made if the circumstances are genuinely 
exceptional... If there is a class of cases which I chose to 
try to treat as suitable for ex gratia payments, then I 
could start a line of expenditure not envisaged in the Act and 
not endorsed by Parliament, and expressed in Government account-
ing as to close that option off." 
Sir Peter Baldwin concluded that, if he were to concede to the wishes 
of the Select Committee, he would expect to be rapped over the knuckles by 
the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Legislation was therefore the only 
answer. 
Despite the polite disbelief of the Select Committee, there is no doubt 
that this dilemma is a real one. It has been discussed by the Public Accounts 
H.C. 91 (1978-79) pp. 13-14 
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Committee. 1 Following the pressure applied by the Select Committee, but 
before the Government's response, the PCA discussed the problem of large—
scale tax concessions without statutory authorisation. The PAC expressed 
some concern that their control might be weakened because the concessions 
would be reported to the Select Committee on the PCA. There would in this 
way be a transfer of responsibility which would weaken parliamentary control 
over government expenditure. 
In the Committee's view the recommendations of the PCA necessitated 
legislative intervention, "at the earliest possible moment." 
(iii) 	Administrative Convenience and flexibilit 
In response to this suggestion, Sir Arnold. ance ,Cktairmoth oc tke, Board of Wcomt RevonAL 
suggested that it was not always convenient to legislate. 	Administrative 
compensation or, in this case concession, allowed the administration latitude 
to experiment. He told the P&C: 2  
"...You have got to give an extra—statutory concession a 
reasonable run before you would be in a position, anyhow, 
to legislate to see, if you are dealing with the right 
kind of case. You get an example and you say: 'Yes, clearly 
there ought to be a concession here. This is not what 
Parliament meant at all.' You do not want to say: ',Right, we 
will legislate to deal with this,' because over the next year 
or so you nay get other cases and you may need a wider area of 
concession. You have to see exactly what it is you need before 
you can legislate." 
Procedural factors may also influence the decision whether to intro-
duce legislation or to rely on the administrative process. In the Court 
Line affai4 for example, the PCA found that certain statements made by 
1. Reports of Public Accounts Committeei H.C. 300—I; 375—I; 537(1970-71) 
PP. 408-10. 
2. Loc. cit p. 409 
3. 5th Report of PCA, H.C. 498 (1974-75) pp 25-26. 
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Industry Secretary in the House of Commons concerning the viability of Court 
Line's travel agencies might have misled the public. He found therefore 
that the Government could not be "absolved of all responsibility for 
holiday makers' losses." But legialation had already been introduced and 
was before Parliament and the compensation question had been discussed 
with the PCA who explained that: 
.... the redress is made from a Fund to be financed by payments 
made by the travel organisers... and ultimately by holiday-
makers but started off by an interest free government loan... 
I should add, however, in view of my findings, that when the 
Bill was being debated in Parliament, government spokesmen made 
it clear that, if I'wsre to allocate some measure of responsib- 
ility to the Government and if the Government decided that 
public funds should be drawn updn for the benefit of the customers 
of Court Line affected by my reports there was nothing in the 
Bill to prevent this." 
Absonders from Borstals and Prisons 
The administration does not always have recourse to legislation and 
it is , 	difficult to see why the purely administrative character of some 
schemes is retained. The Home Office :for example, operates a number of 
wholly extra-statutory schemes of which the most interesting is that for 
the compensation of people whose property is damaged or stolen by absconders 
from Borstals and prisons. This scheme was originally devised in about 1947 
and, it muSt%be stressed, extends only to proem, since all payments a1 
compensation in case of death or personal injury require Treasury sanction 
(and would today be covered by the Criminal Injuries Scheme). 
The ground rules for the scheme are as follows: 
(i)Only cases occurring in the neighbourhood of the institution 
from which the escape was made will be considered. 
(ii)No payment is made when the loss or damage isoovered by 
insurance except in cases involving damage to cars etc. where 
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compensation may be paid in respect of loss of "no 
claim" bonus. 
(iii) Escapes from outside hospitals, working parties or 
from escort when proceeding on transfer are treated in 
the same way as escapes from actual penal establishments. 
Compensation under the scheme is based on the standard actuarial 
practices of insurance companies. 
The question immediately arises how does this ex gratia scheme fit 
in with the decision in the Dorset Yacht case and why, if the scheme an-
ticipated the courts by so many years, was litigation necessary? The an, 
swer is that the plaintiffs were insured,— though in view of the small sum 
at stake, the decision to litigate still seems a strange one when measured 
against the psychological advantageio the Home Office of an absence of legal 
liability. 
The Home Office believes that the Dorset Yacht case has had a neglig-
ible impact, the reason being in all probability that the scheme is wider 
than the legal liability imposed by the House of Lords. . The Scheme in two 
respects presents a direct comparison_ to the French experience: first, 
the Scheme uses the original "neighbourhood" test of the Thouzellier  
decision; secondly, as with French law, this test has been replaced by a 
test of "causality", following a complaint to the PCA from a householder 
who found herself excluded from the scheme though living only 17 miles from 
2 a Borstal. The Select Committee was told: 
1. All the information in the text has been supplied by the Home Office 
in letters to the author. The following payments have been made under 
the scheme in recent years: 
Year 	Number of Cases 	Total amount paid 
1974-75 74 E2,470.71 
1975-76 65 g,7'2,036.00 
1976-77 43 Z1,792.68 
2. 	1st Report of PCA, H.C.42(1973 —74) Case No. C514/G p. 111; Report of 
The Select Committee, H.C.268 (1974) pp 14-17 (my emphasis) 
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"...We have liberalised the 
is no absolute limit within 
which we pay. It is more a 
this was .in the 
geographical test and there 
which these damages occur on 
estion of time and how far 
ess and how far it was 
the person going back to his ordinary criminal habits..." 1 
Charged by the Select Committee with providing free insurance to 
people living near penal establishments, Sir Arthur Peterson explained that 
the scheme was more properly described as a public—relations exercise. 
He said: 
"The purpose of introducing the rule in 1950 2 was a 
reasonable one. It was to get people to accept ,more 
readily the setting up of an open borstal in the 
neighbourhood and I would say that the amount of money 
paid out has been very well justified over the years 
In the sense that it has enalded borstals to be set up 
in different parts of the country which might otherwise 
not have been set up and the expense of the Government 
in having to maintain borstal boys would have been greater." 
In some ways this explanation is entirely acceptable. Indeed, arguably 
it illustrates my point that it is for the administration rather than courts 
to assess this type of ttrade—off' or to balance the 'profit and loss' account.  
On the other hand, it does suggest the possibility of confusion and muddle 
arrising from the proliferation of ad hoc schemes applicable to small sections 
of the community. In the case in point, it seems that the decision to retain,the 
existing ad hoc arrangements may have actually disadvantaged the administration , 
1. Not only does this principle tally exactly with the causal test used 
by the French cases which followed the Thouzellier decision, but it 
seems that in France, too, the administration may have voluntarily 
extended the Thouzellier ruling by administrative action. In one of 
the later cases the Government Commissioner, Madame Gre-visse suggests 
this in a reference to the practice of the Ministry of Justice which 
she calls "A generous interpretation of the Thouzellier decision". 
Etablissements Delannay, C.E. 19 Dec 1969, R.D.P. 1970 p. 7E7 concl. 
Grevisse. 
2. This date does not tally with the date supplied by the Home Office 
in correspondence. 
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because it has allowed the rules of legal liability, in both criminal 
and civil cases, to develop in a way which the administration would not 
have wished. Courts in this country are not allowed to look to the insur-
ance position and exclude damage which is insured. Yet it is perfectly 
proper for insurance to be considered in drawing up an administrative 
scheme. It is, in fact, much simpler for the owner of property to provide 
for its insurance. On the other hand, so long as insurance is not oblig-
atory,it is hard if uninsured losses rest on the victim. Formalisation 
of the existing administrative scheme together with better publicity would 
have led to greater efficiency and prevented the development of disparate 
standards of liability. _ 	. Formalisation would in this case. be  
extremely simple, as the scheme could be administered by the CICB, which 
would help to crystallise its position at the centre of all compensation 
caused by the operations of the criminal process. 
In view of the strongly held administrative view that large scale 
expenditure merits legislative intervention as soon as is rationally possible, 
one : 	_ wonders why the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 
has itself never been put on a statutory basis. Very large sums of money, 
after all, pass through its hands. 1 
1. The total compensation paid between lst August 1964 and 31 March 1978 
was £50,526,013. Compensation for the Great Britain ( the Northern 




The sum is increasing and is expected to increase annually. 
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At the time of inauguration, the omission to legislate was justified 
to the House of Commons on grounds of informality and flexibility. The 
Home Secretary explained that "because of many imponderables': amongst 
which, one might no doubt number the difficulty in predicting the number 
of claims and quantifying compensation, "the Scheme was to be started on 
an experimental basis so that it could be modified later." It was in fact 
1 modified on several subsequent occasions. 
By 1978,4argument sounded increasingly thin and an Interdepartmental 
2 Working Party 	set up to review the SCheme made'the basic assumption 
that the Scheme should now be placed on a statutory footing. They admitted, 
however, that in practice such minor adjustments as finally seemed 
necessary could be introduced by amending the existing non—statutory Scheme. 3 
In the case of the Criminal Injuries Scheme (and, probably, the 
Property Compensation Scheme) there is a secondary motive ) which is that 
of retaining full power over the amount of compensation and the modalities 
of payment in the hands of the administration and Government. This receives 
confirmation from Paragraph 4 of the Scheme which provides that: 
"The Board will be entirely responsible for deciding 
what compensation should be paid in individual cases 
and their decisions will not be subject to appeal or 
to Ministerial review• • •" 
1. H.C. Deb vol. 694 col 1129. See further Hirschel "The Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Board" (1973)26 Current Legal Problems - 40. 
2= Review of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme: Report of an 
Interdepartmental Working Party, HMSO 1978 p. 4. 
3. This has now been done: see furtherflii/IJP.04-20 
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The intention was obviously to limit parliamentary accountability to 
the occasion on which the annual report and accounts were debated by 
Parliament; together with such parliamentary questions as might be forth-
coming. The worst suspicions of public lawyers are thus confirmed: 
This intention was frustrated by the courts whichheldthat, notwith-
standing the ex gratia nature of the Scheme and the fact that it was estab-
lished under prerogative powers, the Board was amenable to judicial review 
for error of law by means of application for a prerogative order. 1 The 
1978 Review thought this a clumsy solution and proposed instead a formal 
right of appeal to the High Court, combined with supervision by the Council 
on Tribunals and the PCA (surely a clumsier solution?). If this recom-
mendation were to be accepted, then the two main theoretical objections to 
a statutory scheme would fall — though that is not to imply that legislation 
would be forthcoming: 
Before attempting to explain why, it is convenient to consider the 
sharply contrasting affair of compensation to the victims of vaccine damage. 
Vaccine Damage Compensation 
Ybllowing a skilful and ardent campaign by pressure groups, the Government 
recently announced that the prindiple of compensation to those who had been 
"seriously damaged as a result of vaccination" had been accepted. Since the 
Pearson Commission was sitting, however, the Government had referred the 
matter to the Commission and did - not want to prejudice a more general sol- 
ution. The campaign organisers very wisely kept up the pressure and, following 
1. R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex p. Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 
764; R. v. Criminal Iniaries Compensation Board ex p. Schofield [1971] 
1 WLR 926. A small but steady stream of cases has followed. 
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the preference expressed by the Pearson Commission for strict tortious 
liability in cases of vaccine damage 1 combined with their recommended general 
payment to all disabled children from social security funds, 2 the Government 
announced immediate interim payments. The Secretary of State told the House 
of Commons that there was no prospect of yarliamentary time during the 
summer session but that a new vote would be inserted into the supplementary 
estimates to cover the estimated need of X7 million. Ex gratia payments 
of X10,000 would be made to any child who "on a balance of probabilities" 
had suffered vaccine damage. The ex gratia system had an added advantage 
becallse it did not affect either existing rights in tort nor potential:. 
rights which might accrue if the Pearson report were implemented. 3 
Legislation was quickly introduced to regulate the matter, receiving its 
second reading on 5th February 1979.4 During the debates, speakers made 
several unusually clear statements of the reasons for state responsibility 
which afford an interesting parallel to the theoretical arguments for lia-
bility in French administrative law discussed in previous chapters. Dr. 
Vaughan gave an exposition of the 'profit and loss' principle which Eisenmann 
would surely approve, when he said: 
1. Pearson Commission, vol. 1 pp 292-298 at paras 1409-1413. 
2. Ibid pp. 318-319 
3. H.C. Deb 8 Feb 1977 col. 1227 et seq; H.C. Deb 7 March 1977 col 1129; 
H.C. Deb 14 June 1977 cols 239-147; H.C. Deb 9 May 1978 cols 973-985. 
4. H.C. Deb. 5 Feb 1979 cols 32-86. The Bill became the Vaccine Damage 
Payments Act 1979 and the Scheme is operated under the Vaccine Damage 
Payments Regulations 1979 which came into force on 6 April 1979. 
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"A child is vaccinated partly for his own protection but also 
for the sake of society. We need to ensure that there is an 
adequate number of immunised children ilthe community to guard 
against epidemics. Society has asked for children to be 
vaccinated and the Government, representing society, have 
endorsed the procedure. It is therefore right that society 
should shoulder some of the responsibility when the procedure 
goes wrong." 1 
The Minister (Mr. Ennals),perhaps a modern disciple of luguit, preferred 
the principle of Equality before Public Charges. He called the Scheme "a 
way in which the community as a whole has sought to share a responsibility 
7 for the hardship that has fallen upon [the victims]. 2  These passages 
suggest that the public does accept as the equitable or moral basis of 
administrative compensation the principle of mutual assurance even if the 
various theoretical explanations are too far divorced from the technical 
rules of legal liability to provide more than a very general explanation 
for the rules themselves. 
I have dealt with this scheme at considerable length because it seems 
to me to provide a good illustration of the advantages of political over 
legal resolution of problems of administrative liability. A High Court 
action takes on average three years or more. 3 One year after the House 
of Lords ruling in the Anns case no settlement had been reached. 4 The 
litigation in the Sastre affair was protracted over twelve years. By 
way of contrast, in a session when the legislative timetable was crowded 
1. H.C. Deb 5 Feb 1979 col 40 
2. H.C. Deb 9 May 1978 col 977 
3. See Report of the Winn Committee on Personal Litigation cmnd 3691 
(1968) Section III; Atiyah op. cit. pp 274-6 
4. Judgment was delivered on 12 May 1977; the case was reported unsettled 
on June 24 1978 (The Times). 
3 1 
less than two years elapSed between acceptance of liability and 
the final implementation of the Vaccine Damage scheme in published 
regulations. The scheme was well publicised by the Department 
of Health which circularised all health authorities and issued a 
simple leaflet which included a claim form. 1 By way of contrast, 
in the industrial injuries cases,several applications had to be 
made for extension of the limitation periods as information percol-
ated only slowly to the public 2 while, in the Thalidomide affair, 
several parents only recognised that they might have claims at a 
late date. 3 
(iv) 	Causality  
To return to the question of compensationpaid by the State 
to the victims of crime, I suggest tentatively that the unwillingness 
overtly to accept responsibility,in sharp contrast to':-the Vaccine 
Damage Scheme,derives less from a malign desire to preserve discret-
ion intact and free from control than from a wish to confine the 
responsibility of the adminstration to cases in which a causal link 
between damage and administrative action is clearly discernible. 
1. H.N. (79)7 LASSL (79) 1 and HB3/Augsut 1978 
2. See the Harper case (above) 
3. See Sir Alan Marrels report, op. cit. above. Fewliht Iflest report- 
Oh The oVeYAFioh OF Iht SCInet44L, see,- 11-c • Daly 2µ Oct 11761, WI cm, 
Clo sl 
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The refusal of the Home Office to concede the point of responsiblity 
in the Borstal and prison cases parallels the reluctance of the Government 
to admit overtly to anything more than a sense of generosity by putting 
the Criminal Injuries Scheme on a statutory basis. But it also closely 
reflects some of the legal reasoning in the Dorset Yacht case. In the 
Copt of Appeal, for example, Lord Denning M.R. 1 referred to the difficulty A 
that the damage might be thought tooremote, "the chain of causation being 
broken by the act of the person who had escaped." In the House of Lords, 
Lord Dilhorne 2  seized upon this causal analysis to found his own dissenting 
judgment. 
This type of reasoning is prevalent tiroughout the administration 
and the present PCA (who is a lawyer) is frequently guilty of it as well. 
On the other hand, the Select Committee seems less impressed. In a recent 
report from the Parliamentary Commissioner, for example, one finds the 
following case: 
A complaint was made to the PCA of unreasonable delay by the Department 
of the Environment in coming to a decision to allow a rugby club's applic-
ation for a new site on former agricultural land. As a result of the delay, 
the club had to pay development land tax on the sale of its former site. 
The investigation revealed that the inspector's report was available one 
year after the application was filed with the district council; but a 
further year elapsed before the decision was made, during which prolonged 
negotiations and meetings took place between the Department of the Environment 
and the Ministry of Agriculture. The PCA found lack of intervention at 
1. [1969] 2 Q.B. at p. 424 (Lord Denning M.R.) 
2. [1970] 2 WLR at p. 1163 (Lord Dilhorne) 
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ministerial level to settle this inter-departmental dispute; the excessive 
delays; and the Department's failure to keep the club fully informed amounted 
to maladministration. 
But no compensation was forthcoming. The PCA thought the department's 
obligation was "to reach a Planning Act decision lawfully, fairly and with 
due regard to good planning practice and established government policies, 
after resolving any difference of opinion that might arise with other 
government departments about the application of those policies to the 
particular case." There was a "general duty of reasonable expedition" 
but this did not extend to consideration of the particular financial cir-
cumstances of any particular individual. In any event "a more expeditious 
decision could as easily have gone against the club as in their favour." 
To paraphrase this last point, the loss did not flow inevitably from the 
delay. 1 
A second case involved a complaint that a reminder note sent by the 
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre misled some car owners into paying Z10 
more in duty than they should have done. The PCA thought the note mis-
leading and recommended compensation but the scheme instituted by the 
Department of Transport led to further complaints on the grounds (a) that 
compensation should have been extended to anyone who claimed to have been 
misled whether directly or indirectly and not restricted to those who had 
received the misleading form and (b) that repayment should have been auto 
matic. 2 The PCA, though he expressed a little token sympathy,made short work 
of this argument, finding it quite reasonable to restrict compensation to 
1. H.C. 302 ( 1 97 8-79) P. 15 case no. 4/898/77 
2. 3rd Report of PCA, H.C. 247 (1978-79) 
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people "who had received that particular renewal form." The Department 
could not be criticised for "not extending the scheme to others who, if 
misled at all, had been misled not by a form thus sent to them but in. 
some other way." The PCA's reasoning was based on traditional legal 
notions of causality. In the case of those who had not read the fatal 
form, it could be said that "Insofar as they had been misled, it was not 
demonstrably the Department themselves who had misled them." 
A similar argument was put to the Select Committee 1  in a case where 
a disability pension was wrongly calculated. The Department accepted 
liability to compensate only in case of major error. In the particular 
case neither party was demonstrably at fault. A Committee member (Mr. 
Cope) remarked: 
"The point I am raising is really the difference 
between those two phrases; 'through no fault of the 
recipient' and 'due to the error of the Department'. 
In the particular case where this arises it is my view it is 
not the recipient's fault he did not get the money at the 
proper time norl admit was it the Departmentlsibult. It 
arose from his mental condition and it was nobody's fault. 
Should the Department then pay compensation in a case of this 
kind?vie.14&r .saLtit;E22alz31should." 
But Mr. Atkinson for the Department of Health was unable to accept 
this. He was quick to explain the implications in terms of risk. liability, 
saying: 
"I think that to pay compensation in all such cases has 
very wide implications. It gould mean for example that if 
the claim were rejected initially and then succeeded ult-
imately on appeal that the initial decision would not only 
have been overturned but treated as wrong in the sense that 
the Department had made an error in making that decision. 
It seems to us it is more reasonable to look to see whether 
that decision was a decision which could reasonably have been 
1. 	3rd Report of Select Committee H.C. 544, 295 (1977-78) pp.30 -31 
(emphasis mine) 
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given on the facts, although another opinion might 
be held, and only in the cases where in the best iwigment 
of our medical advisers could it be said the doctor who made 
the decision was not making a decision which was reasonable 
in all the circumstances, then would we regard it as being 
an error rather than a genuine difference of opinion." 
The speaker urged bn the Committee that large numbers of claimants 
might be affected throughout the social services and other arguments of 
administrative expediency l but the Committee was not convinced. 1 They 
recommended to the Government the substitution for the 'fault' or 'causality' 
test the 'abnormal loss' principle l remarking:, 
"Your Committee do not expect interest to be paid on 
arrears of benefit in every instance, but in the case under 
review the recipient was awarded thirteen years' back 
pay twenty years later, by which time the value of money 
and consequently the real value of his award, had fallen 
very greatly. Your Committee believe that cases such as 
this merit more generOus treatment..." 2 
I believe this reasoning to be very significant because it demon-
strates the way in which the traditional legal notions of fault and caus-
ality operate to restrict liability. This mechanism may be used by courts 
and administration alike. French administative law has never yet broken 
the tenacious hold of these twin ideas. A leading text book denies the 
possibility of liability for losses which are not attributable to the 
administration saying: 3 
"For there to be liability there must be injury and that 
injury must originate directly in an activity of the public 
service. To put this in another way, the damage must have 
been caused by the branch of the public service administered 
by the defendant while the victim must prove a causal connection. 
between the administrative activity to which he attributes his 
injury and the damage of which he complains." 
1. At pxiii, See also Report of the Select Committee H.C. 454 ( 1 974-75) 
PP ix-xi and Omnd 6442 (1975-76) 
2. Ibid 
3. Odent, op. cit pp 1073-4. 
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Laubadere confirms this statement of the law. Distinguishing ladmin, 
istrative risk' orIcreated risk/ from 'social risk' or situations in which 
"the State is under an obligation to compensate for certain losses even 
though they are not attributable to administrative activity," 1 he denies 
absolutely the existence of the second type of liability in French administrative 
law. Causality, in short is a notion as restrictive as fault. The Select 
Committee is right in trying to break away from it.. Indeed, if we fail to 
do this, the purpose of administrative compensation may be defeated. 
(v) Distributive Justice and .individual treatment 
Lawyers rather than administrators perceive discretionary power as 
designed to promote individual consideration of individual cases.-2  Admin- 
istrators are more alert to the injustices which may be perpetuated by hasty 
acts of compassion and frequently give priority to the principle of equality 
of treatment. For convenience,' will set this principle out once more in 
Weale's definition, according to which: 3 
"(a) good reason has to be shown for treating one person 
or group of persons differently from any other person 
or group of persons. In the absence of such a reason 
all persons or groups of persons should be treated 
similarly. 
(b) 	Like cases are to be treated as like and unlike cases as unlike 
Stubborn and inflexible adherence to this principle has more than 
once brought the administration into sharp conflict with the PCA and the 
1. Traiter, vol 1. p. 679 
2. Galligan, "The Nature and Function of Policies within Discretionary Power" 
[1976] P.L. 332. H. Lavender and Sons v. Minister of Housing and Local  
Government [1970] 1 WLR 1231; Sagnata Investments, v. Norwich Corp.  
L1971i 2 Q.B. 614. 
3. Weale, Equality and Social Policy, 1978, p. 2 
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the Select Committee, both inclined to give priority to the contrary 
principle that justice must be done in individual cases. 1 Yet it has 
to be admitted that, by a less legalistic and casuistic interpretation 
of its own principle, the administration could avoid blunders such as the 
Home Loss Compensation Scheme. 
In one complaint referred to the Health Service•Commissioneran 
elderly lady,who could not obtain an NHS bed ) had to enter a private 
nursing home. The PCA found that the health authority had a duty to admit 
the patient on the grounds of her urgent need. He further found that 
her life was only saved by the availability of a private nursing home 
bed. He therefore recommended that the fees paid should be refunded on 
an ex gratia basis. The health authority refused. Questioned by the 
Select Committee, the authority explained their refusal, saying "We are 
very nervous of the consequences of making an ex gratia payment; I am 
referring to the long-term consequences". 2 This position was supported 
by the Department of Health which explained that "there were other cases 
of a similar nature so that, if they approved one, they would have to approve 
them all." The Minister 	held this line on the floor of the House, where 
he distinguished between a moral or 'public' duty and a 'legal' duty en-
forceable by an action in damages. 3 
Both the PCA and the Select Committee took a diametrically opposed 
view. The PCA preferred individual treatment of individual cases and stated 
"In my view each case ought to be judged on its own merits 
and I consider there were significant differences between 
this case and the others which were shown to my officer." 
1. 2nd Report of Select Committee H.C. 334 (1971-72) p. xiii 
2. 3rd Report of PCA H.C. 223 (1977-78) Case C257/K pp 88-91; 2nd Report 
from the Select Committee 1977-78, H.C. 372 (1977-78)  ppxi, 57-58. 
3. Hospital (aergency Beds) Debate, H.C. Deb. 7 Mar 1977, cols 1143-1157 
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The Select Committee endorsed this attitude. 1 Considering the cases 
submitted to them by the PCA,they found the complaint before them differed 
in character from the other cases,in none of which had their been any 
question of urgency. Also, in all the other cases, geriatric nursing would 
have been involved. Rejecting the Authority's attempt to break the causal 
link by attributing blame to the general practitioner involved in the un-
fortunate affair, the Committee blamed the Authority for its 'Ungenerous 
attitude' and 'failure to rectify a mistake.' Thus the principle of justice 
in individual cases was preferred by both the PCA and the Select Committee. 
Neither gave much consideration to the danger of possible discrimination 
(breach of the Equality principle). Nor, despite the claims of the 
Department urged by its Minister, did either pay much attention to the 
real danger that a single, compassionate concession might escalate rapidly 
into a principle of automatic compensation bearing a marked resemblance to 
legal liability for breach of statutory duty. 2 
Again,in the Vehicle Licensing case to which I have already referred, 
the Department of Transport explained their initial refusal to make a refund 
in terms of the Equality principle. The Department feared that concession 
in a single case "would encourage similar refund requests, difficult to 
check for their bona fides but awkward in equity to refuse." They antic-
ipated a possible 600,000 claims with a consequent loss of E4 million in 
revenue. 
The PCA was not very impressed. He reported: 
"I think the Department attach undue weight to the 
problems, the number and therefore the cost of the 
refund requests likely to have to be met in practice. 
I- 	
1. 3rd Report of the PCA for 1976-77 H.C. 223 (1977-78) Case C 257/K 
pp 88-91; Second Report from the Select Committee, H.C. 372 (1977- 
78) p. ix. 
2. An attempt to claim that the 'public duty' was enforceable by mandamus 
subsequently failed. The case was apparently never reported. 
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And in any event it must be questioned whether any 
individual clearly shown to have suffered through 
maladministration, even though it involved his over-
paying only E10, should necessaly be refused a tangible 
remedy in the shape of a refund merely because of official 
unwillingness to face coping with similar claims from 
others." 1 
In manipulating the Equiaity principle, the administration has so 
far shown considerable adroitness, not a little expediency, and a 
tendency to reason imprecisely. It is clear that,by manipulating the 
boundaries of the 'classes' said to be affected and by comparing like 
with unlike liability to compensate can be reduced at will. As the 
Select Committee pointed out in the Hospital Admissions case, the adminis-
tration has a regrettable tendency to compare sheep with goats. If 
they are to pray in aid the principle of procedural justice, they must 
first, classify more precisely and, secondly, recognise that the principle 
cannot be used in conjunction with the fault principle of legal liability. 
If the two are combined, a restrictive and inequitable result is in-
evitably achieved. 
Conclusions  
In the teeth of all the evidence, lawyers persiSt in believing that 
chaos can be transformed into order by a process of classification. Let 
me immediately admit that my system of classification is wholly without 
validity and about as useful as MUnchausenis tales in guiding a traveller 
around the terrain of ex gratia payments. All that I have succeeded in 
1. 5th Report of PCA H.C. 524 (1977-78) Case No. 3B/474/77 PP. 300-303. 
Compare Congreve v. Home 0ffig [1976] 2 IILR 291. 
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in which 
piecing together is a map of a rather unsatisfactory country_ disparate 
cases are grouped haphazardly togetherand there is very little understand-
ing of the true purpose of extra statutory compensation or of the principles 
on which it ought to be based. Such principles As can be discerned are 
applied to wholly incompatible cases and(as in the case of the failure to 
provide an emergency hospital bedOthe fact situations for which prin-
ciples are selected are often wrongly analysed. At the level of prin-
ciple what is really happening is that the administrators are turning for 
support to an assortment of maxims, political, constitutional, legal and 
even equitable, to rationalise, or provide excuses for, 	decisions 
taken for purely expedient reasons. 
Not only is there considerable confusion over principles of compensation, 
but also over methods. Unsuitable procedures are very often selected and, 
once again, the selection is not scientific but hapahzard. Administrative 
efficienCy is mentioned as a criterion for settlement but the data on which 
the choices are based are too often absent. In the Vehicle Licences Case, 
for example, the PCA was informed1 that potential claimants might amount 
to 600,000 with a resultant revenue loss of £4 million. No calculation 
of the respective costs of (i) paying all claimants and (ii) assessing 
the claims of selected individuals accordingly to the unsatisfactory criteria 
adopted by the Department which ultimately caused a second PCA investigation 
were given. To encourage a proliferation of Ombudsman investigations - 
as in the Home Loss affair - may itself be administratively inefficient but, 
as even the average cost of a PCA or CLA investigation has apparently never 
been accurately calculated, we are not in a position to judge. 
Againi the choice of purely administrative schemes as' opposed to 
machinery which contains a judicial stage seems to be hapahzard. The Select 
Committee has had to consider this point during the debate over the 
1. H.C. 524 (1977-78) p.303 
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"Sachsenhausen affair", where the Foreign Office was very much criticised 
for rejecting the claims of ex-prisoners of war to have been interned in 
Sachsenhausen and hence to be entitled to compensation. Sir Paul Gore-
Booth explained to the Select Committee the system used for the payment 
of claims for compensation. 1  The Foreign Office, he said, relied on two 
methods: (i) a draft Order in Council entrusting regulation of claims 
to the Foreign Compensation Commission and (ii) administrative procedure. 
In the case of Sachsenhausen, administrative procedures were used partly 
for reasons of speed, because "the claimants had already been waiting a 
long time". In retrospect, Sir Paul regretted this decision. He said'. 
"It is arguable that it would have been better to put these 
cases to the decision of a judicial body, or on a judicial basis 
before a body separate from the Executive; but the view . 
taken at the time was that the Foreign Compensation Commission 
hdd in fact concerned itself mainly with property claims and 
that claims that dealt with death and imprisonment and disability 
perhaps should be dealt with differently." 
Why they should be dealt with differently and why personal injury 
did not merit a judicial inquiry when property compensation did, Sir Paul 
did not attempt to explain. Pressed hard on the need for a tribunal, how- 
ever, Sir Paul stuck to his views, arguing: 2 
"...in the compensation agreements where there was very 
considerable unclarity as to the issues and as to the 
value of evidence and so on, a moment came when it really 
was right to put the questions in front of a judicial 
authority rather than try to deal with it administratively. 
...I think in general this really is a course of wisdom. Mr. 
Watts [a Member of the Select Committee] has reminded me that 
one thing that does happen in the Foreign Compensation 
Commission, which I think is also an advantage,is the possibility 
of having open oral hearings; that I think is an advantage 
which that process would have..." 
1. Report of Select Committee, H.C. 385 (1968-69) PP 1-4 at p. 3 
2. At pp 10-11 
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Not only are the suggested criteria themselves vague and amateurish 
but they appear never to have been applied to the case in point. 
Another example of amateurishness might be taken from the use of 
actuarial methods. Today disablement and physical. injury can be relatively 
accurately quantified; the Department of Health, for example, uses 
standard disablement tables. 1 Courts of law, on the other hand, are 
well known to be hostile to actuarial methods. 2 Yet the awards of the CICB 
are expressly tied to the antiquated common law concept of damages twith 
the result that we find the Chairman (a lawyer) indulging in assessment 
exercises with the Bench and .Bar to ascertain whether their awards are 
roughly in line! 
When ex gratia payments were thought -to consist of a few individudal 
handouts, the fact that they were not subject to any systematised control 
was perhaps not very important. The advent of the PCA changed this in 
two ways. In the first place, the actual extent of the practice was re- 
vealed and it became apparent that a very sizeable operation was involved. 
Secondly, the PCA himself and the Parliamentary Committee to which he 
reported, began to intervene in the process of compensation. Thus, while 
the PCA himself provided the safeguard of an outside supervisory element, 
his activities actually increased the need for supervision. At the same 
time )his lack of enforcement powers drew attention to his own insufficienbies 
as a control mechanism. At the present time, therefore, one must doubt 
whether the controls for ex gratia payments are adequate. 
1. H.C. 246 ( 1 977-7 8) Case No. 3B/354/77 pp 116-121. 
2. Prevett "Actuarial Assessment of Damages: The Thalidomide Case" (1972) 
35 MLR 140 and 257. See for a more complete survey, The Pearson 
Report, Cmnd 7054—I Ch. 12 pp. 79-105. 
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The advent of the PCA changed ex gratia compensation in another way. 
The system had always Operated within the bounds set by legal liability 
on the one hand; ministerial responsiblity and financial accountability 
on the other. The PCA now added the dimension of 'maladministration'. 
This concept does not exactly tally with legal liability; the cases show 
that the Select Committee often urges a greater spirit of equitable gener-
osity. Nor do the PCA and his committee seem fully to appreciate the 
very real limitations on administrative action imposed by the rules of 
government accounting. Again, and curiously for a parliamentary body, 
they sometimes are seen urging civil servants to depart from their con- 
stitutional role and exercise governmental powers more properly exercisable 
by Ministers. 
A final point which emerges very clearly from the cases is the over-
whelming pull exerted by the principle of legal liability. These principles 
are all too easily incorporated. The civil servant's natural reaction 
when faced with a claim for compensation is to take legal advice and act 
on it. Indeed, not to do this may constitute maladministration. Through-
out the system of ex gratia payments one finds references to the legal 
ideas of 'negligence' and 'causality'. A further factor here is once 
again the advent of the PCA with his jurisdiction based on the parallel 
concepts of 'maladministration' causing 'injustice'. As a result, in 
an area in which we are entitled to look for new ideas and novel principles 
we find instead the reasoning of a common lawyer. 
I do not myself believe that administrative compensation will ever 
be tidy. In the nature of things the cases dealt with are likely to be 
heterogenous. I do, however, think that a degree of rationalisation could 
be quite easily achieved. Indeed, the main reason why this has not already 
occurred seems to the to be that public lawyers and administrators alike have 
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been misled by the lack of information into under-estimating the extent 
•of the practice. Over a/II:Lover again one finds references to the limited 
and individual nature of ex gratia payments when all the evidence points 
to entirely opposite characteristics. 
The first essential seems to me to be a regrouping of the cases. 
The first group of cases is correctly perceived as negotiated settlements  
of legal liability. These are not really amenable to control and the 
administration must be free to negotiate like the private litigant. 
Once the administration decides not to litigate and not to settle, 
the claim may be considered for ex gratia_payment. At this point it 
should be classified eitheras a claim which seems individual in character, 
or as one which is likely to involve a considerable class of unseen applic-
ants. Although the two categories do exist and the distinction is quite 
clear, cases may sometimes be difficult to classify, because most class 
claims first appear in individual guise presented either directly to the 
administration or indirectly through the Ombudsmen. Some may, therefore, 
be wrongly classified as individual claims. Again, it seems inevitable 
that some applicants will emerge as prizewinners in the forensic lottery. 
Once a case emerges as an individual claim for an ex gratia payment, 
unlikely to be recurring or to cause a drain on public funds, the question 
of legal liability can be set aside. The two criteria on which compen-
sation can most properly be based seem to be (i) abnormal loss and (ii) 
maladministration. It should be stressed that these are alternatives 
and not cumulative. 'Abnormal loss l is admittedly an imprecise concept 
which is difficult to define. I personally believe that society is 
entitled to leave small financial losses to lie where they fall. More-
over, insurance is a relevant factor. A general, overall threshold - 
as with the Criminal Injuries Scheme - ought not, therefore, to be entirely 
o n tkt ()they hand, 
ruled out. I would urge that ,Lall loss of .liberty should always . be 
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considered abnormal._ .1O borrow a rather colourful passage from Lord 
Atkin: 
"Grievous as is the wrong of unjust imprisonment of 
any alleged criminal, I apprehend that its colours 
pale beside the catastrophe of unjust imprisonment 
on an unfounded finding of insanity". 1 
Intangible loss (injury to reputation, refusal of civil rights etc.) 
could also be considered for compensation in such cases 'IA final factor 
would be the principle of Equlaity before public Charges. If a loss is 
suffered in the public interest and falls — as in the Watchford Festival 
case — on a single individual, the loss is abnormal and compensation ought 
to be considered. 
The principle of maladministration is simpler. Wherever an adminis-
trative blunder causes loss,the administration ought in principle to redress 
the injury. Where maladministration is revealed by an Ombudsman investig-
ation the case is even stronger and refusal to conform to his findings 
should in itself be considered maladministration. 
At this stage the question of finality arises. At present, the decision 
not to make an ex gratia payment is final,subject to any second finding of 
maladministration by an Ombudsman, which in turn would be unenforceable. It 
is not clear that this is right. These are precisely the type of claims we 
recognised - in Chapter 6 as more suitable to the judicial than the political 
process. It seems logical, therefore, to introduce some sort of appeal. 
The two clear choices are of appeal to the Divisional Court on a point of 
law, which, because the Divisional Court is likely to introduce legal criteria, 
seems unsuitable; and appeal to an administrative tribunal — the solution 
1. 	Everett v. Griffiths [1920] 3 K.B. 163, 211 (Atkin L.J.) 
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favoured by Sir Paul Gore—Booth in the Sachsenhausen affair. 
If one were to decide on appeal to a tribul01,a secondary choice 
arises: either a centralised appeal tribunal must be instituted or appeals 
could be classified according to subject matter and jurisdiction given to 
existing tribunals already functioning in the area. Claims in respect of the 
criminal process would go the CICB, land - compensation claims to a Land 
Valuation Court and Foreign Office claims to the Foreign Compensation 
Commission and so forth. The second solution seems On the fact of it to 
have the advantage of expertise. It may, however, have unseen disadvantages 
and, in the absence of statistics of the number of claims received or likely 
t)be received, a clear preference cannot be expressed. 
Introduction of a judicial or quasi—judicial stage might lhowaver, 
entail reconsideration of the PCPs view that the administration has a duty 
to trace third parties likely to be affected by individual judicial or 
tribunal decisions. A judicial decision is individual in character. It 
follows from this that justice should be done to the individual without 
reference to other potential claimants. It follows also that the decision 
must be implemented and ought not to be retrospectively overturned. 1 If 
the ruling is applied as a matter of course to third parties not before the 
court it may be that these arguments lose some of their force, while, if 
the principle is expanded from the decisions of a court of law into the area 
of ex gratia decisions, and if individual decisions are considered capable 
of creating precedents, general policy decisions are subsumed by the sol-
utions to individual cases. This ought not to happen, both because it 
allows for a considerable transfer of political power to courts and tribunals 
and because it allows political decisions to be made obliquely rather than 
directly. 
1. 	See for further discussion, Prosser, "Politics and Judicial Review. 
The Atkinson Case and its Aftermath" [1979] P.L. 59 and Partington, 
[1979] P.L.1. 
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Turning to the second category of class claims * it seems that the 
most useful criteria here are (i) the policy of the government (ii) 
the principles of government accounting (iii) the principle of abnormal 
loss and (iv) the mutual insurance principle. It would be wrong for 
administrators to _assume important government decisions by instit- 
uting compensation schemes (e.g. by agreeing to compensate the victims of 
absconding prisoners or of criminal injury). If we wish to secure con-
trol of government finance through the principle of parliamentary account-
ability it would be wrong, too, to encourage civil servants to break 
through the constricting framework of the government accounting rules. 
We must accept, therefore, that there are some decisions which only the 
government can take. 
In considering what recommendations to-make to governments, however 
I suggest that administrators allow themselves to be too much influenced 
? by the legal criteria of negligence and causality. Per contra, they do not 
pay adequate attention to the principles oflabnormal loss'or'mutual 
V 
assurance. To illustrate, the Vaccine Damage Scheme seems to be based 
on the right principles because it considers effects rather than causes 
and gives priority to the victim's needs. Many compensation schemes break 
away successfully from notions of causality. To cite a single example: 
the decision to compensate farmers for loss of stock caused by abnormal 
weather conditions in the winter of 1978-79 was based on the mutual in-
surance principle, as was the similar case of the earlier East Coast floods. 1 
By way of contrast, we could cite the misguided Home Office insistence that 
compensation will be allowed to the victims of miscarriage of justice only 
1. H.C. Deb 1 August 1978 vol 955 col 223 (Scotland); H.C. Deb Mar 18 1953 
col 32 (E. Coast). 
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in the case that serious error or negligence can be shown. A little 
imagination and goodwill would dictate a wholly different solution,, in 
which the principle of compensation for abnormalloss was admittedx but 
the victim's own default was a barrier to compensation., 
We are entitled to expect . . 	a greater measure of experiment- 
ation and imagination in this are of administrative compensation. Some 
of the worst lacunae in the system of legal liability could easily and 
inexpensively be filled. Again. I will content myself with a single 
example. We have seen that the absence of strict liability places the 
victims of accident caused by the public utilities at a grave disadvantage. 1 
In fact, most of these risks can be easily quantified,and economic analyses 
of civil liability show that models for optimum allocation of losses can 
be constructed. The Gas Board, for example, keeps accurate statistics of 
damage caused by explosions 2  and can estimate the cost of automatic com-
pensation. The costs can be redistributed to consumers and the payments 
systematised by a simple scheme. 
Once the principle of compensation is allowed,the choice of means by 
which it is to be implemented must be made. While I concede the need 
for experiment and flexibility on occasion, I feel that the normal model 
should be statutory and resemble the Vaccine Damage Scheme more closely 
than the Criminal Injuries Scheme. It is not sensible, as Professor 
Atiyah points out, to allow compensation schemes to proliferate, even if 
1. Dunne v. N.W.Gas Board [1964] 2 Q.B.806; Pearson v. N.W. Gas Board rom 2 1. =R= 
2. Report of the Inquiry into Serious Gas Explosions, HMSO, 1977 
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his ideal of "a single comprehensive system based on the existing social 
security system" 1 seems a little idealistic (or even inflexible). 
A final principle seems important. At the third stage, after im-
plementation when claims are submitted,a chance to contest decisions in 
individual cases should be given. 
Once again there are two basic models: the judicial Foreign Compensation 
model with its administrative tribunal; and the administrative Criminal 
Injuries model with its two stage application. The latter is efficient, 
cheap and speedy. 
By allowing claims to proceed in the first instance to a single member 
who works from documentary evidence and holds no hearing the Board is able 
to process up to 20,000 claims per annum at an average cost of £53. Con-
tested claims are referred to a three man Board which holds a simple 
hearing; even then the cost rises only to £255. 2 The system 
seems to function relatively well, as the average figure for applications 
for judicial review remains constant at between 1 — 3 per annum. 3 
1. Op. cit. p. 572 
2. For the most recent figures see Cmnd 7396 pp 5-7. In 1975-76 there 
were 16,690 applications; in 1976-77, 20,400; in 1977-78 20,826. 
The actual cost was: 1975-76, £911,165 (12.3% of total expenditure) 
1976-77 £1,157,601 (10.7% of total expenditure) 1977-78 £1,266,789 
(11.1% of total expenditure. The average cost of a single member 
decision in these 3 years was E49.65, £50.65, and £53.82 respectively. 
The average cost of a 3 man hearing was £220.62, £248.30 and £255.71 
respectively. In its second report (Cmnd 3117 (1966-67) the average 
cost per case in the first 2 full years of operation was £119 and 
£41. 
3. During the same period, 3 applications for judicial review are 
recorded: R. v. S22112z. 2. Clowes 29 Mar 1977; R. v. CICB ex. . 
McGuffie 13 Oct. 1977; R. v. SICIUyiaLata21 Jan 21 197 . 
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Whether a final stage of judicial review should be permitted is a 
very controversial point, but one which in practice has a relatively 
simple if cynical answer. Since the 'Oourts will go to inordinate lengths 
to retain their jurisdiction and since no judge—proof clause has as yet 
been devised, 1  it may be betterto legalise their P rivateering forays from 
the outset by precluding preclusive clauses. 
It is pleasant to end on an optimistic note. When the administration 
really sets its mind to the matter it is able logically to evaluate the 
principles on which administrative compensation should be based, to break 
away from the tort system, to devise new formulae for assessment of com-
pensation and to weigh the advantages of state compensation , against the 
judicial process and insurance. This is demonstrated by a single admin-
istrative document, the report of a committee set up to consider compen-
sation for property damage by criminal activity in the special circumstances 
of Northern Ireland2 . If this can be done in one case it can be done in 
others. Administrative compensation is the technique of the future and 
there is no need to feel pessimistic about its possibilities. 
1. Anisminic v. Foreign. Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147; 
R v. Criminal In'uries Com ensation Board ex . Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 
64. 
2. Report of a Committee to Review the Principles and Operation of the 
Criminal Injuries to Property (Compensation Act) (Northern Ireland) 
1971, Belfast HMSO, 1976. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In Englandcoherent principles of governmental liability seemed 
at the start of the twentieth century almost out of reach. The common 
law viewed the transfer of losses from the victim to any other individual 
as an exceptional step which always needed to be justified. Loss normally 
rested with the victim, no matter how meritorious or blameless, except 
where justification for a transfer was provided by the existence of 
fault- or wrongdoing. 'Wrongdoing'was traditionally defined as the breach 
of an obligation imposed by the law and the disparate character of the 
obligations which the law saw fit to impose left many gaps in the system 
of liability. 
In the case of the State or Crown, this limited conception of 
civil liability was capable of working injustice. Citizen ancUaate 
were by no means equal parties. The State was able to endow itself and 
its officers with wide-ranging powers, capable of causing considerable 
harm to private citizens. The traditional formula of personal tortious 
liability permitted the nature of these powers to be concealed behind 
the misleading metaphor of the public servant as a 'citizen in uniform', 
while the immunity of the Crown was theoretically incompatible with 
idea 
the/of the sovereign as accountable and subject to the rule of law. 
These difficulties encouraged the growth of the idea that government 
liability was in some way special, that private law was incapable of 
dealing with the challenge posed by the special nature of state power 
and that the citizen could never be adequately protected against loss or 
injury caused by the Mate unless special public law rules of liability 
were developed. 
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This proposition is not really as logical as at first it seems. 
It is not the existence of wide ranging powers which gives rise to 
tortious liability but their abuse or misuse. Some of those who protest 
at the limited scope of government liability are guilty of blurring this 
distinction and of confusing compensation for the lawful exercise of 
power with liability for its abuse or misuse. They are protesting about 
the existence and wide scope of statutory powers rather than about their 
abuse or misuse. Government liability is in this model invoked as an 
indirect means of review and a curb on the powers of the legislature. 
It must nonetheless be admitted that, faced with abuse or misuse 
of power, the common law possesses deficiencies. In the first place ) 
 in contrast to the principles of liability for intentional and 
negligent wrongdoing, the concept of malicious wrongdoing is largely 
inchoate. The continental concept of abuse of rights is missing from 
the common law. Instead,our judges are left to manipulate the antiquated 
torts of conspiracy and of misfeasance in public office. This creates 
uncertainty and ambiguity. There is no doubt that this area of the law 
of torts needs urgent attention from the Law Commission and the legis-
lature. 1 
Secondly, because tortious liability in the common law was always 
exceptional, it was closely linked to fault. The idea of risk as a 
general basis for liability was discounted; indeed, until comparatively 
recently, strict liability was considered a medieval relic, unsuited to 
the conditions of a modern, industrial society. 
1. Devlin, Samples of Lawmaking, 1962, pp.11-13. 
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these 
It is tempting to see / gaps as necessitating a separate 
system of public liability. This could be created either by removing 
from the civil courts all jurisdiction in cases of administrative tort_ 
and contract or less drastically, by allowing special principles of 
liability to develop in this area. 
The French experience is valuable in helping us to weigh the costs 
and benefits of separate administrative courts. A dual hierarchy is 
seen to be an old—fashioned and cumbersome solution which brings in its 
train tiresome jurisdictional disputes. If an organic criterion for 
jurisdiction is selected, cases are classified arbitrarily according 
to the defendant's status. Parallel hierarchies are created and pressure 
to harmonise the substantive rules results. The object of the exercise 
may then be largely defeated. On the other hand, the search for a 
functional test is equally frustrating, since it is virtually impossible 
to identify any particular activity as typically governmental. Indeed, 
if our institutions continue to evolve as they have recently been evolving, 
public and private will increasingly be interwoven in the fabric of our 
society. 
Turning to the alternative solution of special rules, two possi-
bilities immediately suggest themselves. Liability could be imposed for 
all loss caused by illegal or invalid administrative action. This is 
really a form of risk liability, or, as some would say, a profit and 
loss theory of liability. Alternatively, or perhaps concurrently, a 
power to award compensation to those injured by legal or valid adminis-
trative action might be considered. 
3 4 
The Beaudesert decision alone 1  is sufficient to show us that a 
principle of liability for all invalid administrative action is not 
beyond the ingenuity of the judiciary; the question is not whether they 
can create such liability but whether they ought to do so. Clearly 
they ought not. Such a step is' well outside the ambit of judicial 
legislation. It would have the effect of creating a large class of 
vested rights to compensation. This in turn would mortgage the resources 
and possibly limit the action of future governments. Such momentous 
decisions are for the government and not the judiciary. 
To allow to the judges a power of compensation in the case of 
valid use of administrative power seems at first sight even more drastic. 
The French experience demonstrates, however, that this is not really the 
case. *Legality' and 'illegality' are relative and flexible concepts; 
compensation and liability are really alternative routes to the same 
destination. The real difficulty is to isolate any definite principle 
on which the courts could base their awards. The French principle of 
Equality before public charges provides us with an illustration of the 
difficulties which our courts would face. Eminent philosophers find 
difficulty in explaining the principle in terms sufficiently precise 
for consistent application by the courts. 2 A generous interpretation 
may easily lead to the nullification of well-considered government 
policies, while even an administrative court as powerful as the Conseil 
d'Etat hesitates to intervene by the consistent use of the principle to 
impose liability in the case of governmental functions - such as the 
1. Above p. 
2. E.g. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 19121 1310.100- i07)25V-Z93 
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judicial function, the defence powers and the police power — traditionally 
sheltered by sovereign immunity. Thus the principle is reserved by 
the court for a handful of trivial cases best dealt with by ex gratia 
payments. In any event, the allocation of such a power to a court would 
involve a substantial shift in our own traditional constitutional 
arrangements where the power balance is weighted in favour of the govern-
ment and the legislature. 1 
Even if we were to find such a reallocation of power politically 
palatable )those who seek to fashion the principles of tortious liability 
into a coherent whole mistake the nature of the legal process. The 
tort action is designed to single out from a large class of goats a 
few fortunate sheep to whom damages are awarded. In other words, the 
liability pattern and the criteria for reparation are deliberately 
complex, because loss lies normally on the victim and each individual 
transfer must be justified. 2  It follows that "a major part of the total 
system consists of legal costs. And it is the nature of the system 
which renders these legal costs necessary." 3 It is apparent that 
English law and French administrative law share these characteristic 
features and that they are more similar than dissimilar. Compensation 
schemes, on the other hand, aim to reach a large class of claimants 
easily and cheaply. The criteria for payment are made as simple as 
possible while the schemes are relatively cheap to administer. For 
example, the administrative cost of the social security system, which 
••■••111■11■■■•••■ 	
1. See for confirmation, Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy:diagnosis and 
prescription, 1977. 
2. Blum and Kalven t op.cit., p.30. 
3. Atiyah, op.cit., p.457. 
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reaches many more beneficiaries, is much less than that of the tort 
system. 1 To change English principles of liability for French principles 
is a minimal change. The real choice is between legal liability and 
administrative compensation. 
Public lawyers have been inclined to see administrative compen-
sation as an unsatisfactory substitute for legal liability. They will 
have increasingly to accept, in England as in France, that it is really 
the normal machinery for compensation. This does not mean, however, 
that government liability has been superseded by arbitrary and uncon-
trollable discretionary power. 
It is generally accepted today that discretionary power is seldom 
if ever uncontrolled. Administrative law is largely perceived as a 
system of rules designed for the control of discretionary power. 2 
These rules need to be extended to the area of administrative compen-
sation, where, at present, system is notably lacking. 
We are entitled to insist that the administration should formulate 
principles for the allocation of compensation which are applied in a 
systematic and equitable fashion. It is here that the principle of 
Equality could come into operation. Judges are bound to give a high 
priority to certainty; administrators are not. Even if it is too uncertain 
to be formulated as a legal rule, the ideal of Equality,in the sense of 
	■•••■•■••■•■■•■■•■■■••• 
1. The Pearson Commission Report, vol 2 pp. 205-8 and Table 158 tentatively 
estimates £4.7 million as the cost of administering the social security 
system and Z175 million for the tort system. Too much reliance should 
not be placed on these figures, as the basis for the calculations i., 
not entirely clear, nor are the two systems exactly comparable. 
2. See further above, pp. 
an understanding that losses suffered in the public interest ought 
not to rest on individuals but on the community, is capable of providing 
a basic principle for administrative action. It ought to be accepted 
that'hardshipl or'abnormal loss' givesrise to a presumption that com- 
pensation should be made, even if'hardship'2,nil abnormal losss i are hard 
to define in general terms and must be assessed in the light of parti-
cular facts. Measured against this principle, 	some notable gaps 
appear in our compensation system and ought to be filled. 
Secondly, because the importance of administrative compensation 
schemes has not hitherto been entirely appreciated, insufficient 
attention has been paid to structural questions. Schemes have been 
allowed to proliferate. Their structural suitability for their purpose 
has - as in the Sachsenhausen case - too often been ignored. Sometimes - 
as with the Land Compensation Act - compensation can be dealt with 
administratively and the only question will be whether to provide for 
appeals. In some cases, compensation is made available to a large class 
of victims: in this case, a model like the Criminal Injuries Scheme is 
eminently suitable. In other cases,a small amount of money must be shared 
between claimants each of whom must show that he conforms to complex 
criteria: in this case, an initial judicial hearing before a tribunal 
may be essential. Just as the Franks Committee imposed a modicum of 
a 
order intq/varied system of individual' 	tribunals, so we should 
insist on rationalisation and formalisation of ex gratia payments. Over-
lapping remedies and disparate procedures need not wholly be ruled out. 
But if we do not think carefully we shall create confusion-and incidentally 
encourage tforum-shoppingt by the clever and unscrupulous. 
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Even if we envisage the administrative scheme as the normal 
method of providing compensation, this does not necessarily mean that 
the tort action can be allowed to decay, or that it should be brutally 
abolished. The central justification for every important theory of 
government liability is the protection of the individual from the power 
of the State and of its officials. It is true that we cannot at present 
demonstrate the efficiency of the tort action in providing redress in 
cases of abuse of power. On the other hand, we have not so far been 
able to devise any machinery which is noticeably superior. There are 
a few exceptional cases, as with the case of police brutality, where 
the tort action seems the best we can offer. Again, in the occasional 
case s  the tort action provides a platform for the expression of political 
views which seem unable to find expression through normal political 
channels. The fact that the levers of the civil action are operated by 
individuals rather than officials acts as a safeguard against administrative 
abuse, while the status and independence of our judiciary lessens the 
danger of party political pressure. For these reasons, we need to retain 
the tort action at least temporarily and until we feel convinced that it 
can safely be abolished. 
Retention of the existing system of shared responsibility for 
administrative liability is admittedly untidy. It is also open to the 
criticism that the lessons of history concerning the weaknesses of the 
political process have been ignored. On the other hand, the French 
experience does not suggest that the admixture can be avoided and, even 
if it could, .systematisation brings its own dangers. 
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Government liability is only the obverse side of citizens' rights. 
In defining citizens' rights solely in terms of the legal process >we 
may be guilty of confusing litigation with legality and rule of the 
law courts with the rule of law. There is no perfect solution. We 
shall have to concede that "the best solution is no more than the least 
bad. "1 
1. Groschens, "Rgflgxions sur la Dualite' de Juri. dictions", A.J.D.A. 1963 
P.536 , 539. 
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note 3 	should. read: "op cit p. 352" 
p. /1 note 1 	should read: "See H.C. Deb 1 Apr. 1977 cols 829 and 833 
(debate concerning compensation for wrongful imprisonment 
in the Glastonbury and Long cases); H.C. Deb 22 May 1977 cols 
1243-54 (Case of Tanya Price (Whooping Cough Vaccination)); 
H.C. Deb 7 Mar 1977 cols 11143-57 (Case of constituent Who 
had to use a nursing home because no hospital bed was 
available; no award) 
p. 93 note 1 	substitute: Vicar of Writtle v. Essex C.C. (1979) 77 LGR 656 
and p. 279 note (Forbes J) 
p. 292 	text 3rd line from bottom: for 'Watchford Festival Case' read 
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and note 2 Insert: Annual Report for 1977, H.C. 157 (1977-78) and case 
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